ConZ's In House Theory

[wild]

clw
Thank you for your answer ,good shot and it does have a certain logic even if undermined by the erronious reference to the Crow's nest.
Look at it this way.Custer sent Benteen to scout valleys to the East of the LBH then he himself takes his 5 troops along the East side.That makes 8 troops committed to the East side 3 to the West.Yet you hold that he knew the Indians would be on the West bank?

[mcaryf]

I think there are some grounds for thinking there were Indians camped on both sides of the river. Certainly the McElfresh map shows the Spotted Tail Agency Indians located on the East bank. However, clw is correct in suggesting that the lie of the land would more probably mean the main camps would be on the West bank as indeed they were.

The Crows and the Arikara managed to ascend and descend the bluffs along from Reno Hill towards Weir Peaks so it would not have been impossible for Custer to take his command down there to "support" Reno by an attack up the East bank.

It is an interesting agument to claim that Benteen's focus was meant to be the East bank of the LBH when he was actually sent to follow a line to the SW. Given that all of Custer's command were initially to the East of the LBH, they would all necessarily reach the East bank first.

Regards

Mike

[clw]

Granted the Spotted Tail group is shown on the east side, but in a flat clearing with acess to the water. They were camped on the west side because all along the length of the camp they could get to the river. Some of the scouts knew the ground and this would be a no brainer for them to figure out.

[crzhrs]

The reason Custer ordered an attack on the 25th rather than waiting for the morning of the 26th was the fact that all indications pointed to Indians running.

This was the greatest fear of the military . . . lose the Indians and the army may never find them in such large concentrations again and the whole campaign would fizzle into a maddening chase of small groups of Indians.

Reno was ordered to bring the Indians to battle . . . again the belief Indians were running rather than making a stand.

Reno sends two messengers to Custer, Girard tells Cooke the Indians are making a stand and Cooke relays he would tell Custer.

Those messages altered Custer's plans. He may have gone much further downriver than he wanted. Rather than joining Reno's attack at a much closer distance he heads downriver in the hopes of capturing non-coms while most warriors are dealing with Reno.

Rather than the warriors immediately countering Reno they created a dust screen to hide non-coms and their movements. It was only Reno's stopping that gave the warriors the edge. Stationary soldiers on foot were now less of a threat than charging cavalry. The balance of power was now tipped in the Indians favor.

It seems Custer's main goal was to capture the non-coms and probably hold the village as well . . . a double bonus. Captives & possession of the village with all its food, equipment, & necessities of life . . . thus forcing the Indians to reservations.

If Custer's plan was to capture non-coms then he should have had enough men to do so. Benteen's additional men may have helped but was not a necessity at that time.

Custer may just have wanted Benteen to return from his scout and be ready to assist against the Indians anywhere he could, not just with Custer.

I believe Girard's telling Cooke the Indians were making a stand completely changed the fate of the 7th.

[conz]

clw said:

conz said:

1. Custer deviated from Reno's path after, and because of, messages he received from Reno (via messenger and Cooke/Keogh). Had it not been for that word, he would have followed Reno into the valley.

Why did this cause him to change his plans?

My interpretation is that Custer was awaiting intelligence to decide how to best deploy his main body to defeat the warriors. If they were running, he would follow Reno, as that would be the quickest way...up the flat valley, not going through the hills.

If they were standing to fight, he would move to flank them and trap them, and the only way to do this, really, was to go up the bluffs on the right side of the river, get below them, and cross to attack their flank.

The word from Reno was that they were standing, so his choice was only THEN, made.

Clair

[conz]

elisabeth said:

I have to say that I have worries about Cooke's report -- if he even bothered to give it -- meaning anything. To Custer, this would be SOP. Attack a village: of course the warriors come out. Custer would expect that, and expect it to mask the withdrawal of the families. (He'd probably have rolled his eyes heavenwards at Reno's, as he'd have thought, over-excited report.) He may possibly have been fooled by the dust and commotion into thinking that the whole mega-village was on the run, and that he could "head them off at the pass"... but as you say, their determination to stick was the deciding factor.

