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Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 24, 2017 8:49:40 GMT -6
Hi AZ So clearly Benteen knew the content of the verbal order. So that should negate one of your "failures". Benteen knew that Kanipe was delivering a message to "Hurry Up" the pack train.Granted but the order contained more than that. It had instructions as how to navagate and gave permission to jettison loose packs. And there is an issue as to Kanipes credibility. The military system ordains that you obey the last order. Thus because Benteen did not to see fit inform the packs of the changes, they were operating under Kanipe's version not martin's version. This muddies the water causing confusion. I will state here that Trumpeter Martin, after giving me that note, I asked him about this village. He said the Indians were all skedaddling, therefore there was less necessity for me going back for the packs.Are you suggesting that verbals from a non English speaking trooper take precedence over the orders of the commanding officer? And as it turned out Martin's advice was totally wrong. And if the packs were making all speed why did Benteen say that Hare had been sent to hurry them up? Benteen states that it was his duty to bring up the packs .He patiently did not, they came up under their own steam. Cheers Richard Richard That's why officer's get paid the big bucks. Are you suggesting that Benteen should have conducted a full investigation of Kanipe and why he in particular would be sent? I don't think so. Just what do you think the pack train did differently that would have required information from the Martin note? Benteen turns and moves to the bluffs following Custer and the pack train does the same thing. Do you have any information from the pack train that they were not moving as fast they could and that when they could hear gunfire they closed up and moved to where Benteen was located? Didn't the part of the rear guard react at that time and moved forward of the pack train. You seem to think there is some different route or speed. Benteen knew the actual situation and made the best available choice. Bring packs rather than stopping and parking the pack train is consistent with SOP movements in general and exactly what Kanipe would have delivered. Regards Steve
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Post by wild on Feb 24, 2017 11:52:02 GMT -6
Hi AZ That's why officer's get paid the big bucks. Are you suggesting that Benteen should have conducted a full investigation of Kanipe and why he in particular would be sent? I don't think so. The train was operating under orders perhaps standing orders. Benteen now receives orders to direct the train, that the situation is urgent and that contact has been made.He must to avoid confusion relay this information to the pack commander. You see perhaps there were more messengers than Kanipe sent to the pack train. Custer saw fit to send Martin after Kanipe, if this did nothing else other than stress the urgency Benteen was obliged to send the order back. When Mathey realised that there was action up ahead he informed Mc Dougal ,the pack train halted and closed up with the escort taking up positions fore and aft. This action would have been carried out earlier if word had come back from Benteen. Are you suggesting that orders and information pertinent down the command line be filtered out? Has Benteen the authority to vet Custer's orders? He also owes it to his junior officers to have them operating under the latest orders and to be aware of a change in the chain of command. It is easy to say it was no big deal and everything worked out in the end but that is not the issue . The issue is that the staff work that drives the command and control system was ignored by Benteen. It is one of a pattern of failures by the man. Best wishes Richard
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Post by wild on Feb 24, 2017 13:01:22 GMT -6
Further I did not. I will state here that Trumpeter Martin, after giving me that note, I asked him about this village. He said the Indians were all skedaddling, therefore there was less necessity for me going back for the packs When Benteen reached Reno he saw that far from skedaddling the Indians had inflicted a resounding defeat on Reno .At this point the packs were 1.5 hours and 7 miles back the trail and yet Benteen did not think to inform the most vulnerable unit of the command of the danger ahead Cheers
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Post by crzhrs on Feb 24, 2017 13:27:54 GMT -6
Further I did not. I will state here that Trumpeter Martin, after giving me that note, I asked him about this village. He said the Indians were all skedaddling, therefore there was less necessity for me going back for the packsWhen Benteen reached Reno he saw that far from skedaddling the Indians had inflicted a resounding defeat on Reno .At this point the packs were 1.5 hours and 7 miles back the trail and yet Benteen did not think to inform the most vulnerable unit of the command of the danger ahead Cheers When Benteen received the "order" from Martini he had no idea the command had been divided, no idea there was an attack order given or in fact where the command was. He had no idea that Custer ordered Reno to attack fleeing Indians or a fleeing village. In fact it was Custer who was derelict in failing to inform Benteen that an attack order was given. It wasn't until Custer was approaching the village that he sent back messengers (whether Kanipe was legit or not is still debatable) telling Benteen there was a "big village" but nothing about the command being further divided and Reno on his own. Benteen only realized there was a major battle taking place when he approached the remnants of Reno's command fleeing with hordes of Indians chasing after them. Whether Benteen realized it was the full command or not was not his fault. He joined up with Reno and it was only then was he informed that the command had been further divided and Reno was to make an attack and he would be supported. However, Custer never supported Reno. It was Benteen who supported Reno and saved the remainder of the 7th Cavalry.
