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Post by conz on Dec 6, 2007 13:11:00 GMT -6
Fred,
I don't think we should have much doubt that Custer would have gone to whatever elevations were at hand before ordering an assault on Ford B. He wouldn't make an "assault" decision before seeing the situation there, even if he had moved a squadron down to the area in preparation for a possible assault.
I can't imagine that Custer did not see the amount of Native force in the vicinity of Ford B before ordering any attempt on it by Yates.
And in seeing that resistance, he would order Yates to dismount, and conduct fire to see if the resistance might break and allow his command through, or if it would at least draw the Natives off Reno, if that was any part of his need at the time.
This decision made, it would require finding another way across the river, IF he still thought he could successfully attack these Natives. It is right here that he gambled and lost, IMHO...the ONLY mistake he made that day.
He may have made this decision on Nye Ridge, but I think it probably was made closer to a location like Finley point, with Tom and perhaps Yates with him, and his small entourage (couple officers, four or five enlisted men). Probably Bouyer was with him now, too.
LT Smith may have been shot about this time...could have influenced his decision.
Clair
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Post by mystic on Feb 23, 2008 18:27:39 GMT -6
Custer's unlucky wounding in his chest at Ford B, put a spanner in the spokes for any success of the 7th....
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Post by conz on Feb 25, 2008 9:23:20 GMT -6
Mystic,
I think the main, and almost compelling, argument that Custer was NOT hit at Ford B is that this HAS to have happened at the beginning of his fight, if at all, and if it had the command would have immediately returned on the path the way it had come to reunite with the rest of the regiment under Reno.
I can't find it credible that the Custer squadrons could possibly continue on with any mission to the north if Custer wasn't leading it, IMHO.
Clair
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Post by darkmoon on Jul 31, 2008 16:22:24 GMT -6
HI In reply to Conz's initial post. 1. Custer deviated from Reno's path because it was initally part of his plan. Had it not been a part of his plan he would have sent a message back to Reno notifying him of the change. 2. Custer's goal (plans) were ilicited many times through numberous first hand participants who knew. Reno was to attack where he did. Custer was to go downstream to the other end of the village and attack there. Benteen was to attack between the two presumably at MTF. 3. Thus Benteen NOT Reno "failed his mission utterly...in a manner that can most kindly be described as incompetent. Had Benteen been where ordered to, Custer could not have been overwhelmed, and probably would have forced at least Ford D if not MTC ford, breaking the Natives and capturing the village." 4. Custer DID NOT "attempt to force the MTC ford," that was Benteen's job! 5. Custer didn't split up his battalion until after reaching the battlefield, and even then this didn't occur until after crossing Deep Ravine. 6. No doubt the ford known as D did play a significan part in Custer's plans. But once again he didn't leave any part of his battalion behind! They all advanced toward the village. 7. see above! 8. As Yates was returning from Ford D, Crazy Horse led a large force of Natives up Deep Ravine... NO he didn't. He charged north across ford D and chased Custer's battalion back to battle ridge via the coulee to the right of the present road. 9. Nice idea, but Custer nor anyone else in command had any such illustrious time! They in effect were overran at that point when they dismounted! 10. Take a shell count at Calhoun's position. Somewhere between 25 to 30. At 1 rpm. the best time is 25 to 30 minutes. But this firig is and was way too slow. The firing rate at Calhoun was somewhere between 2 to 3 rpm. What this shows is that the entire battle there on Custer field took no longer than 10 to 12 minutes! 11, Weir and Benteen could see the battle area, without knowing exactly what was transpiring. (I don't agree, they knew exactly what they had observed!) But certainly they could tell that Custer had not withdrawn towards Terry...his command was in that cloud of dust on Battle Ridge. (That cloud of dust by the way was when CH made his charge and overran those on the SSL before they could have fired but one shot holding their horses. 