jody
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Posts: 53
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Post by jody on Sept 15, 2009 10:42:16 GMT -6
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jody
Junior Member
Posts: 53
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Post by jody on Sept 15, 2009 11:21:01 GMT -6
SOP for crossing a river, road, trail, etc.
As I recall, the SOP or Standard Operating Procedure, (simplified) went something like this:
1. Reconissance of the area.
2. Securing the near bank (if a river)
3. Securing the far bank.
4. Then moving the Main Body across.
Jody
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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 15, 2009 11:29:08 GMT -6
Only a civvy, so vets correct me, but........
It sounds pretty useless unless there is A (as in one-1) front. It makes no sense when taking fire from the flank, much less when near surrounded. Like Sgt. York's routine, just picked off in sequence as in that trench. I can understand that volleys from a firing line can break up a charge coming at you, but if surrounded by guys with cover or protection, you're just giving them a stationary target standing against the sky.
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Post by sherppa on Sept 15, 2009 12:11:20 GMT -6
Don't know where the military types went. No one has even identified WMRH's gun for me. Can you believe it? clw, check the thread, I think BrokenSword is right about it being a Snider carbine. But as stated on the thread, how did it get in WMRH's hands.
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jody
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Posts: 53
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Post by jody on Sept 15, 2009 12:15:08 GMT -6
Not quite sure what you are referencing in the first part of your post. Probably my confusion.
When fighting on a hill or ridge, the position of troops is along the "military crest" not silhouetted against the sky.
The "Military Crest" is defined as downslope of the true crest far enough so that you aren't against the sky.
(I am very sure of this, having positioned my people on a crest in training and being roundly chewed out for doing so!)
This placement on the military crest, does a couple of things:
Against an enemy advancing from the bottom of the hill, he (the enemy) must expose his whole body to engage the troops above him. (This works better if there is a parapet or something in front of the defender up on the hill.)
Being below the true crest, the hill behind provides both "cover" - which is anything that is between you and the bullets: and "concealment" - which is anything that prevents the enemy from seeing you and shooting you.
One reason that I see the SSL as an intended position rather than as a line of fleeing troupers, is that they are placed on the NW (towards the cemetary) side of that ridge, slightly downslope. (As you can imagine, prone or kneeling troops need to be less downslope from the true crest for protection than someone mounted.) Conz's nice illustration on another thread aside - where he has the fire of the company there on SSL going towards Deep Ravine, that position on the NW slope shows the axis of fire to be opposite of that. (The axis of fire is considered to be normal to the long axis of the troops.) Note the few markers on the DR side of the ridge, horseholders?
How do I see this applying to Cemetary Ridge? If a detachment was returning from a Northern foray and being pressed, placing people on the SSL could cover their withdrawl.
Members of that group could join them on the SSL or continue up to LSH.
Jody
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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 15, 2009 15:01:17 GMT -6
If the first paragraph referenced is mine, I was just saying I never served in the military, so what seems logical to me is not (always) logical to those who've been there.
I was thinking more of a firing line in general than one defending a crest, and so , yes, I should have vectored in more on their just standing, whether seen against grass or sky. For Sioux hiding in grass or wherever, it had to have been a turkey shoot, especially to those enfilading that line as they climbed uphill from the MTC area. But, point taken.
It's just that all else being equal, a standing firing line against those under cover and protection makes no sense to me. I grasp the importance of volley fire impact against a body of soldiers moving against you, but that isn't the case (or only rarely the case) in Indian fighting. Godfrey actually had a front moving back to Reno Hill, something not valid four miles north, and he was backing away to avoid inevitable flank fire. In any event, there were no markers in any ravine where testimony placed the bodies, and because there is no huge discrepancy between numbers of bodies reported and the markers, 20 odd belong down there and not on the SSL, which depletes any semblance of evidence for a line, something Camp noted.