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Post by fred on Feb 24, 2017 15:12:58 GMT -6
When Benteen received the "order" from Martini he had no idea the command had been divided, no idea there was an attack order given or in fact where the command was. He had no idea that Custer ordered Reno to attack fleeing Indians or a fleeing village. In fact it was Custer who was derelict in failing to inform Benteen that an attack order was given. It wasn't until Custer was approaching the village that he sent back messengers (whether Kanipe was legit or not is still debatable) telling Benteen there was a "big village" but nothing about the command being further divided and Reno on his own. Benteen only realized there was a major battle taking place when he approached the remnants of Reno's command fleeing with hordes of Indians chasing after them. Whether Benteen realized it was the full command or not was not his fault. He joined up with Reno and it was only then was he informed that the command had been further divided and Reno was to make an attack and he would be supported. However, Custer never supported Reno. It was Benteen who supported Reno and saved the remainder of the 7th Cavalry. One of the best, most succinct posts on the subject I have ever read. Good for you, Tom. Brilliantly stated. Very best wishes, Fred.
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Post by wild on Feb 24, 2017 15:16:01 GMT -6
crhrs While In general agreement with you it is my opinion that Benteen no more saved Reno than he was responsible for Custer's destruction. Benteen was no more than an witness to the unfolding tragedy. Custer's blunder was of such proportions that it put it beyond the mear negligence of a disloyal officer. Benteen did nothing that influenced the outcome of the battle.His arrival at Reno hill was by pure chance....he had nothing to do with it. There remains but one issue which requires some research......his oblique march ....if he had followed his orders more strictly would he have arrived at ford A sooner than he actually did and with what consequences. Cheers Richard
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Post by dave on Feb 24, 2017 16:26:22 GMT -6
Wild For the life of me I can not comprehend your reasoning for saying Benteen did nothing to influence the outcome of the Battle of the Little Big Horn. Your dislike/hatred for Benteen is twisting your view of this seminal event.
On the army side no except for Custer, affected the outcome of the battle more than Benteen. His timely arrival, Steve has provided the information to refute the ole canard that Benteen dawdled, on the bluffs enabled the the soldiers regroup, secure additional ammunition and provided the leadership so badly needed. Fred has clearly pointed out the situation facing Benteen when joining Reno and he is a combat veteran.
I always enjoy your posts and observations but on this issue: "But one was out on the hills away, Far off from the gates of gold." Regards Dave
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Post by herosrest on Feb 24, 2017 18:09:32 GMT -6
Excerpted from CUSTER'S LAST BATTLE by E.S. Godfrey and Ree scout Red Star's narrative as given in the North Dakota Collections 1906, volume 6.
At all events, during the morning of the first day of battle at Little Bighorn, 7th Cavalry's presence was believed to have been discovered and further concealment was deemed unnecessary with the regiment advised they would move at once to attack the village; because (supposed) discovery made it imperative (for Custer) to act at once, as delay would allow the village to scatter and escape.
Troop commanders were ordered to make a detail of one non-commissioned officer and six men to accompany the packs; to inspect their troops and report as soon as they were ready to march; that the troops would take their places in the column of march in the order in which reports of readiness were received; the last one to report would escort the pack-train.
