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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 17, 2009 16:04:21 GMT -6
Exactly, crzhrs. It's the simplest explanation, it violates nothing, and Custer usually being in front (if with Yates at all) provides opportunity, perhaps likelihood, of being hit. A wounded Custer who doesn't cede command.
There's no reason for not crossing at MTCF if they were on the offensive. If the northern end of the village, self explanatory. If the middle of the village, still the fastest way to the civvies (unlikely target) or just the supply-stuffed lodges to burn them. Taking an entirely visible eternity to putter north on the east coast to cross over and then back down to where they already were would fool nobody, remove shock and surprise, serve no purpose other than to construct an entirely unlikely scenario of some clever trick using 2 companies, leaving three a mile away.
Once surprise and shock are lost, you're on the defensive since they outnumber you and are unlikely to entertain your presence while you unite the command. Waiting for Benteen only makes sense if he could then be seamlessly integrated into some mass action. Having retreated over bad ground to battle ridge in full view would not allow it. Hard to believe Custer would choose the worst of all possible alternatives absent extreme duress or command confusion.
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Ryan
New Member
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Post by Ryan on Sept 17, 2009 21:02:30 GMT -6
I didn't have time to read all the post on the ford "D" story. However, I did propound a theory on page 6 on the Luce Hill discussion where Custer did that exact movement during the Civil War (cannot recall the battle). He sent a company or two to hold the enemy at one ford, and then took the remaning force and crossed unmolested at another ford, circled around and attacked the Rebs from behind. The intersesting fact here is that he did it with Yates--the same Yates that was sent to ford "B" at the Little Big Horn. Was he attempting to repeat this same manuever again? Only this time he was repelled at or seriously wounded at ford "D" causing a withdrawal--this may have accounted for the often heard twenty minute unexplaned halt north of LSH. Tony, that's VERY interesting. Would you be able to provide the name of the battle you are referring to, once you find out? I'd like to read more on that. Does anyone know if Ford B was at the end of the village, or was it the middle? According to one of Fox's archaeological studies, Ford B was at the approximate end of the village. Then again, a lot of Indian maps and testimony say the Cheyenne camp was closer to Deep Ravine. I'm personally not sure. Either way, using Ford B would have done little more than grant access to a rapidly emptying village. Capturing and destroying the village proper would have been a temporary success, maybe a tactical victory, but it wouldn't have thwarted warrior resistance in the same way that capturing noncombatants might have (at least in theory..). Thus, it wouldn't have been a strategic victory. Warriors might think twice before firing on women and children being corralled by troopers,which in turn might cause them to lay down their arms and hopefully return to the reservation. Even if a fraction of the warriors complied, this would have been a victory of sorts. Custer did this with 53 hostages at Washita, and prevented a much larger body of warriors from attacking his command following the destruction of that camp - although he also had his band play some tunes to intimidate the warriors with all the noise (not exactly a compliment to the regimental band). Also, a northern move with two companies was not necessarily an ASSAULT on the camp and/or noncombatants. More than likely, if it occurred, it was a probe - sizing up what's there and, for that matter, not there. Custer isn't going to defeat 1500 warriors with 82 men in a head-on, blow for blow battle, nor was he planning on doing so with the entire regiment in my view; I think it was more about grabbing what was dear to the warriors - capturing women and children, and causing morale to break down to force warriors to comply. To have a big enough impact, Custer would have needed Benteen's forces to capture enough noncombatants to enforce this compliance. There is a reason he recalled Benteen, and he was well aware this was a "big village." He needed to move further north, and he needed more men to effect this plan.
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Post by bc on Sept 17, 2009 21:36:32 GMT -6
Ryan, I think the majority of the theories have the northern Sioux camps at and just past MTF. The Cheyenne camps were north of these yet. Squaw creek would be north of the Cheyenne camps and where the squaws all ran to the ravine there which comes out somewhere opposite Deep Ravine. Ford D/Willy Bends ford/the iron railroad bridge/base of cemetery ridge/south skirmish line would be further north of Squaw Creek. The Sioux camps would extend somewhere north to the present day Real Bird reenactment site or just beyond.
