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Post by montrose on Feb 25, 2017 22:06:02 GMT -6
I think I have been ineffective in explaining command and control.
It involves information management.
1) What is the enemy doing? (SALUTE data) (Size, Activity, Location, Uniform, Time, Equipment, I think, been a few decades since BIT).
2) What are we doing? This means what is our plan.
3) Common operational picture. This means having subordinates understand the same friendly and enemy analysis that you have, and understand their part in the plan.
4) The management/command thing. Commander needs to be where he can monitor friendly and enemy activity, and where he can make adjustments.
LTC Custer was grossly derelict as a commander at LBH. He placed himself where he could not exercise command, and could not control his regiment.
Look at the orders to the Benteen and McDougal battalions. What is the plan? There is none. WHere is the data on friendly and enemy actions?
In general, you can assume officers understand how a template attack takes place, with advance guard and main body in mutual support, etc, etc. When LTC Custer decided to move the main body out of support from the advance guard, this would instantly confuse any competent officer. The commander is required to explain the change to his subordinates, since now we are not following SOP.
LTC Custer failed to do so. In fact, he did not even tell the advance guard, which was the direct cause of their defeat. They met the enemy, sent numerous messages that trigger main body support, and were abandoned.
Leaders lead. Where was the leadership here?
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Post by wild on Feb 26, 2017 6:56:32 GMT -6
Hi Dave Always a delight to debate with a gentleman.
If he had not taken command when reaching the bluffs do you not believe the outcome for the soldiers would have not been different? If he does not organize and establish military discipline would the Indians been able to overcome the soldiers? Different philosophy Dave. At a local level what you describe cannot be faulted . At mission level it is a total misuse of assets and time. By halting Benteen became part of Reno's defeat greatly exacerbating an already critical situation. The cost to the regiment of Reno's defeat of a battalion of 3 companiee became 2 battalions plus packs and escort for a total loss to the mission of 7 companies , possibly 350 men. Game set and match to the Indians.
As to Benteen's "saving" of Reno this required not a shot to be fired. If this is elevated to an heroic battlefield action one can only wonder why Terry was not awarded the medal of honour for his saving of Benteen?
The scene on Reno Hill was described by the arriving pack commander capt McDougal as being like a picnic. Add to that Benteen's total indifference during this period including his desertion of his post and loss of control of his battalion and I fear his leadership qualities had much room for improvement.
Best Regards Richard
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Post by montrose on Feb 26, 2017 8:36:24 GMT -6
1. Situation. The regiment main attack in the valley was defeated when the main body failed to support the advanced guard. It is now a fact that 3 companies are too small a force to fight the Indians.
2. MAJ Reno massed the seven companies from the three trailing battalions. LTC Custer broke the 2 battalions with him into companies, and then scattered these 5 companies across the prairie, with none of them in support range of any other.
3. Wild is recommending that the trailing battalions should also scatter across the prairie in small elements. Why? The mission is to attack and defeat the Indian village. The village is in the valley. There is not a single tepee in the badlands east of the river. There is not a single horse grazing in the badlands east of the river. There is no tactical significance to anything east of the river.
4. LTC Custer failed to control the critical terrain vicinity Ford B. Once he crossed the drainage between LCN ridge and Battle ridge, he was marching past the village, exposing his flanks and inviting defeat in detail. It was an enormous tactical blunder.
5. To quote Rick Flair, "If you want to be the man, beat the man." If you want to fight in the valley, fight in the valley.
6. Field grade leadership matters. Field grade leaders manage two or more companies. This can be temporary task forces (called battalions I this era) or standing organizations like regiments. The only officer who demonstrated competence, if not excellence, at LBH was CPT Benteen. McDougal and Reno were average. Custer, Keough and Yates failed massively, to the point where they were unfit to perform at that level.
The military makes a distinction between incompetence and gross incompetence. The first means you had a bad day. The second means you are not fit to perform at that rank. Custer and Keough show gross incompetence. LTC Custer had been convicted by general court martial for gross incompetence in 1867. His tactical ineptness at company and field grade were not new. Oddly enough did pretty well at brigade and division, which is general grade.