12. Benteen was negligent in his duty for failing to depart from CUSTER more quickly, and for failing to make a greater demonstration against Reno from point 2 (see Mguire map). Benteen should have arrived with five companies at point 2 by 1P.M. at the latest..." (And no by this time Custer and his company was long dead.) "Had Benteen advanced, Custer's battalion would have largely survived (perhaps a few remember Edgerlies testimony at the RCOI?, "and the Natives probably would have fled the battlefield." 13. 2 hours? I seriously doubt that it took 45 minutes let alone 30! Clair
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Post by Deleted on Jul 31, 2008 19:26:16 GMT -6
HI In reply to Conz's initial post. 10. Take a shell count at Calhoun's position. Somewhere between 25 to 30. At 1 rpm. the best time is 25 to 30 minutes. But this firig is and was way too slow. The firing rate at Calhoun was somewhere between 2 to 3 rpm. What this shows is that the entire battle there on Custer field took no longer than 10 to 12 minutes! Very nice synopsis, Darkmoon, however, I would not base a theory on a lack of trooper resistance based on the few shell counts found anywhere on the battlefield, especially a location just off the battlefield road. These locations have been picked clean of shells for years due to the large number of souvenir hunters and battlefield visitors. This is one of the great flaws in basing our theories on archaeology. We really have no idea how many shells were originally found in that position. The same holds true for the Keogh position and Last Stand Hill. Much of the battlefield is severely tainted in this respect. This is one of the major flaws in Richard Fox's theory of what transpired, although I tend to admire many other aspects of his research. mwk
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Post by darkmoon on Aug 1, 2008 11:12:34 GMT -6
Thanks mwk for your reply. It is never my intention to diss anyone even those who have poured their heart and souls into the research on this subject. And that includes Dr. Fox's work. Though I disagree with some of his theories. I cannot accept that his scientific work is useless to our cause. Errors in judgement happen all the time, and these errors then become for us the greater good in understanding this battle. That goes for other authors as well. Many have faltered over the years and yes even recent years, two that come to mind is Gray in Custer's Last Campaign, and Greg Michno's Lakota Noon. But perhaps the most damaging was Walter Camps errors that have led way too many astray for far too long. A seasoned professional he wasn't, and it showed in his work. Nevertheless even his work is of value. That being said, I now turn to your comment. "Very nice synopsis, Darkmoon," THANKYOU. "however, I would not base a theory on a lack of trooper resistance based on the few shell counts found anywhere on the battlefield, especially a location just off the battlefield road. These locations have been picked clean of shells for years due to the large number of souvenir hunters and battlefield visitors. This is one of the great flaws in basing our theories on archaeology. We really have no idea how many shells were originally found in that position." YES WE DO! RCOI - Custer Battlefield Historical and Museum Assn. edition: Pg 236 Captain Myles Moylan commander A Co. 7th Cavalry in Jun 1876. "The evidences were great many dead men lying about there. I saw Lieutenant Calhoun's company were killed in regular position of skirmishers. I counted 28 cartridge shells around one man... " Similar stories from others who were there right after the battle tell us that is was no more than that! If my memory also serves me it was Lt. Hare who also said that it was 26 cartridge shells he counted there; this from a book on him by Ray Mekeeta. And if you care to look closely I think you will find some of these eyewitness testimonies in Fox's book! As for the other subject of this thread. For Mystic... If Custer was killed at the ford then how do you explain Curley speaking of him in the present tense (ie. quite alive) to Bouyer at Calhoun hill?