"Two scouts are coming." They were Red Star and Bull. These two Arikara scouts were returning from Lt Varnum, chief of the scouts, who had gone ahead to reconnoitre, and whose party discovered the camp of the Dakotas.
Camp broke up, the horses trotted, and the army stopped at a hill and Custer came down to join them. His orders were to go ahead riding hard and take the Dakota horses.
Stabbed rode around on horse-back, back and forth, exhorting the young men to behave well and be brave. He said : "Young men, keep up your courage, don't feel that you are children; today will be a hard battle. We have been told that there is a big Sioux camp ahead. The mule train with supplies was left behind and Pretty Face was detailed on the duty of looking after it.®
An officer of Benteen's command and one of the regiments scouts knew an attack had been ordered at the officer's call.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 25, 2017 6:03:27 GMT -6
Are you suggesting that orders and information pertinent down the command line be filtered out? Has Benteen the authority to vet Custer's orders? He also owes it to his junior officers to have them operating under the latest orders and to be aware of a change in the chain of command. It is easy to say it was no big deal and everything worked out in the end but that is not the issue . The issue is that the staff work that drives the command and control system was ignored by Benteen. It is one of a pattern of failures by the man. Best wishes Richard
Yes for sure. An officer realizes that a situation can change in real time and that the officer is expected to make the best available choice. So Benteen's knows that Kanipe is delivering a message to hurry. What you are not addressing is that part of the note that states for him Come On and Be Quick. That absolutely means that Benteen has to make a best available decision. IF Kanipe was not on his way to the pack train then Benteen could send someone to deliver the message to hurry up.
My question to you is what do think Benteen with three companies going back to the pack train could do to make it hurry up. I think this area of animal management that is an example of the lack of battle readiness that Custer was directly responsible for in both training and experience. It was really the lack of training and experience. I would offer Crook as an example of an officer in charge having trained and maintained skills to move ammunition and equipment in support of cavalry and infantry missions.
Do you really think it is OK to start a pack train from scratch while in pursuit of mobile Indians?
As far as letting junior officers know what he is thinking I would guess he kept those thoughts to himself. Although he did sat how could he do both things Be Quick and Bring Packs.
There is nothing in that order that puts Benteen in charge of the Rear Guard. At best Mathey maybe who was in charge of the pack train.
I don't see a change in the chain of command from Custer to Benteen in that note. Does McDougall report to Benteen or Reno when he reaches the hill?
Regards Steve
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Post by herosrest on Feb 25, 2017 7:06:03 GMT -6
Richard From the RCOI Kanipe A mile or so from that tepee, I met a Sergeant coming back with instructions to the commanding officer of the pack train to "Hurry up the packs'. I told him the pack train, I thought, was about 7 miles back and he could take the order back as I had nothing to do with that; that Captain McDougall was in charge of the pack train and would attend to the order. So clearly Benteen knew the content of the verbal order. So that should negate one of your "failures". Benteen knew that Kanipe was delivering a message to "Hurry Up" the pack train.Now Martin Q. At that point where you met Trumpeter Martin, can you state how far it was from the Little Big Horn River? A. It was about 2 miles from where Maj. Reno first crossed. Q. How far was it from that tepee? A. It was about 2 miles from the tepee that I met Martin, Q. Did you then know whose trail you, were following? A. I did not. I will state here that Trumpeter Martin, after giving me that note, I asked him about this village. He said the Indians were all skedaddling, therefore there was less necessity for me going back for the packs. Regards
Steve
