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Post by clw on Sept 16, 2009 11:24:37 GMT -6
bc, I misssed your post before I posted mine. Although I do think Boyer was pretty familiar with the area, there was a definate buffalo trail crossing at a northern ford. Philo Clark's map even shows it as such. Hope I answered the rest of your questions.
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Post by George Mabry on Sept 16, 2009 16:20:27 GMT -6
clw,
The reason I don’t like the “five company reverse flow” hasn’t got anything to do with tactics. Almost all the Indian accounts I’ve read pick up the flow of battle from MTC or NC ridge to Calhoun ridge/hill. At least one body of troops never left that area. The Indians have this group stopping, fighting and dying at that location.
I don’t know how you feel about the Indian accounts but I like them. There are plenty of problems with the accounts but I think there is a lot that can be learned from them. This initial flow of battle is one of them.
I’m not saying that a reverse flow didn’t occur at some point in the fight. I just don’t think it involved all five companies. At least one group of soldiers remained around the Calhoun Hill vicinity and never went farther north.
Your theory, or something similar, is something I considered with the exception that I dropped off at least a company or two on Calhoun ridge. I ended up dismissing it because it would mean Custer was on the offensive and I don’t think he was. If he wouldn’t/couldn’t attack at MTC with five companies, I don’t think he would have done it farther downstream with less men and less surprise.
A reverse flow does have some merit. Look at that mass of headstones on LSH. With everything that was going on across the river and with Indians coming up Deep Ravine and all points west, would you want to stop there? Would you pick that place to make a stand? I don’t think so. In brief, if you set up on the western slope of LSH/ridge (where the headstones are located) you’re going to be receiving fire from 180 degrees to your front and you don’t have cover one. Common sense tells you to cross over the hill/ridge and use the ridge as cover while you fire back to the west. But what happens if things are just as hot on the east side of the hill as on the west side? In that case you LEAVE. It doesn’t matter if you’ve already lost all your horses. You LEAVE. It doesn’t matter if you have no where to go. You LEAVE. You’ve got to find a place from which you can make a defense. Some Indian accounts have soldiers doing just that when they charged down off LSH. Sure, any maneuver from that point on might be futile but I would try something and I think they would have too.
This is where I kind of like the “Custer wounded” scenario. What if, during a reverse flow, Custer (and most likely some others as well) is shot off his horse while crossing the western slope of LSH (enroute to Keogh?). That might bring the entire group (your choice on what companies you want to involve here) to a halt and account for some grouping of bodies. Disorganization and despair may have caused the remainder to have stayed at that exposed position long enough to account for more groupings of bodies.
I don’t think Custer’s group would have just been sitting there when he was shot. He would have been on the move. I don’t think he was enroute north because I think troops were in Cemetery ridge area for a period of time and he probably would have been with them. So that leaves him coming back the other way when he’s unhorsed. I don’t know. By this point there is so much guesswork going on that I've lost confidence in any conclusions I might draw, so I just stop, prop my feet up, and watch the latest edition of Whacked out Sports. WTF
George
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Post by bc on Sept 16, 2009 17:01:46 GMT -6
Ok, you two have me thinking again.
Assuming troops were on Cemetery Ridge, they would be key to holding any NAs, such as Crazy Horse, from looping around through the ravine that runs on the north side of the present day cemetery and NPS complex and to the north side of LSH and then around to the Northeast of LSH. Once troops were forced off of Cemetery ridge back to LSH, assuming they had much ammo left, there were no clear fields of fire from LSH to stop the NAs from going around through that ravine. My understanding of the new NA monument north of LSH is a location where some of the NAs died. That had any escape routes to the north and east cut off. That would help explain Custer shooting his ring of horses at the eastern edge of LSH. At the time of Custer's arrival at LSH is primary pressure may have been from the north and east as he still had Co. E dropped off at the head of Deep Ravine to keep the the NAs in check for a while until they swarmed.
Then if we have many NAs that swarmed up Deep Coulee, passed by Henryville below Calhoun, and circled around to the Eastern Ridge and adjacent coulee, they just flanked Calhoun and have Keogh and Co. I boxed in and the entire Custer battalion surrounded. I never placed many NAs as having moved up Deep Coulee around the east side of Calhoun and circling around to the east but I want to examine the NA accounts to determine the feasibility of such.
That brings up my other thought. We all seem to assume that the last soldiers who jumped up and ran from LSH were going to Deep Ravine. What if the NAs that made those sightings were actually on the east side of Battle Ridge? They could be talking about the string of dead between LSH and Keogh possibly or for that matter they could be talking about the remnants of Calhoun hill running towards Keogh. Might be worth examining those NA accounts and their battlefield movements.