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Post by conz on Aug 1, 2008 12:49:38 GMT -6
Glad to hear from you, Darkmoon! 1. Custer deviated from Reno's path because it was initally part of his plan. Had it not been a part of his plan he would have sent a message back to Reno notifying him of the change. Perhaps...I think two other possibilities are just as likely: 1) He sent a message to Reno later, as he moved across the creek to the north, or 2) His message was the waving of his hat from the bluffs. This would tell Reno all he had to know quicker than any horse-mounted messenger could get to him. What more did Reno need to know, other than that he could see Custer's command moving north on the bluffs? That would be Custer's attitude, I think. Perhaps, but I'm not sure it is a clear as you imply. There are a couple enlisted men's comments that "imply" the above that I've seen, but no serious evidence that this was a plan derived in advance. Doesn't mean it isn't true. <g> I agree, but place both officers at equal fault in my judgment book. And we can blame Custer a little for allowing a situation that enabled both his subordinates to fail him. That's a part of good leadership. I don't think that fact is very solid (that it was Benteen's job), but I agree that Custer didn't attempt to force MTC ford. Doesn't mean he wouldn't have if he thought he could have, however...it MAY have been his original intention before the situation developed as it did. I think Martin evidence says otherwise, does it not? As does many Native accounts. Seems to me that it is overwhelming evidence showing two groups split upon arriving at the MTC...one heading for the ford, and one going up on Luce ridge. Too much evidence to ignore, I think. Can't be disproved, but convincing folks of this model will be a challenge, I think, if only because of the locations of bodies found afterwards. That is actually the old, almost original, model for Crazy Horses action, and still believed by many. But just as many scholars of this battle now believe that CH and party never went to Ford D area, but crossed at Deep Ravine or crossed at MTC ford, came up the east side and charged from there. Last I'd heard the Deep Ravine approach, also now called "Crazy Horse Ravine" by many, was the interpretation from the Park Service there. Yet I don't think this jives with the many Native witness accounts, does it? They all talk about a long "sniping" period at both parts of the Custer field...Calhoun and Custer hills. Multiple each of those shell counts by 10 and you probably have a truer number of how many were fired there. That's archeology. <g> Perhaps...I agree in general...as to what parts Weir and then Benteen actually saw is hard to pin down. I think evidence shows that Weir was there about a half hour earlier than Benteen, and actually sent his company down from Weir hill towards the MTC, but didn't cross it before they came back. I think that's about right, at least by my current model. I don't think that agrees with all the fighting described by Native testimony. I know they can't be very precise with regards to time, but you put them all together and you certainly get the sense that the Custer fight was much longer and drawn out, with many more separate episodes, than the Reno fight was. Thanks, and enjoy! Clair
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Post by conz on Aug 1, 2008 12:58:15 GMT -6
Darkmoon,
I see better what you meant by the shell counts at Calhoun hill.
Infantry firefighting is sporadic...not like artillery fire. You can't say that 25 shells meant that they fired one shell a minute for 25 minutes.
It could easily mean that this man was on Calhoun for 10 minutes before he fired at all, averaged one shot a minute for the first 15 minutes at long range, and then no shots for five minutes as Natives maneuvered and it was very quiet, and then 3 shots a minute for the next five minutes as they approached, and then 5 shots in the minute just before he was overrun. This would come to a thirty-minute firefight from Calhoun hill, and then you have the close combat time...another five to ten minutes, so the entire Calhoun episode could have taken some 35-45 minutes or so, and that is about minimal time, I think. Could be stretched out further.
Of course, that is ONLY if this man that was observed and commented upon actually fought to the very end of the episode. If he was shot and incapacitated half way through this Calhoun fight, what does that tell us?
Clair
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Post by darkmoon on Aug 7, 2008 14:53:27 GMT -6
So so sorry it took so long to get back to you. I don't get much time these days!
I shall not try to take a point by point view. But rather summarize as best I can some of these with proof.
Giovanni Martini: (A coffee camp "several miles from the divide")..."He (Custer was talking to an Indian scout, called Bloody Knife, when I reported (as orderly trumpeter), and Bloody Knife was telling him about a fib village in the valley, several hundred tepees and about five thousand Sioux. Very soon the General jumped on his horse and rode bareback around the camp, talking to the officers in low tones and telling them what he wanted them to do. [Odd, isn't it? According to both Reno and Benteen at the RCOI; Custer didn't have any plans and if he did, he didn't tell them about it. Tis too bad Custer didn't speak in a more 'tone' efficeint manner isn't it? perhaps both of his junior officers would have hear these plans and what he had to say! (Later there was an episode. Custer had an arguement with one of them about being discovered. Custer thought they had not been discovered; the scout insisting that they had.) "At once he (Custer) ordered me to sound officers call and I did so. This showed that he realized now that we could not surprise the Sioux, and so there eas no use to keep quiet any longer." [Many today assume that Custer was still trying to maintain concealment from this time on, but here, clearly Martini says no. "For two days before this there had been no trumpet calls and every precaution had been taken to conceal our march. But now all was changed.
"The officers came quickly and they had an earnest conference with the General. None of the men were allowed to come near them, but soon they separated and went back to their companies. [Interesting, isn't it: Here once again the General is giving orders to who? Benteen, Reno et. al. And yet Custer according to both Reno and Benteen had no plans. Just what was he doing? Inviting them to afternoon tea with cookies on lace doilies with fancy napkins? Custer personally told Benteen that he had the "Advance." Both of these men lied at the RCOI about Custer's plans, if not elsewhere also: Thus thier credibility and trust in their word becomes a huge problem.
