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Post by conz on Nov 30, 2007 11:53:04 GMT -6
I'll give it a try.
Skipping the standard stuff, here are my current perceptions on controversial issues concerning LBH:
1. Custer deviated from Reno's path after, and because of, messages he received from Reno (via messenger and Cooke/Keogh). Had it not been for that word, he would have followed Reno into the valley.
2. Custer's goal was to hit the Natives "coming out" to face Reno from a different direction. To make this work, Reno had to hold the Natives at his front to prevent them from blocking Custer's move. Or barring that, Reno needed to attack the Natives if they tried to move force back against Custer.
3. Reno failed his mission utterly...in a manner that can most kindly be described as incompetent. Had Reno stayed in the timber, Custer could not have been overwhelmed, and probably would have forced at least Ford D if not MTC ford, breaking the Natives and capturing the village.
4. Custer attempted to force the MTC ford, but was unable to do so because of strong Native forces in that area. He had Keogh's three-company battalion cover Yate's squadron's withdrawal from the lower ground, and Yates moves over to the current cemetery vicinity.
5. Custer then decided to have Keogh's battalion fix the Natives at the ford, while he attempted another flanking maneuver at Ford D.
6. His crossing at Ford D was also thwarted by Natives, so he gave up on this and returned to Custer Hill. From Yates dismounting a couple hundred meters above MTC ford, to Custer going to Ford D and then arriving back at Custer hill, about an hour has transpired.
7. During Custer's absence, Keogh ordered Harrington to have C Co move down off "Battle Ridge" and occupy Greasy Grass ridge to form a better defensive perimeter and to better secure Calhoun Hill from being flanked to the west.
8. As Yates was returning from Ford D, Crazy Horse led a large force of Natives up Deep Ravine, over Custer Ridge, and overran I Co dismounted, holding horses, in their "swale." Lame White Man led dismounted natives from Deep Ravine behind C Co causing them to flee towards Calhoun Hill. Close combats ensue against I Co in the swale, and L/C Cos on the hill, simultaneously.
9. While Crazy & Co are chopping up I and L/C companies, Custer occupies Custer Hill and sends E Co to counterattack against Deep Ravine to stop the hemorrhaging of his position. The attack fails, E Co ending up in a deep ditch that crossed their attack path.
10. It takes 30 minutes from Crazy Horse's initial charge to the final deaths of Keogh and Calhoun and E Co in the ditch. During this time some Natives fight hand-to-hand dismounted, and some ride back and forth through the various small cavalry groups trying to defend themselves. Keogh rallies I Co and attempts to move as a "square" towards Custer. Calhoun tries to move off Calhoun Hill towards Keogh. Both groups are overrun in the dust by close combat, firing lines becoming ineffective in the mixed melee and obscuration. Now the Natives turn to finish off F Co on the hill and E Co in the ditch simultaneously. That takes nearly another hour.
11. During the last half hour of this fight, Weir and Benteen could see the battle area, without knowing exactly what was transpiring. But certainly they could tell that Custer had not withdrawn towards Terry...his command was in that cloud of dust on Battle Ridge.
12. Benteen was negligent in his duty for failing to depart from Reno more quickly, and for failing to make a greater demonstration against the Natives from Weir point. Benteen should have arrived with five companies at Weir point by 5pm latest, about when Crazy Horse began his fateful charge. Had Benteen advanced, Custer's battalion would have largely survived, and the Natives probably would have fled the battlefield.
13. Entire action, from arrival at MTC ford to the last death, takes about two and a half hours (4pm to 6:30pm).
Clair
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Post by crzhrs on Nov 30, 2007 13:36:44 GMT -6
Re: Question #1 . . .
How far was Custer downriver when Cooke gave him the message about Indians making a stand?
If Custer was going to support Reno immediately where could he have attacked from? Was there a suitable spot for his command to descend the high ground and cross the river within supporting distance of Reno? That may have been as much of a factor as anything.
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Post by conz on Nov 30, 2007 15:44:21 GMT -6
Re: Question #1 . . . How far was Custer downriver when Cooke gave him the message about Indians making a stand? I've seen a couple places by various historians. Probably not the bluff closest to Reno's crossing point of the LBH...but rather the ridge before that that heads north. Not sure the distance...probably about three-quarters mile (1000 meters) from the ford. "Immediately"... he would follow Reno's trail. Nothing along the bluffs would constitute supporting Reno "immediately," depending upon your perception of that term. Clair
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Post by clw on Nov 30, 2007 16:39:56 GMT -6
1. Custer deviated from Reno's path after, and because of, messages he received from Reno (via messenger and Cooke/Keogh). Had it not been for that word, he would have followed Reno into the valley. Why did this cause him to change his plans?
