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Post by tubman13 on Nov 11, 2016 18:10:45 GMT -6
Pequod,
Ok lets be fair, the elites in both parties are/were clueless, except maybe Bill Clinton. Let us see if you can figure that out. Also, lets hope political correctness is dead, doubtful.
Regards, Tom
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Post by dan25 on Dec 29, 2016 15:12:25 GMT -6
Since the board is so quiet I want to try a theory again. I posted this not to long ago and it was quickly shot down with what seemed to be not to much thought. Perhaps I didn't explain it properly. I ask you to read this with a completely open, unbiased mind. For the moment put aside any contempt or prejudice for Custer. Don't think about Custer's reputation or any past actions, or his glory hunting. Also put aside your military knowledge and thinking as far as what Custer should have done, or what Custer could have done and simply look at what Custer actually did do.
Please read this slowly so you will better understand what I am trying to point out.
The object of the expedition was to contain or capture the Indians. It appears Custer was very concerned even fearful the Indians would escape. Should that happen he would be held responsible, so he decided to arrive at LBH a day earlier than previously planned. I left out the word "attack".
Custer sends Benteen to the south. Custer then sent Reno into the valley. Custer went to 3411 where he observed Reno and he had to observe a portion of the village. At this time there had to be much chaos, confusion and noncombatants fleeing northward. Custer moves northward up cedar coulee, turns into MTC and heads toward the river. When he arrives at the flats he turned right and rode up to Luce Ridge a fair or considerable distance away from the village.
At this point lets look at what Custer has actually done, or didn't do. 1. Custer made no attempt to return toward Reno or ford A to deliver a 1 2 punch down the valley. 2. Custer made no attempt to cross the river and attack the village. So far this rules out a hammer and anvil tactic, also a repeat of Wasita to capture noncombatants. 3. He has placed himself a considerable distance from the village as a show of force.
Custer now divides his command again, leaving soldiers near the coulee. Custer heads north then west toward ford D. Custer does not cross the river, instead he goes to higher ground possibly to observe the situation.
If we look at the positioning of the regiment at this point, what we see is soldiers to the south and soldiers to the east. It appears, I repeat just appears that Custer has positioned the regiment to block or intimidate the Indians from fleeing in either of those directions. Not thinking of the warriors but the woman, children and the elderly needed those coulees to escape eastward. By positioning the regiment where he did he left one easy avenue of escape open, northward where he knew Gibbon's and Terry was coming from. I did not mention westward because remembering Gibbons could not locate a crossing of the Yellowstone, if that were true than the Indians surely would have known also, definitely leaving only northward open. Custer made no actual attempt to attack, or to get involved in a pitched battle nor any attempt so far to gain glory.
I seriously think Custer was allowing the Indians to escape but in the direction he wanted them to go. I don't think Custer ever thought the Indians would actually attack him with the intent to completely distroy his command, but naturally put up a stout defense allowing the woman and children to escape. Once they were safe the warriors would follow the noncombatants and Custer would follow them.
This is not the Custer that any one would expect, but I also believe that Gen. Sheridan had a very significant influence on Custers actions at the LBH.
Sheridan had a unusual admiration for Custer. Consider the incident involving the small table that Gen. Lee had signed the surrender on. Giving it to Libby Custer and saying no one deserves this more than your husband. Really? Of all the officers Custer deserves it ? How many other times did Sheridan intervene and pull Custers butt out of the fire? The last incident was in Washington awaiting his testimony against Pres. Grants brother and Custer left without any permission and was arrested and returned. Again Sheridan came to the rescue. I find it extremely hard to believe that Sheridan didn't have a long and serious talk with Custer, even to the point of mentioning if Custer screwed up this campaign he could lose his military career for ever, with Sheridan being unable to help. This may sound like pure speculation, but it is highly plausible.
Best Regards Dan25
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Post by Colt45 on Dec 30, 2016 8:56:07 GMT -6
Dan, Your theory is as plausible as any other with regards to what Custer was thinking about. However, if he intended to push them north, he needed more than 3 companies to do that. Reno had maybe 140 or so men, against what Custer estimated to be 1500 warriors. So he doesn't have the force in the valley to cause the Indians to begin fleeing north. His sending of Benteen to the south scout indicates his lack of knowledge about where the Indians actually are, and you can't execute the push you describe unless you know where they are, the terrain in their area, and what routes you have to block in order to force a northbound movement.
