Could Benteen have saved Custer?

[tatanka]

darkmoon. I have read your post carefully and I respect your opinion. But it is as you say, little is known of the instruction Custer gave to Benteen. Could Benteen have moved quicker? Did he know Custer was in trouble and if he did was it too late to help him? You didn't answer my question of how Benteen or Reno was expected to help him. They were in a desperate situation themselves,

[runaheap]

No way Jose! This whole thing is a timeline! Benteen arives at the hilltop just after Reno has extracted his battalion (or what's left of it). Benteen's last instructions from his commander (Big Village, Come Quick, Bring Packs, P.S. Bring Pacs) The Packs ain't up yet! RCOI/Reno, McDougal and the packs don't arive for another hour to an hour and 20 minutes. Custer by then is already whipped or real close to it.

[Dark Cloud]

The message does not say "Come quick," requiring presence before the sender. It says "be quick" in bringing the packs forward to the action. That there is an understood and decided difference between "come quick" and "be quick" is revealed by those who keep trying to insert it into the record falsely.

"Get ready for school. Be quick." I don't need to see you before you leave.

"Get ready for school. Come quick." I'm waiting to drive you there.

Not all that subtle a difference.

[AZ Ranger]

Report to me immediately

[conz]

In any event, I don't think that any presumed instructions to bring the pacs meant that Benteen should slow his arrival to the battlefield to the pac's pace for his entire battalion.

Benteen can gallop his battalion to Calhoun Hill, and still comply with "bring pacs" by ensuring that McDougall is on his way there too, as quickly as his mules can travel.

IOW, "bring pacs" does not equate to "be as quick as the mules will allow."

Clair

[tatanka]

I would think the "be quick, bring packs" message meant that Custer wanted Benteen to arrive with the packs. Custer wouldn't realise he was going to be overwhelmed as quickly as he was.

[clw]

Aug 16, 2008 13:04:47 GMT -6 @conz said:

In any event, I don't think that any presumed instructions to bring the pacs meant that Benteen should slow his arrival to the battlefield to the pac's pace for his entire battalion.

Benteen can gallop his battalion to Calhoun Hill, and still comply with "bring pacs" by ensuring that McDougall is on his way there too, as quickly as his mules can travel.

IOW, "bring pacs" does not equate to "be as quick as the mules will allow."

Clair

This is so obvious that I wonder at any other explanation. 'Come on' and 'Be quick' can not have included any scenario in Custer's mind of Benteen arriving with mules in tow. McDougall was perfectly capable of expediting the train once he had the order where to bring them. I can't believe that Custer's intention was to tie up an entire battalion for that job.

[conz]

Aug 17, 2008 5:36:00 GMT -6 tatanka said:

I would think the "be quick, bring packs" message meant that Custer wanted Benteen to arrive with the packs. Custer wouldn't realise he was going to be overwhelmed as quickly as he was.

For a military officer in this situation, not much reason for this interpretation, though. Now if hostiles were all around to circle the entire regiment at this time, this might be a possible interpretation by Benteen.

Note that there are two parts to this question of responsibility: "What did Custer really want?" and "How did CPT Benteen interpret what Custer wanted?" If you want to draw it out even further, the real decision facing Benteen is not only what his boss wants, but also what is the RIGHT thing to do, which may not be the same. That's why they pay officers the big bucks. <g>

Obviously Benteen did not think Custer wanted him to escort the pacs, as he decided NOT to do that, so that kinda decides the issue of what HE thought was the proper interpretation of that order, eh? Either that, or he took it upon himself that whatever Custer wanted, he wasn't going to wait for the pacs...he was going to "do the right thing." He kinda intimated this at the RCOI.

I believe Benteen interpreted the order correctly as to not escorting the pacs...I think less of his interpretation to "be quick."

Clair

[AZ Ranger]

We need to consider how many troopers were with the packs into the equation Benteen plus those is equal to what Custer had with him.

"Be quick" is not a destination. I believe it meant hurry they may be getting away. Since the Indians were not going away the basis for the note had changed. This quite often happens and officers are expected to adjust to current conditions and not blindly follow instructions.

IMPROVISE, ADAPT, OVERCOME

AZ Ranger

[Dark Cloud]

The note, if an example of Custer's command style or command itself, is damning. Interpretation isn't a desired response and good orders are not subject to interpretation. That note, if viewed as an order, is an illustrative example of the worst, least informative of the genre imaginable, misleading and repetetive in only 12 words.

In fact, even minimally competent orders aren't - or should not be - subject to interpretation. Benteen knew this (Buford and Grant knew this and were famous for their clear, precise, orders) and seems to enjoy referring to the note as his "orders" and using it as a damning device at the RCOI. And nobody said "wait a minute....those are 'orders' from a commanding brevet general? Was this typical?" Because they may have known they were.

In reality, I think the note was nothing more than an exhortation put to paper.

If there is any question as to what the orders mean - and after 130 odd years veteran combat officers disagree - the fault is entirely Custer's. He made his bed and lies in it.

Custer wasn't stupid, but he was certainly evasive this time around, his commands not clear or fully understood because - it's safe to feel - he wanted wiggle room to play cya. It's not hard to understand why. He'd taken the out Terry had allowed in his "instructions" and followed the trail, probably due to the lousy train in aggregate with other reasons, and was going to attack rather earlier than Terry thought appropriate. So he was now entirely on his own hook, he knew it, and it had better work out or his career was over.

