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Post by jodak on Nov 22, 2016 20:39:38 GMT -6
Top Secret
23 November 1941 From: CINCAF (Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet - Hart) Action: OPNAV (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations - Stark) Info: CINCPAC (Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet - Kimmel)
221150
No information here supporting Dutch report in your 211833. We have not detected presence in mandates of any men of war other than those normally assigned Fourth Fleet and although all units of latter have not been positively identified since 1 November it is probable that they are all in mandates but no concentration these units is apparent. There may have been an increase in number of transports and marus but this is hard to establish with certainty. The concentration of marus in Saipan area which has been apparent since about 20 October and numbers between 35 and 40 continues. CINCFOURTH is at Saipan and AIRON 24 may be. Traffic association between units combined fleet and mandates mentioned in COM 16 0916 of 27 October continues. One BATDIV and two carriers may be preparing to proceed mandates but no such movement has been detected. We continue to watch closely.
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Post by jodak on Nov 22, 2016 20:50:11 GMT -6
From The New Age of Franklin Roosevelt, by Dexter Perkins -
"It is fair to say, therefore, that the situation had reached an impasse by the autumn of 1941. It was aggravated still more by the fall of Prince Konoye in October. Even then, strong elements in Japan wished to avoid a break, and Admiral Tojo, who took Konoye's place as premier, seemed to show some willingness to continue negotiations. But the new cabinet lost little time in accelerating the preparations for war, and the conversations between the Secretary of State and the Japanese ambassador, Admiral Namura, accomplished nothing. Nonetheless, it must again be emphasized that the Roosevelt administration by no means desired to force things to a conclusion.
On the contrary, a memorandum of the President (written about November 17) evinced a desire to resume commercial relations in some degree if the Japanese would send no more troops to the south and would agree not to be bound by the tripartite pact. Furthermore, a week or so later the State Department produced proposals that later became famous as the last effort to avert a clash. These proposals asked the Japanese to withdraw from southern Indo-China and to limit their forces in the northern part of the country. In exchange the United States would agree to lift restrictions freezing Japanese assets in America, and exports would be resumed subject to the control measures made necessary in the national defense.
The proposal caused a howl of anguish from the Chinese, won little enthusiasm from the British, and met with a frigid reception from many circles in the United States. Secretary Hull soon dropped it in disgust. Though his action has since been the subject of harsh criticism, there seems little reason to believe that in any case it would have been acceptable to the Japanese. At the very same time that it was under discussion, the Japanese squadrons were already sailing eastward to the attack on Pearl Harbor."
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Post by jodak on Nov 23, 2016 16:58:36 GMT -6
From: Honolulu (Kita) To: Tokyo November 24, 1941J-19 #234 Re your #114 .
Strictly Secret.
1. According to normal practice, the fleet leaves Pearl Harbor, conducts maneuvers and forthwith returns.
2. Recently the fleet has not remained for a long period of time nor conducted maneuvers in the neighborhood of Lahaina Roads (The fleet alternative anchorage of Lahaina Maui.). Destroyers and submarines are the only vessels who ride at anchor there.
3. Battleships seldom, if ever, enter the ports of Hilo, Hanalei, or Kaneohe. Virtually no one has observed battleships in maneuver areas.
4. The manner in which the fleet moves :
Battleships exercise in groups of three or five, accompanied by lighter craft. They conduct maneuvers for roughly one week at sea, either to the south of Maui or to the southwest. Aircraft carriers maneuver by themselves, whereas sea plane tenders operate in concert with another vessel of the same class. Airplane firing and bombing practice is conducted in the neighborhood of the southern extremity of the island of Kahoolawe.
The heavy cruisers in groups of six carry on their operations over a period of two to three weeks, doubtless going to Samoa. The length of time that they remain at anchor in Pearl Harbor or tied up at docks is roughly four or five days at a stretch.
The light cruisers in groups of five spend one to two weeks in operations. It would seem that they carry on their maneuvers in the vicinity of Panama.
The submarines go out on 24-hour trips Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.
The destroyers, in addition to accompanying the principal units of the fleet, carry on personnel training activities in the waters adjacent to Hawaii.
Mine layers (old-style destroyers) in groups of - - - - -, have been known to spend more than three weeks in operations in the - - - - - area.
Furthermore, on the night of the 23rd, five mine layers conducted mine laying operations outside Manila harbor.
