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Post by erkki on Dec 4, 2007 17:07:01 GMT -6
And what was Custer doing between Gray's 3:18 for the formation of the skirmish line and his arrival at Ford B at 4:00 p.m.? That's not just Gray's here. Walter Camp also believed that Custer remained in the vicinity of MTC or Luce/Nye-Cartright Ridge for about 40 minutes or so for some reason or other. Varnum thought it unlikely that Custer would wait there, but then, where was Custer's location when the volleys were heard just after 4:00 pm? It is thought that Calhoun Hill was too far away for the firing to be heard from Reno's hilltop position. This would leave either Nye-Cartright Hill or MTF, thus we are back to Camp's position that Custer remained in that area for nearly 40 minutes. But if so, then why? I'd put the heavy firing around 4 o'clock with the C Co. charge from Calhoun Ridge/Finley to Greasy Grass and Lame White Man's counter charge after Custer was driven back up to/toward/through the cemetery from Ford D1. Camp's 40 minutes in MTC more credibly derived from the deployment of Cos. L and C across Nye-Cartwright to Luce while GAC made his foray to the Cheyenne fords. Fords--plural--D1, in the vicinity of Deep Ravine and D2, the Willy Bend ford near the present RR bridge. Remember: Camp "knew" Custer was first hit at Ford B and wrote up his notes accordingly--and that knowledge also influenced Marquis, Miller, Hyde et al..
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Post by mwkeogh on Dec 5, 2007 19:19:33 GMT -6
I don't understand how gunfire can be heard 7 miles away. I live in the country and hear gunfire almost daily. But I'm pretty sure I haven't heard it that far away -- I'd guess five miles tops if all the conditions are perfect. Does sound travel further in the west? I would have to agree with you here clw. Whatever scientific theory stated that gunfire could be heard 7 miles away is just a bit too bent for me to believe. It is more likely that the proposed location of the morass where gunfire was heard was incorrectly located 7 miles from the valley, when the actual location was far closer to the valley fight.
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Post by mwkeogh on Dec 5, 2007 19:42:27 GMT -6
I'd put the heavy firing around 4 o'clock with the C Co. charge from Calhoun Ridge/Finley to Greasy Grass and Lame White Man's counter charge after Custer was driven back up to/toward/through the cemetery from Ford D1. Camp's 40 minutes in MTC more credibly derived from the deployment of Cos. L and C across Nye-Cartwright to Luce while GAC made his foray to the Cheyenne fords. Fords--plural--D1, in the vicinity of Deep Ravine and D2, the Willy Bend ford near the present RR bridge. Remember: Camp "knew" Custer was first hit at Ford B and wrote up his notes accordingly--and that knowledge also influenced Marquis, Miller, Hyde et al.. Doran also theorizes that Custer made his way towards the north ford right away leaving a few of his companies behind to skirmish on the Luce & Blummer Ridges. I could certainly agree that much of the skirmishing on these ridges occupied a good portion of the missing 40 minutes of time, however, that would bring us to 4:00 pm and I cannot see the action around Keogh's position on Battle Ridge occurring so very soon in the fight. It would take much more time for both forces (Cavalry and Indians) to cover this ground and deploy dismounted. I think it less likely that the volley firing heard on Reno Hill derived from Calhoun Hill. I think it far more likely that this fire came from the skirmish positions identified on Luce and Blummer Ridges and far closer to Reno's position. If true, it would still leave plenty of time for Custer's 2nd battalion to reach the Willy Bend ford and return to LSH by 5:00 or 5:15 pm. I understand that a number of researchers do not believe that Custer made any effort whatsoever to cross at MTF, but if so, I cannot for the life of me understand how he could justify not doing so with at least one of his two battalions. It made no sense whatsoever to ignore this option to provide support to Reno and further demoralize the hostiles. And there is evidence to support a brief fight occurring in the vicinity of MTF, which is what Camp was basing his views upon. (ie: Peter Thompson, Gustave Korn, Sgt. Bustard or another I trooper and horse), Indian accounts, and even the Real Birds claim to have picked up buckets of cartridges in the vicinity of MTF when they were children. Clearly something happened down there, however truncated it may have been).
