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Post by jodak on Nov 28, 2016 7:30:59 GMT -6
[1] Top Secret 28 November 1941 From: Com 14 (Bloch) Action: Opnav Info: 280240
Following received by British Consul from usually reliable source. Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on 1 December without ultimatum or declaration in order get between Bangkok and Singapore. Attackers will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa. Main landing to be made at Songkhla.
Note: Although the anticipated date was a week early, this was correct in all other respects, including the actual landing location.
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Post by jodak on Nov 28, 2016 7:32:36 GMT -6
TOP SECRET
NOV. 28, 1941. From: CINCPAC. To: OPNAV. Action: 12. 280627.
Reference urdis 270040 and 270038, Wright now at Wake to discharge ground crews and material to operate one squadron of Marine planes. It proceeds afterwards to Midway to land similar items. Arrangements have already been made to send each of those places essential ground material for temporary operation of 12 B-17 Army bombers, to leave Pearl about Dec. 1st, but at present only 6 such planes of the 12 on Oahu are in operating condition. An acute shortage of Army bombs precludes any shipments to outlying bases but Navy bombs are now available there. These may be used by the Army with minor alterations. Usefulness of Army pursuit planes for insular defense is radically limited by their doubtful capability of operating over 20 miles offshore. Their use is possible but inability to land on carrier freezes them to island were landed, and flexibility dispositions is thereby curtailed. Additional anti-aircraft guns needed this area for Army & Marine defense battalions. Consider use of Army troop reinforcements for outlying bases inadvisable as long as Marines are available but plans are being made for such use of Army troops. All outlying forces must be exclusively under Navy command, 12 Marine fighters leave Nov. 28 in carrier for Wake. Expect send other Marine planes to Midway later. On Dec. 1st sending 12 patrol planes to Wake from Midway, and replacing those at Midway from Pearl. The feasibility and advisability of relieving Marine planes with Army pursuits will be investigated more thoroughly.
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Post by jodak on Nov 28, 2016 7:49:09 GMT -6
November 28, 1941
U.S.S. Enterprise departs Pearl Harbor to deliver fighter planes to Wake Island. Once at sea, the captain issues issues the following order:
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE
At Sea November 28, 1941
BATTLE ORDER NUMBER ONE
1. The ENTERPRISE is now operating under war conditions.
2. At any time, day or night, we must be ready for instant action.
3. Hostile submarines may be encountered.
4. The importance of every officer and man being specially alert and vigilant while on watch at his battle station must be fully realized by all hands.
5. The failure of one man to carry out his assigned task promptly, particularly the lookouts, those manning the batteries, and all those on watch on the deck, might result in great loss of life and even loss of the ship.
6. The Captain is confident all hands will prove equal to any emergency that may develop.
7. It is part of the tradition of our Navy that, when put to the test, all hands keep cool, keep their heads, and FIGHT.
8. Steady nerves and stout hearts are needed now.
G. D. MURRAY, Captain, U.S. Navy Commanding
Approved: November 28, 1941. W. F. HALSEY, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy, Commander Aircraft, Battle Force
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Post by jodak on Nov 29, 2016 7:00:17 GMT -6
29 November 1941 From: Berlin To: Tokyo #1393 "Ribbentrop:
"It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been and probably never will be a time when closer cooperation under the Tripartite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at this time, and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European New Order, all the military might of Britain and the United States will be concentrated against Japan." See document
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Post by jodak on Nov 29, 2016 7:02:08 GMT -6
[Secret]
From: Tokyo To: Washington 29 November 1941 (Purple—CA) #857
Re my #844* We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:
The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and judicial position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of both sides.
However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government.
With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. government has made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government.
(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.) 25496 JD-1: 6921 (F) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (S-TT)
*JD-1: 6898 (S.I.S. 25445) dated 28 Nov., in which Tokyo's first reaction to the new U. S. proposals castigates them as humiliating. When Japan sends a reply in 2 or 3 days giving its views on them the negotiations will be 'de facto' ruptu
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Post by jodak on Nov 29, 2016 7:03:53 GMT -6
From: Tokyo To: Honolulu 29 November 1941
J-19 #122
We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.
JD-1: 7086 25823 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)
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Post by jodak on Nov 29, 2016 7:04:27 GMT -6
From: Tokyo To: San Francisco 29 November 1941 (J19) Circular #2431
Make full report beginning December 1st on the following:
Ship's nationality ship's name, port from which it departed, (or at which it arrived), and port of destination, (or from where it started), date of departure, etc., in detail, of all foreign commercial and warships now in the Pacific, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea.