Custer's route from 3411 was wide to the east where he would be hidden from view. If he wanted to block an escape to the east with a show of force, he could have moved all 5 companies down MTC, which would have been very visible to the village. There would have been no need to go any further north than the LNC area. If they were thinking of fleeing east, seeing all 210 men in the LNC area would make them move further to the north. And if they attacked him, he could move back to the south toward Reno.
He also had to know that he was early, as Terry had indicated a link up around the 26th, therefore pushing them north still left enough escape room before Terry could be in an effective blocking position.
His comments to Gibbon as he departed on the 22nd about not leaving any hostiles to the rest of them (Gibbon's statement to Custer to not get greedy) indicates he wanted this to be a 7th cavalry victory only, not to be shared with anyone else. My opinion is that he badly needed this campaign to be a glorious victory attributable to him only, as that was the only way he could resurrect his career and possibly launch other opportunities later, either in business or politics. If you haven't read Custer's Trials, do so, as it gives one of the best insights into the man that you will find, and this helps in trying to understand what he was thinking on the 25th of June, 1876.
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Post by dan25 on Dec 30, 2016 11:58:02 GMT -6
Colt, Thank you for the reply. I based my suggestion on Custer's actual movements, I did not suggest that Custer intended to forcibly push the Indians northward. His intention appears to let the Indians flee on their own without attacking them, by simply placing soldiers to the south and the east which he did blocking any easy escape routes.
When Custer was at 3411 he had to have seen a portion of the village, and he might have even seen the woman and children already fleeing north. If you are already going north why change direction? Therefore Custer could have assumed by going east blocking the coulee's was a sensible coarse of action. As I stated in my last post Custer would have had no thought that the Indians would be so forceful.
As far as glory or restoring his reputation, how do you gain glory by staying that far from the village or setting on Cemetery Ridge?
If you look at Fred's time line, from the time Custer turns from MTC and heads up to Luce Ridge, approx. 1:35 PM, until he leaves Cemetery Ridge toward Last Stand Hill, approx. 3:12 PM, Custer has spent 2 hours and seventeen minutes riding all over on the east side of the river. This appears to be some one doing a lot of observing a situation, or some one without a clue as what to do next. Can anyone explain how Custer planned to gain glory based on his actual movements? It is a fact not speculation that Custer did not attack the Indians, the Indians attacked Custer.
Best Regards Dan25
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Post by Colt45 on Dec 30, 2016 13:09:49 GMT -6
Dan, Your theory that Custer was only trying to block the eastern escape while Reno scared them to the north assumes Custer was a team player, which he was not. He was all about Custer. His actual movements were designed to get to the the north end so he could hit from two sides, a tactic that he had used before and was a standard military tactic of the day. At 3411, we are not sure what Custer saw. He could have seen Reno deploying into his skirmish line, and assumed everything was going fine, i.e. the Indians were setting a screening force to allow time for a northern escape. Or he could have seen Reno's left flank being turned, and realized he needed to get into the fight quickly. We will never know exactly what he saw, but I don't think you can see the entire village from that point.
From the moment he sent Reno across the river at ford A, Custer was in attack mode. All his movements were to facilitate an attack from the north. He never entered into the assault phase of an attack. Reno was the only one that actually assaulted the Indians. Custer went from attack mode to defense/retreat mode when he was repulsed from crossing the river in the ford D area. He hoped to gain glory by capturing or killing as many as he could before Terry's forces could arrive. His plans got changed for him by the rapid response to his presence by the Indians in the north, and by those returning from the Reno fight.
If he were not interested in wrapping things up single-handedly, he would have laid up on the 25th, or continued south to the headwaters of Tullock's creek, as Terry had desired. That extra time taken to finish the scout would have allowed all the forces to be at the LBH at roughly the same time. That is what a team player would have done. He was told the village was very large by the size of the pony herd his scouts saw from the Crow's nest. This should have prompted him to wait rather than go into attack mode on the 25th. He gambled that he could handle the Indians by himself.
