Ryan
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Post by Ryan on Sept 20, 2009 15:27:46 GMT -6
Ryan, I am not sure of the name of the battle (Civil War) that both Custer and Yates pulled off that move--However, it was in "Custer Victorious"--I will look for it again when I rerturn home and get the book. I remembered it when I read that somewhere a Cheyeene woman re-tells a story that she shot a leading officer off his horse at a ford. The remaining soldiers jumped off their horses, surronded the wounded officer, took him from the river (where he fell after being shot) dragged him off and left. For years everyone thought that the woman meant ford "B" and that the story must have been fabricated. However, it now appears that it could have happened at ford "D". Again, this could account for the unexplained 20 minute delay--a story that continues to pop up. If this did occur, then it explaines the delay as stated in my eariler post. Matter of fact, it puts a vast majority of unexplained moves in perspective (including the south skirmish line debacle). For years I have jumped back and forth between my two aforementioned theories--Custer going to LSH to protect his flank while waiting for Benteen, and the two ford attack theory. HELP! AZ's point about the type of warfare is a totally relevant point, but I think the experience at Cedar Creek could have had some bearing on the game plan at LBH, especially since Yates and Custer were veterans together...Makes things move much smoother if its the same players playing the same play, even if it is a different game. I'd like to read more about Custer and Yates at Cedar Creek, to learn more about that. I think F Company and HQ winding up on LSH was not initially planned for defensive - there are some Indian accounts that suggest Custer had to fight his way up the hill. I think he may have been trying to link up with Keogh and was moving over LSH when he was stopped, after which a [brief] resistance was offered from that location, as they very quickly became surrounded by warriors. Scott and Fox say that warriors moved from Calhoun sector to the east of LSH via Keogh sector, and also through SSL sector on the other side of LSH. Personally, I think it has more to do with the two ford theory - I believe Custer was on Cemetery Ridge with E Company, and F was held in the basin below Custer Hill, following the Ford D recon. That would explain why he even bothered moving north at all (he evidently moved at least as far as LSH with E and F as a discrete unit). Why bother? Why not establish a perimeter on Calhoun Hill, which was comparatively better ground that Last Stand Hill. And common sense says that if they are really under pressure, keep the companies closer together, rather than spread them nice and thin along a 1/2 mile long ridge.
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Ryan
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Post by Ryan on Sept 20, 2009 15:50:55 GMT -6
Again, the Washita was against one group and the 7th outnumbered them. The 7th attacked in winter when the ponies were weak and the people not much better, and the attack came at dawn while everyone was freezing. What were the results? The heroic warriors, so concerned were they for the women and children, apparently immediately bolted. As previously said, not only not fighting to the end, but not even fighting till lunch. And the cavalry apparently were unable to catch men (not all got to a pony) running in bare feet through the snow. Or follow them. Something. It took hours for Custer to get this much smaller bunch together, corral the hostages. And this at a camp of fifty odd lodges. Reliable testimony from participants, like Herendeen, put the LBH camp at 1800 lodges. But suppose he was drunk. Halve that. Only 900 lodges this time, 18 times the number in Okieville, which Custer attacks after Wheaties midway or more through a summer day when the enemy was stuffed with food, water, and weapons and had been jellin' for a while. If he had hostages at the Washita, and hostages precluded attack (that same heroic concern for their families again....) why did Custer fear attack after? Because he knew other tribes would not be so emotionally affected and surely would go for the 7th? Again, who gets to tell Gall to hold off on this revenge thing. If Custer had killed zero Indians, but just burned all their food and lodge storage, significantly reduced their pony herd, it would have been enough, given they had to feed themselves and the warriors would have to start again. Or, more likely, return to the rez. Because at some point, the women would point out all this self worship of Indian manhood was an excuse for current real life incompetence in feeding the family. Just because the rival high school has a football team, it doesn't mean all means of comparison are as nothing if you can't beat them on the field. In fact, if your school produces graduates of accomplishment who can have a life beyond, and other school's students measure everything from last game and the prom as down hill in life, you won. That's why, within increasingly broad parameters, the warrior ethic can be a hindrance, Europeans or Indian. Even with less men and greater enemy, Custer committed 25% to attack an enemy whose specific location and size he did not know. It's way too late to 'probe' or hold any sort of meeting. He