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Post by fred on Nov 30, 2007 19:25:18 GMT -6
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 1. Agree, though the impetus came from Cooke rather than any messengers from Reno. 2. Do not agree, especially since the stated objective is completely contradictory to your initial supposition, which is correct. 3. Completely disagree. 4. Completely disagree. Again, it contradicts the previous supposition. Plus, it makes absolutely no military sense. 5. Completely disagree. The distance was entirely too great for that idea to have been effective. 6. Completely disagree. You can't have it both ways: Reno versus Custer. 7. Generally agree, though I think you are pushing Harrington too close to the river, and the idea of protecting Calhoun's flank from anywhere down there or on Finley ridge is wrong. If he strung out on Finley, who would protect Harrington's flank and rear? 8. Generally agree. Don't have a lot of problems with that, other than Crazy Horse's route, though I think I would agree with you, especially if you promised to buy the beer. 9. I wouldn't belabor that point, except I think E Company attacked much later, when things were hopeless. 10. Generally agree, though I will hedge on the timing issue. The hedge comes from ignorance. 11. Fact bedimmed by assumption. 12. Presumptuous and incorrect. To me, it is actually the worst thing you have posted. 13. You could be absolutely correct or completely wrong. I would tend toward the former rather than the latter. You have a lot of good points, Clair, but I think you have made too many assumptions and I don't agree with your tactics. I am a little surprised at that; I thought we would be closer. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by markland on Dec 1, 2007 3:15:45 GMT -6
Fred, where do we respond? Even with my lack of interest in the Custer-Cluster, I spot a lot of, to put it mildly, "Hail Marys."
Billy
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Post by fred on Dec 1, 2007 6:24:35 GMT -6
Billy--
Pick a topic and start a thread. Conz did a great job here and like so many others, will probably hate my guts for my comments. I was going to start the whole thing with that "Introductory" thread, but was still formulating some "how to's." (It gets a little harder at my age. Besides, in my wife's and my quest to find a place we want to settle in, I'm spending entirely too much time trying to figure out how I can get there without having to drive through Kansas again.)
Seriously... you can either pick one of Conz' points and start a thread with that... or you can continue it here... or you can start a thread with one of your own "pet" theories. The only requirement I would like adhered to is that we stick with the thread's topic. And of course you know about the other, but that's never an issue with you. (Accept, of course, with promises not kept.)
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by clw on Dec 1, 2007 9:44:11 GMT -6
Back to #1 again... If you are assuming that Cook's report of the Indians coming up to meet Reno indicated to Custer that he could get behind them with a flank attack, I don't believe there is any way that would have worked. The village at that point was no where near fully mobilized. If Custer had engaged from a lower ford, he would have ended up trying to protect his rear from the warriors coming into the fight from the northern end of the village and hence surrounded by warriors on all sides. Granted with Custer in such a fight it wouldn't have been as easy, but I still think the sheer numbers and the will to defend their families would have secured a victory.
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Post by elisabeth on Dec 1, 2007 10:14:35 GMT -6
I have to say that I have worries about Cooke's report -- if he even bothered to give it -- meaning anything. To Custer, this would be SOP. Attack a village: of course the warriors come out. Custer would expect that, and expect it to mask the withdrawal of the families. (He'd probably have rolled his eyes heavenwards at Reno's, as he'd have thought, over-excited report.) He may possibly have been fooled by the dust and commotion into thinking that the whole mega-village was on the run, and that he could "head them off at the pass"... but as you say, their determination to stick was the deciding factor.
If Cooke reported that warriors were making a stand, this would surely be nothing more than Custer would expect ...?
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Post by clw on Dec 1, 2007 11:15:51 GMT -6
If Cooke reported that warriors were making a stand, this would surely be nothing more than Custer would expect ...? And which is why I don't think Custer had a change of plans at all. My theory is that he was headed for the high ground (N/C, etc). not the flank.