As I said before, your theory that he only wanted to show himself on the south side, and prevent any flight to the east side is just as valid as mine, which is that he intended to attack totally from the moment he turned up the bluffs on the east side. We are really just guessing at what was in his mind in terms of a plan. You made good points in your previous post and you may be absolutely right, but based on what I have learned about the man, plus all the evidence gathered over time, I think he meant to be a one-man show the whole way.
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Post by dan25 on Dec 30, 2016 13:57:26 GMT -6
Colt, Thanks again. You seem to be the only person willing to discuss this with me and I appreciate it.
You mentioned Custer being repulsed at the ford D area, I don't recall any action there. Was it at ford B?
Also, you made no mention or comment regarding my theory about Gen Sheridan having a serious talk with Custer. I would like to hear your take on it. It does seem quite possible.
Best Regards Dan25
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Post by benteen on Dec 30, 2016 14:44:27 GMT -6
Dan25,
First let me say that I appreciate your time and effort in posting your opinion, it could be true. However, I agree with Colt 100%. Allow me to explain why.
I have posted this before but I dont think you were on the board at the time, so here goes again.Remember this is only my opinion. We will never know what Custer was thinking;
GAC left the PRD with 700 men and about 900 animals. This was no LRRP mission, it was a bold move right through the heart of Indian country. The animals would have left a trail of manure 50 yards wide, there would have been supplies falling off the pack train, the dust would have been seen for miles, their campfires would have lit up the sky,their resting area would have been a square mile. There is no way Custer could have thought that he arrived on the 25th unnoticed. I believe these Indians knew where Custer was the minute he left the powder river. What they didnt know was what he planned to do. I dont believe that Custer could possibly think that he was unnoticed. But "OH no they found a bread box, they know we are here, we have to attack" I dont buy that for a second. At best it was a flimsy excuse in case he failed as to why he went against Terrys orders. But I dont think Terry or the Army would except it any more than they did his flimsy excuse as to why he left his command to go to Libbie. Custer was in the doghouse and this would be his last chance to regain his former standing as the Boy General.
As to his wanting them to escape to the North, I dont believe he wanted even a dog to escape. He wanted this victory all to himself. Thats why he attacked in the North. To prevent them from getting to Terry. And God forbid Crook should show up, (Remember he didnt know Crook had been defeated) that would really rain on his parade.
Again Dan, this is only my opinion, I dont know anymore than you or anyone else what was going on in his head.
Be Well Dan
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Post by Colt45 on Dec 30, 2016 15:27:02 GMT -6
Dan25, Conventional theory holds that Custer tried to cross at ford B, but the Indians never referred to the fords by letters. Their interpreters placed those labels there. There is no archeological evidence of any fighting at ford B. It was assumed Custer tried to cross there based on shod horse tracks found there. These could have been tracks made after the Indians had retrieved cavalry horses and went back across ford B to the village.
Militarily, ford B is useless. It is not wide enough for 5 companies to go across in line formation. It also was a ford that led to the middle of the village, which also makes it unusable. Custer could have seen the village across the ford from the LNC ridgeline. He would have known he couldn't cross into the middle of the village, so he moved north from LNC, behind battle ridge and LSH and down to the flats where the souvenir stand and hamburger joint now reside. That whole area by the river is ford D, which can consist of several locations for crossing that would have allowed for a wide line crossing. You cross in a line to bring all your guns to bear on the enemy on the other side.
Many of us believe ford D is where the crossing was attempted and where the accounts of an officer being wounded are referring to. All Indian accounts were relayed through interpreters who probably applied the account to terrain that fit their particular theory of what happened. As a result, you can't go strictly by accounts. As Dark Cloud always reminded people, there were no eyewitness accounts. What we got were accounts of accounts, flavored through the filter bias of the white recorder. Probably the best Indian account available is John Stands in Timber, because his grandfather, who was in the battle, walked the battlefield with him and related it to him in his native tongue, thus much less distortion when JSIT related the story in English.