Respectfully,
William
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Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 26, 2017 10:05:17 GMT -6
There is nothing in that order that puts Benteen in charge of the Rear Guard. If you study the RCOI you will see that McDougal is co of the pack train and escort.The order placed packs and escort under Benteen's direction. Best Regards Richard
Richard
So if Benteen is in charge of the pack train that relieves McDougall of the portion of his assigned duties. He would than be free to act as rear guard for the main body. Right? There would be
The assignment to the pack train changed throughout the march. A rear guard would still be there even without a pack train. Advance Guard ---Main Body--- Rear guard--- Custer could have sent the ammunition mules with the battalions, parked the pack train with the almost 2 companies of men (80) and still had a rear guard moving down Reno Creek following the main body.
So besides the factor that you like to argue for no apparent reason what physically would be different in your scenario? Especially deal with the Be Quick portion of the note that you have a tendency to ignore.
Regards
Steve
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Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 26, 2017 10:16:34 GMT -6
Richard From the RCOI Kanipe A mile or so from that tepee, I met a Sergeant coming back with instructions to the commanding officer of the pack train to "Hurry up the packs'. I told him the pack train, I thought, was about 7 miles back and he could take the order back as I had nothing to do with that; that Captain McDougall was in charge of the pack train and would attend to the order. So clearly Benteen knew the content of the verbal order. So that should negate one of your "failures". Benteen knew that Kanipe was delivering a message to "Hurry Up" the pack train.Now Martin Q. At that point where you met Trumpeter Martin, can you state how far it was from the Little Big Horn River? A. It was about 2 miles from where Maj. Reno first crossed. Q. How far was it from that tepee? A. It was about 2 miles from the tepee that I met Martin, Q. Did you then know whose trail you, were following? A. I did not. I will state here that Trumpeter Martin, after giving me that note, I asked him about this village. He said the Indians were all skedaddling, therefore there was less necessity for me going back for the packs. Regards
Steve
With regard to Martinand the skedaddling, he did not know that the village was skedaddling. He knew that it was standing. Camp interview of 1908 - 1 - Martin says Custer's trail passed along where Reno retreated to. Then Custer halted command on the high ridge about 10 minutes, and officers looked at village through glasses. Saw children and dogs playing among the tepees but no warriors or horses except few loose ponies grazing around. There was then a discussion among the officers as to where the warriors might be and someone suggested that they might be buffalo hunting, recalling that they had seen skinned buffalo along the trail on June 24. Custer now made a speech to his men saying, "We will go down and make a crossing and capture the village." The whole command then pulled off their hats and cheered. And the consensus of opinion seemed to be among the officers that if this could be done the Indians would have to surrender when they would return, in order not to fire upon their women and children. 2 - Martin started back on trail before got up the hill (that is up to high point where whole command had halted) he heard heavy firing in the direction of his right. It might also have been Reno's fire which he heard as that would have been to his right. He afterward supposed was at Ford B. After this he met Boston Custer [George A. Custer's youngest brother] going to join the command. When Martin got to top of ridge he looked down in village and saw Indians charging like swarm of bees toward the ford, waving buffalo hides. At the same time he saw Custer retreating up the open country in the direction of the battlefield. (He did not tell this at the Reno court of inquiry because he was not asked the question. He thinks that in Reno court of inquiry it was not desired that he should tell all he knew and said that afterward he never was invited by officers to discuss what he knew of the battle and never volunteered to do so.) Martin could not speak of what he did not know and had no reason to mislead Benteen. From Kanipe's 1924 account - When we reached within a quarter of a mile of the junction of Benteen's creek with the Little Big Horn I sighted Indians on the top of the range of bluffs over the Little Big Horn river. I said to First Sergeant Bobo, "There are the Indians." General Custer threw up his head about that time and we -- Troops "C," "E," "I," and "F" -- headed for the range of bluffs where we had seen the Indians. Tom Custer, brother of the general, was captain of my troop, "C." We rode hard, but when we