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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 1, 2017 9:43:18 GMT -6
If you want to see the maps for various accounts than I would suggest Drawing Battle Lines The Map Testimony of Custer's Last Fight by Michael Donahue.
You will find a map by JSIT which is an Indian Account. John Stands in Timber was fluent in Cheyenne and English so there should be little loss in the translation.
His map clearly shows that Custer moved across MTC and directly toward the Ford D area.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by dan25 on Jan 1, 2017 10:23:01 GMT -6
Colt, I wanted to be sure no one misunderstood my post's.
I have read some reactions of some members when some one post's something and they misunderstand it, or the post wasn't to their liking. I also didn't want some one to misunderstand and just ignore it. By posting a completely different theory I was hoping to attract many reply's and put a little life back into this board.
Wild, You mention the possibility of Indians attacking Custer all along his route of march. While I agree with you do to the number of Indians already on the east side of the river before Custer's arrival at LBH, I some how don't think it was serious enough to cause any deep concern. Otherwise why would any officer split his command and head toward ford D with only 2 company's, then set on Cemetery Ridge for any length of time? What I think happened the situation with Keogh and the 3 company's didn't worsen until after Custer's departure and he had no knowledge of how serious it had become until he left CR and headed toward LSH.
AZ, Thank you for joining in. I am not quite sure what your post meant, unless it was to confirm my thought that Custer stayed to the east and didn't attempt to attack the village.
Best Regards dan25
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Post by wild on Jan 1, 2017 11:49:42 GMT -6
Hi AZ
If you want to see the maps for various accounts than I would suggest Drawing Battle Lines The Map Testimony of Custer's Last Fight by Michael Donahue. You will find a map by JSIT which is an Indian Account. John Stands in Timber was fluent in Cheyenne and English so there should be little loss in the translation. His map clearly shows that Custer moved across MTC and directly toward the Ford D area.
John Stands in Timber was not present at the battle. The maps you refer to are an interpretation of hearsay. Bestwishes Richard
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Post by wild on Jan 1, 2017 12:06:22 GMT -6
Dan25 While I agree with you do to the number of Indians already on the east side of the river before Custer's arrival at LBH, I some how don't think it was serious enough to cause any deep concern When Custer advanced beyond Weir Point he was in tactical contact with the enemy.He was never more than 1000 meters or 3 minutes away from a force which outnumbered his own and was growing in strenght.
Otherwise why would any officer split his command and head toward ford D with only 2 company's, then set on Cemetery Ridge for any length of time? This is not factual.It is part of a possible scenario. It only fits if you have the Indians taking leave of their senses. Cheers Richard
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 1, 2017 12:22:06 GMT -6
Richard
Not sure hearsay applies to maps. It is what JSIT made based upon his research. That he would qualify as an expert witness would seem more likely than not and as such he could give an opinion the map is a representation of an event. Maps are used in court all of the time that are not produced by the subject(s) involved. A simple traffic accident with injury could have maps produced by an attorney or expert witness and there is no objection to them being hearsay. Both sides may have maps of events which the judge or jury has to decide which is correct.
I drew maps based upon what suspects stated they did and have used them against them.
Expert witnesses testify all the time and produce drawings and other court room aids and they are not subject to hearsay.
Of course you can challenge the map but not on the basis of hearsay in my opinion.
Happy New Year
Steve
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 1, 2017 12:28:27 GMT -6
Richard
Everything we present here if I follow you would be hearsay. Even a photo of a letter is not the best evidence and the letter would have be produced. I think that so many years after everyone is dead the best we can hope for is a lively discussion and what weight we each want to put on something.
Regards
Steve
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Post by wild on Jan 1, 2017 13:33:37 GMT -6
Hi AZ Many happy returns.
A map is a representation of natural and manmade features... geographical info. They are fixed in time and space. Superimposing the secondhand account of troop movements onto a map does not in anyway enhance their dubious credibility. Best Wishes Richard
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Post by dan25 on Jan 1, 2017 14:09:21 GMT -6
Wild, In regards to Custer heading toward ford D or being on Cemetery Ridge, you said, "This is not factual. It is part of a possible scenario". I based my statement only on what I have read from Indian accounts. Wolf Tooth and Big Foot claimed they seen the soldiers go down the coulee toward ford D, I believe they said they even fired at them. Hanging Wolf claimed he seen the soldiers on Cemetery Ridge where they remained for fifteen to twenty minutes. At this time I can't remember if there were more accounts.
