|
Post by Dark Cloud on Apr 5, 2014 17:48:46 GMT -6
welshofficer,
Regarding your points:
1. "It either made no difference to the outcome (either too late to be of any material difference or Yates executed "the Custer plan" - maybe not as well)."
If it happened, it would most certainly would make a difference. The career span of an officer or soldier who played any role in letting a Custer (or any well known hero of a commanding general) fall, wounded, into enemy hands - especially those likely to hack him up - was zero. It would become a prominent aspect of the mission, and suddenly.
Second, momentum: you have to keep moving, you can't create a traffic circle and what seemed like a good idea and direction to get him away wasn't. And, in a short time, they may not have been able - even with the will - to return south. I don't think it requires more than a quick decision based on an assumption they could treat him and reorganize on the fly. The regression from an area of combat they assumed would be brief wasn't.
(2)"Yates continuing to move northwards makes no sense whatsoever (the southern end of battle ridge was the place to take stock of known NA dispositions and decide whether to seek to push northwards, vacate eastwards or move back southwards towards the relative safety of "the left wing" - all had their downsides)."
I agree, it's an inexplicable stupid move, and the reason why they, in fact, did move north to land not easily deciphered in clear weather today is the primary justification I think they were in emergency mode, initially viewed as temporary, soon entirely out of their hands.
I'm guessing you haven't been to the field. It is deceptive and hard to read even when you know what's there. Do not mistake today's photos for what officers would see that day. The land north of MTC is a horror for the 7th. No officer would willingly take them there: dangerous, farther from village, Reno, and support from south.
I think a wounded Custer would explain it easily, including the bodies found en route, platoon drops to delay pursuit or recipients of increasing fire from their flanks all the way to LSH.
|
|
|
Post by welshofficer on Apr 5, 2014 18:06:20 GMT -6
Dark Cloud
As I am anxious not to inadvertently misrepresent your position again, perhaps I could start by asking you what do you think was Lt Col Custer's plan until he got WIA/KIA and how was he deploying?
Please remember that I have only commanded infantry, and at the platoon and company level.
My major problem with Lt Col Custer was going up onto the eastern bluffs at all, and certainly without a prior reconnoitre of the terrain and safely knowing his 5 companies could arrive by surprise and assault in force across Ford D. With the benefit of hindsight, I know.
|
|
|
Post by welshofficer on Apr 5, 2014 18:56:37 GMT -6
Dark Cloud
Perhaps it would help if I explained my concerns with Lt Col Custer's performance:
(1) We know he turned down Gatling guns, declined additional cavalry companies, and discarded sabres. Now there are cogent reasons for discarding each and all, if one is content to have a light mounted infantry regiment (which is effectively what the 7th became).
(2) I just don't see subsequent actions on 25 June 1876 consistent with this. If he is exclusively going to rely on 500-550 rifles, why is he splitting his command into 5 separate battalions not simultaneously engaged? There is no concentration of rifle firepower, his only remaining weapon. Impossible, obviously, but it would be illuminating to know how many minutes during that afternoon were there more than 150 rifles firing against the NA at any one time across the entire battlefield? Not many, I would venture.
(3) Ascending the eastern bluffs at all was a huge risk. Advertising it to the NAs led to his destruction. Not informing his own subordinate commanders rounded it all off.
So I am struggling to understand what his tactics were, even if things had gone to plan. There are at least 3 separate occasions that afternoon where Cpt Benteen is going to be seriously "hacked off". Clearly things did not go to plan, possibly the only uncontentious statement any of us can make about this battle/massacre.
|
|
|
Post by Dark Cloud on Apr 5, 2014 19:26:08 GMT -6
WO,
Please don't be intimidated by my military credentials (zero). I'll remember you commanded infantry, you remember I never served.
The questions you raise, the examples you provide, do not conflict with my scenario and actually support it. I'm confused.
I don't see this as a big Custer Think at any time. He, as Fred vectored in on, went to 3411 to see what was to be seen, and that was the reason to head north from his severance point from Reno. From there, looking north, he could see zip beyond Weir Pt. and Sharpshooter and not the extent of the village groups. Unlike Fred, I cannot believe he wouldn't want to check Weir out.
