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Post by jodak on Nov 25, 2016 9:12:01 GMT -6
NOVEMBER 25, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff: Subject: Far Eastern Situation.
1. The following are extracts from cables received in the Office of Naval Intelligence together with G-2 comment thereon:
a. From Shanghai November 21. Intense activity at Woosung since the 15th. Unusual number of ships present including former merchant craft 10,000 tons and up. Wednesday 10 transports sailed, eight of which carried troops. Same day 32 additional ships, similar type, anchored in lower Whangpoo. Landing boats included in outgoing equipment. On decks of three outgoing ships was observed a number of creosoted heavy timber trestles in sections each approximately 60 feet long and 8 feet wide. Several merchant vessels recently taken over observed installing machine gun mounts. One thousand troops departed from Swatow last Saturday.
G-2 Comment: Movement of troops from Central China believed directed toward Hainan and Indo-China. No evidences of heavy concentration on Taiwan (Formosa).
b. From Guam November 23. Increased naval activity Truk, Saipan area. Indicated increases base forces in Mandates. Additions to fleet;-Palao, one division Marus, Truk, two divisions Marus; and two seaplane tenders, also shore command (possible landing force). Saipan, two divisions Marus; Jaluit, three divisions Marus and three unidentified shore commands, also two seaplane tenders. Air force activity increasing. Eleventh Air Group believed in Palao. Airon 24 concentrated in Marshalls. Fifth Fleet apparently at Chichijima, portions possibly at Marcus. It is estimated that 70 itinerant ships arrived or departed from Mandates since November 1 with emphasis on Truk and Jaluit areas.
G-2 Comment: Marus are small cargo or passenger vessels requisitioned by the Navy for use as trains, supply vessels and tenders. A Division of Marus consists of some two to four vessels.
The Eleventh Air Group is something a little larger than an American Squadron. The Fifth Fleet consists of odds and ends of vessels not useable by the Combined Fleet. Airon 24 consists of one old carrier (Kamoi) and one converted carrier.
2. From information available in the Division the Japanese strength in the mandated islands is believed to be as follows:
15,000 ground troops. 8 destroyers.
100 aircraft of all types. 9 submarines.
4 light cruisers.
3. The Navy Department have supplied the following comment on November 24th regarding Japanese activity in the Western Pacific:
"Apparent establishment by Japan of combined air and surface patrol over shipping routes U. S. to Australia. Daily aircraft patrols observed extending over Gilbert Islands from Jaluit. Surface craft believed covering area extending to Ellice Island. Fishing fleet reported cooperating with patrols. Fishing fleet divided in three sections: one in vicinity of Bathhurst Island, one near Arnham one near Thursday Islands. Fishing fleet expected to appear around Dutch New Guinea. These ships equipped with long range radio."
SHERMAN MILES Brigadier General U. S. Army Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Distribution: Secretary of War War Plans Division G. H. Q.
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Post by jodak on Nov 25, 2016 9:15:14 GMT -6
November 25, 1941
From Secretary of War Stimson's diary: "the question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without too much danger to ourselves."
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Post by jodak on Nov 26, 2016 8:36:29 GMT -6
26 November 1941.
From: CNO (Stark) To: CINCPAC. (Kimmel)
270038.
In order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use OPNAV has requested and Army has agreed to station twenty five Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake provided you consider this feasible and desirable X It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier X Planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats essential spare parts tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of Regular Navy supply vessels X Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents X Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies X Stationing these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to Philippines X Additional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary X Can Navy bombs now at outlying positions be carried by Army bombers which may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations X Confer with commanding general and advise as soon as practicable X.
Copy to: War Plans Division, U. S. Army.
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Post by jodak on Nov 26, 2016 8:38:31 GMT -6
26 November 1941.
From: CNO To: CINCPAC.
270040.
Army has offered to make available some units of Infantry for reenforcing defense battalions now on station if you consider this desirable X Army also proposes to prepare in Hawaiian garrison troops for advance bases which you may occupy but is unable, at this time to provide any antiaircraft units X Take this into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable number of troops desired and recommend armament X.
Copy to: War Plans Division, U. S. Army.
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Post by jodak on Nov 26, 2016 8:40:53 GMT -6
November 26, 1941. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff: Subject: Japanese Naval Task Force.
The following information was received from the Commandant 14th Naval District through the Office of Naval Intelligence at 12: 45 a. m., this date:
1. The Japanese have been organizing a naval task force for the past month comprising:
a. Second Fleet: Under the command of Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet. (The Second Fleet corresponds roughly to our Scouting Force, consisting mainly of strong Cruiser Divisions).
b. Third Fleet which formerly was the China Coast Command Force including its first and second base forces, constituted by miscellaneous small vessels.
c. Combined Air Force consisting of all large carrier forces.
d. Also destroyer squadron 3, air squadron 7, submarine squadron 5, and possibly 1 battleship division from First Fleet consisting of 3 battleships.
