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Post by welshofficer on Apr 5, 2014 14:30:30 GMT -6
welshofficer, There were no wings after Custer took command again. They were maintained under Terry, who gave orders to Reno directly for his scout. Part of Custer's punishment, perhaps, but he had no command till dispatched south. Had there been, he would have divided forces at the divide according to wings rather than divide by company after conference with Cooke. Your confident assurance that Custer was on the offensive throughout is contradicted by your own observations of fact. We all get to that point. What Custer did after MTC makes no sense. What explains everything introducing no Custer new to history is he was wounded while descending MTC towards the village to render the support promised, and all else up to LSH was a series of attempts to delay and then escape unexpected numbers attacking them. Messy. All the detailed scenarios of this company or that's tactics is simply fan fiction: there is no evidence that points to one scenario and not others, and in truth, no evidence, just wishful thinking. Dark Cloud,
I thank you for your views. Much appreciated.
I am not talking about any formal wings, I just use the terminology to aid my attempts at understanding what happened and what went so badly wrong for Custer. Even if I still view in terms of 2 wings of 6 companies each, obviously Cpt McDougall got "transferred by events" on 25 June to the left wing.
Whilst it would be convenient to explain the subsequent calamity, I have never intuitively felt comfortable with the idea that Lt Col Custer was incapacitated or killed at Ford B. If anything, that was the greatest single incentive for Cpt Yates, Cpt Keogh and Cpt T Custer to fall back towards the left wing. If an officer was incapacitated/wounded at Ford B, there is a far more obvious candidate because of the 1 corpse that is otherwise later "in the wrong place" (Lt Smith).
The great fascination is that we will never know for certain what happened. But my gut instinct is that things began to unravel at Findley/Finkel Ridge and reached their denouement in or near the top of Deep Ravine.
You will have your own interpretation......
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Post by welshofficer on Apr 5, 2014 14:43:56 GMT -6
Welshofficer: As fine a summation of events as I have seen. DC is correct that there were no formalized wings once Custer left the Powder River Depot, HOWEVER that is not I suspect how you meant to use them. If I read you correctly you were using them to denote units that initially operated on the right and left flanks of the total operation. Correct me if I am wrong. As for the rest of DC's post, if there is wishful thinking abroad, it is contained in the last two of his three short paragraphs.Custer being wounded is DC's own form of fan fiction, for when pressed he has no basis for it, only a reason presented as a simplistic explanation for what followed. Custer was engaged throughout until the very end offensively, attacking, but not assaulting, the carrying of the attack forward to its ultimate conclusion. He miserably failed to reconnoiter, He failed miserably in the task organization he chose. He failed to focus on a specific objective. He failed to exercise command and control over his regiment, electing instead to place himself much to far away and out of contact to exercise that control.. And yes you are correct. He was operating like a brigade commander with regiments at his disposal, or possibly as a division commander, having brigades, Instead he showed his complete lack of experience at the level he was assigned by employing battalions and companies (in reality platoons and companies) as if they were regiments or brigades. Everything Custer did is perfectly understandable under two scenarios:The first is that had he been the covering force for a much larger main force. The second is if he was in command of a brigade or division. Quincannon,
Thanks for your response and time. Please also see my response to Dark Cloud.
I have always felt, if Custer had reconnoitered the terrain in advance, that he had 2 options for this battle:
(1) He either concentrated his assault firepower at the southern end of the village to drive the NAs towards Gen Terry, with perhaps Cpt Benteen to the west to ensure any dispersals in that direction was a scattering without village supplies; or
(2) If he was splitting his force and going up the eastern bluffs, he was staying out of sight to the east of battle ridge until the NAs first became aware of his presence when he turns up for a full on 5 company assault at Ford D.
What he doesn't do is go up the eastern bluffs and advertise his presence without assaulting, because that is poor terrain to be defending. I just laugh at some posters who think that Cpt Benteen was to go past the defeated Maj Reno and battle through with 3 companies (4 companies and a mule train?!) to rescue Lt Col Custer's 5 companies.
It just wasn't regimental commanding, in my view. He had 12 companies of cavalry and reduced his operational command to basically dying on a hill with F company.
But I do instinctively believe that he was on the offensive until he realised the Keogh battalion was beginning to unravel.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 5, 2014 15:00:22 GMT -6
Of your two scenarios WO, I far prefer the first. A concentration of combat power.
The second has possibilities though. I don't think a divided regiment had enough combat power to pull it off as it was, BUT, had he been full up, moving wide eastward and coming up over the southern extension of battle ridge, there is some attractive ground to his front between Ford D and present day Crow Agency.. Its nice and flat, a river borders it on two sides, and your approach is from high to low.. If he could get them spooked in the south, chances are a lot would run that way. Timing as in most things must be precise, and pulling it off without a radio a bugger, but I think possible
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Post by welshofficer on Apr 5, 2014 15:00:25 GMT -6
QC/Fred,
Yes, what I mean is that Lt Col Custer did not have 125 men spare for a pure reconnaissance mission. That was way too large a proportion of his overall available manpower. Those 3 companies had to join the fight, one way or another, and they didn't in their original mission.