There is no good way to get around to the flank side of the Cheyenne camps and squaw creek/ravine without following the present day battlefield road up from MTF and along Findlay and then along Battle Ridge until past Deep Ravine before you can go south. (there are too many deep ravines to prevent cavalry crossing them between MTF/Deep Coulee and cemetery ravine/south skirmish line) The only other options to cut to the north would be to follow the LBH river bottom or ride down some steep bluffs.
bc
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Post by bc on Sept 17, 2009 21:41:09 GMT -6
Ryan said: "Custer isn't going to defeat 1500 warriors with 82 men in a head-on, blow for blow battle".
I'd bet Custer thought he could or he wouldn't have ridden any farther north than MTC. He had the other 3 companies in reserve anyway following along on Luce, Nye Cartwright, and then Calhoun and Findlay.
bc
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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 17, 2009 21:55:13 GMT -6
Again, the Washita was against one group and the 7th outnumbered them. The 7th attacked in winter when the ponies were weak and the people not much better, and the attack came at dawn while everyone was freezing. What were the results?
The heroic warriors, so concerned were they for the women and children, apparently immediately bolted. As previously said, not only not fighting to the end, but not even fighting till lunch. And the cavalry apparently were unable to catch men (not all got to a pony) running in bare feet through the snow. Or follow them. Something.
It took hours for Custer to get this much smaller bunch together, corral the hostages. And this at a camp of fifty odd lodges. Reliable testimony from participants, like Herendeen, put the LBH camp at 1800 lodges. But suppose he was drunk. Halve that. Only 900 lodges this time, 18 times the number in Okieville, which Custer attacks after Wheaties midway or more through a summer day when the enemy was stuffed with food, water, and weapons and had been jellin' for a while.
If he had hostages at the Washita, and hostages precluded attack (that same heroic concern for their families again....) why did Custer fear attack after? Because he knew other tribes would not be so emotionally affected and surely would go for the 7th? Again, who gets to tell Gall to hold off on this revenge thing.
If Custer had killed zero Indians, but just burned all their food and lodge storage, significantly reduced their pony herd, it would have been enough, given they had to feed themselves and the warriors would have to start again. Or, more likely, return to the rez. Because at some point, the women would point out all this self worship of Indian manhood was an excuse for current real life incompetence in feeding the family.
Just because the rival high school has a football team, it doesn't mean all means of comparison are as nothing if you can't beat them on the field. In fact, if your school produces graduates of accomplishment who can have a life beyond, and other school's students measure everything from last game and the prom as down hill in life, you won. That's why, within increasingly broad parameters, the warrior ethic can be a hindrance, Europeans or Indian.
Even with less men and greater enemy, Custer committed 25% to attack an enemy whose specific location and size he did not know. It's way too late to 'probe' or hold any sort of meeting. He had limited opportunity for surprise, and its knocking at the door was fading. Riding in near full view north to a crossing would be met by prepared opposition. Why not hit through MTCF - whatever its relationship to the village perimeter that day - to get some value from surprise and shock? Sending a probe would invite retaliation, would mandate a retreat and - if not careful - a defensive position on god awful cavalry ground.
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Post by Melani on Sept 17, 2009 22:15:17 GMT -6
I agree, Washita was a very different situation--that's why Custer survived to die at LBH. He almost got his goose cooked at Washita, but the factors mentioned above were enough to allow him to squiggle out. I think he may have learned at least a partial lesson there, and that's why he sent Benteen off to scout for more Indians.
But he sure didn't do sufficient reconnaissance at LBH. Based on his past experience, he probably figured he could outfight a larger number of Indians, but there were a whole lot of factors that were different, such as the Indians' attitude and the fact that Reno's attack folded as quickly as it did.