For over a 130 years a lie if not a multitude has been perpetrated uon the general public. I just exposed those that perpetrated it. And thus any book, publication or work based upon thier word becomes that lie! They made Gen. George Armstrong Custer the scapegoat for thier failures. The proof was in the orders and plans they not only had received as presented here, but those they actually received from Custer and perverted it into the story of his incompetence.
For years people have wondered: "Why didn't Custer scout ahead before charging into thousands of Indians which he knew nothing about? In fact he didn't! He did something else, something that the general public would not have known.
BENTEEN'S ORDERS: Martini cont..."Pretty soon the General said something to the Adjutant that I could not hear (from 2 yards away?) In a few minutes Capt. Benteen with three troops rode off in the direction that the General had pointed. [Here an obvious order had personally been given to Capt. Benteen. His mission as we learn from other sources was that of the "Advanced Guard." The Advance Guard... Kuhlman, Custer and Gall Saga, pg. 8...Information gathered in concert with Capt. E.S. Luce and Brig. Gen. H.G. Hawkins: "The duties of the advanced guard are many, depending on what it finds (not if) it makes contact. If it actually attacks or is itself attacked, the enemy is compelled to show his hand more or less and this betrays to the commander of the main body some of the things he must know ("position, strength and temperment of the enemy) before he can make and intelligent disposition of his force for the principal action... (Benteen was) sent and an Advanced Guard to open the engagement... It was a routine proceedure when the exact position, strength and temper of the enemy are not known." Now some to this day call this a "scout." It wasn't! It is what is known today as reconnaissance in force, a term Gen. George Patton, an old Cavalry officer himself knew all to well. They were to probe forward, find the weakness in the enemy (known as position, strength and temperment) and then relay that information back to the main body which then reinforced the Advanced Guard, in whole or part, to attack on that weakness. A scout it was not! Benteen was sent there to attack (pitch in), and report his findings back to Custer. A job not done. And an order he freely admitted during the RCOI that he disobeyed!
Now most would say in fairness to Benteen, "he had nothing to report!" Not true! According to the scout Varnum, in advance of Benteens battalion on those very same bluffs/hills Benteen's battalion marched. Varnum reported seeing the huge village and a large number of Indians about an hour prior to Reno's order being given. If he saw that village and those Indians then so too did Benteen! Was this or should this have been something that Benteen reported? How about that small force of Indians just ahead of the main column? The answer to both is unequivoally, undeniably a resounding - Yes! And did he? Failure to comply under any circumstances in this case was not an option. Thanks to Varnum the General knew of this before sending off Reno. For Varnum's observations proved to be the "exact location (position) , and their (number.) Exactly what he had sent Benteen to find out!
2) RENO'S ORDERS: Martini cont... "Soon we came to an old tepee that had a dead warrior in it. It was burning." [Interesting to point out here that Benteen salty as he was, was also flame retardant, because he entered this tepee after returning from his advance, only to describe it to his wife in a letter. And if anyone doubts the location of this tepee read Edgerly's testimony at the RCOI, it was virtually as the same location as the one where these scouts had set afire! One can allay any fears about Benteen by reading McDougall and Mathey's tesimony that it was indeed burning when they arrived there just prior to Benteen's arrival.] "The Indian scouts had set it afire. Just a little off from that there was a little hill, from which Girard, one of the scouts, saw some Indians between us and the river." [The same one's Benteen forgot to report.] ..."He said they were running away. He (Custer) ordered the Indian Scouts to follow them but they refused to go. Then the General motioned to Colonel Reno, and when he rode up the General told the Adjutant to order him to attack the village, and that he would support him with the whole regiment. He said (Custer) to Reno that he (Custer) would go down to the other end and drive them, and that he would have Benteen hurry up and attack them in the center." [Sounds like a plan to me, but noooo... Not to Benteen and Reno, Custer didn't have any plans!] Who was initially ordered to follow the Indians? 25 scouts! Since when does that order change from following them to sending a full battalion to attack a village?