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Post by fred on Dec 6, 2007 5:33:23 GMT -6
I understand that a number of researchers do not believe that Custer made any effort whatsoever to cross at MTF, but if so, I cannot for the life of me understand how he could justify not doing so with at least one of his two battalions. It made no sense whatsoever to ignore this option to provide support to Reno and further demoralize the hostiles. And there is evidence to support a brief fight occurring in the vicinity of MTF, which is what Camp was basing his views upon. (ie: Peter Thompson, Gustave Korn, Sgt. Bustard or another I trooper and horse), Indian accounts, and even the Real Birds claim to have picked up buckets of cartridges in the vicinity of MTF when they were children. Clearly something happened down there, however truncated it may have been). Bill-- When are all you guys going to rid yourselves of the notion that Custer had to give support to Reno? It's the same trap everyone falls into with the business of the packs and the Martini/Benteen note. Where and when, suddenly, does this great, altruistic and loving commander enter the picture? " Protect the Packs!" "Head north to support Reno!" I just cannot understand it. Custer was interested in one thing only: bringing the Indians to bay. His hat waving, his comments to his men, the men's cheering after he left the Reno sighting, all point in one direction: confidence. Whatever his initial feelings were when he separated from Reno and headed over the hills, what Custer saw when he watched Reno fighting in the valley gave him new confidence he had achieved some measure of surprise and that if he hustled he could wrap the whole thing up, toute de suite. And again, if Custer wanted to cross at Ford B, why didn't he? Or do we have this "deploying Indians" business still in mind, this great tactical cabal the Indians were busy perpetrating on the poor unsuspecting troopers? I still cannot believe there is anyone out there who would think George Custer would attack a 1 1/4- to 1 1/2-mile-long village with some 88 men (3 of whom were non-combatants), leaving 58.1% of his force a mile back from the quasi-disputed crossing point. I especially wouldn't think it of you, a person who has clearly forgotten more about this whole event than I even know. Or may ever know, for that matter! Here is something to consider when thinking about Custer "wanting" or "needing" to support Reno: DeRudio claimed he saw Custer five to six minutes before Reno retreated ... and he estimated it only took five to six minutes for the command to begin getting across the Little Big Horn in its retreat. If that is the case, Custer could have gone only about two miles—at a gait of ten to twelve miles per hour, which is pretty fast—and would not have even reached Ford B, some 3.6 miles from where DeRudio saw him. If Custer’s route took him down Cedar Coulee into Medicine Tail Coulee, down Medicine Tail to its north fork, then up onto Luce Ridge—where he would have paused for a minute or two to view and issue instructions—then down the ridges to near Ford B, he would have been only where North Fork enters Medicine Tail when Reno reached the retreat crossing. You have to figure another ten minutes before Reno’s command began reaching the top of the hill, and in those ten minutes, Custer would have dropped off Keogh—one, two minutes—and traveled another three thousand feet—reasonable at eight miles per hour on the ridges—putting him near the Ford B environs about the same time Reno’s men were beginning to reach the hilltop. If the Indians left the valley some little while after Reno’s men got to the top of the hill—they were milling around, watching Benteen for a while—then it stands to reason Custer was not confronted by any large number of Indians as he approached Ford B. At the Reno inquiry, Benteen said he thought there were about nine hundred Indians in the bottoms—about one mile away—circling around, when he arrived on the hill. He thought the Indians remained there no longer than one-half to three-quarters of an hour, before heading downstream. DeRudio confirmed part of Benteen’s comments when he said soon after Reno’s command left the woods and reached the hill, firing began on the other side of the village, but it was a few minutes after the command reached the top of the hill and it was after the heavy firing began downstream, that the Indians left Reno. He even clarified this a short time later when he testified Reno was not on the hill for ten minutes when the firing started downstream. “I heard immense volleys of firing and more than half the Indians around Major Reno left. Part of them went on the highest bluffs and part went down the river. Some of them picketed their ponies under the bluffs and lay down flat, watching Major Reno.” Reno’s orderly, Private Edward Davern, gave us further confirmation when he claimed that shortly after he reached the hilltop he heard firing, volleys from downstream, though not very distinct, and most of Reno’s command was already on the hill.
(This timing also lends significant credence to the theory that Custer never knew of Reno’s plight. Some writers/students believe Custer found out Reno was in trouble when Mitch Boyer—supposedly watching the battle from Weir Peaks—rode down along the bluffs and informed Custer—near Ford B—that Reno had retreated. Given the time situation—forget about the difficulty of Boyer’s route down to Medicine Tail Coulee!—this scenario appears highly unlikely.)