More to the point, what in the world would this northern foray accomplish? It couldn't have included enough men to panic the enemy, who enjoyed the enemy deploying in units not supporting each other. What logic is there in dedicating less and less of your force to something or other the closer you get to the enemy, slicing off units too small to even protect themselves and that's if the regiment itself wasn't too small? If Keogh's group is having an Afternoon Activity sprung on them, that's an increasing enemy presence on your six (if facing NW) and time to (well, long past time to...) reunite the command. I cannot see Custer or any of these officers doing that. He'd seen the village size, and warriors, from all accounts, used MTC like the Holland Tunnel at rush hour pretty much as soon as he left it. Whoever was in charge had to have been aware of that.
If no bodies is claimed as evidence nothing much happened at MTCF, than no bodies must also support no action in the cemetery area. If that's retracted, then we need return to MTC, and the CD's loom to explain tales of soldiers in the cemetery and/or village itself.
If that url article you posted isn't being sarcastic, then it reads like those cheerful nuclear war preparation booklets, where neighbors help each other prudently evacuate a major city within the speed limit, singing camp songs, no pushing or shoving, in the twenty minutes between launch and vaporization.
Love this, and illustrates why the Civil War is almost totally irrelevant to Indian War.
When the cavalry was dismounted, the horses were sent to the rear to take advantage of the nearest shelter from the enemy’s fire, No. 4 having no difficulty in managing the three horses entrusted to him, or in moving them from place to place at any gait. In case a retreat became necessary, portions of the dismounted men would fall back alternately, taking new positions in rear, assisted by artillery, until it was possible to mount and retire without interference; or, in other cases, some of the line would be withdrawn and mounted, and then deployed as skirmishers to cover the retreat of the remained, with mounted charges made occasionally on the flanks or front.
1. The nearest shelter - there being so many options! And no trouble handling four horses, one your own, especially if one or two are shot on your trot back.
2. Oh, bother! The enemy just WON'T go home, and keep coming. So sequentially we back up in units because they never flank us, thanks to all the artillery! In a note just handed me.......oh, dear.
3. Oh, stop whining. Just a few more miles till we can mount without interference. Then, tea!
4. Some of you mount and charge here and there, to the front, to the sides, wherever, and look good, would you? Bye. Oh, before you go, fill out these forms and don't forget to vote for me for officer of the year, would you? Good boy. Will write a moving letter to next of kin. Bye.
And I mean: Bye.
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Post by sherppa on Sept 15, 2009 16:37:29 GMT -6
I'm leaning to the SSL being a token representation of E Troop fleeing from Cemetery Ridge.
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Ryan
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Post by Ryan on Sept 15, 2009 19:21:37 GMT -6
No matter what Custer found or decided to do at the hypothetical Ford D, how would he get the info to Keogh or anyone else in time to take advantage of 'it'? It's two to four miles to Calhoun Hill, depending where it the ford is supposed, uphill. Further, does it make sense that Keogh, if left to wait for whatever reason by Custer, or if Custer stayed with Keogh (even less compatable with his personality) wouldn't see LSH as both higher and ergo better for his dubious purposes than Calhoun? The continually supposed division to places not in support of each other or even hearing or sight distance (given the dust) does not reflect well on whoever was in charge, and it's for that alone - although there's much else - I don't think Custer or any of his officers would do that. Everything east of the LBH to Custer Ridge is god awful ground (and worse beyond), and I cannot see any cavalry officer willingly going there having seen it from Weir Point, and this atop the old adages of stopped cavalry is defeated cavalry, going further from the enemy and not supporting Reno, all of that. Custer must be believed to have good intentions, and going in at MTC made the most sense today as it did then. Ford D would make sense if there was a shred of surprise possible, but they couldn't have announced themselves better with radio time and a bi-plane display sign overhead. Surprise was a ship that not only had sailed, but was taking water around Coronel. I think the idea was to place Keogh on Calhoun Hill to await Benteen's column - he