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Post by fred on Dec 1, 2007 12:29:29 GMT -6
If you are assuming that Cook's report of the Indians coming up to meet Reno indicated to Custer that he could get behind them with a flank attack, I don't believe there is any way that would have worked. The village at that point was no where near fully mobilized. If Custer had engaged from a lower ford, he would have ended up trying to protect his rear from the warriors coming into the fight from the northern end of the village and hence surrounded by warriors on all sides.... I still think the sheer numbers and the will to defend their families would have secured a victory. clw-- I completely agree with this assessment. I have never bought the "flank attack" theory and that's what Ford B-- even though it wasn't the flank, per se, was. Custer was out to break the back of the Sioux and Cheyenne nations and he couldn't have done it with either a dumb tactical move or by charging through an emptying village. He had to immobilize the warriors and he could only have done that through a threat to their families. I have to say that I have worries about Cooke's report.... To Custer, this would be SOP. Attack a village: of course the warriors come out. Custer would expect that, and expect it to mask the withdrawal of the families.... He may possibly have been fooled by the dust and commotion into thinking that the whole mega-village was on the run, and that he could "head them off at the pass"... but as you say, their determination to stick was the deciding factor. If Cooke reported that warriors were making a stand, this would surely be nothing more than Custer would expect ...? Elisabeth-- I do not think you are fully correct here. I think the scattering business so permeated the military's mind, there was no room for any other permutations. Otherwise I think Custer would still have gone down the valley behind Reno... and then, so would have Benteen. Theoretically, that could/would have broken the Indians' back. I think he felt that if he couldn't surprise them before they could fully react to the warnings, he would expect nothing more than a scattering village. That's one of the reasons I think he moved so quickly down Reno Creek, and then just as quickly, cross-country. He might have expected Gerard's first warning: "There go your Indians, running like devils." That's fine; Custer could run right after them... they could not run as quickly as Custer. But, if the warriors came out to meet Reno, that would delay him and give the families a chance to hightail it out before the troops could break the screen. It might even blunt Custer's "second wave" behind Reno. That would have been catastrophic because the Indians could much more easily break off contact than could the soldiers (organization, etc.). Reno was to be the initial puncture, but the killing blow would have been administered by Custer's follow-up, with a possible coup de grace by Benteen. Now... Elisabeth and clw— Let me try to present this the best way I can. First of all, to me, you cannot cherry-pick this theory. One event leads logically to another and it develops a flow that leads to something else. If you change a part, then what follows can very easily become illogical. That doesn’t make it fact—we will never know “fact” for sure—but it makes it possible. If it’s possible, it’s probably logical. Custer crossed the divide some time after 10 a.m., local time. This would tie in very nicely with Gerard, Herendeen, DeRudio, and Indian accounts of when the shooting began and Reno pulled out of the timber. It would only tie in, however, if Custer “busted it” down Reno Creek. There is testimony that says this is the case, even though there were some slowdowns and possibly stops along the way. The distance of almost 12 straight-line miles from the divide to Ford A, and then another 2 to 3 miles to the skirmish line would be consistent with a rate of march in the 7 to 9 miles per hour range, even allowing for some slowdowns on “Gerard Knoll” and the Cooke and Keogh moves to Ford A. We must also remember the frame of mind of the various participants. Custer believed—so we are told—that the column had been spotted. But communications were not instantaneous in 1876, so even if that were the case, it would take time for the reports to reach the village, therefore, a rather breakneck pace down Reno Creek. Gerard further confirmed this with his sighting from “Gerard’s Knoll” in the flats. At this time, it is my belief that Custer planned on sending Reno ahead of the Keogh/Yates battalions to draw out and tie down whatever warriors he could-- the first stab-- and Custer, et al, would follow through with a second assault, behind, to the right, to the left… it makes no difference. Then things changed. Gerard reports Indians are coming out to meet Reno. To me, that indicates “screen,” which indicates “delaying tactics,” which indicates… why?… Indians are going to scatter. The screen buys them time. The logical route of advance in this kind of a situation is clearly down the valley, not along and amidst the bluffs and ravines. (It is also, by far, the easiest route and you will not be able to hide large numbers of the enemy in any hidden swales.) If—as Custer may have felt—there were enough warriors to oppose his command and tie it down before scattering, then something must be done to prevent, (a) either the scattering, or, (b) the tying up of his regiment. The only thing he can do is move around the village and come in from the other side-- not the flank. He sends Reno downstream to attack while he heads off to the right into the high country. In short order, he sees Reno on the skirmish line and he sees Reno pulling into the timber. So far, fine. Reno is accomplishing his "mission" and by pulling into the woods, he will tie down the warriors forever because of the proximity to their village. Or so he thinks. (He does not realize these particular woods are not suited for any coordinated defense. Some may scoff at that, but it is very important in assessing Reno's moves. Unless you can properly coordinate a defensive position, you are subject to piecemeal destruction and in this case, you are fighting the way the Indians fought. That eliminates all the military's advantages and allows the Indians to dictate the method of battle. The soldiers could never compete in that arena. Custer's battalions proved that!) This buys Custer more time-- or so he thinks. He has moved very rapidly so far—both down Reno Creek and across the hills to the point where he sees the valley fight (and I am convinced that point is NOT Weir Peaks)—and