But, by the time that was reached, Reno had been engaged way too long. MTC could be seen, and the ford location predictable, go for it. I don't see Custer doing else, and riding in view to the north or east for god knows what, makes not only small military sense, I'm told, but no sense at all regardless of intent. He could feel time pressure and he knew he had to move.
|
|
|
Post by welshofficer on Apr 6, 2014 1:19:11 GMT -6
DC,
Thanks for clarification. I am not sure that Lt Col Custer wanted to cross at Ford B (at least if/when he scouted it and if possible), entering before the NA village ends without sabres, even if the crossing is uncontested. There is a "military logic" of sorts in going northwards, a crossing north of the village. The downside, obviously, is that he has disclosed his location and finding it uncontested has severely diminished. Don't the NA testimonies point towards only "E" company approaching Ford B, probably with "F" company in some form of support?
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Apr 6, 2014 2:46:41 GMT -6
Realizing that there was not one Frederick the Great in camp with the Sioux and Cheyenne on 25 June, not one, it still begs the question why contest any river crossing at Ford D. Please God may all my enemies be foolish enough to face me with their backs to a river, and me in superior numbers.
Crossing at Ford B is another matter. You are immediately in the midst of a highly concentrated built up area. Even a man as poorly equipped as Custer both for both combat and life would realize that. The most dry of all dry holes, where nothing good and a whole lot of bad could and would be accomplished.
|
|
|
Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 6, 2014 4:52:18 GMT -6
Hello Welshofficer and welcome, I too had problems with the wing system, it came from a diagram I found years ago; Going back to the battle; if Custer’s group of five Companies got into trouble either in MTC or at its mouth then why do we only have two bodies between MTC and FF/Calhoun areas? If they came unstuck at the mouth of MTC and rode under pressure all the way to LSH, how could the any warriors be there to greet them? If they moved out of the northern end of the village then it is likely they went via deep ravine or even across the area known as ford D, but the point is why would they simply trek off uphill to sit and wait for Custer to turn up. Ian.
|
|
|
Post by fuchs on Apr 6, 2014 5:36:29 GMT -6
Realizing that there was not one Frederick the Great in camp ... I think you answered your own question here, on multiple levels First of all, even if a Frederick the Great would have been there, next to nobody would have paid him much attention once the battle was underway. This was a people, or more precisely, a significant fraction of multiple peoples under attack. Trying to analyse the Indian actions with the toolset of Army vs. Army fights will not work particularly well. What tactics Fredrick would have come up with might have been totally inappropriate, given that there were individual warriors, women and children of multiple tribes, not an Army with a command structure. And from the viewpoint of an Indian people under attack, the list of priorities would look quite different from what would be assumed for "civilized" warfare. 1. Keep the families safe. That is by far the most important. 2. Keep overall casualty numbers low. 3. Keep control of as many horses as possible. 4. Save as much of the lodges and their content as possible. 5. Kill as many enemies as possible and take their stuff / capture their horses In that order, if one goes by how historically attacks on Indian villages played out. Buuut, one may point out, at Washita the warriors cowardly ran and left almost a hundred "civilians" to their fate. Correct, but what purpose would it have served to fight to the bitter end? Only marginally more dead soldiers, but a whole lot more dead Indians. An Army force crossing the river at the north end of the village would be a threat to the families, horses and lodges. A set piece battle on flat, open ground against a large Army force will be costly in Indian lives.
|
|
|
Post by welshofficer on Apr 6, 2014 7:22:07 GMT -6
Hello Welshofficer and welcome, I too had problems with the wing system, it came from a diagram I found years ago; Going back to the battle; if Custer’s group of five Companies got into trouble either in MTC or at its mouth then why do we only have two bodies between MTC and FF/Calhoun areas? If they came unstuck at the mouth of MTC and rode under pressure all the way to LSH, how could the any warriors be there to greet them? If they moved out of the northern end of the village then it is likely they went via deep ravine or even across the area known as ford D, but the point is why would they simply trek off uphill to sit and wait for Custer to turn up. Ian. Ian,
Many thanks.
