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Post by jodak on Nov 27, 2016 8:28:41 GMT -6
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Post by jodak on Nov 27, 2016 8:45:12 GMT -6
[Paraphrase] G-2 SM/td NOVEMBER 27, 1941. G-2's All Corps Areas Caribbean Defense Command Hawaiian Department.
Advise only the commanding officer and the chief of staff that it appears that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock stop Acts of sabotage and espionage probable stop Also possible that hostilities may begin stop
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Post by jodak on Nov 27, 2016 8:53:22 GMT -6
November 27, 1941. From: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS. Action: CINCAF (Asiatic Fleet), CINCPAC (Pacific Fleet) Info: CINCLANT, SPENAVO. 272337. This dispatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46 X Inform District and Army authorities X A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Spenavo inform British X Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.
This message was the big one. It could hardly have been more succinct in its warning that something was about to happen and a heightened state of alert was therefore warranted, yet Kimmel seems to have not given it much weight at all and was to later contend that "war warning" was not a standard term that he had ever seen before and therefore did not know what it meant.
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Post by jodak on Nov 27, 2016 8:56:39 GMT -6
NOVEMBER 27, 1941.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Far Eastern Situation.
If the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack: the Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces.
There is little probability of an immediate Japanese attack on the Maritime Provinces because of the strength of the Russian forces. Recent Japanese troop movements all seem to have been southward.
The magnitude of the effort required will militate against direct attack against Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies until the threat exercised by United States forces in Luzon is removed.
Attack on the Burma Road or Thailand offers Japanese objectives involving less risk of mayor conflict than the others named, and clearly within the means available, if unopposed by mayor powers. Attack on the Burma Road would, however, be difficult and might fail. If successful, the Chinese Nationalist Government might collapse. Occupation of Thailand gains a limited strategic advantage as a preliminary to operations against Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies, might relieve internal political pressure, and to a lesser extent, external economic pressure. Whether the offensive will be made against the Burma Road, Thailand, or the Philippines can not now be forecast.
The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to gain time. Considerable Navy and Army reinforcements have been rushed to the Philippines but the desirable strength has not yet been reached. The process of reinforcement is being continued. Of great and immediate concern is the safety of the Army convoy now near Guam, and the Marine Corps' convoy just leaving Shanghai. Ground forces to a total of 21,000 are due to sail from the United States by December 8, 1941, and it is important that this troop reinforcement reach the Philippines before hostilities commence. Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided so long as consistent with national policy. The longer the delay, the more positive becomes the assurance of retention of these Islands as a naval and air base. Japanese action to the south of Formosa will be hindered and perhaps seriously blocked as long as we hold the Philippine Islands. War with Japan certainly will interrupt our transport of supplies to Siberia, and probably will interrupt the process of aiding China.
After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that Joint military counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100° East or south of 10° North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.
Japanese involvement in Yunnan or Thailand up to a certain extent is advantageous, since it leads to further dispersion, longer lines of communication, and an additional burden on communications. However, a Japanese advance to the west of 100° East or south of 10° North, immediately becomes a threat to Burma and Singapore. Until it is patent that Japan intends to advance beyond these lines, no action which might lead to immediate hostilities should be taken.
It is recommended that:
prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military, counter-action be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States British, or Dutch territory as above outlined;
in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British and the Dutch governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken;
steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch or the issuance of such warning.
/S/ G. C. MARSHALL
/S/ H. R. STARK
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Post by jodak on Nov 27, 2016 8:58:52 GMT -6
7 November 1941 Memorandum for the Chief of Staff
See document
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Post by jodak on Nov 27, 2016 9:01:02 GMT -6
27 November 1941 From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. To: PACIFIC FLEET
See document
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Post by jodak on Nov 27, 2016 9:20:16 GMT -6
November 27, 1941
Message from War Department (Gerow) to Hawaiian (Short) and Philippine (MacArthur) commands -
Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.
Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civilian population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.
This was the Army's equivalent of the Navy's "War Warning" message. Short focused on the portion about not alarming the civilian population and reasoned that he could not implement an alert without doing that, although it had been done before by his predecessor. He was also obsessed with training and saw things like alerts as interfering with his precious training schedules.
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Post by jodak on Nov 28, 2016 6:51:24 GMT -6
November 27, 1941
The U.S. proposal of November 26 is studied at the Liaison Council between the Imperial General Headquarters and the Government, with the conclusion that war was inevitable.
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Post by jodak on Nov 28, 2016 6:56:13 GMT -6
"From: Washington (Nomura) "To: Tokyo "November 28, 1941 "Purple "#1214 To be handled in Government Code.
"Re my #1190.
"So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United Staten; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and headlines like this are appearing in the papers "Hull Hands Peace Plan to Japanese," and "America Scorns a Second Munich." The papers say that it is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principals, or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan.
"This we must carefully note."
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Post by jodak on Nov 28, 2016 7:11:16 GMT -6
[Secret] From: Tokyo To: Washington November 28, 1941. Purple (CA) #844 Re your #1189
Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180 and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can.
Army 25445 JD 6898 Trans. 11-28-41 (S)
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Post by jodak on Nov 28, 2016 7:16:40 GMT -6
From: Rio To: Santiago November 28, 1941 J-19
Circular #326 (Message from Tokyo Circular #2416)
(To be handled in Government code) Concerning Japanese-American negotiations, the counter proposal presented to us by the United States on the 27th, overlooks all we stand for; therefore, of course we disregard it. There is nothing to do but break off negotiations, and our relations with England and the United States within the next few days will assuredly take a critical turn. The above is for your information only.
Army 26000 Trans. 12/9/41 (7)
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Post by jodak on Nov 28, 2016 7:18:12 GMT -6
From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo November 28, 1941 Purple (Priority) #1209. To be handled in Government Code. What the Imperial Government must, of course, consider is what Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and China, egged on by the United States, will do in case the Imperial forces invade Thailand. Even supposing there is no armed collision with British forces, in the Oral Statement of President ROOSEVELT on the 17th of this month he prophesied that suitable action would be taken immediately in case Japan carries on any further penetration beyond French Indo-China. Moreover, newspaper reports at present would tend to lead to the conclusion that, even though England and the United States might not oppose us militarily within Thai, the United States assisting all nations concerned would adopt the policy of so-called joint defense throughout the whole southwestern Pacific area; thus, as I said in my #1204 , there is no slight possibility that she might occupy the Netherlands Indies on the excuse that this action would be necessary for purposes of defense. I am sure you already have all these things in your mind, but in view of the gravity of the present situation, I just wanted to remind you again.
25793 Trans. 12-6-41 (X)
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Post by jodak on Nov 28, 2016 7:20:45 GMT -6
From: Hsinking To: Tokyo November 28, 1941 Purple #781. Strictly Secret
To be handled in Government Code.
In view of the situation, after conferring with the competent authorities, the following measures having to do with the treatment of British and American nationals in Manchukuo in the event that war breaks out with England and the United States are as outlined below...
Army 25572 Trans. 12-2-41 (5)
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Post by jodak on Nov 28, 2016 7:21:50 GMT -6
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Post by jodak on Nov 28, 2016 7:23:21 GMT -6
From: Manila (Nihro) To: Tokyo November 28, 1941 Purple #799
Recently they have utilized a group of nine planes (one flight of six and another of three planes) in high-level scouting patrols over the city of Manila from four o'clock in the morning. In addition, three other planes fly over the city independently. Though in the morning and evening the weather is clear and windless, squalls come once a day.
ARMY 25764 Trans. 12/5/41 (6)
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