Food for thought and to help an extreme diet. George, I'm with you on this guesswork stuff. But all we can do is keep throwing guesses up against the wall and see if any sticks. There is still hope that a logical conclusion may yet stick.
bc
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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 16, 2009 17:34:50 GMT -6
You have the issue of the coagulation of officers, and they on the rim, not the center, of a supposed defensive position. Not with organized companies, either. Contentions of a "ring" of horses are dubious, like the lots of ammo reported at Calhoun's position by his brother-in-law, possibly the sole source or an agreed upon story like Keogh and Custer's mutilation escape. Maggie Custer (a husband, three brothers, a nephew) had to have been a concern. Give her something. Further, when arranged by photo and testimony, they were much more scattered on LSH and 20% fewer than the fence now encloses.
That supports the view they were shot about the same time and dropped where they were found. Or what? Sequentially running to near the same point to see what was wrong?
It's a bad defensive position, and the top of the ridge is too wide to shoot over it or use as a wall and is totally exposed to the north and east. This would be apparent from Keogh's site, which is why an unknowing approach from the west would partially excuse that assumption.
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Post by shan on Sept 16, 2009 17:37:46 GMT -6
George, Like you I to believe that the Indian accounts indicate that a number of soldiers stopped on Calhoun for whatever reason; probably on Findley as well, and that they fought, and were finally overwhelmed there. The Indian accounts further describe the survivors fleeing as they tried to try reach those in the swale behind the hill, and that the fight then became the famous buffalo hunt, part of which involved some hand to hand fighting.
That is of course only a broad outline of what they had to say, and whilst I know DC will probably dismiss these accounts with all the reasons he usually throws up, allowing for all the problems that are indeed inherent in the Indian accounts, I find a level of consistency in these reports, reports which come from from quite a number of witnesses, many of whom fought in that sector, whatsmore, I'd say one gets the same sort of general consistency in the numerous reports concerning a number of men fleeing LSH sometime towards the end of the battle.
I also have to say that it seems to me that had there been any dead men or horses from E or F companies lying around either Calhoun, Findley, or indeed in the swale, that someone would have mentioned it. Yes the bodies were difficult to identify, but if you read Hardorffs book about the identification of the dead, I think many more were identified than we tend to think. Besides, even a few dead grey horses would have been very noticeable, { I believe Benteen said there were more dead horses around Calhoun than on LSH,} and had they been there, they would have; in my opinion, surely been a cause for comment.
So where does that leave us? Three companies left at Calhoun and two moving further North before the fighting got serious enough to demand that they stay behind and get involved. Like many of you I can't believe Custer planned any kind of move across the river, and as you so rightly point out, if he couldn't attack across MTF with 5 companies why would he imagine he could do it at ford D with 2?
We further know that a few men from the three companies left at Calhoun were found amongst the dead on or around LSH, which indicates that they fled there after their own position fell, so the traditional pattern of the battle is further reinforced by that, i e. that the fight around LSH and deep ravine happened after Calhoun collapsed, probably beginning shortly after Keogh was killed and his men fled North.
But this doesn't leave us with anything but guesses as to where, and what Custer and the two companies were up after they left Calhoun. The lack of bodies and dead horses on Cemetery ridge indicates that if they were there, then they weren't there long enough to take any casualties. Likewise the theory that there was a SSL. Given that most of us accept that the number of bodies that were described as being found stringing down from LSH tallies with accounts of at least one group, if not two, fleeing the hill, then if there was a SSL, this fight too must have been very brief with virtually no casualties.
That Custers force must have been moving back towards LSH, maybe to try and relieve the pressure on Keogh, when something dramatic occurred, something fairly catastrophic, something along the lines of DC's 'shot off their horses as they crested the ridge,' seems to be the most likely scenario, and here once again I find myself agreeing with George, nobody in their right mind would have chosen to stop and dismount, and then try defend that open slope unless they had reached the end of the line and had nowhere left to go.
Shan
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Post by George Mabry on Sept 16, 2009 18:21:05 GMT -6
BC,
I guess a big part of trying to determine why that group of soldiers clustered on LSH is making assumptions on what was going on around them at the time. You might be right about the western slope being the safest place around at the time they stopped there. Realizing it still just amounts to guesswork, I would think that for every Indian that swung the loop around to the east side, there were at least two Indians that went at the troopers from the west. The Indian warriors mentality would be to keep themselves between the village and the soldiers…maybe.