would be in plain sight of Benteen's column approaching from WP. Perhaps an officer's call was given to discuss how to coordinate the wings once Benteen arrived, but I suspect Custer was locating fords, and Keogh awaited Benteen - once Benteen linked with Keogh, the command or much of the command would advance to Custer; presumably the E Company position on CR would have been an obvious reference, since Cemetery Ridge is very visible from Calhoun Hill and Ridge. That's just a theory. Also, Calhoun Hill was decidedly better for defense - it was the highest point overlooking Deep Coulee and was described as a position ideal for fighting Indians. Custer Hill was not given such favorable comments by officers who viewed the battlefield in the days after the battle. (not the highest point, narrow crest, etc.). Its why L Company manned a line at Calhoun, and E at CR - both were level positions within sight of one another, screening the flanks. The decision to divide was not an unheard of tactic - and it was Custer commanding the battalion. The guy divided his command at the Washita - the idea of striking the village from multiple directions wasn't unconventional to Custer's mind. He didn't know the lay of the terrain at the time of the battle, so without the benefit of reconnaissance he'd have to figure it out as he went. I believe Ford B was probed, but not attacked, and the whole decision to head back to Battle Ridge and (possibly) beyond was decided by the noncombatants fleeing the village towards Squaw Creek. If he crossed at MTC, he'd have left an entire passage open for noncombatants to continue fleeing, without a blocking force further north. I don't think he was chased to battle ridge, because warriors couldn't teleport from Reno to Custer. I believe the pressure took time to build. Then again, Custer's lowest grades at West Point were, ironically, in cavalry tactics. Maybe it just boils down to bad judgment.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 15, 2009 20:14:16 GMT -6
The decision to divide in the face of an enemy you outnumber, as at Washita, is different from what appeared at LBH. And no, Jackson at Chancellorsville isn't the same, either.
We know MTC was probed to one degree or another, how far they got is open to supposition only. Having been to Weir Point, Custer'd seen enough to know the crappy land east of the river. The whole theory of Custer going for the civvies was Reno's supposition at first, but what might work in one small village unlikely in such a huge one where nobody could have known a sizeable percentage of those assembled. Who would be the lucky guy to tell Gall not to slaughter the soldiers after his wife and some kids were killed? Who'd enforce that? Different bands, and that some Cheyenne might get killed would not stop Sioux from seeking vengeance.
These tales of great affection between bands was easy when the going was good. After Dull Knife's village got nailed, they went to seek Crazy Horse for protection, but he could not afford to share anymore, so he gave them the heave ho, after which many Cheyenne offered their services to the Army.
But regardless of what he was doing, Custer didn't need to park 60% of his force miles from the other forty percent's actions, supposedly doing something constructive about 2 miles away or more. If they weren't going to attack, why kick the bee hive to incite the enemy to attack you on bad ground? Benteen's presence could have been accomplished with clear orders sent by a several messengers. If they couldn't get through, it was a bad plan anyway.
I don't care who said that, there is no place on LBH's east side that was a good place to fight Indians (or enraged Hare Krishnas, Richard Simmons, or anyone) who outnumber you and have ample force to surround you. There were some less terrible than others for defensive positions, and Calhoun might resemble that. But for people who were waiting in order to go on the offensive again, it strikes me the best thing was to keep moving, and that this had to have been apparent, and they were not parked along that ridge proactively. And they would not know the quality of Calhoun Hill till they arrived, so the choices had already been made.
At the time anything is supposed to be going on near cemetery ridge, the Indians were well into MTC, and hardly all of them were fighting Reno, probably not even a majority. Custer mostly fought others than those who fought Reno to that point.
As with the CD's, we can't pretend that the markers forming the so called SSL represent additional soldiers not accounted for. Not saying none of them aren't valid. But suppose they were valid for the line, and you're correct, and this atop those testified as in the ravine, that's another 28 stones which would have to be removed from the two ends of Custer Ridge.