Also, there has been evidence of fighting in the ford D area. The reporter Kellogg's marker was originally in that area. Plus, recent cartridge finds in the battle ridge extension area support the notion of fighting in that area. BRE is north of LSH and leads down to the highway and the burger joint. The JSIT account and map shows Custer approaching the river in the ford D area, being repulsed and moving back to CR, LSH, battle ridge, and Calhoun Hill and FF ridge. He showed all 5 companies moving from LNC to the Calhoun Hill area. He never shows any movement toward ford B. Fred's timings work out quite well with the ford D theory if you don't have a movement toward ford B.
I am one of several folks who advocate the ford D theory as long as the timings stay within the bounds Fred laid out in "Strategy" and that the theory can be supported by archeological evidence and good military practice in use at the time. So far, the ford D theory fits very well within all those parameters. Of course, no one will ever know for sure.
As to Sheridan, he was a big supporter of Custer, but only to a point. He knew he was a good fighter and his popularity coming out of the ACW aided the army in acquiring funds from Congress. It was a lot easier to get funding for the Indian problem if Congress knew the great fighter Custer was going to lead the campaign. This also helped Sheridan with his career goals. However, he was not going to go down with the Custer ship if George screwed up any further in 1876 or beyond. George had pretty well used up all the favors he had coming. Again, I refer you to Custer's Trials if you haven't read it as it does an excellent job of covering Custer from the academy days up to the departure from Ft Abe Lincoln.
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Post by dan25 on Dec 30, 2016 16:33:29 GMT -6
Colt, thanks again for the info.
Dan, thank you for joining in.
Dan, you mention that the Indians knew where Custer was. I have read several Indian accounts and they claimed they had no idea Custer would attack that day. They only knew their were soldiers at or near the rosebud area.
Wolf Tooth claimed that he and a small group of Cheyenne snuck across the river and were headed toward the rosebud when they were informed that soldiers were attacking the village at the LBH.
I don't know if this is correct, but I think had the Indians knew where Custer was they never would have allowed him to get that close to the village. To protect the village they would have rode out to meet him as far from the village as possible just as they had done with Gen Crook at the rosebud.
Best Regards Dan25
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Post by Colt45 on Dec 30, 2016 18:35:39 GMT -6
Dan25, I believe the Indians knew he was in the area as they didn't want anyone going out of the village area as I believe Sitting Bull is reported to have told his people to do nothing until they knew what the soldiers wanted. He was supposed to have said something along the line of "let's see if they want to talk, if they want to fight, we'll give them a fight". This may have been in reference to the report of Reno coming down the valley, but keeping all warriors in the village was due to the knowledge Custer was not too far away. I think I read an account of their knowing he was along the rosebud for some time.
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Post by tubman13 on Dec 30, 2016 19:28:39 GMT -6
Dan25, I have not added any to this as Colt has put forth most of my thoughts, we are on the same page. What you will find below is an excerpt from Godfrey's article. It fits hand and glove with JSIT's account. There also was no interpreter needed.
"The accepted theory for many years after the battle, and still persisted in by some writers, was that Custer’s column had turned the high bluffs near the river, moved down the dry (Reno’s) creek, and attempted to ford the river near the lowest point of these bluffs; that he was there met by an overpowering force and driven back ; that he then divided his battalion, moved down the river with the view of attacking the village, but met with such resistance from the enemy posted along the river bank and ravines that he was compelled to fall back, fighting, to the position on the ridge. The numerous bodies found scattered between the river and ridge were supposed to be the first victims of the fight. I am now satisfied that these were men who either survived those on the ridge or attempted to escape the massacre."