had limited opportunity for surprise, and its knocking at the door was fading. Riding in near full view north to a crossing would be met by prepared opposition. Why not hit through MTCF - whatever its relationship to the village perimeter that day - to get some value from surprise and shock? Sending a probe would invite retaliation, would mandate a retreat and - if not careful - a defensive position on god awful cavalry ground. Ok, a couple of points to cover here...but thanks for the breakdown on the Washita. Certainly different circumstances, like winter, and it was certainly a smaller encampment. But one obvious point is that it was not "one" group that the 7th encountered; rather, there were multiple camps that Custer didn't know about. He thought he was up against one group, but he was not. And getting the hostages prevented hundreds of other warriors from attacking him - I think the hostages alleviated the fear of counterattack, if it did not guarantee safety. Even if Custer just went in at LBH like Yosemite Sam and burned the village and did great harm to the hostile's ability to survive outside of the rez, there would still be the immediate concern of a counterattack. Or scatteration. Even if it meant starting over, bands of Indians moving away and outside of the Bighorn Valley? Some say the encampment had as many as 8,000 inhabitants. Even if Custer destroyed, say, one of the camp circles, it might have been tough work to get away with that whilst 1500 warriors are coming back north away from Reno, screaming their heads off at ya. Point taken about probe, but I think we simply subscribe to different takes on what greeted Custer's men when they came down MTC. I don't think the resistance was as imminent as you would have it, and I personally believe most warriors at the LBH camp were either battling Reno, at the pony heard, or helping women and children flee to the north. I don't think too many were actually defending Ford B or, for that matter, points further north. Many Indian accounts describe only a handful of warriors defending MTC. I grant you that 1500 warriors didn't move as a body, and not every warrior fought both Reno and Custer. But if you accept that a relatively small body of warriors initially engaged Custer at MTC, a move to the north wasn't a way of flirting with disaster, if it was possible to believe that not too many warriors were in a position to threaten a probe to the north. That's more my take on the subject, which makes a probe not "too late" in my book. Why even bother going to Custer Ridge if under duress or anticipating great resistance? Why not hightail it back to Weir Point and the bluffs, closer to friendly units (and for that matter, friendly units moving in that direction - Benteen, Mcdougall) If there were so many warriors in the village, moving to Custer Ridge is, in itself, too far north if perceived resistance was as great as you indicate.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 20, 2009 19:02:29 GMT -6
At the Washita, it WAS one group the 7th encountered when they hit the village for the first hours. Only afterwards did neighbors of some miles distance show up. The 7th may have exchanged long range shots with some - and Elliott's group, miles away, was killed by them - but this was after the village was more or less secured and the pony slaughter was on, hostages taken.
The hostages obviously did not protect them. They so feared attack they did the head fake towards the other villages and then retreated. If hostages were any protection, it certainly wasn't obvious by their actions. In truth, other than their own Cheyenne men hesitating to attack and inadvertently kill their own, Kiowas and Arapahoes or Commanche or whatever was there probably couldn't care less if they wanted to fight. And despite everything, they sure didn't seem thrilled for a gun fight in the dead of winter anyway.
Custer's thoughts at the LBH are a puzzle, and he was such a predictable and reliable performer I suspect he was hurt early. I truly don't think he thought in terms of a counterattack, given he thought they'd split and that without most of their ponies, at least initially. To be doubted he pictured all the warriors fighting to the end. He wouldn't have moved on them if he did.
We have too many accounts saying that there were plenty of Indians for both Reno and Custer, and it's not at all sure most of the Indians ever were with Reno.
I don't think too many were actually defending Ford B either, as all accounts suggest, but it only takes one to hit the guys in the lead, where Custer would be in any attack, reliving his years as a 2nd Lt.
If there was nobody much at MTC, riding for two to four miles as the crow flies depending on hypothetical ford location, in full view as an incitement, surrendering all surprise and shock, this would grant an advantage of, eh, what? A probe for the sake of a probe?
"Why even bother going to Custer Ridge if under duress or anticipating great resistance?" If under duress, because you have no say about it. I don't think they did go to Custer Ridge with an eye to defense.
Weir Point is a terrible defensive place. No cover, surrounded by lots of cover for the Sioux, much like Custer Hill. High ground without cover surrounded by superior forces with both protection and cover is a bad idea. I don't think the 7th was in proactive mode after MTC.