JD-1: 7037 25710 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (2)
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Post by jodak on Nov 29, 2016 7:15:15 GMT -6
Memorandum by the Secretary of State Regarding a Conversation With the British Ambassador (Halifax) [WASHINGTON,] November 29, 1941.
I expressed the view that the diplomatic part of our relations with Japan was virtually over and that the matter will now go to the officials of the Army and the Navy with whom I have talked and to whom I have given my views for whatever they are worth. Speaking in great confidence, I said that it would be a serious mistake for our country and other countries interested in the Pacific situation to make plans of resistance without including the possibility that Japan may move suddenly and with every possible element of surprise and spread out over considerable areas and capture certain positions and posts before the peaceful countries interested in the Pacific would have time to confer and formulate plans to meet these new conditions; that this would be on the theory that the Japanese recognize that their course of unlimited conquest, now renewed all along the line probably is a desperate gamble and requires the utmost boldness and risk.
I also said to the Ambassador that a calm deliberate Japanese Government would more than ever desire to wait another thirty day to see whether the German Army is driven out of Russia by winter. I added that the extremist fire‑eating elements in Japan, who have preached a general forward movement supported by the Army and Navy have influenced a vast portion of the Japanese public to clamor for such a movement, would probably take no serious notice of the Russian‑German situation, but would go forward in this desperate undertaking which they have advocated for some time; that at least it would be a mistake not to consider this possibility as entirely real, rather than to assume that they would virtually halt and engage in some movements into Thailand and into the Burma Road while waiting the results on the Russian front.
C[ORDELL] H[ULL]
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Post by jodak on Nov 29, 2016 7:30:16 GMT -6
Secret
G2/CI FMH
Received at the War Department, November 29, 1941. From: Fort Shafter, November 29, 1941. No. 986.
To: TAG
With reference to protection of vital installations outside of Military reservations such as highway bridges, telephone exchanges, and power plants this headquarters by confidential letter of 19 June, 1941 asked the Governor of the territory to use the authority given him by the Organic Act Section 67 which provides that the Governor may call upon the Naval and Military Force Commanders of the United States in the Hawaiian Territory to suppress or prevent invasion, lawless violence, insurrection, etc. In accordance with the above stated Authority on 20 June 1941 the Governor made a confidential formal demand in writing on this headquarters to supply and to keep on furnishing such suitable protection as may be required in order to prevent sabotage, and violence of a lawless nature in connection therewith, being done in the territory against vital structures and installations. Suitable military protection in accordance with the above request is now being given important civilian installations and structures. Upon the suggestion of this headquarters, in connection with the above, the county and city of Honolulu enacted, an ordnance on 30 June 1941 permitting the Hawaiian Dept. Commanding General to restrict the use of and travel upon or to close within the county or city of Honolulu any road whenever such action is necessary in the interest of National Defense. No exercise of the authority thus given has yet been necessary. Cordial relations exist and have been maintained and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters which involve the FBI and all other Federal and Territorial Officials.
In regard to the secret radiogram of your office numbered 482 dated November 28, 1941, within the scope of investigative responsibility of the War Department (Paragraph No. 3 MID SC 30-45) and Military establishments which include equipment and personnel, full precautions against activities of a subversive nature are being taken.
SHORT.
This is General Short's response to the warning message sent to him on the 27th in which he was instructed to report steps taken. It is largely incoherent mumbo jumbo. but the gist is that he had taken steps to guard against sabotage only. That was not what the War Department intended, and General Marshall was to later testify that this was his opportunity to step in and take a hand, but he did not do so. For this failure to correct Short's actions, both Marshall and Chief of War Plans General Gerow were later censored. I respect Gerow as being about the only high level official that fully accepted any responsibility that he may have had in the Pearl Harbor debacle. He went on to become one of the most highly regarded corps commanders in Europe, but without the stigma of Pearl Harbor attached to him he may have been more, as he had previously outranked most of the other European commanders, including Eisenhower and Bradley. The same can be said of Chief or Naval Operations Stark who was shuttled off to be the U.S. Naval commander in Europe, and I believe it possible that Short and Kimmel may have likewise continued their careers and contributed to the war effort in meaningful ways if they had just kept quiet and taken their lumps
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Post by jodak on Nov 29, 2016 7:31:09 GMT -6
DEFERRED-SECRET
Date: 29 Nov 41. Originator: OPNAV. Action: CINCPAC.