ARMY 26352 (Japanese) Trans. 12/16/41 (2)
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Post by jodak on Nov 23, 2016 17:01:31 GMT -6
From: Manila (Nihro) To: Tokyo November 24, 1941 Purple #789
1. Putting together various reports, it appears that a large amount of military stores was removed from the "port area" during the "blackout" on the night of the 21st. Forty or fifty civilian buses (carrying the "mark" of the Manila Electric Company) were seen in the Rizal Province district. Investigations are being made to find out if these were loaded with troops. 2. At about two o'clock in the afternoon of the 22nd, 60 light tanks (carrying one gun, two -----) and 20 ammunition trucks were seen leaving (Quezon Bridge ?). These light tanks and ammunition trucks were seen on the 21st grouped near the headquarters of the "port area" military police. It is conjectured that (troops ?) arrived on military boats recently entering the harbor. An English language "bulletin" of the 24th stated that a large number of light tanks and ammunition trucks had left at four and six o'clock on the afternoon of the 22nd in transit for Meycuayan in Bulacan Province and San Fernando in Pampanga Province. I believe that these had been landed sometime around the 21st. The final destination of these tanks and trucks is now being investigated.
3. At present it is seen that there are two or three hundred American army trucks near the "port area" which have been imported at short intervals, creating a hurried atmosphere. Also, troops have newly arrived at (certain places in ?) the hills within the city. They are evidently American reinforcements. Feeling among the people in general has become tense. ARMY 25530 Trans. 12/1/41 (6)
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Post by jodak on Nov 23, 2016 17:05:26 GMT -6
24 November 1941 From: Cmdr. Layton To: Ad. Kimmel
COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
General.-Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic above normal. Traffic analysis impresses are unchanged from yesterday's report. The difficulties of identifications have prevented more definite information of vessels (and fleets to which attached) that appear to be moving south from Kure-Sasebo area. If the poor reception prevailing here the last two days can be disregarded and the assumption made that Radio Heeia intercepted their "share" of the total traffic, the following impressions are worth something: (a) The falling off of traffic to China addresses. (b) The increased activity among third fleet addresses with a high percentage of what appeals to be movement reports. (c) The above normal activity in the Mandates both ashore and afloat addresses. The association of Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Force continues as usual. Palao and Jaluit appear prominently in dispatch traffic, the Second Fleet Commander with the former, and the Submarine Force Commander with the latter. First and Second Fleets.-Very little activity in First Fleet. The radio call believed to represent the flagship of Cruiser Division Seven originated a dispatch to Commander Cruiser Division Seven, CinC. Second Fleet, Commander Southern Expeditionary Force, and Radio Sama, Takao, Sasebo, and Tokyo. The CinC. Second Fleet continues to appear as the Task Force Commander of a large number of units from First and Second Fleet plus Carrier Division Three and Combined Air Force units. Third Fleet.-Large number of dispatches involving Third Fleet units, some of which appear to be movement reports. The fact that CinC Third Fleet appears as information addressee on many dispatches to and from Second Fleet units indicates that these two fleets will be closely associated in any future operations. Yesterday, a large number of dispatches associating Carrier Division Three with Cinc. Third Fleet. Fourth Fleet and Mandates.-Fourth Fleet appears to be concentrated in Truk area since all of the recent definite reports from Fourth Fleet vessels have come from Truk. Air Squadron Twenty-four and perhaps a large number of submarines from the Submarine Force are in the Marshall Area. Submarines.-Comparatively little activity. China.-Comparatively quiet. Carriers.-No definite indications of location. Combined Air Force.-Commander Kanoya Air appears in the Takao area. Otherwise no change.
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Post by jodak on Nov 23, 2016 17:08:01 GMT -6
24 November 1941 From: OPNAV Action: SPENAVO London Info: 250100
CNO advises as follows after studying special reports from CINCAF CINCPAC and Guam on the subject of my 222040;-you are at liberty to disclose the info to Vice Admiral Furstner and the British CNS. None of these special reports show any info supporting the Dutch report. Unquestionably activity in the mandates has increased both as regards warships and merchant types. A considerable number of garrisons are being strengthened. CINC Fourth Fleet is in Saipan and some units of fleet plus merchant types are fairly well distributed throughout the mandates. Air force submarine and patrol craft activity is increasing but as a general proposition Japanese emphasis is chiefly on the Truk and Jaluit areas. The CNO does not believe that any large Japanese aggressive force is now prepared for any immediate move from the region under discussion but he is concerned over southward troop movements from Shanghai and Japan to Formosa and also apparent preparations in China Formosa and Indo China for an early aggressive movement of some character. There are no clear indications at present as to the direction or strength of such a movement and the situation should be carefully watched.