Yes, that is the 2 wings as the regiment went out on summer deployment. Although Lt Col Custer suspended following Maj Reno's scout:
(1) He effectively commanded the right wing on 25 June, with McDougall's B company detached guarding the mule train. I think Keogh's battalion had L company, but then I think C company was Calhoun's host company anyway so should not have been an issue for him. Or for Crittenden!
(2) The left wing was divided in two. Maj Reno would obviously command if/when united - major out ranks the senior captain, and this was 1876. I think there was an issue whereby Moylan should have been with Benteen on strict seniority, but Benteen/Weir was a happier combination. I could be wrong.
I don't personally think that Custer got in trouble at MTC, other than in the sense that it was not to the north of the village and surprise was gone and crossing at Ford D was now going to be crucial and now likely heavily contested.
|
|
|
Post by welshofficer on Apr 6, 2014 7:39:59 GMT -6
An Army force crossing the river at the north end of the village would be a threat to the families, horses and lodges. A set piece battle on flat, open ground against a large Army force will be costly in Indian lives. I think this is the key point for me.
There are huge question marks over notifying subordinates, concealment of his right wing east of Battle Ridge until he assaults Ford D, co-ordinating his attack timing with Reno and the quality/numbers of the 7th cavalry troops, but there is a potentially successful plan for Custer involving the right wing ascending the eastern bluffs.
With the "plan" he adopted, Custer did not realise until way too late that he could become (and was becoming) the fox and was not guaranteed to be the hounds.
Otherwise, I think you and QC are more at cross purposes than actually disagreeing with each other. The NAs were just a highly decentralised and numerous irregular light cavalry army and, once you realise their priorities (as you do), you will have a good idea of how they will react to Custer's deployments without much (if anything) in the way of central command and control.
|
|
|
Post by Dark Cloud on Apr 6, 2014 8:09:53 GMT -6
Custer did not think in terms of evaluation of his weapons against the Sioux. He and all the officers HAD to know the 7th was not a great shooting outfit atop not being, en masse, at home in the saddle. His feeling, and the Army's, was that attacked by cavalry waving 3 hole paper punchers, the Sioux would run. They ALWAYS ran, could be shot in the back. Reload. Then run to catch up to them again to shoot more in the back. They'd "studied" the matter, had all sorts of data, and just knew.
There are all sorts of conflicting cliches exposed in this battle, none true in themselves, few relevant.
We have accounts that Custer thought the warriors either asleep or away but not present to his view. Hit them now and hard. MTC or nothing. It's too logical, there, and so....now.
No matter how you try to pat it into shape, sending two companies in plain view up north to recon a crossing and then wait while the majority of your still WAY insufficient force you craftily placed 'waiting' 'in reserve' two miles back receives the message and joins you and NOT EXPECT EVERY WEAPON THE INDIANS HAVE AND EVERY WARRIOR NOT TO GREET YOU is insulting to attach to Custer or any officer. You hit them hard when they're disorganized and panic them, not buy the equivalent of 1876 radio time to announce your moves, perform them slowly, and all to no point.
It didn't happen, anyway. Accounts about soldiers up there were most likely warriors in army garb, on army mounts, in formation that terrified the Cheyenne camp in some Indian accounts. This explains all the artifacts and accounts by Indians of soldiers shooting towards LSH. THAT happened, they said it did, and yet it is ignored.
|
|
|
Post by fuchs on Apr 6, 2014 8:19:44 GMT -6
but there is a potentially successful plan for Custer involving the right wing ascending the eastern bluffs. And that's where I disagree Unless we allow Custer a time machine, and position his entire "right wing" near the northern end of the village the moment Reno launches his charge. In my opinion timing is absolutely crucial for any kind of elaborate plan cooked up for the Army side of that battle. And under elaborate I understand anything more complicated than a concentrated attack of the south end, relying on brute force and superior firepower. Those plans assume a mobility advantage and communications that were simply not available, and still tend to fall into the old trap of underestimating the Indians (and/or overestimating the Army). The 7th was lucky to come as far as they did before being detected, and nonchalantly allowing them even more time to deploy in some 20/20 hindsight based optimal battle setup is pure fantasy in my opinion. There were probably good reasons why successful Army attacks on Indian villages either relied on overwhelming firepower, total surprise, ignorance of the Indian side that they were actually considered hostile or a combination of those factors. Probably boring, but successful. Fancy deployments rarely had an influence on the outcome, or were even counterproductive (e.g Reynolds' attack) Now that's something mostly everyone will agree on, I suspect. Still, a mystery what that plan was, if there was one. I think over at the other board someone dug up a quote supposedly from Custer himself, that pretty much amounts to him making up "plans" as he goes along, relying on his superior grasp on the "classics" to instanteniously come of with appropriate decisions. But that also is hindsight. Few Army officers apparently invested much energy in trying to understand the Indian's point of view, and "standard operating procedures". Custer wasn't one of those. After all, the Indians always run No point in trying to understand why, how exactly, and when they run, or when they might actually not.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Apr 6, 2014 8:31:01 GMT -6
Quincannon wishes to make it quite clear that he thinks crossing that Ford at D would be the absolute worst thing that could be done from a tactical perspective.