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Ryan
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Post by Ryan on Sept 20, 2009 20:27:35 GMT -6
At the Washita, it WAS one group the 7th encountered when they hit the village for the first hours. Only afterwards did neighbors of some miles distance show up. The 7th may have exchanged long range shots with some - and Elliott's group, miles away, was killed by them - but this was after the village was more or less secured and the pony slaughter was on, hostages taken. The hostages obviously did not protect them. They so feared attack they did the head fake towards the other villages and then retreated. If hostages were any protection, it certainly wasn't obvious by their actions. In truth, other than their own Cheyenne men hesitating to attack and inadvertently kill their own, Kiowas and Arapahoes or Commanche or whatever was there probably couldn't care less if they wanted to fight. And despite everything, they sure didn't seem thrilled for a gun fight in the dead of winter anyway. Custer's thoughts at the LBH are a puzzle, and he was such a predictable and reliable performer I suspect he was hurt early. I truly don't think he thought in terms of a counterattack, given he thought they'd split and that without most of their ponies, at least initially. To be doubted he pictured all the warriors fighting to the end. He wouldn't have moved on them if he did. We have too many accounts saying that there were plenty of Indians for both Reno and Custer, and it's not at all sure most of the Indians ever were with Reno. I don't think too many were actually defending Ford B either, as all accounts suggest, but it only takes one to hit the guys in the lead, where Custer would be in any attack, reliving his years as a 2nd Lt. If there was nobody much at MTC, riding for two to four miles as the crow flies depending on hypothetical ford location, in full view as an incitement, surrendering all surprise and shock, this would grant an advantage of, eh, what? A probe for the sake of a probe? "Why even bother going to Custer Ridge if under duress or anticipating great resistance?" If under duress, because you have no say about it. I don't think they did go to Custer Ridge with an eye to defense. Weir Point is a terrible defensive place. No cover, surrounded by lots of cover for the Sioux, much like Custer Hill. High ground without cover surrounded by superior forces with both protection and cover is a bad idea. I don't think the 7th was in proactive mode after MTC. On the first point, I don't know if the hostages genuinely protected Custer, or if they did more so than the winter weather. But I think that was the perceived idea at the time, and it was a part of his strategy. Otherwise, why bother corralling the women and children at all? Why not just burn the camp and leave the NDNs to their own survival? The hostages facilitated the retreat. It is obvious in that the warriors did not pursue Custer's column. Yeah, it was dead winter, but why bother feigning at attack if fear of counterattack wasn't relevant? Hostages prevented pursuit. Actually, I am curious to know how you would describe Custer as "predictable." His military record would suggest capriciousness before predictability. Whether it was leading 7th michigan against Stuart's column at Gettysburg (heavily outnumbered) or Trevilian Station, or...any number of examples that demonstrate more audacity than can be ascribed to any measure of predictable military behavior. I guess the audacity itself might be considered predicable, but his choice of tactics were more "spur" of the moment (I enjoy bad puns). I never said all the Indians were with Reno. But it is plausible that if not all of the Indians were with Reno, they were not initially in a position to defend against Custer's unexpected move at MTC. That's important, because if Custer DID move north, he would not have anticipated any resistance, and for that matter, resistance would have taken time to accumulate. Why, might I ask, do you think they went to Custer Ridge, then? Care to share? To me, if the men were routed in MTC (like Pennington would have it), they would flee towards the closest place for support. That support didn't exist on Custer Ridge. It is far away from friendly forces. Battle Ridge wasn't chosen for defense, but as a rendezvous point with Keogh's wing; the ridge did have a rather good view of the valley floor, which would have given Custer a rather nice view of the overall non-com situation there. What a great time for Mitch Bouyer to nudge Custer on the elbow and say, "hey, what about that buffalo crossing yonder?" I never said that they would have used Weir Point for defense, either. I'm saying Weir Point was closer to friendly forces, and Custer had just traversed that area en route to MTC. Why not flee there if Custer were wounded, or resistance were deemed too high? Makes no sense whatsoever to flee to a ridge further north, and further away from friendly forces. Unless, of course, you were still thinking offensively. That early on, the cavalry forces could have gone back the way they came, or at the very least, go to Nye/Cartwright Ridge where Keogh was. Instead, both wings go to a ridge farther away from Reno and Benteen, four miles away. Even some warrior accounts remark on the time that elapsed, and allude to the possibility of escape; Two Moons pondered why the men didn't go back the way they came (south), and says they could have but by the time fighting on LSH occurred, it was too late.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 21, 2009 6:37:11 GMT -6
At Washita from the start of the attack to the first appearance of the other Indians was a much longer time. Even if mounted the winter horse was not very good for combat. The conditioning could be such that running off the last of the horses fat could kill it further into the winter.
If it was truly a surprise to most of the village then I would expect only about 1/3 of the warriors to get ready in the first half hour. After that time I believe the rest of the warriors got ready and the hesitant ones realized they were going to win and joined in the battle.
Once Custer moved across MTC and did not cross MTF the majority of the Indians that did not go after Reno made it impossible for Custer to get back. They pursued him and forced him to retreat and go on defense.
Custer or whomever was in charge of the battalion did not realize the determination of the Indians for there is no example of the 5 companies taking a mutually supporting defensive position.