He had no real time intel, had not seen the village, when he had sent Reno to attack the unknown. Then, when he had seen much if not all of the village, he sent the note to get Benteen there, at the same time burdening him with the train in case the train got whacked, so he could blame Benteen with mutually exclusive concerns. I don't necessarily think this was conscious, but it serves the purpose.

He'd "indicated" (lawyer weasel word) that he'd support Reno, but gave no facts as to time frame or direction so that he could excuse himself any which way. And given he had no clue himself when he could, this was wise. But, it's also kind of sleazoid on Custer's part, having provided outs for himself should things not fall into place. On the other hand, he'd done this fairly often and things had worked out. Audacity and all that. But not that day.

Why suddenly the concern should shift to an assumption of destruction to Custer's group and risking the mission and regiment to save someone who, frankly, should not have needed saving, is testament to the current emotional needs of Custerphiles than any reasonable military concern concurrent to the event.

War is probably a lot more sloppy than those who've never been in it appreciate, and that there are a gazillion 50-50 calls that can haunt officers forever and this is all boilerplate to soldiers but 'news' to civvies who find that clear evidence of guilt and evil. But really, if Reno had gotten away, there was zippo reason to think that Custer had not or could not.

In any case, Benteen was pretty clear that his impression was the 7th was out of its league that day, and he brought everyone in without threat, and got everyone on the same page, did not dis Reno, did not shoot Weir. Events support his diagnosis.

[George Mabry]

I’ve been following this discussion on the note. This same topic seems to come up all the time and I’ve never understood why. We’re arguing for the sake of arguing. It seems to me that America’s love of syntax and finite definitions is at the center of this debate more so than any dilemma the wording caused the recipient. Battlefield orders are not accompanied by a briefing booklet. They are by necessity, short and choppy; just like the Come On note.

Benteen was not confused by the wording. Did Benteen hold up his advance so he could pace himself along with the packs? Apparently he didn’t feel like the note was instructing him to accompany or “bring” the packs. So why do we argue this?

Finding solace in the fact that military veterans (or combat vets) are confused by the note is about as enlightening as trying to develop a foreign policy based on man-on-the-street interviews. An E-3 fork lift operator, E-4 fireteam leader, E-5 radar technician supervisor, or a Quartermaster Captain’s interpretation of the note lacks weight to say the least. The question is or should be: was Benteen confused? Whether or not we posters are confused is meaningless. Were Benteen’s actions upon receiving the note those of a confused battalion commander?

Benteen raced ahead of the packs to “be of service” to the regiment. Benteen’s actions (or inactions if you are so inclined) after linking up with Reno have nothing whatsoever to do with befuddlement or obedience in relation to the note. That is a separate issue altogether. When Benteen arrived on Reno hill he had two options. He could have gone to the sound of the guns and never worried about censorship. Reno was not in a position to stop him either legally or ethically. Or, Benteen could place himself under Reno’s command and remain comfortably under that umbrella. Either decision could be justified and apparently was.

In the end, the Come On note did not effect the outcome of this fight one way or the other. The note is an interesting keepsake of the battle and nothing more.

Just my 2 cents worth,

George

[tatanka]

Did Benteen and the pack train arrive on Reno Hill at the same time? If they did then he obviously slowed his advance to wait for it.

[elisabeth]

The packs were a bit behind. Benteen's battalion left the morass just as the packs were arriving there, so he didn't wait; as he later said, he was confident that he was between the packs and any Indians, so it was OK to let them come along behind at their own pace.

Perhaps the most interesting thing about the note is the importance Benteen placed on preserving it -- sending a copy to his wife "as it may be of use or interest hereafter". Possibly, this was just to demonstrate Custer's lax command style. But the one thing this note does is to justify Benteen's return to the trail. Without it, we might still be arguing (as many do, and not without reason) that he was initially supposed to continue into the LBH valley and attack from there. This note is his get-out-of-jail-free card, demonstrating that it was OK for him to have returned to where he could pick up the train. This is the aspect he seems touchiest on in his later writings -- where he could have got to if he'd continued his scout -- so it's perhaps not unreasonable to think he second-guessed himself on this in the years that followed. The note gives him his "out".

[Dark Cloud]

Perhaps Mr. Mabry can give an example of choppy battlefield orders that we might all see what he means, braced, of course, with what previous orders the commander and subordinate were basing things on so it might be compared to the issue before us? Surely in his combat experience, he has an example? Orders usually contain time and location indicators.

Benteen was only academically confused as to what Custer meant. It's quite likely he knew exactly what was going on, as suggested, and did what was correct: he accepted responsibility for the train, which fortunately did not suffer an attack in the interim, but he was conclusively on the hook for it.

Combat vets are different than forklift operators, and if officers of combat experience cannot agree what it was Custer wanted, it's a bad, bad order. That wannabes and never-were's feign confusion is, agreed, of no moment.

Other than the British contingent who've never seen the field, few - not many - think Benteen was supposed to go into the LBH valley if no enemy seen in that direction.

[George Mabry]

Aug 17, 2008 12:03:22 GMT -6 @elisabeth said:

.. But the one thing this note does is to justify Benteen's return to the trail.

Elisabeth, I'm curious as to why you think Benteen felt he needed to justify his return to the trail. It's rare that one would feel like he had to justify a decision that proved to be correct.

I've read Benteen's explanation as to why he rejoined the trail. The impression I got was that he wasn't so much trying to justify his decision to return to the trail as he was trying to highlight what he thought was the utter uselessness of his valley hunting mission.

George