I am very much intrigued by Tony's theory involving the CW battle. And while I realize that White Cow Bull is often thought of as a major BS artist, there is that account of the soldier getting shot at the ford and a sudden retreat. The question is, could he have meant Ford D? I'm not sure a description of a buckskin jacket, which Custer had taken off when last seen by survivors, is real relevant. WCB may have added some details to his account to make it sound better, but the core story may be true. Custer is pretty certainly the only one they would have stopped for, and the only one they would have dragged up to LSH. The chest wound might not have been immediately fatal, but he might no longer have been in command at that point.
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Post by clw on Sept 18, 2009 8:03:20 GMT -6
The heroic warriors, so concerned were they for the women and children, apparently immediately bolted. An amazing oversimplification, even for you. But continuing on... Very good. And after all, the goal of the campaign. It always comes back to the fact that they stood and fought. They weren't supposed to do that.
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Post by shan on Sept 18, 2009 8:08:38 GMT -6
clw,
When wanting to use certain Indian testimony to bolster up ones argument, I would beware of the way that the Indian accounts are utilized in Michnos' work, I'm thinking primarily here of Lakota Noon. Excellent book as it is, he tends to tie the accounts to particular moments and places on the battlefield in order to to support his arguments, and whilst there is nothing wrong with that, Lord knows we all do the same, and I plead as guilty as everyone else to doing exactly that, at the same time he can be as equally wrong as the rest of us in placing their observations in both the wrong place, and at the wrong time.
Hardorrf does a better job in the three, or is it four books he has devoted to Indian accounts by just giving the statements verbatim, and then confining himself to notes and opinions at the bottom of the page. But even he cannot resist utilizing them to confirm his own picture of the battle, so even with him the accounts are contaminated so to speak.
As you re-read through all the Indian accounts, one is struck by how few references there are to particular landscape features, or the use of the names we are all so familiar with, the names we happily bandied about on these boards as if they were always set in stone. But then why would they use them? The names they had themselves for these features, { if indeed they ever had many, } names for the various gullies, water courses and hilltops have either been ignored, or else been transposed by the ones that were later given to them by white folks, primarily I'm guessing, the army. Thus when they gave their stories, one imagines that if they did use a name of a landscape feature that the translator didn't recognize, then all he could do was make his best guess as to where it was they were referring. Having said that I sometimes think that we are too hard on these translators, I suspect that their fairly minimal skills with two languages apart, that they were fairly uneducated men who were just doing a job to earn a few dollars, some of them doing it well, some not, But the thing we ought to keep in mind above all, is that they never could imagine the reverberations the battle would have down the centuries, and never in their wildest dreams could they have imagined that we would all be picking through their translations for clues after a man had been to the moon.
If there is little or no references to particular pieces of the landscape, there is very little reference to time, and I think that any references that are there should be viewed with skepticism. After all their picture of time was radically different to ours, especially the way we break it down to hours and minutes, so anytime I see an Indian talking about an hour or a number of minutes I feel pretty sure that they have been put into his mouth by an interpreter.
Now if I've made it sound as if the Indian accounts are of little or no use, then I've painted the wrong picture. I've always argued that there are a few small, fragile bones of truth lying beneath the self aggrandizement of even the biggest liar, or the short cuts, or sheer laziness of a tired, fed up translator. For instance if you read as many Indian accounts as you can straight through without reference to name or tribe, one of the feelings that comes across is that from MTF onwards the fight was a running one with little or no stops, not even at Calhoun, with only a very brief stand at last stand hill. It's a picture that blows most of out pet theories out of the water and if one were to take it on board, it would put and end to multiple arguments as to whether there was a long pro-longed fight at Calhoun, or whether Custer ever went to ford D, whether he went North to try and capture Non-coms, or indeed that there was a reverse flow. I'm not saying that's exactly how it was, but I suspect that it may have been closer to the truth than many of our theories.