More later, I intend to get to your questions. But first I have to go through this rather timely process. It is important! So sorry once again, but my time on this machine is limited. Try to answer you soon.
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Post by biggordie on Aug 7, 2008 15:45:39 GMT -6
darkmoon:
I believe that Mathey and Mc Dougall arrived at the lone tipi sometime AFTER Benteen did, not PRIOR TO. Was this simply a typo, or do you have some credible evidence that the pack train preceded Benteen to the tipi location?
Gordie
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Post by Dark Cloud on Aug 7, 2008 16:02:35 GMT -6
It makes sense under his original User ID's. Sorta. Amazing how they appear and vanish. Like the details of Martini's stories over the decades.
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Post by conz on Aug 8, 2008 7:52:55 GMT -6
Let's talk a bit about what is a "plan"...
Putting aside for a moment the distinction between "plans" and "orders," a plan can take many forms. In this case, we don't know much about the enemy, so the plan and its attendant orders are going be quite non-specific.
In a "movement to contact" situation as this the commander has an "intent," in this case to damage the Indians and destroy their belongings...that would accomplish the purpose of forcing them onto the reservation eventually...and then uses a plan to accomplish that intent. The plan can't be detailed at this point, because not enough about the enemy and the terrain are known. So you throw out an "advance guard" on your line of march, and "reconnaissances-in-force" to places not directly on your line of march.
Reno was performing this former role, right from the divide split, and Benteen was performing the latter role. A "scout" with a large force is the same thing as a "recon-in-force." But they are NOT the same thing as an "advance guard," because this role is deliberately preparing the way for the main body against the main threat, not any side-issues like Benteen was after.
The plan was only that..."Reno take the advance, Benteen recon the left flank, scouts all about, the village is probably down there but we don't know if it is alerted or not, and I'll give further orders when I find out more." That's the whole plan with probably some embellishments from discussions earlier like "I want to try to pull off an attack like at Washita...don't get into close combat with the Natives, use fire...keep the packs well up so they don't straggle...etc."
I think for sure Reno and Benteen understood more about what Custer expected, tactically, for them to do than they let on. It's just human nature to CYA...do you really want them to incriminate themselves?
Clair
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Post by Deleted on Aug 8, 2008 17:52:04 GMT -6
With all due respect Darkmoon, I take an entirely different interpretation of Moylan's remarks about the number of cartridge shells found around one trooper. I do not believe he was referring to the total number of shells found atop Calhoun Hill. He already indicated that Calhoun's men were found in regular skirmish order and then added that he counted 28 shells around one of those troopers. My interpretation is that Moylan was indicating that the troopers atop Calhoun Hill had each fired off about a third of their total number of cartridges, not that one trooper fired off 28 rounds and the other 30 men just stood there without firing a shot. Hare would have indicated the same thing in my view....that each trooper had fired between 25 to 30 rounds a piece.
keogh
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Post by Dark Cloud on Aug 8, 2008 20:07:40 GMT -6
Weigh in that Moylan was Calhoun's brother-in-law, and he'd have to be the one guy to face Margaret at some point. Nobody then or now would blame him, or anyone else, for trying to fluff up some aspect of the horror, such as Calhoun's unit putting up a great fight whether or not there was actual evidence for such. She lost three brothers, a nephew, her husband, and a lot of friends. He could have easily inserted that into the tale. And, frankly, what difference would it make?
And there's one actual and a few reasonable assumptions of precedent related to the LBH battle. Nobody seems to have lost sleep over bald face lying to Mrs. Sturgis years later by non participants, and there was a general agreement that a lot was kept under wraps because La Custer lived so long. It would not be surprising if Moylan and others fibbed about this sort of stuff from the get go as well. And, perfectly acceptable.
It's also the sort of thing they wouldn't want to blurt out at the unexpected RCOI, and lend a tone of concealment to their testimony.
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walkingstar
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Life is but a dream...
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Post by walkingstar on Aug 8, 2008 20:21:06 GMT -6
Poor, dear Maggie. She lost a husband, three brothers, and a nephew all at once. It would be so understandable for Moylan to have attempted to ease Maggie's horrific pain with tales of gallantry on behalf of her husband. How astute of you Dark Cloud to recognize the eloquent and human need to soften the devastating blow of death.
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