So, at ten miles per hour, it would have taken Custer twenty-two minutes to reach Ford B. (DeRudio confirmed this when he told the court Custer could have reached the ford in twenty minutes from where DeRudio had seen him.) If DeRudio were correct about his five-to-six minutes, plus his second five-to-six minutes, and then another ten minutes for the van to begin reaching the hilltop, Custer would have been nearing—or might have already arrived at—the ford as the body of Reno’s men was reaching and consolidating the hilltop. Custer’s movements would have been at a very high rate of speed, but that is reasonable and fully consistent with his actions to that point, and even if his movements were slowed down by a few minutes it would still tie in with DeRudio’s claim that the firing downstream began a few minutes after Reno’s men reached the hill. This was the prelude to the first volley firing heard and based on the archaeological evidence, the initial volley—or volleys—would have had to have been fired on Luce Ridge, in all likelihood by Myles Keogh’s battalion.Another thing... what is this sudden fascination with James Bustard? According to Edgerly, his body was found next to Keogh. Only Kanipe claimed it was Bustard’s horse that bolted into the Indian camp, but he was wrong, because Bustard was riding SGT DeLacy’s horse that day. On the other hand, PVT William A. Brown's (F) body was found on the west side of the LBH, near the mouth of MTC. Bruce Liddic-- among others-- said his body was found 250 yards across the LBH from the Deep Coulee crossing [ Vanishing Victory, p. 164]. One other possibility-- though my preference is by far William Brown-- is SGT John S. Ogden (E), whose body was buried at the mouth of Deep Ravine, near the river. Greg Michno, however, claimed it is possible he was killed near MTC ford. In his narrative in The Mystery of E Troop, p. 30, Michno has Ogden as the E Company trooper whose horse bolted across Ford B and into the Cheyenne village. You will not find me arguing that something happened at Ford B, but a failed crossing is so far from the truth as to be head-shaking. I have no doubt Custer and Yates were there, firing went on, and Custer pulled back. I will cede the point that if he thought it propitious, Custer would have crossed there-- he could have easily signaled for Keogh to come down-- but, for whatever specific reason, he decided against it. If Custer's aim was to attack that village with 2 companies-- 88 men-- then the U. S. Army was better off rid of the man!! and he got what he deserved. As for the Realbirds and their buckets of cartridges, I believe that is more Crow bloviating than fact. Some, I'll grant you, but "buckets"? Again, there was testimony at the RCOI about great demonstrations and firing in that area... and more than once, mind you. But you talk about tainted archaeological interpretation! If one went to that ford a day or two after and saw "buckets" of cartridges, one might think WWIII had been fought there, yet it could just as easily have been Indian bravado, à la, Middle Eastern hoop-la. And what about all the rain and snow over the years? Or were the cartridges buried by the stomping of Indian ponies, only to be revealed to the Realbirds? I guess it's possible. Where are those cartridges today? Conveniently turned into plowshares? Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by shan on Dec 6, 2007 6:42:23 GMT -6
Fred,
I totally agree with you about lack of evidence for any serious attempt of an attack being attempted at MTF. Why this was not pursued is one of those mysteries us non milatary folk have to grapple with, surely it makes sense right? As a matter of fact it's the main reason many of us even think of giving head room to the Custer killed at the ford theory, all the evidence is against it, yet it persists like an itch in the mind because it would at least be some sort of explantion. But, to reiterate, I don't think there was a plan to attack using that route, though why in that case, those companies were sent down in that direction there is yet another of those irritents that keeps us awake at night.
However, my main purpose in this post is to thank you for that run down on how long it would have taken Custer to actually get to the ford. As I said elsewhere, I have walked that route, well the road section of that particular bit, but that was not much help in trying to assertain Custers timing, and besides, he used a different approach anyway. Seeing it from Weir point didn't help much either, for if the light is kind the immagination tends to get you there so much quicker. I had always thought that Custer could have been down there much quicker than you imply, which of course makes the fact that he didn't attack across the all the mysterious.
So here we are at the beginning of his side of the battle agreeing, it can only go downhill from here,
shan
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Post by wild on Dec 6, 2007 7:41:38 GMT -6
Conz Custer was committed to advancing along the East bank before Girard's meeting with Cooke.