One should take serious Benteen's description of the battlefield. It would appear that they were overwhelmed and close quarter battle determined the outcome.
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Post by clw on Sept 21, 2009 7:32:42 GMT -6
. But I think that was the perceived idea at the time, and it was a part of his strategy. Otherwise, why bother corralling the women and children at all? Why not just burn the camp and leave the NDNs to their own survival? I wasn't about perception or strategy. Sheridan's specific orders directed him to capture the women and children.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 21, 2009 9:42:39 GMT -6
R,
As I said, I don't think they 'went' by decision to Custer Ridge; they were driven there, and were precluded from return. It's logical to suspect the entire five cos. went down MTC for a bit, were blunted, Keogh took his three back to high ground when it looked like they'd be caught in a gully, parallelled Yates' guys as they were driven north, periodically providing covering fire, increasingly under attack themselves. I suspect the blunt was occassioned by a Custer, possibly the Custer, being wounded, and the actual as opposed to the official chain of command took over, the point and inevitable result of nepotism.
Which is to say family and friends decided to get the wounded to high ground and perceived safety. Units flensed off to provide cover were subsumed in sequence, and as they summited LSH the officers (who'd be in front) were shot from their horses. Everyone down, it was a short fight. Keogh may never have known what happened or why they were not reuniting with Reno.
As you say, reuniting the command was the wisest choice, but one not open to him after MTC. There were small parties on the east bank before Custer showed up.
He had orders for the civvies at Washita, which granted him no protection, and it's to be doubted he'd try the immeasurably larger task at LBH with fewer men than he had in 1868. There's no real 'mystery' here. Custer possibly could not see the entire village through smoke and dust, thought it was empty in the parts he could see anyway, thought he could give support to Reno before he actually could, did not think the Indians would swarm to him but rather flee. He was driven along the path nature dictated for the road from MTC to the square mile border, where he remet Keogh's guys, and by the time they strung out along the ridge, were surrounded, had no cover, were dead in the water.
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Post by bc on Sept 21, 2009 10:02:44 GMT -6
If all five companies went down MTC and were driven back, the only logical way to make it work would be for the lead companies to be driven back up Deep Coulee on the north side of Butler Ridge and the remaining companies to be driven back up MTC on the south side of Butler Ridge. Chasing NAs up MTC and NAs coming over Bouyer's bluff would prevent the soldiers from moving south and confine them at Luce & NC ridges. Chasing NAs up Deep Coulee forced those soldiers to veer towards Calhoun Hill. With the bulk of the NA pressure coming up MTC and the soldiers going up Deep Coulee being separated from the others, those on Luce & NC ridges move north as well. With the NAs moving north to places like Deep Ravine to flank the soldiers, the soldiers have to keep moving to protect their flank and try to outflank the NAs in a leapfrogging flanking action moving north.
Not my present model but one of many that is workable.
bc
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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 21, 2009 10:13:24 GMT -6
The only thing that recommends "my" theory is that it accepts logical and utterly understandable reaction (rather than implausible proaction) from both sides, covers all found evidence (which suggested a mess), doesn't violate the known Custer, and doesn't require untrained for intricacy by soldiers or Indians.
If the 7th was going to "wait" for anyone, highly dubious, best do it south of MTC and put someone on Weir Pt. to direct the others. If they were going to attack, do it while you had some surprise and momentum. They did none of these logical things because they could not.
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Post by tonypag7 on Oct 2, 2009 11:36:26 GMT -6
For what it's worth, I would like to add my theory into this mix (if it is ok with others). As far as Custer waiting for Benteen--I think that is percisly what he did. You don't send for someone and tell him to "come quick"indicating exergent circumsatnces and then leave the area so he cannot find you. I believe Custer entered MTC, saw how large the village really was and sent Martin back for Benteen. Custer may have been planning to attack via ford "B" as soon as Benteen arrived--which he thought would be quick. Now in the meantime, if your planning to attack via ford "B" any Commander worth his salt would send a recon. company down to test the crossing (i.e. depth of water, type of groung under water, strength of enemy etc.). When Custer saw from his viewpoint, warriors comming from the pony heard (north),warriors returning from the valley (whuich he could see from his high viewpoint on Cartwright/Luce) and now warriors comming in from Wier Hill area, he finnaly realized something was amiss. He recalled the recon. company and headed to Calhoun (why--I have no idea. Maybe a better defense) While on Calhoun, and still waiting for Benteen, he may have seen warriors comming out of Deep Ravine and decided to take two companies to the higher hill (LSH) to protect his flank, while the remaning stood their ground on Calhoun--still hoping for Benteen to show. Now I know this theory leaves much to debate, but isn't that why we are here? by the way--this theory is only one of two that I propound. The other is Custer at ford "D" and being mortaly wounded there.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Oct 2, 2009 16:28:23 GMT -6
1. True, you don't send for someone and tell him to "come quick" and bolt, and Custer did not. The message is 'be quick.' Here's the difference:
Get ready for school; be quick.