With regard to Martinand the skedaddling, he did not know that the village was skedaddling. He knew that it was standing. Camp interview of 1908 - 1 - Martin says Custer's trail passed along where Reno retreated to. Then Custer halted command on the high ridge about 10 minutes, and officers looked at village through glasses. Saw children and dogs playing among the tepees but no warriors or horses except few loose ponies grazing around. There was then a discussion among the officers as to where the warriors might be and someone suggested that they might be buffalo hunting, recalling that they had seen skinned buffalo along the trail on June 24. Custer now made a speech to his men saying, "We will go down and make a crossing and capture the village." The whole command then pulled off their hats and cheered. And the consensus of opinion seemed to be among the officers that if this could be done the Indians would have to surrender when they would return, in order not to fire upon their women and children. 2 - Martin started back on trail before got up the hill (that is up to high point where whole command had halted) he heard heavy firing in the direction of his right. It might also have been Reno's fire which he heard as that would have been to his right. He afterward supposed was at Ford B. After this he met Boston Custer [George A. Custer's youngest brother] going to join the command. When Martin got to top of ridge he looked down in village and saw Indians charging like swarm of bees toward the ford, waving buffalo hides. At the same time he saw Custer retreating up the open country in the direction of the battlefield. (He did not tell this at the Reno court of inquiry because he was not asked the question. He thinks that in Reno court of inquiry it was not desired that he should tell all he knew and said that afterward he never was invited by officers to discuss what he knew of the battle and never volunteered to do so.) Martin could not speak of what he did not know and had no reason to mislead Benteen. From Kanipe's 1924 account - When we reached within a quarter of a mile of the junction of Benteen's creek with the Little Big Horn I sighted Indians on the top of the range of bluffs over the Little Big Horn river. I said to First Sergeant Bobo, "There are the Indians." General Custer threw up his head about that time and we -- Troops "C," "E," "I," and "F" -- headed for the range of bluffs where we had seen the Indians. Tom Custer, brother of the general, was captain of my troop, "C." We rode hard, but when we reached the top the Indians were gone. However, we could see the tepees for miles. The Crow Indian scouts with our outfit wanted to slip down and get a few ponies. Some of them did slip down, but they got shot for their pains. Chief Scout Mitch Buie, Curley, a Crow, and "Bloody Knife" Reeve stayed up on the bluffs with us. Well, sir, when the men of those four troops saw the Indian camp down in the valley they began to holler and yell, and we galloped along to the far end of the bluffs, where we could swoop down on the camp * * * * (four words illegible). I was riding close to Sergeant Finkle. We were both close to Capt. Tom Custer. Finkle hollered at me that he couldn't make it, his horse was giving out. I answered back: "Come on Finkle, if you can." He dropped back a bit. Just then the captain told me to go back and find McDougall and the pack train and deliver to them orders that had just been issued by General Custer. Neither man was in a position to advise that the hostiles were fleeing. That is a reality and therefore Benteen's memory of the matter is faulty or there were other messengers.
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Post by wild on Feb 25, 2017 8:31:14 GMT -6
Hi Dave Thank you for your reply. It is only by offering opposing views that opinions are tested.
The battle was lost by the time Benteen arrived on the scene. It was lost by Custer's blunder . Nothing that Benteen might have attempted would have made any difference to the mission. I make this observation armed with hind sight. But Benteen must be judged as our friend Bruce says by what he knew at the time which amounted to zero.Therefore he was not in possession of sufficent intell to justify his halting of his command And though I do not agree with the Ford D theory it is not without support on this board and must be added to the context ie what role was open to Benteen while this operation was afoot?