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Post by welshofficer on Apr 5, 2014 15:16:49 GMT -6
Fred,
Thank you for your lengthy reply. I can't begin to have your knowledge of the Little Bighorn, but that battle is of some resonance to my old regiment (Royal Welsh, Royal Regiment of Wales, South Wales Borderers) because we had a battle in South Africa 2.5 years later (January 1879) where many of the same blunders were made.
Just to clarify a few points:
(1) As I believe Lt Col Custer is continuously in offensive mode along the eastern bluffs, my language was imprecise because he is after a far bigger prize than relieving any pressure on Maj Reno. To the extent that Lt Col Custer is still interested, that is what Cpt Benteen is better placed to do (if necessary). The place for Lt Col Custer to have supported Maj Reno is where he thought he would receive such support!
(2) I am sorry for my confusing use of "wings", but that is how I view it even if it was technically incorrect after Maj Reno's scout. The 6 companies of the Yates/Keogh battalions are my "right wing", and the 6 companies of the Reno/Benteen battalions are my "left wing". McDougall finds himself "transferred" by me on 25 June 1876!
(3) The point I was trying to make about Cpt Benteen, again my language was imprecise, is that is force was far too large to be merely a reconnaissance and had to be engaged in the fight. In its original mission, it did not do so.
Thank you for the feedback. Your time is much appreciated.
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Post by welshofficer on Apr 5, 2014 15:24:58 GMT -6
Of your two scenarios WO, I far prefer the first. A concentration of combat power. The second has possibilities though. I don't think a divided regiment had enough combat power to pull it off as it was, BUT, had he been full up, moving wide eastward and coming up over the southern extension of battle ridge, there is some attractive ground to his front between Ford D and present day Crow Agency.. Its nice and flat, a river borders it on two sides, and your approach is from high to low.. If he could get them spooked in the south, chances are a lot would run that way. Timing as in most things must be precise, and pulling it off without a radio a bugger, but I think possible Quincannon,
I am definitely with you in favouring (1). About 550 effective guns is weak against the NA size force he tried to bite and chew, even if all concentrated at the southern end.
As regards my option (2), that is the only journey up the eastern bluffs that I can see that might not end in a whole lot of Sioux/Cheyenne pony manure. If he can simultaneously hit by surprise from both ends, "Custer's luck" might have seen him through again. He is again severed from the "left wing", but he may be able to fall back upon Gen Terry if it gets too hot to handle.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Apr 5, 2014 15:30:53 GMT -6
"You will have your own interpretation......" which I will and do, but please don't misrepresent it.
I don't mention Ford B, and I point out yet again that too many just assume action in or mention of MTC is equivalent to Ford B. It ain't.
What I and so many others have thought (my basic scenario does not originate with me) from the beginning is that action of some sort well back from the river occurred. Since there is nothing to suggest early presence of hostiles in large numbers there, it probably was a small group. My scenario requires only one guy with a gun. How would the 7th be deterred by such? If Custer or A Custer went down, wounded, not ceding command, or whoever assumed command feeling the immediate need to keep moving and that away from the demonstrated danger just endured. Cavalry can't slow down under fire.
Five companies in a single column extends well back. Keogh may never have known exactly what had happened. Yates takes them north, Keogh follows in parallel providing fire support when possible till he had his own issues.
It's not one officer but a coagulated bunch of brass at the apex of a hill. They were not in the center of a defense but bunched together on the perimeter, as if they were unhorsed as they became exposed hitting the summit at the front of a column. NOT based on marble today, but on accounts as to where they were. There are accounts that describe some horses as shot in motion heading for the top, Custer's among them in at least one account. Nobody agrees on that stuff, of course.
So. No Ford B, please. That's someone else.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 5, 2014 15:42:00 GMT -6
DC: The only choices you give us are Ford B or thin air, neither of which, pardon the pun, hold water. Were you in a court of law asked to testify you would be ruled out of order, attempting to present fact not in evidence.
Just because that is the only way you can possibly see this going down, does not mean events transpired this way. Just because you see a cluster atop LSH, does not mean they were always there, and did not move there at the last extremity. You are presenting fiction, and not really well though out fiction at that. According to you Custer could have been shot in Medicine Tail Coulee by one of the Rocket Men From Mars with a ray gun. That's is exactly how far out you are here, and while this is an exception to your usually fine work it is a lulu.