Another thing that causes me problems is that I’m prone to account for too many bodies on LSH. I don’t think it’s possible that 40-50 soldiers hunkered down in an area with no cover and remained there until they were all slaughtered. Some of those markers are spurious. But how many? Archeology isn’t going to help us there either. With all the bone scattering that went on that first year, I wouldn’t be surprised to find that a human bone can be found within any three foot square on that hillside.
You make a good point that the Indian accounts might have been misinterpreted. Many of the interpreters probably interjected their own concept of the battle in with the Indian’s narrative. In almost all these accounts you have to think “could this action have occurred at a different point on the battlefield?” I’ve read some accounts that start with the action moving from MTC to Calhoun Hill. The narrative goes on about the fighting there and suddenly the action ends on LSH. Were they talking about LSH all along? It gets confusing and I find myself reaching for the remote control. But I still like them. Especially those like Godfrey’s account after he talked to Gall. They were standing on the ground with Gall pointing out who went where.
Don’t let my pessimism dampen your enthusiasm. I like reading your theories.
George
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Post by George Mabry on Sept 16, 2009 19:07:59 GMT -6
That Custers force must have been moving back towards LSH, maybe to try and relieve the pressure on Keogh, when something dramatic occurred, something fairly catastrophic... Shan Hello Shan, I enjoy reading your posts. I especially like your respect for the Indian accounts. Troublesome as they are, they are accounts by the only eye witnesses we have and I believe that for the most part, they were telling the truth as they saw it. The problems arise of course from the interpretations of what they said. I honestly don't have any expectations of myself or anyone on this board solving the mystery of what happened after Custer entered MTC. The time for finding the answers to those questions has long since past. But I do think we can each determine to our own satisfaction "what didn't happen." That may not sound like much but it's a big step forward in this case. Here are just a few of the things I'm fairly convinced didn't happen: 1. Custer went north with two companies to find a suitable ford. 2. Custer went north with two companies to stop the downriver flight of the non-combatants. 3. Custer's movements north of Calhoun hill were geared in part to hostage taking. George
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Post by Melani on Sept 16, 2009 20:19:56 GMT -6
...an agreed upon story like Keogh and Custer's mutilation escape. Custer I can understand--spare Libbie's feeling and all. But why do you think they would make that up about Keogh? His relatives were mostly in Ireland and not known to the regiment, and the descriptions of other mutilations, like Tom Custer's, were pretty graphic. Were there any others who were reported as not mutilated?
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Post by bc on Sept 16, 2009 22:10:25 GMT -6
George said: "Don’t let my pessimism dampen your enthusiasm. I like reading your theories."
Then George said: "Here are just a few of the things I'm fairly convinced didn't happen:
1. Custer went north with two companies to find a suitable ford.
2. Custer went north with two companies to stop the downriver flight of the non-combatants.
3. Custer's movements north of Calhoun hill were geared in part to hostage taking.
George"
My response in my humble opinion is:
Here are just a few of the things I'm fairly convinced "possibly did" happen:
1. Custer went north with two companies to find a suitable ford.
2. Custer went north with two companies to stop the downriver flight of the non-combatants.
3. Custer's movements north of Calhoun hill were geared in part to hostage taking.
George, at least we can agree that Custer went north with 2 or more companies. What he did when he went north is the 2 dollar question and they quit printing 2 dollar bills so we will never know.
bc
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Post by bc on Sept 16, 2009 22:26:56 GMT -6
I always hesitate, George, to conjecture tactics with, well, guys like you who know your business. But WTH, here's what could have happened..... Sadee, you've always participated some with the tactics. You and Zekesgirl and a few others seem ready to dig into those things. Glad to have ya. There are some present and former female members with thousands of posts to their credit and virtual experts on Custer who don't seem to have a battle theory they are willing to discuss which was and is kinda disappointing to me. After all, isn't that what we are here for? I suspect they could tell us what color of panties that Libbie wore (that's common knowledge) but that doesn't solve the battle mystery. Besides anyone can read and learn tactics, it doesn't require a military background to understand those things. Most cavalry tactics requires more knowledge of horses than about anything else. Ride a few horses and watch a few John Ford movies, and before you know it, you can be my kind of cavalry expert. bc
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Post by George Mabry on Sept 17, 2009 6:49:57 GMT -6
Ying,
If we all thought alike, these boards wouldn't be very interesting would they?
Yang
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Post by clw on Sept 17, 2009 8:10:25 GMT -6
Thanks for the encouragment, bc. I imagine dragging this dog and pony show to a weekend horseshow is very like deploying a battalion. MOVE! is my favorite word. It can even be said in two syllables and at various decibles to two legged and four legged alike.