Shan
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Post by tonypag7 on Sept 18, 2009 8:13:48 GMT -6
Ryan, I am not sure of the name of the battle (Civil War) that both Custer and Yates pulled off that move--However, it was in "Custer Victorious"--I will look for it again when I rerturn home and get the book. I remembered it when I read that somewhere a Cheyeene woman re-tells a story that she shot a leading officer off his horse at a ford. The remaining soldiers jumped off their horses, surronded the wounded officer, took him from the river (where he fell after being shot) dragged him off and left. For years everyone thought that the woman meant ford "B" and that the story must have been fabricated. However, it now appears that it could have happened at ford "D". Again, this could account for the unexplained 20 minute delay--a story that continues to pop up. If this did occur, then it explaines the delay as stated in my eariler post. Matter of fact, it puts a vast majority of unexplained moves in perspective (including the south skirmish line debacle). For years I have jumped back and forth between my two aforementioned theories--Custer going to LSH to protect his flank while waiting for Benteen, and the two ford attack theory. HELP!
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Post by clw on Sept 18, 2009 8:23:33 GMT -6
It was Cedar Creek. And he had Sheridan to back him up. The circumstances (as always) were very different. The battle had gone on all day and the Union Cavalry finally had Rosser pretty much contained. The tactic was used to mop of what was left.
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Post by clw on Sept 18, 2009 8:29:32 GMT -6
clw, When wanting to use certain Indian testimony to bolster up ones argument, I would beware of the way that the Indian accounts are utilized in Michnos' work, I'm thinking primarily here of Lakota Noon. Excellent book as it is, he tends to tie the accounts to particular moments and places on the battlefield in order to to support his arguments, and whilst there is nothing wrong with that, Lord knows we all do the same, and I plead as guilty as everyone else to doing exactly that, at the same time he can be as equally wrong as the rest of us in placing their observations in both the wrong place, and at the wrong time. Hardorrf does a better job in the three, or is it four books he has devoted to Indian accounts by just giving the statements verbatim, and then confining himself to notes and opinions at the bottom of the page. But even he cannot resist utilizing them to confirm his own picture of the battle, so even with him the accounts are contaminated so to speak. As you re-read through all the Indian accounts, one is struck by how few references there are to particular landscape features, or the use of the names we are all so familiar with, the names we happily bandied about on these boards as if they were always set in stone. But then why would they use them? The names they had themselves for these features, { if indeed they ever had many, } names for the various gullies, water courses and hilltops have either been ignored, or else been transposed by the ones that were later given to them by white folks, primarily I'm guessing, the army. Thus when they gave their stories, one imagines that if they did use a name of a landscape feature that the translator didn't recognize, then all he could do was make his best guess as to where it was they were referring. Having said that I sometimes think that we are too hard on these translators, I suspect that their fairly minimal skills with two languages apart, that they were fairly uneducated men who were just doing a job to earn a few dollars, some of them doing it well, some not, But the thing we ought to keep in mind above all, is that they never could imagine the reverberations the battle would have down the centuries, and never in their wildest dreams could they have imagined that we would all be picking through their translations for clues after a man had been to the moon. If there is little or no references to particular pieces of the landscape, there is very little reference to time, and I think that any references that are there should be viewed with skepticism. After all their picture of time was radically different to ours, especially the way we break it down to hours and minutes, so anytime I see an Indian talking about an hour or a number of minutes I feel pretty sure that they have been put into his mouth by an interpreter. Now if I've made it sound as if the Indian accounts are of little or no use, then I've painted the wrong picture. I've always argued that there are a few small, fragile bones of truth lying beneath the self aggrandizement of even the biggest liar, or the short cuts, or sheer laziness of a tired, fed up translator. For instance if you read as many Indian accounts as you can straight through without reference to name or tribe, one of the feelings that comes across is that from MTF onwards the fight was a running one with little or no stops, not even at Calhoun, with only a very brief stand at last stand hill. It's a picture that blows most of out pet theories out of the water and if one were to take it on board, it would put and end to multiple arguments as to whether there was a long pro-longed fight at Calhoun, or whether Custer ever went to ford D, whether he went North to try and capture Non-coms, or indeed that there was a reverse flow. I'm not saying that's exactly how it was, but I suspect that it may have been closer to the truth than many of our theories. Shan Point taken. I've never liked Lakota Noon much for exactly the reasons you state. I think the accounts are placed in the timeline with great liberty and to make matters worse, they're paraphrased. I gotta get Hardoff.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 18, 2009 8:34:37 GMT -6
I think blocking a crossing that would prevent a conventional army access to the other side is much different than trying to block 1,000s that could cross anywhere they felt. Crossings were a convenience to the Indians but in cavalry tactics a necessity.