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Ryan
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Post by Ryan on Sept 15, 2009 21:40:11 GMT -6
Hey Dark Cloud,
Thanks for the reply. No, circumstances were certainly different at Washita (Custer was outnumbered when you reckon in the hundreds of warriors or so that came from the other camps along the river after the camp was sacked...even ordered the band to play "ain't I glad to get out of the wilderness" to make as much ruckus as possible to discourage an Indian attack) Guess he figured he should look for other camps next time? And I wasn't about to go to Jackson's fake-retreat-flank- attack at Chancellorsville. I don't think Custer was that calculating as a commander - rather, a "bit" more impetuous than Jackson. But, there is something to be said for Custer's mentality...I always think about Trevilian Station, in particular. Yeah, bigger units, not fighting Injuns', better ground, blah blah, but the man couldn't seem to help himself when it came to taking risks in a fight. It was bad ground for defense, but the only other alternative is that he didn't see the need for defense. I don't know if he needed to park 60% of his command at Calhoun Hill, but it appears he did, because elements of his command at least proceeded to Custer Hill as a discrete unit - otherwise, you'd have E and F troopers lying dead before they got to Custer Hill. Death doesn't distinguish by unit. Beyond that point is conjecture, but I don't think bad ground scared Custer - and if you think in terms of an aggressive mentality, he may have only been pondering old men, women, and children hiding in Squaw Creek - he's a fish going for the bait, if you will. It did evidently incite the enemy by probing north, and I bet if Custer had a chance to retake a few cavalry tactics exams at the Point, he would have. He did graduate bottom of his class...Not trying to say that's the direct cause of his defeat, but conventional thoughts weren't his concern. Even the Washita, despite the circumstances, entailed splitting forces up. And far as he was concerned, Indians wouldn't stand and fight. Even when they did, smaller forces could withstand larger bodies of warriors (beecher's island and the lot). Maybe it was the perceived capabilities of the warriors that further encouraged an offensive maneuver north, even if warriors (and a substantial number) were still in the village.
Good point about the warrior numbers - hard to believe 1500 warriors ran after Reno, then ran after Custer, as a group; certainly only a fraction engaged both, many probably engaged one or the other.
Calhoun was comparatively better than Custer Hill. Had he have been hard pressed out of MTC, you'd think he would have consolidated his command right then and there, or turn back towards WP and back to the bluffs, rather than go in the opposite direction from friendly forces located in the south. If he was interested in going north, though, Calhoun was the best alternative. And I'm not a military guy, but if you don't know the land beforehand, you just develop a quick eye for opportunities.
Not sure I understand your meaning with the stones. I tend to look at each sector of the battlefield differently, with the understanding that there are spurious markers in all of the sectors, some areas slightly more accurate than others. In regards to SSL, a lot of them simply don't belong there. I think its 58 markers in total; gotta check that. Doesn't matter though, its a highly inflated number either way; Camp's notes and RCOI testimony make that abundantly clear to me. Some give vague references, but others are more precise; Fox gives a pretty nice summary on this, which I personally agree with. 6-10 bodies in upper SSL, 13 in drainage above ravine. 28 (or so, not a precise number technically, just most common figure offered) in the ravine, presumably near the headcut wall.
Mike Donahue writes in his book, (p.384), in reference to Ford D area: "this area was disturbed in the 1950's with the development of a gravel pit to support the construction of the entrance road, a human leg bone and a soldier's spur were discovered." THAT'S it! Proof! Could be the sloppy work of a burial detail? Or a predator that got "carried away" (no pun intended), or....proof of a Ford D excursion? Or a Crossdresser with cavalry spurs getting popped there? I personally go with a cavalry deployment up there, what with JSIT, Big Beaver, et. al. who talk about guys fighting beyond Custer Hill and/or on Cemetery Ridge. And a few other minor archaeological finds that suggest troopers fired from CR towards DR (bullet orientation, all that CSI jazz). Nothing conclusive when looked at individually, but becomes a very intriguing composite and possibility. When I was at the LBH this past June, PR Jerry Jasmer related that there was "artifactual evidence" to suggest Custer even CROSSED the river. I can't draw my own conclusions because Jasmer did not seem to want to reveal the nature of the evidence (mel calls it area 51 with good reason...that's classified with eye's only! emphasized). But if they find human remains near the gravel pit, and you got Indian accounts describing men getting shot off their horses over there, I wouldn't rule out a northern foray...and I remain intrigued by what was (or for that matter, wasn't) found on the other side of the river. Maybe something unrelated, but if we're talking human remains with contextual association with 19th century artifacts, I lean towards a Ford D excursion.