If Cooke reported that warriors were making a stand, this would surely be nothing more than Custer would expect ...?

While Custer may have expected that the Natives would probably come out to defend their village, this was not a given. There were plenty of cavalry actions in prior years which Custer was well aware of where the charging cavalry got into the village before a Native stand could be made. In this case, they often ran out the other end of the village "for the hills."

So if Reno actually managed to surprise the Natives to this extent, Custer may have wanted a head-on pursuit...going around the flank would never catch any running bodies.

So if they stand, you make a flank move. If they run and try to scatter, you charge head on--quickest way there.

Clair

[conz]

Fred,

As always, your models are sound. I agree with most of what you postulate, with perhaps these differences and why...

fred said:

I completely agree with this assessment. I have never bought the "flank attack" theory and that's what Ford B-- even though it wasn't the flank, per se, was. Custer was out to break the back of the Sioux and Cheyenne nations and he couldn't have done it with either a dumb tactical move or by charging through an emptying village. He had to immobilize the warriors and he could only have done that through a threat to their families.

I agree that this is one way to pin the Warriors so you can kill them. Another way is to separate them from their pony herd. And sometimes in a pinch Warriors would still abandon their families, so it is not a sure thing. But as long as the Warriors are standing, you don't care about their families, eh? The main object is to kill Warriors. And the only way to really do this is to get behind them.

I think the scattering business so permeated the military's mind, there was no room for any other permutations. Otherwise I think Custer would still have gone down the valley behind Reno... and then, so would have Benteen. Theoretically, that could/would have broken the Indians' back. I think he felt that if he couldn't surprise them before they could fully react to the warnings, he would expect nothing more than a scattering village.

I agree...if Reno actually surprised the Natives enough, they could not have made a stand, and Reno would be chasing them through the village. In this case, Custer's slower movement roundabout through the hills would be next to useless.

So if it is already a full pursuit, Custer must follow Reno, I'm sure he thought. If there is resistance, though, he should move around them to get into their rear (whether you call that a "flank attack" or not is immaterial to me...all you want is to kill Warriors effectively).

Note that cavalry can no more ride over an Indian firing line than the Indians can ride over a cavalry skirmish line...in both cases, you have to go around it to really kill your opponents.

Then things changed. Gerard reports Indians are coming out to meet Reno. To me, that indicates “screen,” which indicates “delaying tactics,” which indicates… why?… Indians are going to scatter. The screen buys them time. The logical route of advance in this kind of a situation is clearly down the valley, not along and amidst the bluffs and ravines. (It is also, by far, the easiest route and you will not be able to hide large numbers of the enemy in any hidden swales.) If—as Custer may have felt—there were enough warriors to oppose his command and tie it down before scattering, then something must be done to prevent, (a) either the scattering, or, (b) the tying up of his regiment. The only thing he can do is move around the village and come in from the other side-- not the flank.

just so

If—as I believe—the activity at Ford B was minimal, then Custer was under little or no pressure and moved farther north at his own convenience and desire (as opposed to being forced there). This must CLEARLY be the case because he would have moved back in the direction he came if he was under severe pressure. Or he was an utter fool... your pick.

OR...the activity at Ford B was only "minimal" because Custer saw the opposition at the ford and didn't push the issue. Native accounts have quite a bit of skirmishing going on here above Ford B, without any close combat. This doesn't mean that Custer did not intend to use Ford B...it only means that he chose not to after seeing it.

I do not believe Custer was in the round-up business. To me, his idea was to gather enough troops—he left Keogh back to, (a) protect his rear, and (b) to await Benteen’s arrival-- then move against the villagers and whatever forces were with them. His recon completed, he moved from Ford D back to the Cemetery Ridge/Last Stand Hill area to wait for both Keogh and Benteen and THEN he would have moved across Ford D and that's what would have threatened the Indian families. The threat alone could have had a serious affect on the warriors and could have broken the back of the resistance.