George and Shan shamed me into reviewing NDN accounts. They were the first thing I ever read about the battle but since I know so much more now, a review was in order. So I picked up Lakota Noon last night and read through 2/3 of them , skipping Michno's commentary. He does a lot of paraphrasing and I think he has many things in the wrong place in his timeline, but at least most of what they said is in one book. I also have an unpublished Mnicoujou account that is very detailed.
There are two schools of thought on 'fords'....
1. There was heavy fighting at the ford. These are mostly Cheyenne accounts and some Mnicoujou (the Lakota who were most closely aligned with the Cheyenne)
2. Custer never got near the river. He basically took a look and moved on.
This obviously (to me) indicates these are two different incidents at two different fords and that the heavy fighting occured at Ford D. Remember the Cheyenne camps were at the northern end.
Shan wrote:
I don't think this negates a reverse flow. There aren't any references to when this happened in the battle except that some accounts mention this coincided with engagement at the north end of the ridge. I was careful not to accept any naming of geopgraphic features (refernces to Medicine Tail, etc.) as these were obviously hardly ever part of NDN accounts.
The reverse flow (it has a name now -- progress!) is pretty much based on JSIT, especially his American Heritage article in 1966. Many here have said he's the only one having much to say about anything happening at Ford D, but I found many Cheyenne accounts that seem to support this.
When I finished reading tonight, I'll be back.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 17, 2009 8:15:33 GMT -6
There were a lot of Catholics in the 7th. Guessing that Calhoun and his family were among them, and Mathey as brother in law as well. If Keogh wore the medals, which we're told were left on his corpse, and he wasn't mutilated, all would follow. If however, he had been squashed like TWC, the tale might arise anyway to grant power to the Pope's medals or to prevent assumption that they were weak medicine. It's probably important to know when these stories became public, as opposed to being written down in private correspondence.
Godfrey lied at first, saying Custer wasn't mutilated and others were not as well. Later, only Custer escaped mutilation, thus casting Keogh into the blender. After La Custer died, they ALL had been mutilated, probably closest to the truth.
These represent Greater Truths than reality allows, and it was not uncommon for these truths to find expression in tribute to battle deaths.
Mostly agree with Mabry's points. In general, the impetus to keep Custer on the offensive way beyond partial sense gets silly fast.
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Post by clw on Sept 17, 2009 9:26:34 GMT -6
Here are just a few of the things I'm fairly convinced didn't happen: 1. Custer went north with two companies to find a suitable ford. 2. Custer went north with two companies to stop the downriver flight of the non-combatants. 3. Custer's movements north of Calhoun hill were geared in part to hostage taking. George 1. Obviously, I agree. But 2 and 3..... If we accept the premise that Custer's biggest concern was the NDNs fleeing, escaping, etc. -- an almost universally accepted tenant, then why is his move north not related to some kind of containment? He could see the mass exodus. And why is there so much doubt as to him being on the offensive, at least early on as he moved down battle ridge? The MTC/MTF doesn't nessarily mean he tried and failed there. Only that he looked the situtuation over. What am I missing here?
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Post by markland on Sept 17, 2009 9:49:21 GMT -6
Here are just a few of the things I'm fairly convinced didn't happen: 1. Custer went north with two companies to find a suitable ford. 2. Custer went north with two companies to stop the downriver flight of the non-combatants. 3. Custer's movements north of Calhoun hill were geared in part to hostage taking. George 1. Obviously, I agree. But 2 and 3..... If we accept the premise that Custer's biggest concern was the NDNs fleeing, escaping, etc. -- an almost universally accepted tenant, then why is his move north not related to some kind of containment? He could see the mass exodus. And why is there so much doubt as to him being on the offensive, at least early on as he moved down battle ridge? The MTC/MTF doesn't nessarily mean he tried and failed there. Only that he looked the situtuation over. What am I missing here? Finally, an thread about the battle!!! CLW, just my uninformed opinion but knowing: 1) of GAC's historical tendencies, i.e., aggressiveness to the point of being overly aggressive 2) cavalry wasn't much use as a defensive force and 3) Indians tended to scatter when their village was attacked; I believe that GAC still had offense in mind. To me then the crux of the matter is where did the village end? If it ended at or upstream of MTC, why not attack there? To me, the only answer would be that the village extended downstream more than most give credit to. If that was the case, I can understand a reconnaissance in force with a view of attacking from the north end and having Keogh's command join. Also, remember there were three companies supposedly on the way to add even more impetus to any charge. Just my two cents worth. Billy
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