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Post by clw on Sept 16, 2009 6:26:06 GMT -6
Mitch Boyer knew that area like the back of his hand. He knew there was a well used northern ford. Maybe, just maybe, Custer didn't divide the right wing at all, as it would have been stupid. Maybe he was repulsed at Ford D, turned the command about, and it was broken up piecemeal trying to retreat back the way it had come.
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Post by George Mabry on Sept 16, 2009 6:39:48 GMT -6
clw, I took a hard look at that possibility and it just won't work. Keogh's battalion remaining in the Calhoun ridge area is about as sure a bet as you'll have. You might be able to come up with a reverse flow action for one or two companies being destroyed as they come back from Ford D but it just won't work with all five companies.
I guess I should say, "I couldn't make it work." If you can, I'd enjoy reading it.
George
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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 16, 2009 7:27:21 GMT -6
A human bone (only one?) doesn't mean anything till it's assuredly from the battle era. As for spurs, the descriptions of the CD's is that they shed items - like spurs - they didn't use as they wandered home, and they wandered home over that area.
Beecher Island wasn't an Army issue. The men were recent volunteers and nearly ALL were excellent shots and frontiersmen, far above the average soldier at any time. Even so, they had to be rescued by the Buffalo Soldiers, having stopped and lost all their mounts. Some officers, yes, but the fighting was done by pros.
The issue with the stones is this: the total number of stones, misplaced and all, are not highly variable from the number known killed. Hence, if there are 28 bodies in a ravine, buried and now washed away, and these received no markers as would be the case if the stones considered the SSL do indeed mark your line with bodies buried initially there, then that would mean 28 additional markers need be placed. But we can't pretend that there were 28 additional men, so markers would have to be retrieved from elsewhere, probably Keogh and Calhoun areas, because we have a count from LSH.
Nothing surprising that soldiers fired from CR to DR.
Most bodies could not be ID'd whatsoever, and guesses about company positions were made because of horse color and officers' corpses and the odd recognizable body.
The only thing archaeology can provide are artifacts that do not conflict with a theory; they're evidence for any number of theories and cannot prove squat. Without knowing anything about Jasmer and his evidence, I'll state it proves the CD's were there at least as firmly as anything else. Indians saying soldiers crossed the river may well have referenced the CD's, who we know fooled a bunch of folks on both sides. You can't ignore this well accounted fact and pretend they didn't happen or exist. You have to provide evidence it wasn't this known quantity that was there dropping future artifacts before insisting something else was.
clw,
I don't see anything deficient in your view. If all five companies puttered down MTC towards the village, the nose got blunted for whatever reason (a wounded Custer, for example), Keogh was not likely to prefer to stay, immobile, in an increasingly deep gully with snipers about. Absent orders or understanding, he might well have ordered his men to reverse till they could get out the north side of MTC, at which point seeing Yates' men heading north further down under fire, he parrallelled them, perhaps firing support volleys from Luce and N-C ridges, ending at Calhoun Hill. Keogh may never have known why they were moving north.
Don't see what doesn't work about that. MTC would be the main highway to the east for the Sioux from the village.