he now continues to move rapidly. He reaches MTC and swings onto the ridges to get a better view of the village and the situation in the valley. I don’t know what he can see from up there, but apparently it wasn’t sufficient, for he took a small part of his command and moved toward Ford B. I don’t believe there was a lot of action at Ford B, but I believe Custer saw enough from there to know Indians were scattering both downstream and into the hills of the Big Horn Mountains. That’s bad news. Meanwhile, Reno has retreated to the hills and shortly after reaching the top volleys are heard. The timing here is consistent with a very rapid move to the Luce Ridge area, yet we don’t know who fired the volleys. It could have been the Keogh command (which was left back) or it could even have been from Smith’s company that was probably on the flats near Ford B. (Evidence in that area could very easily have been erased by the activity of the Indians when crossing and re-crossing or eventually by nature, as it apparently has been erased in the Deep Ravine area.) But again, the volley firing was consistent with a very rapid move to that general vicinity. (This is why you cannot pick and choose with my theory; everything is tied into something else, and it is also why I believe this is what actually happened.) If—as I believe—the activity at Ford B was minimal, then Custer was under little or no pressure and moved farther north at his own convenience and desire (as opposed to being forced there). This must CLEARLY be the case because he would have moved back in the direction he came if he was under severe pressure. Or he was an utter fool... your pick. The question now becomes, what was his objective? On the “Ford D” thread, “Shan” brings up the point about a lot of refugees being collected by a minimal number of troops. I do not believe Custer was in the round-up business. To me, his idea was to gather enough troops—he left Keogh back to, (a) protect his rear, and (b) to await Benteen’s arrival-- then move against the villagers and whatever forces were with them. His recon completed, he moved from Ford D back to the Cemetery Ridge/Last Stand Hill area to wait for both Keogh and Benteen and THEN he would have moved across Ford D and that's what would have threatened the Indian families. The threat alone could have had a serious affect on the warriors and could have broken the back of the resistance. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by wild on Dec 1, 2007 15:37:34 GMT -6
Fred Then things changed. Gerard reports Indians are coming out to meet Reno. To me, that indicates “screen,” which indicates “delaying tactics,” which indicates… why?… Indians are going to scatter It was not a "screen" of any kind but a full blooded counter attack by all available warriors. The Indians had no evacuation plan and no central control----nobody ordered a "screen" to form.
He sends Reno downstream to attack while he heads off to the right into the high country. In short order, he sees Reno on the skirmish line and he sees Reno pulling into the timber. So far, fine. Reno is accomplishing his "mission" Since when did a skirmish line and a retreat equate to an attack? Far from fulfilling his mission it was a cock up.
If—as I believe—the activity at Ford B was minimal, then Custer was under little or no pressure and moved farther north at his own convenience and desire Three of his troops have been defeated ,his reserve are nowhere in sight,he has no plan and he is within 7 minutes of the mother of all gatherings of the plains Indians and you tells us he is not under pressure.Well Fred me old flower I believe you but there are many who would not.
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Post by clw on Dec 1, 2007 18:48:46 GMT -6
Fred Then things changed. Gerard reports Indians are coming out to meet Reno. To me, that indicates “screen,” which indicates “delaying tactics,” which indicates… why?… Indians are going to scatterIt was not a "screen" of any kind but a full blooded counter attack by all available warriors. The Indians had no evacuation plan and no central control----nobody ordered a "screen" to form. Agree with wild. Although I think he's being condescending again. 'No evacuation plan' ?! They had it down to a science. Fred, I don't think it was that complicated. He expected them to scatter. This wasn't news. Agree with Fred. I do think Custer thought Reno could hold the timber. He should have. But all Custer cared about was Reno keeping them busy. Whether they were attacking or defending didn't matter. Agree with Fred. It's all how you see the timing. You're making a lot of assumpution there wild. Yes, the location of his reserve is really starting to concern him, and I think he's lightly engaged not just bebopping along, but I don't think things are as hot as you think yet.
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Post by fred on Dec 1, 2007 19:46:39 GMT -6
Fred, I don't think it was that complicated. He expected them to scatter. This wasn't news. clw-- Look above. I said earlier that Custer's fear was the Indians scattering. So we agree on that. And there is nothing complicated about the rest. But he expected the normal scattering, everybody up and running, not a delaying action that would allow the majority of non-combatants to flee. This is what was unusual. I suspect Custer was looking for a hit and run operation where he hit and they ran and they couldn't run fast enough (that is, lacking a complete surprise which he knew he wasn't going to achieve). I'm sure he expected some sort of resistance when Reno was to hit, that's why he wanted to attack in waves. One other thing. It is much too early for Custer to be concerned about Benteen. I don't believe his worries about Benteen showing up really began until he arrived back on the ridges after the Ford D foray. As for the "condescending" part, I'll let that slide for what it's worth: 0 + 0 = 0. That's what it is; that's what it will always amount to. If it continues: po-o-o-f! There's simply no need for it. Believe me, clw, if I can be decent and civil, anyone can. Thanks for your post; it's nicely thought out. Very best wishes, Fred.
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Post by clw on Dec 1, 2007 20:03:17 GMT -6
We're not far apart, but the main difference is that I think things in the valley were going just as Custer expected and hoped. And because they were, he never made a change in plan based on anything that happened there.
Poor Clair. When he gets back to 'work' on Monday he won't know who to answer first. <bg>
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