"The wife of Spotted Horn Bull, when giving me her account of the battle, persisted in saying that Custer’s column did not attempt to cross at the ford, and appealed to her husband, who supported her statement. On the battle field, in 1886, Chief Gall indicated Custer’s route to me, and it then flashed upon me that I myself had seen Custer’s trail. On June 28, while we were burying the dead, I asked Major Reno’s permission to go on the high ridge east or back of the field to look for tracks of shod horses to ascertain if some of the command might not have escaped. When I reached the ridge I saw this trail, and wondered who could have made it, but dismissed the thought that it had been made by Custer’s column, because it did not accord with the theory with which we were then filled, that Custer had attempted to cross at the ford, and this trail was too far back, and showed no indication of leading toward the ford. Trumpeter Penwell was my orderly and accompanied me. It was a singular coincidence that in 1886 Penwell was stationed at Fort Custer, and was my orderly when visiting the battle field. Penwell corroborated my recollection of the trail. The ford theory arose from the fact that we found there numerous tracks of shod horses, but they evidently had been made after the Indians had possessed themselves of the cavalry horses, for they rode them after capturing them. No bodies of men or horses were found anywhere near the ford, and these facts are conclusive to my mind that Custer did not go to the ford with any body of men."
Take what you want from it, Happy New Year.
Regards, Tom
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Post by dan25 on Dec 31, 2016 11:06:33 GMT -6
Colt, I think my brain was asleep when I posted that for Dan. Your absolutely correct. I now remember reading about their wanting to wait and see what the soldiers intention was. If I remember correctly the Cheyenne even posted guards so no one would leave the village. I'm not sure if I becoming senile or just not thinking before I open my mouth.
Tom, thank you for your input. If I read your post correctly It backs up what I thought that Custer Didn't attempt to attack at either ford.
Do you have any thought regarding my theory that maybe Custer was acting completely contrary to his normal actions and was allowing the Indians to flee north? As ridiculous and far-fetched as it sounds his movements only on the east side of the river and not toward the village has got me baffled. It wasn't the normal Custer. It just seems to easy to accept that Custer only intended to attack and get the glory he always wanted, even restore his reputation based solely on his past actions.
Best Regards, and a very happy New Year to every one dan25
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Post by dan25 on Dec 31, 2016 11:25:26 GMT -6
My brain is not working as usual. I wanted to mention that I hope no one thinks that I am convinced I am correct on my theory and every one is wrong due to my constant asking for thought's or opinions. dan25
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Post by Colt45 on Dec 31, 2016 16:10:37 GMT -6
Dan25, I don't think anyone here thinks you are convinced that your theory is correct. Your theory could be completely right for all anyone else knows. Asking for other opinions is how you can refine your own theories. If two heads are better than one, imagine how much better all the good minds on this board are when it comes to figuring out as much as is humanly possible about this battle.
I have refined my own theories several times due to the very good analyses posted by many others here, and on other boards dealing with LBH. Keep bringing up any question or theory. We all learn from them.
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Post by wild on Dec 31, 2016 19:46:26 GMT -6
There are two main approaches to battle scenario setting.The probables or traditionalists and the possibles or revisioneries. For example the scenario offered by Colt45 [and no disrespect] is possible . I would number myself among the traditionalists confining myself to probability . Probability is limited while possibility is unlimited. The manuevours described in Colt's opus are possible but very unlikely.
Lets go back to basics. Cavalry are not a stand alone formation. Normally they act in support of the infantry. Other than the charge their repertoire is somewhat limited. To put it bluntly the skirmish line with 25% of the troops holding animals is a military joke. Add to that the non existance of a means of command and control. Custer could committ units but could not direct them . This renders battlefield unit cooperation impossible. Custer committed Benteen to the left flank and lost 3 companies. He then committed Reno to attack and lost a further 3 companies.Bearing in mind that cavalry rely on shock, further ah hoc dispersal of his puny force [such as the suggested deployment of Keogh]would have been total madness.
An attack at ford B or ford d would have resulted in the battle being fought in the vicinity of these fords. There is no evidence that any significant action occured at either of these fords.
It is probable Custer was stopped while moving to the North .There are a number of options open to him Northwards of the village . North and he still had the initiative South and he was retreating and on the defensive.
When Custer descended from Weirpoint and took his command into the drainage system he lost sight of the village and Indian movements . Emerging out onto Battle Ridge I think he was hit along his entire line of march resulting in the fragmentation of the column , with the lead companies just reaching LSH with the remainder cut off and surrounded in pockets to his rear .
Beyond MTC we know nothing for certain. There are no indian accounts and as every shread of clothing[except Custer's jocks] and all weapons and accoutrements passed through Indian possession they were rendered useless as evidence.
A happy New Year to you all. Richard
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