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Post by bc on Sept 16, 2009 10:18:12 GMT -6
Mitch Boyer knew that area like the back of his hand. He knew there was a well used northern ford. Maybe, just maybe, Custer didn't divide the right wing at all, as it would have been stupid. Maybe he was repulsed at Ford D, turned the command about, and it was broken up piecemeal trying to retreat back the way it had come. CLW, to me there was too much firing from Luce and Nye Cartwright for Keogh to have moved to ford D as well. My timeline makes it possible though. All the cartridges found at Calhoun indicate those people were there for quite some time. The cartridges at Luce and NC indicate they were there for a while. I think those at Calhoun used to be at Luce and NC maybe supporting the ford B attack and fending off NAs pouring across MTC. Once the NAs started coming up Deep Coulee on the East side of Butler ridge, that forced those on Luce and NC to cross deep coulee and go to Calhoun and Finley to avoid being cut off and separated and to protect those repulsed at Ford B who then moved north to another ford. However, Michno has E troop on Luce and NC ridges which leaves Keogh to go with Custer. I haven't read his book to see what his theory was or if he even has Keogh going with Custer. Michno's E troop on those ridges really messes with a lot of theories. I think Doran has E troop there as well although I don't remember or follow why. If you have Keogh retreating with Custer from ford D, then why was he killed where he was at? Deserting Custer? Was he taking on Gall? How did Calhoun and Crittendon end up at Calhoun hill with al the cartridges found around them? Were Calhoun and Crittendon dropped off at Calhoun hill and Keogh was trying to get back to rescue them while Custer still had a foothold on LSH? How many ridges, coulees, and fords did Bouyer have on the back of his hand? ;D It had been a while since he was there last and with all the ridges and coulees around there, no one can remember all that terrain. Besides the entire river was fairly shallow and narrow. Not like the Jellystone. And Bouyer couldn't know just what was covered by timber and that heavy undergrowth. However, Bouyer and anybody else could follow a buffalo and/or travois trail going to the river and expect that the trail they are following would end up at a crossable place. And I do believe they were following a trail(s) along there. Probably a buffalo trail. Any travois trail coming from Reno creek would have crossed at the MTC area where the vill was unless the the Sioux got there first and blocked it. It would make no sense for NAs moving down Reno Creek to go all the way up to ford D and then cut back south again. However again, there may have been some late arrivals from the reservation who came over from the Tullochs Creek area (a concern of Terry) that could have left somewhat of a travois trail going down to the river in the ford D area. Maybe some Northern Cheyennes? bc
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Post by clw on Sept 16, 2009 10:46:53 GMT -6
I always hesitate, George, to conjecture tactics with, well, guys like you who know your business. But WTH, here's what could have happened.....
Nothing much of anything happens at MTC and MTF isn't probed at all. There is some engagement the head of MTC, quickly brushed off as resistance at this point in time is meager. The command reaches Calhoun Hill about the time Reno is leaving the timber. Most warriors are with Reno now, although some are beginning to head up MTC -- not enough to concern Custer as he keeps heading north. He's moving fast (and very 'Custerlike') to Ford D (Boyer suggested it) and it only takes him about 15 minutes to round LSH and head down toward the ford. He's almost to the northern ford by the time Reno reaches the bluffs. But other warriors have raced him to the ford. He sees some are already across the river and the engagement here kills Kellogg, Voss and Boyer and is heard by Reno's guys on the bluffs and those left in the timber as 'firing downstream'. By now some of the Cheyenne are behind him and also to the north (JSIT). Warriors are also starting up Deep Ravine and have been streaming back from Reno and up the coulees, their objective being to cut Custer off from both the village and the left wing. Bad things are happening fast. The commands turns about in line. Co. L in front, then I with C and F right behind. E is thrown out to the right to cover Deep Ravine as F tries to hold off the Cheyenne from LSH. Keogh manages to reach the swale while Calhoun, out in front, reaches CH. Charges from both sides of the ridge explode C. Some of them probably made it to Finley. F is back on LSH where it too has been cut off. The command is all over the map by now, easy to finish off piecemeal.
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