What makes you think this, wild Because if he was committed to following Reno he would have positioned his force as to support Reno .The whole idea of a cavalry attack is that the entire force hits the enemy in supporting waves.By letting a gap open up between Reno and himself the effect of 320 troopers hitting the target together was lost. Also there is no evidence of Custer asking Reno to report his progress and holding his force back until he got this information. Reno was on his own from the moment he started his advance down the West bank
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Post by fred on Dec 6, 2007 8:10:13 GMT -6
So here we are... agreeing, it can only go downhill from here. Shan-- Not likely, my friend. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by conz on Dec 6, 2007 8:28:01 GMT -6
Because if he was committed to following Reno he would have positioned his force as to support Reno .The whole idea of a cavalry attack is that the entire force hits the enemy in supporting waves.By letting a gap open up between Reno and himself the effect of 320 troopers hitting the target together was lost. Also there is no evidence of Custer asking Reno to report his progress and holding his force back until he got this information. Reno was on his own from the moment he started his advance down the West bank When you are attacking an enemy and on terrain about which you have little knowledge, you NEVER, EVER, put your whole force in, you see. An officer will always send "something" in big enough to "develop the situation." It has to be big enough to get the enemy to react, but not enough to decisively engage (i.e., "tie up") the bulk of your combat power. So this time-worn military concept, well understood by all these combat veterans and West Point-trained officers, was exactly what Custer was doing by keeping his main body well back from his advance guard. So I would revise your model about Custer having his plan all made up before he gave Reno his orders up the creek. He would send in an advance guard, and then wait to see the situation develop before deciding where to commit his main force to destroy the enemy. As for what Custer told Reno, do you think he needed to tell his advance guard commander to make a report? These guys know their business, and Reno knows what he is supposed to report. And Custer made SURE he got the information with TRIPLE reporting systems...his advance guard (Reno), his adjustant and an experienced company commander (Cooke/Keogh), and his scouts (Girard and Indians)...so he knew what the enemy reaction would be when he made his decision on how to commit his main force. Clair
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Post by conz on Dec 6, 2007 8:33:48 GMT -6
Fred,
I pretty much agree with your assessment of Custer's eventual intentions and decisions at Ford B (MTC ford).
Initially Custer would be looking for the quickest way to get at the Indians Reno was fighting (that is the more important imperative...not necessarily "saving" Reno).
While Keogh was securing the high ground (there were Indians in that direction, after all, and many more COULD be to Custer's north) Yates goes to force the ford. As you say, if the ford crossing pans out, Custer can quickly call down Keogh.
Custer decides, by the evidence at hand, that the ford CANNOT be crossed (probably more due to resistance than terrain...after all, if 900 Natives are in front of Reno at this time, aren't 1,100 or more in front of Ford B?!), so he sets up a block at Deep Coulee and goes looking for the next best place to cross. In the meantime, he expects Benteen and McDougall's four companies, at least, to come up.
Clair
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Post by fred on Dec 6, 2007 8:47:07 GMT -6
When you are attacking an enemy and on terrain about which you have little knowledge, you NEVER, EVER, put your whole force in, you see. ... So this time-worn military concept, well understood by all these combat veterans and West Point-trained officers, was exactly what Custer was doing by keeping his main body well back from his advance guard. So I would revise your model about Custer having his plan all made up before he gave Reno his orders up the creek. He would send in an advance guard, and then wait to see the situation develop before deciding where to commit his main force to destroy the enemy. As for what Custer told Reno, do you think he needed to tell his advance guard commander to make a report? These guys know their business, and Reno knows what he is supposed to report. And Custer made SURE he got the information with TRIPLE reporting systems...his advance guard (Reno), his adjustant and an experienced company commander (Cooke/Keogh), and his scouts (Girard and Indians)...so he knew what the enemy reaction would be when he made his decision on how to commit his main force. Clair-- I think you are making this too complicated and I think you are employing some principles that pertain to more modern warfare. I am not sure these ideas held the same sway in 1876 Indian-fighting-warfare that they held in the Civil War or certainly today. I don't see Reno as anything even close to an "advance guard"... unless semantics are again getting in the way. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Dec 6, 2007 9:21:43 GMT -6
Custer decides, by the evidence at hand, that the ford CANNOT be crossed (probably more due to resistance than terrain...after all, if 900 Natives are in front of Reno at this time, aren't 1,100 or more in front of Ford B?!), so he sets up a block at Deep Coulee and goes looking for the next best place to cross. In the meantime, he expects Benteen and McDougall's four companies, at least, to come up. Clair-- Again, this is the "deploying" theory. The answer to your question is, "No." When Custer viewed the Reno battle, I am sure he could make something of an estimate as to how many Indians there were fronting Reno. (Maybe he didn't; maybe he just didn't care.) In his mind, he felt there would be a maximum of 1,500. So, what was the math? I don't know. There was a certain immediacy to the Indians' response, but let's not forget that the preponderance of Indians fighting Reno were those closest to Reno's advance. Yet, many still didn't arrive until late because of all