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Post by mac on Apr 16, 2014 6:30:48 GMT -6
Further thought re Bang moment. I am happy to go with Lame White Man but am intrigued by the timing of the arrival of a couple of hundred guys with their "blood up" from the Reno fight. How would that timinig fit in with the Lame White Man action? Cheers
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Post by mac on Apr 16, 2014 6:33:47 GMT -6
Agreed Ian they would need to build a "critical mass". (See post above) I know QC has pointed out before that Greasy Grass would be a great gathering area. Cheers
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 16, 2014 6:44:40 GMT -6
Mac, Fred will be up and about soon, and he will bring his knowledge to the table as he knows which Indians said they fought at both battles. I only have Grey’s times, which I am reluctant to use because they might conflict with Fred’s, but if you want a general idea then I will post them;
4:30: Benteen Battalion arrives on Reno Hill.
5:10: Chief Lame White Man counter-attacks Company C from his position on Greasy Grass Ridge and rolls up the right flank. Soldiers flee in confusion up Calhoun Ridge.
So going on Greys info, would suggest that 40 minutes had elapsed between Benteen arriving on Reno hill to Lame Whiteman charging, now is that time enough for the majority to return from the valley and move on Custer?
Ian.
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Post by mac on Apr 16, 2014 15:41:09 GMT -6
I suspect that to be the case Ian but we will see. Cheers
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Post by welshofficer on Apr 16, 2014 17:06:59 GMT -6
Ian
I agree that the C company collapse is when the NAs "smelt blood" and GAC's pack of cards started collapsing.
WO
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 16, 2014 17:25:55 GMT -6
Justin;
Yes I agree, the demise of C Company was not only a loss of a troop but this could have unlocked the Keogh sector, for all we know L Company may have been holding there own on Calhoun hill, but when C broke there fire had to be shifted from Henryville to cover men running back up hill on their right flank, and as Chuck mention they didn’t have enough carbines to cover all locations in the first place so this shift in fire could give any enemy that was initially supressed a free reign to move forward.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 16, 2014 17:46:22 GMT -6
Ian: I am not so sure who was supressing whom in the L Company area. If you look at the Bonafides Map and the cartridge finds, assuming they are correct you will see a couple of distinct lines going from lower down on Calhoun Hill to higher. That would be an indicator that the fire from Henryville built up gradually in volume, and as it grew its effects began to tell forcing L's skirmish line backward. There is also a point there where if L goes back far enough it leaves an avenue to the rear (east) open which cannot be covered. All this smells to me of the Hostiles gaining fire superiority (in terms of effectiveness) which is Get out of Dodge Time. Think this ties in nicely with something we have talked about earlier, Keogh in whole or in part preparing to move out. Looks to me like C probably went down into the coulee after L was starting to get pressed from Henryville. Just a guess, but I think a good one.
Completely off topic: Watched the Spig Wead classic Hell Divers this afternoon. Had not seen that movie in probably fifty years. Great 1932 vintage shots of Saratoga. The rest was pure schlock. Got a lot of people interested in flying for the Navy though as was its intent.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 17, 2014 8:28:00 GMT -6
Chuck, wouldn’t C Company have been better served trying to cover L Company with fire towards Henryville thus giving Calhoun a chance to disengage? Any move down the length of Calhoun Ridge would take them away from Henryville, I know we don’t actually know where the main hostile threat was coming from, but those Indians on Greasygrass Ridge could have been over 600m away and any in Calhoun Coulee were out of sight, so any move down there would not aid Calhoun’s men, as the cartridges found on Henryville indicate that this location could be the place that was causing all the damage, not Indians 600m away on a ridge line.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 17, 2014 8:49:20 GMT -6
Ian: Why C Company did what it did will always be a mystery. Almost everything concerning that move is speculation. Only thing I can figure is that in addition to Henryville fire was being taken from that broken ground three or four hundred meters due west of Calhoun Hill. Fire from Greasy Grass Ridge could have been coming in L's direction as well, but it was from much longer range, and likely to be somewhat less effective.
If C going down there was intended to be a quick in and out, then fire received from that flank on L would diminish, giving them a better chanced to stay focused on Henryville, and if withdraw was the intention withdraw by bounds back to the horses, while C returned and covered some of that.
Regardless of the why of C, all of it is indicative that numbers had grown in that broken ground, and the fact they had grown so large was something that both C and L were unaware of.