reached the top the Indians were gone. However, we could see the tepees for miles. The Crow Indian scouts with our outfit wanted to slip down and get a few ponies. Some of them did slip down, but they got shot for their pains. Chief Scout Mitch Buie, Curley, a Crow, and "Bloody Knife" Reeve stayed up on the bluffs with us. Well, sir, when the men of those four troops saw the Indian camp down in the valley they began to holler and yell, and we galloped along to the far end of the bluffs, where we could swoop down on the camp * * * * (four words illegible). I was riding close to Sergeant Finkle. We were both close to Capt. Tom Custer. Finkle hollered at me that he couldn't make it, his horse was giving out. I answered back: "Come on Finkle, if you can." He dropped back a bit. Just then the captain told me to go back and find McDougall and the pack train and deliver to them orders that had just been issued by General Custer. Neither man was in a position to advise that the hostiles were fleeing. That is a reality and therefore Benteen's memory of the matter is faulty or there were other messengers. You left out the obvious and that Martini states it and also tells others that Reno is charging the village and killing men, women and children. People often state things that they can't remember stating.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by dave on Feb 26, 2017 11:06:18 GMT -6
Richard Montrose answered your questions far better than I could so I will simply say I agree with him. I also enjoy corresponding with you as we seem to be on opposite sides of the spectrum at times but politely. Regards Dave
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Post by wild on Feb 26, 2017 11:20:23 GMT -6
Hi Dave Likewise.
Unfortunately the good Colonel makes statements supplying no reasons or examples as backup and as I get a mention in his dispatch he could have at the very least given the quote. Everything I have posted I have backed up with reference to evidence given in the RCOI , most of it given by Benteen himself.
Best Regards Richard
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Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 26, 2017 12:23:12 GMT -6
Hi Dave Likewise. Unfortunately the good Colonel makes statements supplying no reasons or examples as backup and as I get a mention in his dispatch he could have at the very least given the quote. Everything I have posted I have backed up with reference to evidence given in the RCOI , most of it given by Benteen himself. Best Regards Richard 3. Wild is recommending that the trailing battalions should also scatter across the prairie in small elements. Why? The mission is to attack and defeat the Indian village. The village is in the valley. There is not a single tepee in the badlands east of the river. There is not a single horse grazing in the badlands east of the river. There is no tactical significance to anything east of the river.
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Post by wild on Feb 26, 2017 14:47:58 GMT -6
3. Wild is recommending that the trailing battalions should also scatter across the prairie in small elements. Why? The mission is to attack and defeat the Indian village. The village is in the valley. There is not a single tepee in the badlands east of the river. There is not a single horse grazing in the badlands east of the river. There is no tactical significance to anything east of the river.
Thanks for your assistance AZ but I was looking fot the quote which supports the above.
Thanks again Richard
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Post by wild on Feb 26, 2017 16:19:37 GMT -6
Hi AZ So if Benteen is in charge of the pack train that relieves McDougall of the portion of his assigned duties. He would than be free to act as rear guard for the main body. Right? The pecking order is Benteen, Mc Dougal, Mathey. Benteen has the tactical shout. Of course as Benteen did not inform the packs they carried on as per last orders.
So besides the factor that you like to argue for no apparent reason what physically would be different in your scenario? Especially deal with the Be Quick portion of the note that you have a tendency to ignore. The chain of command changes, the configuration of the guard and packs changes,flankers thrown out, weapons check and such like, everything shipshape. The be quick order emphasises the urgency and cancells all domestic drills in favour of speed.
But again I ask you why do you make a case for not passing on information? What would it cost to do so? Cheers Richard
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Post by dave on Feb 26, 2017 16:49:02 GMT -6
Richard Your comment that the Indians won the game, set match makes little sense to me as survival was the plan when Benteen joined Reno. Custer's movement north away from Reno, Benteen and the pack train threw the match. Sans Custer, the others were fighting for survival and could have cared less where the Indians went as long as it was away!