the ritual they went through, the time it took to gather horses, and maybe many were even out hunting. To me, Reno faced a minority portion of the total available force, even at 900 warriors. But it took time to accumulate this Indian force. It is what gives us the time to string out Custer's actions once the command is re-united on Calhoun Hill or Nye-Cartwright. That's why I am so insistent upon the fact that Custer met with little pressure in that Ford B area and well beyond. The Indians mustered all the "immediacy" they could to battle Reno... and that's why the warriors left the Reno fight when they did. We criticize Reno for leaving the timber, but we don't criticize Keogh-Calhoun-Harrington, which was essentially the same-sized force. And if all the Indians who were fighting Reno came back north and confronted Custer's command, then the density of Indians would have been a lot less in the north than in front of Reno: there was infinitely more space/terrain to cover. If it were the case, then Keogh succumbed to a much smaller force. Would you believe that? I wouldn't. As time moved on, the Indian forces swelled. I think somewhere between 20 and 40 warriors confronted Custer at Ford B. And yes, the west side of the ford was Benteen-mirey. Would that have stopped George from crossing. Hardly. There is also testimony that says the Gray Horse Troop occupied the flat, while others (it would have to be F and HQ) remained back from the river on a small bluff. Coincidentally, that bluff was where the brass cartridge case-- consistent with the ones Custer used-- was found. Something entered Custer's mind that told him he did not want to cross there. What was it? I don't know, but maybe his view from that spot was not expansive enough and he still couldn't get the information he wanted, i.e., what the hell has happening at this end of the village. If he was afraid of the Indians scattering, this is where it would take place! If you were Custer, wouldn't you want to see the whole shebang? I know I would. Ergo, a move farther north was necessary and another crossing point vital. I will certainly buy the idea that Custer would have crossed at B had the opportunity presented itself or if the situation warranted it, but in Custer's mind, it did not. You bring up 900 + 1,100. Again, this number is fine, but it does not take into consideration the density factor, something Boyer and LT Bradley harped upon when they spotted the villages on the Tongue and along the Rosebud. It would mean there were more lodges per square foot in the LBH valley than troops were used to seeing in normal Indian encampments. That translates to a lot more warriors. We cannot just eschew that information for the sake of theory and that's what leads me to believe there were a lot more Indians than most people think. Now, where they were when the heat rose, your guess is as good as mine, but I think I gave some reasons earlier and then again, by their own admission, many warriors were not even in the fight. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by conz on Dec 6, 2007 10:55:06 GMT -6
But it took time to accumulate this Indian force. It is what gives us the time to string out Custer's actions once the command is re-united on Calhoun Hill or Nye-Cartwright. That's why I am so insistent upon the fact that Custer met with little pressure in that Ford B area and well beyond. The Indians mustered all the "immediacy" they could to battle Reno... and that's why the warriors left the Reno fight when they did. We criticize Reno for leaving the timber, but we don't criticize Keogh-Calhoun-Harrington, which was essentially the same-sized force. And if all the Indians who were fighting Reno came back north and confronted Custer's command, then the density of Indians would have been a lot less in the north than in front of Reno: there was infinitely more space/terrain to cover. If it were the case, then Keogh succumbed to a much smaller force. Would you believe that? I wouldn't. If less than half the Native force was fighting Reno at the timber, about the time Yates was coming down MTC and Custer was watching the village from Luce or Nye, how many Natives could he see mustering just behind the village? There are probably 1,500 or so Warriors donning their gear, riding around in circles gathering their war parties, driving in ponies...raising a LOT of dust in and along the west side of the entire village. Isn't that what Custer and Yates are looking at coming down MTC, as well as a HUGE dust cloud and firing coming off the Reno area? I think that would make Custer hesitate to commit his whole force immediately to an unknown ford site. I think the amount of actual initial opposition right at the ford is as you say here...but I also don't see how Custer couldn't see hundreds of Warriors within 1,000 meters of the ford area on the west side. Are you going to charge your command across a ford into that? He wants to charge into the rear of the Natives facing Reno, not a mass of Warriors effectively "in reserve" ready to attack the head of the narrow column he would need to use to cross the ford. Agree with all this, adding that I think what made up his mind was the hundreds of Warriors he could see behind the village from his location on the ridgeline. Bouyer, too, could see them even better, eh? Perhaps, but give or take a couple thousand Warriors doesn't make much difference. <g> Where were the Warriors that weren't in front of Reno? We should be able to make a pretty good guess about that...Native witness accounts mention it over and over. They are in the village...mostly center and northern parts, and gathering on the western side of the village to collect themselves to ride into battle in their "groups." And none of them are standing still on their ponies as they work themselves up, I'd have to say. Clair
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Post by wild on Dec 6, 2007 11:31:49 GMT -6
When you are attacking an enemy and on terrain about which you have little knowledge, you NEVER, EVER, put your whole force in, you see. Reno was ordered to attack and he would be supported.How does that become a recce,report back to me,and then I'll decide? Also even if it was a recce don't you think risking 3 of his 8 troops to the unknown a bit reckless?