If I were to engage them in the north it would be with the entire regiment, minus those detailed to cause mischief on the south and east. I have not altered my opinion in any way that maximum firepower must be assembled to overcome any and all resistance. Those so detailed would start large prairie fires to the south and on the eastern bluffs. I don't know how many of you folks have ever experienced a western prairie fire in the dry season, but that grass burns as if soaked in gasoline. My objective is to block both to the south and east. The combination of the fire and a fire panicked horse herd would block to the west forcing the entire population north and over the river and into the killing zone I had prepared and that would be serviced by riflemen initially dismounted on the western slope of battle ridge extension. I would have them in a panicked state, mostly horseless, warriors intermingled with refugees, with both fire and river to their rear. My approach would of necessity have to be much wider to the east than just skirting behind battle ridge.
All this would take a highly trained and cohesive regiment, led by people who are willing to make use of through reconnaissance, which evidently they knew not how to do or dismissed its importance.
The Seventh Cavalry was not capable by training , ability, temperment or leadership to accomplish these things, so it is a moot point.
Now fuchs, I do not find myself having the requirement for a tutorial on Frederick the Great, or the morays and folkways of the American Indian. Crossing that river at Ford D is a bad tactical move regardless if you are fighting Atilla the Hun, Erwin Rommel, or Chief Thunderthud. When you cross rivers you do it with a superior force at your disposal, so that you can both get at the enemy with sufficient force and at the same time deeply expand your bridgehead. Custer did not have this capability with either the force he had or the entire regiment so your concern for the kiddies is misplaced with me in this regard.
When you plan for and fight battles you do so with clear objectives in mind be they territorial or operational. You fight to win. You don't stop until you win or are beaten. You do what needs to be done regardless of any and all things that stand in your way. You kill until it is not required that you kill any more. You then sort the remains of the day out as best you can, by burying the dead, tending within your capability the wounded and injured, feeding the hungry, sheltering the newly homeless. You make your enemy your friend, and look to a day when the world studies war no more, the plowshare business is on the ascendancy and weapons of any kind are an artifact of the past.
|
|
|
Post by welshofficer on Apr 6, 2014 9:07:07 GMT -6
Quincannon wishes to make it quite clear that he thinks crossing that Ford at D would be the absolute worst thing that could be done from a tactical perspective. QC
I must confess that I have not looked closely enough at the topography to the north of the village to have devised a tactical battle, for the simple reason that a concentration of Springfield rifle firepower to the south of the village was the only "option" on 25 June 1876. There had been no reconnaissance of the eastern bluffs and northwards.
But if Custer were to attack the village from another direction to Reno, it must involve the right terrain to bring weight of long range dismounted firepower to decisive effect.
I concur 100% with your views on a prairie fire and the pony herd, not least to reduce firepower in the south in order to maximise firepower in the north.
Neither of us have much confidence in the ability of the regiment to ever have successfully implemented such a battle plan, for reasons previously discussed.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Apr 6, 2014 9:12:14 GMT -6
You WO may not have much confidence in the ability of the 7th Cavalry. Mine however is reduced to none.
Look at that terrain. Don't know if you have a USGS 1:24000 scale map, but it looks pretty darn good to me, in pulling off what I described above. Don't stop at that hamburger joint though. While they have a nice selection of battle related books, the food is horrible.
|
|