I think the root cause was tactical fixation rather then the more broad situational awareness, where you tend to focus on the immediate without true appreciation of the complete picture. Easy to do, and nearly always fatal.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 17, 2014 9:53:23 GMT -6
Chuck I wouldn’t be surprized if most of Deep Coulee, Calhoun Coulee and Greasy Grass Ridge were full of Indians at the point of L Companies demise.
Ian.
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Post by mac on Apr 17, 2014 18:53:35 GMT -6
Following what QC has said then it would seem that over a fairly short time after the occupation of Calhoun Hill the Indians moved in large numbers into the surrounding landscape perhaps forcing L back up the hill and the awareness of this movement prompted C to action to relieve some pressure. Masked by the terrain the number of Indians was much greater than expected and hence C was taken by surprise. The implication being that the movement of Indians was far greater than expected. So I suggest that there must have been a large number of warriors coming from the village to Calhoun soon after the excursion to MTC and these cannot initially be from the Reno fight but new participants who were perhaps not apparent at the time of the MTC recon but were already prepared for action and it was the move down MTC that pulled them to that part of the village. Cheers
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Post by Colt45 on Apr 17, 2014 19:52:05 GMT -6
Mac, Some of the NA accounts (or as DC would say, accounts of NA accounts) indicate that many warriors, preparing or just prepared to fight, were in the village, but had not yet left for Reno when Custer was sighted at MTC. This would validate the premise that a large number of previously uncommitted warriors left the village to go after Custer by crossing ford b and advancing along MTC, Calhoun Coulee, Deep Coulee, etc. I think you are correct that C was taken by surprise, since when they dismounted after their charge, they were counterattacked by a large number of NAs and very shortly afterwards began the retreat back toward Calhoun hill. As QC says, it really makes no sense to have gone down that way, given the pressure that was coming from Henryville, and the distance involved between Calhoun hill and Greasy Grass ridge. It would be great to really know why they did that.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 17, 2014 20:41:10 GMT -6
This may sound rather silly on the surface likening these people coming across like it was an organized military maneuver, but bear with me.
I believe they came across in waves, separated by some elapsed time. I think the first across were those nearest to MTC Ford and after the Yates battalion withdrew they moved up toward the ridge, but their numbers not being that great they moved with caution. Following them were more but still not in great numbers. These were probably the first to return from Reno. So mass is starting to build in some depth. Some of them undoubtedly were mounted and I would expect them to be the ones coming up Deep Coulee and eventually to Henryville, while others on foot were infiltrating up through that broken ground, and being given some covering fire from Greasy Grass Ridge. Somewhere behind them were the mass of the late arrivals from Reno, plus those still uncommitted that remained in the village. Some of these probably crossed at MTC Ford, while others including the bulk of the uncommitted discovered and honored the new threat, Custer in the environs of Cemetery Ridge.
So what I think you would see if you looked at the area between Battle Ridge and the river, and from MTC Ford to Ford D if you looked at it from above is a layered mass moving generally eastward. A perfect storm of combat power headed your way which you have no power to stop. A relatively slow moving series of waves, moving to engulf you, and a wave which you had no power escape the effects of. They were standing like a deer caught in the headlights, unaware that those headlights were the lights of a freight train.
At the very last those waves consolidated, at first swirled around the company rocks, then consumed them. From the point of waves consolidating to consumption probably on the order of ten minutes, but, those waves had been moving ever forward for about forty minutes before that, perhaps a little more on the south side and a little less in the north.
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Post by Colt45 on Apr 17, 2014 20:54:46 GMT -6
Undoubtedly, QC, you are correct about waves. How could it be otherwise? They would not have moved with the organization of a military unit that had a functioning command and control point, but common sense would tell them to gather as many as they could and advance according to their numbers, whether on foot or horseback. The ones on horseback would move quickly to the rear of Calhoun hill soldiers and toward ford d, all the while the ones on foot use the terrain to advance more carefully. Custer aided this "wave" by spreading his forces so thinly. As you have already pointed out, too much terrain to cover and too few troops to do it with. Everything known about Custer's movements indicate NA's coming from almost every direction, though not all directions at the same time. I think he definitely saw a human "tsunami" in just about every direction he looked. It must have been an awesome site.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 17, 2014 21:06:32 GMT -6
Every time I talk about waves Colt some studmuffin tells me I am giving credit to the aborigines when there is no aboriginal credit do. It is usually followed by a lecture on centralized command and control being nonexistent. I would wager if you could see a large fire about a mile off from your neighborhood, those in your neighborhood would gravitate toward it in much like the manner I described above. I think reactions to events like these are more instinctively human than anything else.
Yes, no command and control, just instinctive common sense, and very human reaction.
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