282054.
Arrangements described in your 280627 appear to be best that can be done under the circumstances but suggest advisability of transferring VMF 221 from San Diego to Hawaii via Saratoga X War Dept will instruct COMGEN HAW-DEPT to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and Army troops in support of Marines X War Dept will endeavor to expedite plans for increase of AA defenses but it is doubtful if much improvement is possible soon X Marine Corps will shortly receive 16 37 MM AA guns and receive ammunition in February do you desire these guns for Midway and Wake X Request air mail report on present defenses of all outlying bases and increases planned in immediate future X.
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Post by jodak on Nov 29, 2016 7:37:07 GMT -6
CONFIDENTIAL
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
I. B. 159
BRIEF PERIODIC ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION, DECEMBER 1, 1941‑MARCH 31, 1942 Record Section G2/1 TJB
[1] I. B. 159 NOVEMBER 29, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff
Subject : Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation, December 1, 1941‑March 31, 1942.
I. General.
...
5. The Far Eastern Theater. Here the initiative rests with Japan in spite of her military overextension. She has the following lines of action open to her:
a. Attack Siberia.
b. Attack Yunnan Province to cut the Burma Road with a view to an early end to the war with China.
c. Occupy Thailand.
d. Through Thailand, attack
(1) Burma and the Burma Road,
(2) Malaya.
e. Attack the Philippines and Hong Kong, preparatory to a movement on Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies.
f. Contain or isolate the Philippines and Hong Kong and
(1) Attack Singapore
(a) directly, by sea;
(b) by sea in conjunction with a land attack through Thailand and Malaya.
(2) Attack the Netherlands East Indies. g. Bide her time, wait for a better opportunity to pursue any of the above lines of action, hoping that the course of events will turn in her favor.
h. Seek a general settlement through American mediation, including an understanding with the United States and Great Britain as to political and economic penetration of southeast Asia and the southwestern Pacific.
i. Reorient her whole foreign policy by withdrawing from the Axis.
(h.) and (i) are impossible, short of a complete overthrow of her governing forces.
The most probable line of action for Japan is the occupation of Thailand:
The forces of all other countries in the Far East are on the defensive before Japan. The British Commonwealth, the Netherlands East Indies and the Unite States are in consultative association for the defense of Malaysia. To date this association has been effective in slowing down the Japanese penetration toy the southwest. China is containing the equivalent of 30 Japanese divisions. The U. S. S. R., hard pressed for troops in European Russia, has reduced hey Siberian garrisons to what she estimates to be the minimum necessary to deter, Japan from attacking to the north. So far she has been successful in this effort.
China, aided and encouraged by America, will remain in the war against Japan and will continue to contain important [8] Japanese forces. The effective use of China's unlimited manpower, as an anti‑Axis potential, depends entirely on the extent to which, she is able to equip it, particularly in artillery and aviation. For this, she is entirely dependent upon the United States. The stronger the Chinese become, the more Japanese troops will be pinned down, in China, thereby releasing further Russian strength for use against Hitler.
Although China is receiving an increasing amount of equipment from this country, a major offensive by the Chinese cannot be expected during the period, ending March 31, 1942.
The British Imperial forces in Malaysia and at Hong Kong occupy a purely defensive role. The forces in Malaya have recently been re‑enforced by additional troops from Australia, New Zealand (air), and India, while those in Hong Kong have been augmented by the arrival of Canadian levies. Both of, these localities present a very strong defense against any possible Japanese attack.
The people and government of the Netherlands East Indies have continued, affirmatively and constructively, to function practically as a sovereign state, loyal to the mother country. As evidence of Dutch spirit, they (a) have reorganized their army, (b) are actively at work manufacturing needed army equipment, (c) are actively training reserves, (d) have expanded their system of air fields throughout the islands, (e) have cooperated with the British and United States governments in preparation of extensive plans for defense, (f) have refused to renew their commercial treaty with Japan, (g) have delivered to Japan only 10,000 tons of oil since January 1, 1941—said delivery having been on an old contract still in force.
In the Far East the United States is concerned as a possible belligerent and also as a prime source of war materials for China, the British Commonwealth and for the Netherlands East Indies. We are in process of sending a few military airplanes to Thailand. But this theater will be a secondary one from the point of view of supply. Under all circumstances we will continue to be able to supply Australasia, the Dutch East Indies, and probably, also China, though somewhat precariously, through the Burma Road. Siberia will become completely cut off if Japan attacks Russia.