His timely arrival, Steve has provided the information to refute the ole canard that Benteen dawdled, on the bluffs enabled the the soldiers regroup, secure additional ammunition and provided the leadership so badly needed Indeed his arrival prevented further slaughter and allowed everyone to catch their breath. But was this the correct use of Custer's assets, was 2 hours of it a tad too much? to be continued Cheers Richard
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Post by crzhrs on Feb 25, 2017 9:39:18 GMT -6
When Benteen received the "order" from Martini he had no idea the command had been divided, no idea there was an attack order given or in fact where the command was. He had no idea that Custer ordered Reno to attack fleeing Indians or a fleeing village. In fact it was Custer who was derelict in failing to inform Benteen that an attack order was given. It wasn't until Custer was approaching the village that he sent back messengers (whether Kanipe was legit or not is still debatable) telling Benteen there was a "big village" but nothing about the command being further divided and Reno on his own. Benteen only realized there was a major battle taking place when he approached the remnants of Reno's command fleeing with hordes of Indians chasing after them. Whether Benteen realized it was the full command or not was not his fault. He joined up with Reno and it was only then was he informed that the command had been further divided and Reno was to make an attack and he would be supported. However, Custer never supported Reno. It was Benteen who supported Reno and saved the remainder of the 7th Cavalry. One of the best, most succinct posts on the subject I have ever read. Good for you, Tom. Brilliantly stated. Very best wishes, Fred. Fred: I am extremely honored that you would consider my opinion so highly. Benteen's part of the battle has been just as controversial as everything else about it, but in the end he DID save Reno's command, since Reno seemed to have lost control of what was happening. His strongest part was after the fall back of Weir's "advance" resulting in another chaotic "movement" by another officer (kudos to Godfrey for establishing skirmishers to hold off the Indians). Once the command was dug in Benteen was in charge by default and did a masterful job of setting up defensive positions and inspiring the men. Benteen should be considered one of the few bright spots in the disaster at the LBH!
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Post by dave on Feb 25, 2017 10:59:38 GMT -6
Richard Let's be honest from the start regarding my knowledge of this battle and expertise. I have read many books and been to Montana one time in my life and have no military service but did have 2 years of ROTC which of course qualifies to be an "at home expert" especially if I lived in NYC.
However I spent most of my career working for and with people in all situations and circumstances. I have found that the old adage of "there are sheep, wolves and guard dogs" applies to all people period. Benteen was a guard dog who never shied away from a slight or a fight. If he had not taken command when reaching the bluffs do you not believe the outcome for the soldiers would have not been different? If he does not organize and establish military discipline would the Indians been able to overcome the soldiers?
Would not his military experience coupled with common sense---aided by Reno's addled duck behavior---have enabled him to determine if it would be the best military decision to halt on the bluffs and coordinate both battalions? I would be interested in the responses of our combat vets regarding this action, so maybe Steve, Dan, Justin, Fred or others may weigh in.
Your statement: "Indeed his arrival prevented further slaughter and allowed everyone to catch their breath. But was this the correct use of Custer's assets, was 2 hours of it a tad too much?" I am unsure how to properly respond to this opinion as I have no expertise or proper understanding of this action so I will merely add your feelings for Benteen fairly well match mine of Custer. Benteen's lot in life was to be associated with Custer till the day he died and he never changed his belief that Custer was a foolish popinjay who caused the loss of some many friends, comrades and soldiers that hot dusty day in June of 1876.
As always it is good to correspond with someone who has the passion for this topic to match mine. Regards Dave
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Post by fred on Feb 25, 2017 12:27:53 GMT -6
Fred: I am extremely honored that you would consider my opinion so highly. Tom, I have always valued your posts. You are probably one of the few people whose every post I have read. You cannot believe the amount you have taught me, starting when?, 2005? I doubt you have ever put up a frivolous thing in all those years. For me to praise you and your posts is small payment, indeed. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by wild on Feb 25, 2017 17:39:01 GMT -6
Hi AZ
I don't see a change in the chain of command from Custer to Benteen in that note. Does McDougall report to Benteen or Reno when he reaches the hill? As McDougal was not informed by Benteen that he was under his authority[Benteen's]I imagine he would confer with Reno. This is an example of the confusion that can arise if communication is not maintained. Benteen was asked at the RCOI if two columns are searching for the enemy and one finds them should not that column inform the other, he replied certainly. I cannot see your point in making a case for non communication.
An officer realizes that a situation can change in real time and that the officer is expected to make the best available choice . It is the best available decision to support the mission. How did halting the equivlant of 5 companies and reserve ammo support the mission.
There is nothing in that order that puts Benteen in charge of the Rear Guard. If you study the RCOI you will see that McDougal is co of the pack train and escort.The order placed packs and escort under Benteen's direction. Best Regards Richard
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