Are you just jousting to tilt windmills or do you really believe that Benteen was responsible for the 7th's defeat? Benteen was not the engineer of this train wreck but merely stoked the fires of Custer's ambitions. Regards Dave
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Post by wild on Feb 26, 2017 17:55:08 GMT -6
Hi Dave
Your comment that the Indians won the game, set match makes little sense to me as survival was the plan when Benteen joined Reno Benteen knew nothing . He was obliged to progress his orders as far as possible and that could have been as far as Weir Point.He was also obliged to attempt to communicate with Custer. If survival was the name of the game Benteen performance over the next two hours saw him lose a company , then move off without informing Reno which in turn triggered an ad hoc fragmented advance to Weir piont.
Are you just jousting to tilt windmills or do you really believe that Benteen was responsible for the 7th's defeat? Benteen was not the engineer of this train wreck but merely stoked the fires of Custer's ambitions Absolutely not Dave. I wrote a few posts back that Custer's blunder was of such magnatude as to render Benteen's failures irrelevent to the outcome. However on another day Benteen's halting could have resulted in such a disaster. Best Wishes Richard
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Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 27, 2017 7:50:54 GMT -6
Hi AZ So if Benteen is in charge of the pack train that relieves McDougall of the portion of his assigned duties. He would than be free to act as rear guard for the main body. Right?The pecking order is Benteen, Mc Dougal, Mathey. Benteen has the tactical shout. Of course as Benteen did not inform the packs they carried on as per last orders. So besides the factor that you like to argue for no apparent reason what physically would be different in your scenario? Especially deal with the Be Quick portion of the note that you have a tendency to ignore.The chain of command changes, the configuration of the guard and packs changes,flankers thrown out, weapons check and such like, everything shipshape. The be quick order emphasises the urgency and cancells all domestic drills in favour of speed. But again I ask you why do you make a case for not passing on information? What would it cost to do so? Cheers Richard Hi Richard There were no domestic drills after Custer decided they may have been observed and moved out. He divided the regiment in order to move to contact. McDougall knew that they were moving to contact and in order for the rear guard to get there in time to join the fight he needed to keep the pack train moving. So do you think that Custer thought the pack train would move faster than when he ordered it to follow him down Reno Creek. What part of moving to contact do you consider domestic drills? So can you tell us why the pack train went to where Benteen was located rather than following Reno's trail to Ford A? Regards Steve
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Post by wild on Feb 27, 2017 8:38:01 GMT -6
To address this by the Colonel
3. Wild is recommending that the trailing battalions should also scatter across the prairie in small elements. Why? The mission is to attack and defeat the Indian village. The village is in the valley. There is not a single tepee in the badlands east of the river. There is not a single horse grazing in the badlands east of the river. There is no tactical significance to anything east of the river.
Who said Benteen was searching for a village ? There are a number of myths like this that go unquestioned. Look at the terrain through which Custer is marching , it is interdicted by a drainage system of ravines, cuttings, culees. The whole spectrum of undulations cuts his approach to the valley. You would be a fool not to check them in case of ambush/hit and run.It is more probable that Benteen was in fact acting as a flank guard . And if so his march of at least 4 miles out into the badlands was indicative of a tantrum . A flank march needed only a mile off the main column. It did not need a seperation of 4 miles . Cheers
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Post by wild on Feb 27, 2017 9:34:47 GMT -6
Hi AZ There were no domestic drills after Custer decided they may have been observed and moved out. He divided the regiment in order to move to contact. McDougall knew that they were moving to contact and in order for the rear guard to get there in time to join the fight he needed to keep the pack train moving. So do you think that Custer thought the pack train would move faster than when he ordered it to follow him down Reno Creek. What part of moving to contact do you consider domestic drills? They all knew they were moving to contact from the day one [as per Reno's recce] I don't have a clue what Custer thought but when the pack train became aware [no thanks to Benteen]that contact had been made the configuration of the train changed and packs were closed up.
So can you tell us why the pack train went to where Benteen was located rather than following Reno's trail to Ford A? Let me guess....Mathey saw men on Reno hill and a lot of smoke and took it to be an engagement? Was it not Benteen's responsibility to ensure the packs took the same route?
So again why are you against communication? Is there anything more important than sounding the alarm?
Cheers Richard
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