Best Regards dan25
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Post by benteen on Jan 1, 2017 14:19:18 GMT -6
There are two main approaches to battle scenario setting.The probables or traditionalists and the possibles or revisioneries. For example the scenario offered by Colt45 [and no disrespect] is possible . I would number myself among the traditionalists confining myself to probability . Probability is limited while possibility is unlimited. The manuevours described in Colt's opus are possible but very unlikely. Lets go back to basics. Cavalry are not a stand alone formation. Normally they act in support of the infantry. Other than the charge their repertoire is somewhat limited. To put it bluntly the skirmish line with 25% of the troops holding animals is a military joke. Add to that the non existance of a means of command and control. Custer could committ units but could not direct them . This renders battlefield unit cooperation impossible. Richard, If I may add into your post.One aspect I think we dont take into consideration is who these people were. Let me explain.. In the US Army recruits are given a background check. They all go to boot camp to learn to be soldiers. Than Advanced Infantry to learn the tools of the trade, weapons tactics etc. Then they go to Forts, like Bragg, Benning etc to be trained even more. Under ideal conditions these professional soldiers make mistakes and are corrected. Now for the Cavalry of the west. They were recruited like the French Foreign Legion. The Army didnt care where you came from, why you joined, or even your name. I think they felt that they were fighting dumb savages and all you needed was a warm body in a blue suit and a carbine to hunt them down.As a result the training was poor or non-existant. I dont think the 7th Cav ever trained together as a regiment. Now add to it combat situation, with the noise,smoke, dust, confusion, men and animals being hit, and I think you have real problems with these troops. I agre with the tactics and movements put forth by Colt and other very Knowledgeable people. I just dont think the troops of the 7th Cavalry were capable of performing them. Be Well Dan
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Post by wild on Jan 1, 2017 15:34:02 GMT -6
Spot on Dan. Too many of our friends deal with this as if on a sand table devoid of the terror, confusion, smoke, death , terrified horses and armed with a single shot peashooter. Best Wishes Richard
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 1, 2017 16:42:11 GMT -6
Hi AZ Many happy returns. A map is a representation of natural and manmade features... geographical info. They are fixed in time and space. Superimposing the secondhand account of troop movements onto a map does not in anyway enhance their dubious credibility. Best Wishes Richard Richard Hand drawn maps may not be as you state. They could be way off from what is on the ground. The soldiers testifying at RCOI had problems with the map and it was probably as good as you are going to get for that time period in regards on how to make maps. One of the JSIT maps is a drawing made on a publication produced by the NPS with JSIT adding to it. If Custer's route was criminal in nature then I would agree with you but this is not about criminal charges against Custer. JSIT was on the ground with persons that were there and it at least it rises to the status of discussions on a board in 2017. A side note ; Hearsay relates to testimony at a criminal trial. When someone is dead it can be used. I think JSIT is dead. I think you are attempting to put hearsay conditions on accounts by Indians which are not made and a criminal case. I think you stated what you really believe in regards to Indian accounts which is the nature of your complaint. I think JSIT interviewing participants can not be excluded. It could be wrong but excluding it based upon hearsay is not a good reason in my opinion. Regards Steve
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Post by wild on Jan 2, 2017 5:33:58 GMT -6
Hi AZ The Indian "accounts" are not the accounts of witnesses but of participants . No one was taking notes most were too busy killing. And these participants' accounts were then interpreted by a second party. When interviewed about their part in Picketts charge at Gettysburg the survivers related how they knew nothing about what was happening beyond 5 meters. Their death filled world was no more than 5 meters . As regards maps of the LBH battle ; jsit had no modern contour maps to aid his interviews and if he had I doubt the participants would have understood them. By all means use the accounts to produce a possible scenario but credibility will always be an issue.
A general observation of the battle......I have said before and I'll say it again ; you don't take cavalry to a horse fight. Each warrior could react as he thought fit while the trooper had to wait for orders. The company was only as fast as it's slowest troopers. Indians were not handicapped by formations....slow lines of horses in a horse fight what nonsense. Reno's biggest mistake was going into the timber,allowing himself to be cornered.No horse warrior would have done that. Reno could have withdrawn in good order and linked up with Benteen. In a horse fight you do not dismount.Yet in our discussions the skirmish line has been given the status of the maginot line. The skirmish line was no more than a survival tactic. Annie way... Good Luck Richard
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 2, 2017 6:21:38 GMT -6
Wild,
Who is Annie and what does she have to do with this? Are you saying that Colt's scenario, is questionable or totally out of the realm of possibility?