Custer was not worried about crossing by the Indians until he realized how many had crossed instead of fleeing. The concern of not letting Indians get to the rear makes no sense to me. They had no formations and would go wherever they wanted. How long did it take for them to surround Reno?
I don't think a plan of crossing at MTF by Custer would include a skirmish line with its back to the village. I would think Custer would charge into the Indians and be mixed in with them.
I don't think a skirmish line against a mobile Indian force as a good offensive tactic. The only way I see that working is to have enough troops to completely surround the village. Custer did not have enough.
I can not get past that if Custer crossed MTF and hit the same Indians attacking Reno that Benteen and the pack train would have arrived in time to support and all 12 companies would be in supporting distance of each other. I think that was the plan up to the time Martin was sent to Benteen.
I do not believe it was the Indians fighting Reno that caused Custer to change his plans after reaching the junction of Cedar Coulee and MTC. I believe it was more Indians willing to fight in sufficient numbers that altered the plan.
The Custer Battlefield to me looks like a series of surprise Indian appearances causing moving to unfavorable positions and some defensive actions. I don't see offensive actions that produced any results that would be positive in nature. Even the charges by the brave officer were defensive in nature.
AZ Ranger
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 18, 2009 8:41:38 GMT -6
Lakota Noon would be much better with accounts separate and then plugged in whatever timeline. The author does suggest that one can read a single account by following the times of the individual Indian. You still have the suggested times though to read a separate account.
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Post by clw on Sept 18, 2009 9:05:28 GMT -6
I can not get past that if Custer crossed MTF and hit the same Indians attacking Reno that Benteen and the pack train would have arrived in time to support and all 12 companies would be in supporting distance of each other. I think that was the plan up to the time Martin was sent to Benteen........ I do not believe it was the Indians fighting Reno that caused Custer to change his plans after reaching the junction of Cedar Coulee and MTC. I believe it was more Indians willing to fight in sufficient numbers that altered the plan. The Custer Battlefield to me looks like a series of surprise Indian appearances causing moving to unfavorable positions and some defensive actions. I don't see offensive actions that produced any results that would be positive in nature. Even the charges by the brave officer were defensive in nature. AZ Ranger .......mumble, mumble, that's hard to argue with Steve. Hey George, what channel is Whacky Sports on?
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Ryan
New Member
Posts: 49
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Post by Ryan on Sept 20, 2009 15:18:11 GMT -6
Ryan said: "Custer isn't going to defeat 1500 warriors with 82 men in a head-on, blow for blow battle". I'd bet Custer thought he could or he wouldn't have ridden any farther north than MTC. He had the other 3 companies in reserve anyway following along on Luce, Nye Cartwright, and then Calhoun and Findlay. bc I personally disagree. I think Custer thought he could "defeat" the warriors, but I don't think he intended to do so by literally killing every single warrior that resisted him. I think his plan, which involved a multi-prong cavalry attack from different directions, hinged on capturing noncombatants and destroying the village and compelling warriors to surrender. Also, if Custer went north with two companies, it was not necessarily his plan to attack at that precise moment. I believe he was intelligence gathering.
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