Summary of Above: 14 Heavy Cruisers, 4 Light Cruisers, 10 Carriers, 3 Light Cruisers. 2 Destroyer Squadrons (24 destroyers), 2 Submarine Squadrons (18 submarines), and possibly 3 battleships.
2. The combined air force has assembled in Takao, Formosa, with some units believed in Hainan Island. The Third Fleet is believed moving in direction of Takao and Bako, Pescadores off West Coast of Formosa, from home waters in Japan. Units from the Second Fleet are at present possibly enroute to South China as advance scouts. Strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls. Present location other units of this task force are not known.
3. The evaluation put upon the above information by the Commandant, 14th Naval District is that a strong force may be preparing to operate in Southeastern Asia, while component parts thereof may be expected to operate from Palao and the Marshall Islands.
SHERMAN MILES Brigadier General U. S. Army Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
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Post by jodak on Nov 26, 2016 8:44:06 GMT -6
From: Tokyo To: Washington November 26, 1941. Purple #836. To be handled in Government Code.
The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Bureau on the telephone and make your report to him. At that time we will use the following code: ...
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Post by jodak on Nov 26, 2016 8:47:50 GMT -6
From: Washington To: Tokyo 26 November 1941 (1946 to 1953 EST)
(Telephone Code)** Trans-Pacific Telephone
To Kumaicho Yamamoto* from Kurusu:
Kurusu: "I have made all efforts, but they will not yield.*** I sent a cable expressing my opinions to the Foreign Minister this morning. The situation is just like that. Otherwise there is no means of accomplishing it. I shall cable you now. Already," he interrupted himself, "you have a general understanding I imagine. Accordingly, I do not know how things will turn out regarding my meeting with the President. Hull is not making much progress it seems."
Apparently referring to the above mentioned cable he continued: "If that method can be worked out I shall work night and day on it. But there is no other means we can use. It is very regrettable."
Yamamoto: "The situation in Tokyo is extremely critical also." After thanking Kurusu for his efforts he continued: "The proposition sent to the Foreign Minister is extremely difficult."
Kurusu: "I believe it is of no avail".
Yamamoto reiterated his opinion regarding its difficulty.
Kurusu: "I rather imagine you had expected this outcome."
Yamamoto: "Yes, I had expected it, but wished to exert every effort up to the final moment in the hope that something might be accomplished. "
Kurusu: "I am unable to make any movement (i.e. progress?) at all. Something will have to be done to get out of this situation." 25349
JD-1: 6843 (M)-Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (12-TT)
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Post by jodak on Nov 26, 2016 8:52:42 GMT -6
From: Washington To: Tokyo November 26, 1941 Purple (Extremely urgent) #1180. (Part 1 of 2)
From NOMURA and KURUSU.
As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)
We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.
In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire us back instantly.
Army 25436 JD: 6896 Trans. 11-28-41
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Post by jodak on Nov 26, 2016 8:56:40 GMT -6
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo November 26, 1941. Purple (Extremely urgent) #1189. (Part 1 of 2)
At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.
HULL said, "For the last several days the American Government has been getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September 25th." So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:
A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called "four principles."
B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.
(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of economic treatment fir French Indo-China.
(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo-China.
(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime in China but that of CHIANG KAI-SHEK.
(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.
(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.
(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders. (8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.
(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate the Three-Power Pact.)
In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we think so.
Army: 25442 Trans. 11-28-41 (1)
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Post by jodak on Nov 26, 2016 9:00:28 GMT -6
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo November 26, 1941 Purple (Extremely urgent) #1190.
Judging from the progress of present Japanese-American relations, with which you are well acquainted through successive telegrams, the American proposal on the 26th (message #1189 ) showed a great disparity between the demands of both parties. Unfortunately, there are no hopes of acceptance of our demands within the time limit you set. Although we have requested the agreement of various countries to the numerous demands made, the United States presented this proposal after having conferred with the same countries. Although we cannot allow ourselves to be caught napping by this scheming, we must follow out instructions. Up to the present we have only been able to press them for an early solution. During this time we have not expressed any final intention. Even the President on the 17th said that there would be "no last words." If we do not cause any stop in the present negotiations, in the case of taking independent action after the time set---
The United States is using the excuse that she is at present negotiating with the various competent countries. In view of the fact that she will propagandize that we are continuing these negotiations only with the view of preparing for our expected moves, should we, during the course of these conversations, deliberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger that the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us. There have been times in the past when she could have considered discontinuing conversations because of our invasion of French Indo-China. Now, should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a rupture in our negotiations and suddenly enter upon independent operations, there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as counter-propaganda against us. They might consider doing the same thing insofar as our plans for Thai are concerned. Nevertheless, such a thing as the clarification of our intention is a strict military secret; consequently, I think that it might be the better plan, dependent of course on the opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations be clearly and irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption. I would like, if such a course is followed, to make representations here at the same time.
Furthermore, in view of the fact that there are considerations of convenience having to do with my interview with the President, should there be anything that you would want me to say at that time, please wire me back at once.