Anyway hope you had a great holiday season and that 2017 is among your best.
Regards, Tom
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Post by montrose on Mar 14, 2017 8:49:29 GMT -6
I have written before that LTC Custer showed a classic decision death spiral at LBH. He made a series of bad calls. Yet at each new decision point, he was constrained by the previous bad choices.
I laid this at at length a few years ago, can't find my own posts. I am sitting at home in the middle of a blizzard. I may have to write it again, until I lose power.
For this post, I want to focus on 3411. 3411 is a benchmark on the bluffs, where LTC Custer got his first view of the village and the valley fight.
1. Enemy situation.
-Village was concentrated, not spread out. His previous decisions assumed subvillages would be spread out like Washita, offering an opportunity to hit an element out of mutual support from others. -Horse herds were west of village. -Reno was generating massive enemy response. Some 900 Indians were flowing around his open left flank. Reno battalion (BN) was cut off from Ford A. More were between him and the village. Ponies were being run into the village. A few tepees were being torn down, but there was no possible way the village could pack up and prepare to move.
2. Friendly situation.
-McDougal BN had limited mobility due to mules. It had been deliberately left far behind. When you have elements with different speed, don't think in distance. Think in time. This unit was now hours behind. -Benteen Bn had been sent on a scout mission with a follow on flank attack on a template Indian subvillage vicinity lone tepee. It had also been deliberately left behind. LTC Custer determined that it was bwtter to make contact with his 8 companies than to wait for the scout to return. So Benteen's much maligned absence was due to 2 decisions: the scout/attack decision, and the decision to move forward before Benteen could return. -The Reno BN was the regiment advanced guard. It was leading an 8 company attack in the valley. The problem is that LTC Custer changed his mind, and didn't tell Reno. LTC Custer diverted the 5 company main body up the bluffs. This area was badlands, which meant much slower movement than the valley (SLOWGO terrain, in military terminology). It also put two impassable terrain features between the Custer and Reno BNS (NOGO terrain). -SLOWGO and NOGO concepts are crucial to understanding LBH. The folks who blame LTC Custer's subordinates measure distance as a bird flies, and ignore contour intervals. And even if you take into account actual ground measures, vice air, moving through rough terrain creates far more fatigue than moving on flat terrain. I started out in the Army as a mechanized guy. I was mindboggled at how slow it takes to move an A team through the woods at night, with an 85 pound heater strapped to your back. I believe fatigue is not properly understood on the LBH boards.
3. Decision time. LTC Custer had now made a series of bad decisions that put him I a tough spot. Reno BN needed help, right now. But the Regiment was badly scattered by previous bad decisions. No one was in support range of the Reno BN.
LTC Custer decided that he could not support the valley fight. He sent messengers to the Benteen and McDougal Bns to follow him, and not enter the valley. The logical thing to do was to wait until they closed up. But Custer also decided to move north, likely to gain more information, rather than fight anyone. He went towards LCN ridge, vice directly to Ford B.
LTC Custer decided not to inform MAJ Reno of what the regiment was doing. In the military: no decision is a decision. He also chose not to inform Benteen and McDougal that Reno was being written off, and the location and activity of the main body. It could be he thought no messenger could get to Reno, who was surrounded, but that is no excuse for the other two BNs.
4. As LTC Custer moved north, he delayed the assembly time for the trailing BNs. But at Ford B, he went from bad decision to Little Big Man being a documentary. He saw that he could easily get into the village at Ford B, just a handful of defenders. But he lost his nerve. He blinked. He failed to attack, and withdrew. Withdrawing from Indians is, and was, well known to encourage them to pursue and attack. Then he went to Ford D and blinked again. AT no point did LTC Custer make any offensive action after he ordered MAJ Reno to lead the regimental attack. That's why he lost.
Respectfully,
William
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Post by wild on Mar 14, 2017 11:55:40 GMT -6
-Benteen Bn had been sent on a scout mission with a follow on flank attack on a template Indian subvillage vicinity lone tepee The problem with this is the site is a death trap [for village].Visibility is restricted allowing enemy get within pissing range. Much of Reno creek appears to consist of stagnant water. Custer will pass this site before Benteen. And Benteen's outward direction and suggested orders are taking him away from this site.
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