Our influence in the Fast Eastern Theater lies in the threat of our naval power and the effort of our economic blockade. Both are primary deterrents against Japanese all‑out entry in the war as an Axis partner. If we become involved in war with Japan we could launch a serious offensive against her by Naval and Air forces. But such an attack would fall short of a major strategic offensive because it could not be decisive within [9] a reasonable time, and still more, because it would be a diversion of forces away from rather than toward our objective, the defeat of the Nazis.
...
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, 17. S. Army;
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G‑2.
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Post by jodak on Nov 29, 2016 7:41:34 GMT -6
From: Cmdr. Layton To: Ad. Kimmel
Communication Intelligence Summary, 29 November 1941 General.-Traffic volume above normal, The traffic to South China still very high. Automatic transmissions was attempted on the Tokyo-Takao circuit but was a failure and traffic sent by hand. A good share of today's traffic is made up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo Intelligence sent eleven messages during the day to Major Commanders both ashore and afloat, while the radio intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the Major Commanders. In addition to the stations normally reporting to Tokyo, radio Yokosuka sent in reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The Direction Finder Net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with much activity. One message for Jaluit Radio Direction Finder Station included Commander Submarines for information. The Navy Minister originated his usual two AlNavs and the Naval General Staff addressed Commanders Second Fleet Third Fleet, Combined Ail Force and the South China Units. The unit which has been addressed as the "103rd Air Group" originated one dispatch today whose address was composed entirely of enciphered calls. It is apparent that he has no Navy call list. One address was "JUITIKOUKUUKANTAI" "11th AIR *FLEET*". Since this has appeared before it is evident that the use of KANTAI is intentional making the existence of an air fleet positive. Its composition is unknown. Combined Fleet:-The arrival of Air Squadron Seven in Takao area is confirmed. The presence of Cruiser Division Four in that area is not confirmed nor denied. The dispatches today indicate that the following units are under the immediate command of CinC. Second Fleet: CARDIV THREE DESRON TWO SUBRON FIVE DESRON FOUR SUBRON SIX THIRD FLEET CRUDIV FIVE FRENCH INDO CHINA FORCE CRUDIV SEVEN Associated with Third Fleet are two Battleships but their assignment is not yet definite. Aside from messages which were addressed to Third Fleet, China and South China Fleets, Combined Air Force and the Naval General Staff, Commander in Chief Second Fleet was mainly occupied with the units listed above. Only one message from Commander in Chief Combined Fleet was seen. This was addressed to YOKOSUKA, Combined Air Force, CRUDIV Four and BUMILAFF. The HIYEI sent one message to Chief of Staff Third Fleet. Third Fleet.-Commander in Chief Third Fleet sent one message to Comdesron Five, Number Two Base Force, Number One Base Force, Defense Division One and Comdesron Two and Four. He held extensive communications with the Commander in Chief Second Fleet and BAKO. Two more units of Third Fleet made movement reports. Fourth Fleet.--Relatively inactive today. Sent one message to Commander in Chief Second Fleet, Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. He is still in TRUK area. [170] Submarines.-Traffic for Commander Submarine Force was routed through SAIPAN today. He was at CHICHIJIMA yesterday. South China.-CRUDIV Seven now in SAMA made a movement report but direction was not indicated. The French Indo China Force Commander addressed several messages to Second and Third Fleets as well as TOKYO. The Commander in Chief China Fleet was active in addressing the South China Naval Bases and the South China Fleets, all for information to Commander in Chief Second Fleet.
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Post by jodak on Nov 29, 2016 12:10:59 GMT -6
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Post by jodak on Nov 30, 2016 6:51:15 GMT -6
[Secret]
From: Tokyo To: Berlin November 30, 1941 Purple #986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code)
1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.
2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.
Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.
3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China—they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.
Army 25555 Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)
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Post by jodak on Nov 30, 2016 6:54:48 GMT -6
[Secret]
From: Tokyo To: Berlin November 30, 1941 Purple (CA)
1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured—broken. (I am sending you an outline of developments in separate message #986 [c].) In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.
Part 2 not available. For Part 3 see S.I.S. #25553
4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.
5. This message is important from a strategic point of view and must under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes without saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.
6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier MUSSOLINI and Foreign Minister CIANO. As soon as a date is set for a conference with the Germans and Italians, please let me know.
Will you please send this message also to Rome, together with the separate message.
Army 25553 Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)
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