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Post by jodak on Nov 23, 2016 17:26:18 GMT -6
TOP SECRET
November 24, 1941 From: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS. Action: CINCAF CINCPAC COM11 COM12 COM13 COM15. Info: SPENAVO CINCLANT. 242005.
Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action adees to inform senior Army officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately.
Notes 1. In addition to the action addressees of the commanders of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, the COMXX were the commanders of the Canal Zone, San Diego, San Francisco, and Puget Sound based Naval Districts, encompassing the entire west cost of the U.S. and Central America. Significantly absent is COM14, Admiral Bloch, the Commandant of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and Hawaiian Sea Frontier. That may be due to the fact that it was a subordinate command to CINCPAC, through which this message would undoubtedly have been routed, but it is still curious that it was not a direct addressee. 2. Like the "Bring Pacs" message, this one could have bee worded better and has been the cause of much controversy and debate, both at the time and subsequently. Specifically, Kimmel and others have argued that since it specifically mentioned the Philippines and Guam but not Hawaii, it is understandable that Kimmel did not place as much importance on it as he should have. This despite the fact that Kimmel was included as an "action" addressee, meaning that it was intended for action on his part, as well as the fact that it alerts to a possible hostile move in "any direction" including the Philippines and Guam.
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Post by jodak on Nov 23, 2016 17:29:43 GMT -6
November 24, 1941
From the Duty Book of Captain Shigeshi Uchida:
3rd Submarine Squadron left the Marshall Islands for Hawaii.
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Post by jodak on Nov 23, 2016 17:33:15 GMT -6
From: Tokyo To: Washington November 24, 1941 Purple (Very Urgent) #821 (Government Code)
1. It seems that the United States as well as England, Australia, and the Netherlands is not satisfied with evacuation merely from the Southern part of French Indo-China. We have gone out of our way to venture this proposal in order to break the deadlock. We absolutely cannot make any further concessions.
2. Our expectations, as I told you in my #798, go beyond the restoration of Japan-American trade and a return to the situation prior to the exercise of the freezing legislation and require the realization of all points of Proposal B with the exception of clauses 6 and 7. Therefore, our demand for a cessation of aid to CHIANG (the acquisition of Netherlands Indies goods and at the same time the supply of American petroleum to Japan as well) is a most essential condition. In view of the fact that this is a just demand, the fact that the government of the United States finds it hard to accept it makes us here in Japan suffer inordinately. Therefore, on the basis of what I told you in my #816, [c] as well as all that has gone before, please make every effort to persuade the Government of the United States.
3. Insofar as what we propose in Proposal B is concerned, the United States has misconstrued it as our demand. We here in Japan, in view of the extremely critical situation, only hope most earnestly for a speedy settlement. Naturally, that's all we want. Speaking further on this, it is necessary to warn the United States against enticing England, Australia, the Netherlands, etc., in paving the way for a joint hostile set-up. As you have written, we would like to secure the agreement of other competent countries in accordance with the gist of my #731 [d] at the same time Japan and the United States reach an understanding.
Army 25176 Trans. 11/24/41 (S)
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Post by jodak on Nov 23, 2016 17:36:03 GMT -6
From: Tokyo To: Washington November 24, 1941 Purple (Very Urgent) #822. Secret outside the department. Re my #821.
On the 23d I asked the American Ambassador in Tokyo to visit me and added the following to what I had told him in my caption telegram: The movement of Japanese troops from southern French Indo-China to the north is very important from a military standpoint. The occupation of northern French Indo-China is related to the basic settlement of the China incident, whereas the occupation of the southern portion was related to the freezing of funds by England and America. At the present time a total withdrawal of troops is utterly impossible and when the American President, acting as a spokesman for CHIANG KAI-SHEK, brings a proposal of peace to Japan in the China question, if Japan accepts this and enters into negotiations, it is only proper that we demand that America should not interfere with our efforts for peace. The above solution is not only the best, but the only way. Until this point is made clear, it is absolutely incompatible with the sentiment of the Japanese people to settle the Japan-American negotiations and it is impossible for us to understand why America does not agree to this. I have been making the greatest efforts for our new proposal from the standpoint of cooperation with the American peace policy and have tried to cut down our stipulations, making them clear and concise. When these negotiations are established, we intend to pursue an increasingly peaceful policy on this basis. After I had told him this, the Ambassador left at once to cable the gist to his home office.