As for what Custer told Reno, do you think he needed to tell his advance guard commander to make a report? Reno was his first wave attack commander. In military parlance a recce and an attack have very different meanings.
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Post by fred on Dec 6, 2007 12:22:57 GMT -6
1. If less than half the Native force was fighting Reno at the timber, about the time Yates was coming down MTC and Custer was watching the village from Luce or Nye, how many Natives could he see mustering just behind the village? 2. There are probably 1,500 or so Warriors donning their gear, riding around in circles gathering their war parties, driving in ponies...raising a LOT of dust in and along the west side of the entire village. Isn't that what Custer and Yates are looking at coming down MTC, as well as a HUGE dust cloud and firing coming off the Reno area? 3. I think the amount of actual initial opposition right at the ford is as you say here...but I also don't see how Custer couldn't see hundreds of Warriors within 1,000 meters of the ford area on the west side. 4. Agree with all this, adding that I think what made up his mind was the hundreds of Warriors he could see behind the village from his location on the ridgeline. Bouyer, too, could see them even better, eh? Clair-- I broke down your post so I could better address it. 1. If they came down MTC rather than using the heights to get to Ford B, they saw nothing. Nothing at all. You can't, not even when you have reached the ford. 2. If the dust cloud made by the Indians fronting Reno hadn't already disappeared-- partially replaced by gunsmoke-- again, they would have seen little of nothing. The trees along the river would have obscured the view. Plus, the bluffs come close to the water in that area. Also, if I am correct, Custer never got as close as the water, but stood back from it. With a village strung out for more than a mile, you are making an assumption that all these warriors were gathering en masse, and I do not believe that to be the case. 3. Again, he couldn't see up the valley. 4. You are right about Boyer. That point I will give you. However, Boyer had been warning Custer all along the way, for days. What makes you think a warning at this point would have made Custer do a 180? I will bet you a dollar to a donut that if Boyer told ol' Goldilocks anything, it was, "Hey, boss! You got some serious problems here with numbers!" He was long past Reno's problem. Best wishes, Fred. PS-- Incidentally, Clair... there is an absolutely tremendous map available at the LBH bookstore and you should invest the $8 or $9 in it. It's called the "Little Bighorn Battlefield Map, Archeological Finds and Historic Locations." It's produced by a fellow named Mike Bonafede (1999: Atalissa, Inc., Loveland, CO). It is great! It is simply a fold-out and it consists of aerial photos of the various fields, with marker names, area names, some clarified elevations, and color-coded markings where various artifacts were found. It is a tad bit hard to read, but it is an extraordinary find. The whole thing, unfolded, is only about 24" x 21". What a marvelous reference tool. If there was any question about where Reno's timber was located, this solves that issue. It even plots the old river course (bright blue over the black and white photo background). FCW
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Post by conz on Dec 6, 2007 13:04:18 GMT -6
Reno was ordered to attack and he would be supported.How does that become a recce,report back to me,and then I'll decide? Also even if it was a recce don't you think risking 3 of his 8 troops to the unknown a bit reckless? It is very common and standard military practice to do such a thing, and all the officers on that field understand that. The main leaders are Civil War veterans, after all...have probably seen more combat than any U.S. Soldiers that have ever served in our entire history. Note that it was Reno who said in the RCOI that he was Custer's "advance guard." So he knows what to do. It is not a "reconnaissance" per se...it is a combat formation designed to fight to develop the situation. If it can overwhelm the enemy, it will...that is what makes it different from a reconnaissance mission, which has a much lower fighting responsibility. He's not that either...he is a force with the responsibility in between what you describe above. An "advance guard" mission is given a force when you are making a "movement to contact" or "meeting engagement" in military theory. In such cases, you don't have a plan made out in advance...you develop it as the situation is developed. The advance guard develops that situation and enables the successful employment of the main body to defeat the enemy. Standard Napoleonic tactics as practiced routinely in the Civil War, and indeed, in all wars of human history for that matter. Clair
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