That just doesn't sound aggressive enough for my understanding of Custer. I think he desperately wanted to charge to Reno...moreso the longer the action went on. At some point, he knew that the large numbers in front of him, and seeing natives on and coming over Wier Peak, meant Reno had failed, or was in serious trouble. A cavalry commander doesn't "wait" in such circumstances, I think.

That's what makes me believe that Custer was never merely "reconning" at either ford...that only opposition he judged was too strong prevented him charging his whole command across either ford. Custer was bold, but not so bold as to charge a strong line of much more numerous Natives in defensible positions.

Other theories of Custer's actions I don't think take enough account of his aggressive nature and his great desire to ride to the sound of Reno's guns.

Clair

[conz]

clw said:

We're not far apart, but the main difference is that I think things in the valley were going just as Custer expected and hoped. And because they were, he never made a change in plan based on anything that happened there.

Poor Clair. When he gets back to 'work' on Monday he won't know who to answer first. <bg>

Got that right! Was partying in downtown Louisville all weekend and trying to follow this wild college football week!

Now it's nearly 5pm and I've only read page one. <g>

Great discussions, though....

Clair

[conz]

clw said:

I didn't mean to imply that Reno was intended to be a diversion. It was an attack meant to engage the main body of warriors. The logical expectation was that the village would flee in the opposite direction.

I agree with the purpose, maybe not so much with the expectation.

I think that a cavalry officer's FIRST expectation is that the Natives would form a firing line and defend their village while it disassembles and runs. This means strong resistance by the full force of Warriors.

The SECOND expectation/probability is that the Natives will scatter and abandon their village...a smaller one that the Warriors will run and abandon their families as well. So this implies at least a small amount of resistance.

The THIRD, and not very high in probability, is that the Natives will come out and attack you in force, trying to surround you and attempting to get close to your skirmish lines. This we would call in the military today the "most dangerous, and least probable" enemy course of action. If you aren't prepared for this...watch out.

And that last is, of course, what happened. Custer did not accept the indicators of this last "ECOA" until it was too late to take actions to prevent his disaster.

Clair

[fred]

crzhrs said:

I believe Girard's telling Cooke the Indians were making a stand completely changed the fate of the 7th.

I for one, completely agree. (Except on the spelling of "Gerard.")

Best wishes,
Fred.

[wild]

I believe Girard's telling Cooke the Indians were making a stand completely changed the fate of the 7th.
Custer was committed to advancing along the East bank before Girard's meeting with Cooke.

[conz]

wild said:

I believe Girard's telling Cooke the Indians were making a stand completely changed the fate of the 7th.
Custer was committed to advancing along the East bank before Girard's meeting with Cooke.

What makes you think this, wild?

Clair

[mwkeogh]

erkki said:

And what was Custer doing between Gray's 3:18 for the formation of the skirmish line and his arrival at Ford B at 4:00 p.m.?

That's not just Gray's theory here. Walter Camp also believed that Custer remained in the vicinity of MTC or Luce/Nye-Cartright Ridge for about 40 minutes or so for some reason or other. Varnum thought it unlikely that Custer would wait there, but then, where was Custer's location when the volleys were heard just after 4:00 pm? It is thought that Calhoun Hill was too far away for the firing to be heard from Reno's hilltop position. This would leave either Nye-Cartright Hill or MTF, thus we are back to Camp's position that Custer remained in that area for nearly 40 minutes. But if so, then why?

[harpskiddie]

Someone of a scientific bent has postulated that firing from the Reno position in the valley could have been heard 7 miles away up Ash Creek. Why then would it have been so difficult to hear heavy firing from 3 1/2 or 4 miles away? Perhaps that person might read this thread and weigh in with an answer.

Just wondering aloud. Have no investment in the answer.

Gordie
MC

[clw]

I don't understand how gunfire can be heard 7 miles away. I live in the country and hear gunfire almost daily. But I'm pretty sure I haven't heard it that far away -- I'd guess five miles tops if all the conditions are perfect. Does sound travel further in the west?