Army 25177 Trans. 11-24-41 (S)
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Post by jodak on Nov 23, 2016 17:42:40 GMT -6
November 24, 1941
The U.S. revokes export licenses to Vichy France and at the same time extends Lend/Lease aid to Free French forces.
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Post by jodak on Nov 25, 2016 8:56:18 GMT -6
[Secret]
From: Tokyo To: Nanking 25 November 1941 (Purple) #499
Re your #818* To Naval authorities:
We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer?) for a while.
25390
JD-1: 6848 (F) Navy Trans. 11-27-41 (6-AR)
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Post by jodak on Nov 25, 2016 8:57:41 GMT -6
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo 25 November 1941 (Purple) #1177
Re your #792*
In this office we are withholding all reports regarding the content of the Japanese-American negotiations themselves or any predictions regarding the future. The State Department also is exercising extreme caution in its press conferences. Hence the Japanese correspondents here are transmitting various trends of the negotiations copied from newspaper articles here that are based on pure conjecture. Among these correspondents are those who recognize that the articles are valueless but who are being pressed by the head office for news. I have observed particularly this meaningless competition to get the news among the correspondents who have come to Washington from New York. That this senseless competition to gather inaccurate news will not exert a harmful influence on the course of the negotiations themselves is something that I cannot guarantee. In view of this situation I would greatly appreciate it if the Foreign Office would speak a word of caution to the newspapers concerned regarding this useless competition between their special correspondents in collecting news regarding these negotiations. And it would be particularly helpful if the head offices of the newspapers concerned would issue orders direct to their special correspondents along this line.
25434
JD-1:6880 (H) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (1)
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Post by jodak on Nov 25, 2016 9:01:01 GMT -6
[Secret]
From: Hanoi To: Tokyo 25 November 1941 (Purple-YO) #118 (Strictly secret.)
We are advised by the military that we are to have a reply from the United States on the 25th. If this is true, no doubt the Cabinet will make a decision between peace and war within the next day or two. It goes without saying here, of course, that if the U. S.-Japanese negotiations are brought to a successful termination, the various enterprises shall be launched in accordance with the plans which have been laid down in advance.
Should, however, the negotiations not end in a success, since practically all preparations for the campaign have been completed, our forces shall be able to move within the day.
Under these circumstances, however, there shall have to be some alterations in the program we have laid out for the various enterprises. We shall, undoubtedly, have to establish organs and conduct negotiations which will not conflict with the campaign. The thing that we are most concerned about is whether or not, in the event of war, the status quo will be maintained as far as the French Indo-China's governmental setup is concerned. I feel that it is essential that we not only be advised of this, but it must be done immediately as we wish to make all pre-arrangements as far in advance as possible.
If you have any opinions as to the outcome of the Japanese-U. S. negotiations, will you please inform this office of them together with whatever other pertinent information you may deem wise to impart to us.
Of course, I realize that secrecy is of the utmost importance. According to press reports, however, the United States conferred with the representatives of Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, and even of China, in Washington, and hence the governments of these countries are now aware of the matters being discussed in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations. Moreover, by means of (courier?) service, the military here are aware of not only our stand in the negotiations but also of the general atmosphere of the said negotiations. We feel as if we, a Foreign Office organ, alone have been left out of the picture. As you pointed out in your circular message #2353* the situation is becoming exceedingly critical. Please, therefore, make arrangements to advise us on these points by means of either cable or by special messenger services.
25345
JD-1: 6838 (D) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S-TT)
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Post by jodak on Nov 25, 2016 9:07:01 GMT -6
Top secret
25 NOVEMBER 1941 FROM: CINCAF (Asiatic Fleet) ACTION: OPNAV (Naval Operations) INFO: CINCPAC (Pacific Fleet)
250623
Shipping Adviser Batavia informs that Dutch report concerning Palau originated with Army in Timor Portuguese Timor was named as objective of the alleged expeditionary force. Info was classified as very doubtful and has had no confirmation.
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