It is also true that what Fred, I, and others present may be looked upon as fact not in evidence as well. The difference here is that what we present has some underpinning, be it physical or oral,. That does not mean we, any of us have the facts completely correct, and in proper flow and context, but it does mean that it is far from being conjured up from whole cloth. Tell me one witness, one piece of evidence, even one iota of circumstance that underpins Custer being wounded in MTC, and the chain of command falling apart in a decision frenzy of wrong. Please don't say by going up onto that ridge, and it being a bad place. Bad place yes but soldiers go where they must, if the reason is felt sufficient, and that pretty routine.
You would have an easier time convincing me that the Broncos played their best football in this last Super Bowl then convincing me that this is plausible, and I watched the damned game start to finish.
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Post by welshofficer on Apr 5, 2014 15:58:55 GMT -6
Dark Cloud
I wasn't really thinking in terms of Lt Col Custer being shot anywhere in particular (there was plenty of terrain where he could have been shot and he was never renowned for being inconspicuous). I was only vaguely and in limited terms recollecting NA accounts of an officer being shot at Ford B and, if so, that was very likely to have been Lt Smith for a variety of reasons.
The problems with any "it all went to pot because/after Custer got shot" hypothesis are that:
(1) It either made no difference to the outcome (either too late to be of any material difference or Yates executed "the Custer plan" - maybe not as well); or
(2) Yates continuing to move northwards makes no sense whatsoever (the southern end of battle ridge was the place to take stock of known NA dispositions and decide whether to seek to push northwards, vacate eastwards or move back southwards towards the relative safety of "the left wing" - all had their downsides).
Certainly not an insurmountable hypothesis, for the cogent reasons you have provided, but certainly not the easiest to fit into our limited knowledge of likely "right wing" movements on the ride to destruction.
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Post by fred on Apr 5, 2014 16:43:30 GMT -6
It just wasn't regimental commanding, in my view. He had 12 companies of cavalry and reduced his operational command to basically dying on a hill with F company. But I do instinctively believe that he was on the offensive until he realised the Keogh battalion was beginning to unravel. I find these comments extremely well stated. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Apr 5, 2014 16:54:47 GMT -6
... my old regiment (Royal Welsh, Royal Regiment of Wales, South Wales Borderers... Magnificent! Absolutely magnificent!! I agree with this completely. Agree. Well stated. That's fine... as long as we get your gist. Five companies for Keogh-Yates. While that is correct, Benteen's command was designed to fight. The fact it did not was incidental. If it needed to, it could. A personal note: your manners are appreciated greatly; however, it is not necessary to thank any of us for our time. We are equal compatriots on this board and you time, your opinions, and your knowledge are appreciated as much by us as you may appreciate ours. We are flattered-- as we would be with any newcomer interested in this subject as we are-- to have you spend your time with us. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 5, 2014 17:03:43 GMT -6
What the hell did you expect Fred. He is an Infantryman (note the capital I). All of us have impeccable manners worthy of the stately courts of Europe or a bar room fight. It is only modesty that makes me hesitate in pointing this out to you, you having been of the anointed, but taking that detour into logistics along the way, so I felt I must remind you of the proper upbringing you threw away in favor of riding in a truck.
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Post by fred on Apr 5, 2014 17:16:02 GMT -6
... so I felt I must remind you of the proper upbringing you threw away in favor of riding in a truck. Alas... it wasn't my choice. My poor vision did me in! At least I wear the patches of infantry divisions (1st and 3rd) and my truckers had more than one occasion to fight as infantrymen. Oh, and by the way... I rode in a jeep... M-151, by name. Loved that little sucker!! Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by welshofficer on Apr 5, 2014 17:18:10 GMT -6
Fred,
2 points by way of clarification:
(1) I count McDougall's B company as "right wing", simply because of the history from Fort Lincoln. Obviously on 25 June 1876 his mule train guarding duties moved him to the "left wing", as his covering force was Reno's battalion after Custer climbed the bluffs and then Benteen's battalion was between him and the village after Reno's defeat.
(2) The point that bothers me is that Custer had something like 500-550 rifles available (no cannon, Gatlings, sabres obviously), discounting mule train and B company battalion, and he needed all of those rifles engaged given the size of the opposing force he had attacked. 125 rifles "valley hunting" but not firing was not going to relieve any pressure on Reno or later Custer. Firepower was not being concentrated. Benteen was not going to intercept and engage any scattering, let alone dispersing, NAs with Reno on the retreat and Custer attacking but never quite assaulting. He came upon no satellite villages, as we know. Benteen need not have been there, until he returned to the trail and reached Reno. I suspect Reno would have been very glad to have Benteen's battalion with him when he assaulted the Little Bighorn valley.
Trust clarifies.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 5, 2014 17:20:35 GMT -6
An M151 is called officially Truck, Quarter Ton, M151
Please note Fred it is the Infantry that strikes terror in the soul of our enemies, knowing they are facing the ultimate weapon, it also makes them piss their pants and soil their underwear. The prospect of being skewered with a bayonet has a tendency to focus one's attention on if it is worth attending the Bar B Q.
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