Army 25480 Trans. 11-29-41 (1)
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Post by jodak on Nov 26, 2016 9:04:57 GMT -6
November 26,1941
The Pearl Harbor strike Task Force centering around the First Air Fleet leaves Hitokappu Bay heading for Hawaii with the understanding that should “negotiations with the United States reach a successful conclusion, the task force will immediately put about and return to the homeland.”
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Post by jodak on Nov 27, 2016 7:49:37 GMT -6
[Secret]
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Washington 27 November 1941 (Purple) #842
In the middle of your message #1280*, there is the part which mentions that the United States might make a protective occupation of the Dutch East Indies. Now this is a very important matter, and a point which we would like to know more about.
Will you please give us the reason for your mentioning this point, and any other item which might be of help to us in this matter.
25781 JD-1: 7080 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (6-AR)
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Post by jodak on Nov 27, 2016 7:54:14 GMT -6
[Secret]
From: Tokyo To: Washington 27 November 1941 (J 19) Circular #2409 (In 4 parts, complete) Rio de Janeiro to Santiago as Circular #324 (Washington sent to Ottawa, Mexico City, Bogota, Caracas, Havana, Panama, New York, and New Orleans as unnumbered message.) handle as Chief of Office routing.
With international relations becoming more strained, the following emergency system of despatches, using INGO DENPO (hidden word, or misleading language telegrams) is placed in effect. Please study this carefully...
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Post by jodak on Nov 27, 2016 8:15:33 GMT -6
From: Washington To: Tokyo 27 November 1941 (Purple) #1204 Re your #842*
The United States has been conferring with the Netherlands on subjects pertaining to U. S. claims and because we asked them to do so. In the midst of these talks, the White House suddenly came forth with the announcement on the 24th, that the United States is occupying Dutch Guiana, with the agreement of the government of the Netherlands, for the purpose of protecting it.
As was made plain in the text of this announcement, the main objective of this occupation was to guarantee accessibility to aluminum produced there, which is vital to the national defense of the United States. Ordinarily, the Netherlands Government would dispatch its armed forces stationed in the Netherlands East Indies for this purpose, but she is unable to do so at present because of the present situation in the southwest Pacific area. For this reason, the U. S. Army is being used to protect the aluminum mines in that area. At the same time, at the invitation of the Netherlands Government, Brazil is also taking part in protecting them.
The Netherlands Foreign Minister stopped in the United States en route to visiting the Netherlands East Indies, and conferred with U. S. government officials. Since then, there has been a considerable increase in the amount of military supplies being shipped to the Netherlands East Indies; the traffic of technicians and experts between the United States and N. E. I., has swung up sharply. From these indications as well as from the history of the Netherlands East Indies, it is believed, that depending upon the atmosphere at the time the Japanese-U. S. negotiations break off, Britain and the United States may occupy the Netherlands East Indies. They will do this, probably, much in the same manner as U. S.-Brazil joint occupation of Netherlands Guiana, in the name of protecting the products of the N. E. I. which are vital to national defense, tin and rubber.
I feel that it is essential that we give careful consideration to this possibility. I made reference to this point in my message #1180**. The gist of this message does not differ from that contained in that message.
25535 JD-1: 6914 (D) Navy Trans. 11-29-41 (X)
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Post by jodak on Nov 27, 2016 8:21:37 GMT -6
From: Washington To: Tokyo 27 November 1941 (Purple) #1204 Re your #842*
The United States has been conferring with the Netherlands on subjects pertaining to U. S. claims and because we asked them to do so. In the midst of these talks, the White House suddenly came forth with the announcement on the 24th, that the United States is occupying Dutch Guiana, with the agreement of the government of the Netherlands, for the purpose of protecting it.
As was made plain in the text of this announcement, the main objective of this occupation was to guarantee accessibility to aluminum produced there, which is vital to the national defense of the United States. Ordinarily, the Netherlands Government would dispatch its armed forces stationed in the Netherlands East Indies for this purpose, but she is unable to do so at present because of the present situation in the southwest Pacific area. For this reason, the U. S. Army is being used to protect the aluminum mines in that area. At the same time, at the invitation of the Netherlands Government, Brazil is also taking part in protecting them.
The Netherlands Foreign Minister stopped in the United States en route to visiting the Netherlands East Indies, and conferred with U. S. government officials. Since then, there has been a considerable increase in the amount of military supplies being shipped to the Netherlands East Indies; the traffic of technicians and experts between the United States and N. E. I., has swung up sharply. From these indications as well as from the history of the Netherlands East Indies, it is believed, that depending upon the atmosphere at the time the Japanese-U. S. negotiations break off, Britain and the United States may occupy the Netherlands East Indies. They will do this, probably, much in the same manner as U. S.-Brazil joint occupation of Netherlands Guiana, in the name of protecting the products of the N. E. I. which are vital to national defense, tin and rubber.
I feel that it is essential that we give careful consideration to this possibility. I made reference to this point in my message #1180**. The gist of this message does not differ from that contained in that message.
25535 JD-1: 6914 (D) Navy Trans. 11-29-41 (X)
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