Get ready for school; come quick.
In the first, do the thing and be quick about it. No mention or need of reporting to the parents.
In the second, do the thing AND THEN come here to us. But Custer didn't say that.
Come forward with the train to the area of action where it can be accessed, be quick as possible but it's on your head, now. We know the inherent joys, but it's a big village. See ya later. Nothing abnormal implied or stated, no fear.
The insistence we pretend the note says "come quick", a falsehood, is the sine qua non of the Custerphile.
2. It's exigent, the definition of which the message fails to meet. It doesn't request aid. It doesn't suggest much emotion at all, except excitement. Not fear or concern.
3. Custer would go to high ground to see, and from Weir Point all of the village was visible, and if it was just Sharpshooter, much of it was. He would not increase his vision from anywhere within MTC.
4. Having already ordered an attack, any commander worth his salt would not suddenly discover the benefits of discretion and further divide his command by a scouting party, knowing full well it would attract more than comment from his adversaries. Besides which, he has actual native scouts on high ground already. Revealing himself and then retreating, or puttering north, would sooner than later mandate either a retreat or a disaster.
5. ".... he finnaly realized something was amiss. He recalled the recon. company and headed to Calhoun (why--I have no idea. Maybe a better defense) While on Calhoun, and still waiting for Benteen, he may have seen warriors comming out of Deep Ravine and decided to take two companies to the higher hill (LSH) to protect his flank, while the remaning stood their ground on Calhoun--still hoping for Benteen to show."
He finally realized something was amiss, did he? No. It's cavalry. If you're going to wait for Benteen, wait at Weir Point where he can see you and you him and elevate his awareness with a plan. But once seen, Custer has to attack or reassemble but keep moving, once all surprise and shock is lost once the village sees him. Don't stop. I don't think he would, and that's why I think an attack at Ford B was aborted because one of the Custer's was wounded. If THE Custer, he doesn't surrender command, and the actual command structure of family and clique takes over as, be honest, was the point and the assumption at need for having it.
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Post by cefil on Oct 2, 2009 17:10:32 GMT -6
Here's the difference: Get ready for school; be quick.
Get ready for school; come quick.In the first, do the thing and be quick about it. No mention or need of reporting to the parents. But if you look at the note in full, isn't it more like a teacher saying: The test is starting...be quick...bring your no. 2 pencils.
That certainly seems to involve more of "quickly bring them here to where I am" than you're willing to credit. The word used was, after all, "bring" as in "bring them here" not "take" as in "take them somewhere else." ( Bring being -- as I'm sure you realize -- the causative transitive form of come, just as take is the causative transitive form of go.) cefil (not the causative transitive form of anything)
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Post by sherppa on Oct 4, 2009 8:12:07 GMT -6
The message by Benteen's translation is:
"Benteen, Come on. Big Village. Be Quick. Bring Packs. P.S. Bring Packs. W.W. Cooke"
I fail to see the need for explanation.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Oct 4, 2009 8:31:33 GMT -6
The need is because Custerphiles insist the note says "come quick", which it certainly does not, and in putting "come quick" in quotes for emphasis and repeating it in the hope the plantlife will accept it as true - which, again, it is not - or at least accept the Custerphile fabrication on this point as innocent and trivial, which isn't true on either count. Sorry you are unable to discern the difference between 'be' and 'come', but the language makes the distinction, and there is an obvious chosen option in inference as the example shows.
There is no call specifically for "ammo," either, and there is no requested continuation of the day's unfortunate habit of subdividing the already insufficient regiment into smaller, bite size units by dividing the train. The note does no more than say "It's on! Take charge of the train, hustle up and take part and make sure the train arrives safely where the regiment can access it." The remarks, well attested, of Kanipe and Martin did not wobble those logical conclusions.
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Post by BrokenSword on Oct 4, 2009 8:41:12 GMT -6
sherppa
The problems and debates arise when people quote that message incorrectly.
'Come on' is often misquoted as 'Come quick' and,
'Be quick. Brings packs. P.S. Bring pac(k)s.' is clearly showing an emphasis on the packs (presumably extra ammo packs), and not on speed alone, as the misquoted 'Come quick' implies.
BS
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