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Post by Colt45 on Apr 1, 2014 13:04:04 GMT -6
Agree, QC. Staff officers (generally at least Captain in rank) came up through the line structures. Most were company commanders before being reassigned to staff duty. When attaining the rank of Major, staff jobs are all that generally exist since in the Army, there is no command slot that requires a major (at least not when I was in the Army). They function as XO's, and S1 through S4 positions. All the staff work helps prepare them for higher levels of command, such as battalion and brigade level CO positions. As you know, all career officers will spend time in command slots and staff slots, each being a requirement to reach the general ranks.
You are correct that those that don't know much about military structure tend to blast staff officers as being less than line officers. This is generally an unfair thing to do, although I have seen staff positions being used as a dumping ground for officers that didn't cut it in command slots. The proper thing to do in that situation is dump the under-performing officer, not shuffle him off to a staff job. I served with excellent staff officers and some that were not so excellent, same with line officers. I'm sure you did to. You definitely are right about Captain Dress Up and the remarks he and his kind will make.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 1, 2014 13:15:18 GMT -6
If it were possible to agree more with you Colt I would.
You are also completely correct about substandard officers being hidden in a staff. They should be shown the door and given a lollypop on their way out. That said some really good officers were better at command then they were on a staff. The opposite is also true. But the difference is one of degree of performance, not in the level.
My ego tells me I was a better commander than a staff officer. What I achieved in the Army would indicate though that I made a greater overall contribution as a staff officer. Reviewing my OER's I find that as a commander I merely walked on water. As a staff officer, those same OER's tell me I hovered several feet above it. That's bullshit and you know that already, but the point I am trying to make you understand as well,.
The best OER I ever received was, as a staff officer, is bringing the U S Army, a certain United States Senator from Kansas, The Adjutant General of New York (thus that State), and the Commander of the then forming 10th Mountain Division to the same table, hashing out all the various concerns, and not letting any of them out of the room until the activation process of the division and the contributions to it by the National Guard were locked in concrete.
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Post by Colt45 on Apr 1, 2014 13:27:57 GMT -6
Based on what you said about your best OER, I would say walking on water as a staff officer was an understatement.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 1, 2014 13:37:24 GMT -6
ABOVE WATER.
Actually one of the greatest experiences of my life. I never served in the 10th Mountain, but it holds a special place for me.
The object of the exercise was to provide a round out brigade to the 10th from close by. To do it I originally proposed cutting a brigade slice out of the 42nd Infantry Division, and rebuilding that division (the 42nd) over time. When I first proposed it my boss threw me out of his office. A few days later we did a full brief for the Army Staff with the prospective commanding general of the division Bill Carpenter (the same lonesome end from his West Point football days) in attendance. I briefed the "approved" five proposals, and in what may have been a career ender, I threw my sixth alternative into the brief. Carpenter stood up and said - That is what I want. All of a sudden I was golden. All that remained is working it all out, and we did. Also keep in mind the people I kept in the room were not principles but their deputized representatives.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 1, 2014 17:04:45 GMT -6
Whoa their chaps, as I said I was not having a pop at staff officers, here is what Wiki have to say on the matter;
The British did have staff officers as far back as the Crimean War working in these three cells but staff work was looked at with great disdain in the British Army and only became acceptable after the terrible hardships of the Crimean war, brought on by disorganization" The General Staff in Britain was formed in 1905, and reorganized again in 1908. Unlike the Prussian staff system, the British Army was thought too small to support separate staff and command career streams. Officers would typically alternate between staff and command. Beevor, Inside the British Army, says instead that the terrible cleavages between staff and line units caused by the enormous losses during First World War trench warfare meant that British senior officers decided that from thenceforth all officers would rotate between staff and line responsibilities, preventing the development of a separate general staff corps. In the British system, "staff" is outranked by "command" officers. The staff cannot in theory (and largely in practice) say "no" to a subordinate unit; only the Commander has that ability. In the British system the principal staff officers at any HQ were always outranked by the subordinate commanders, unlike in the US system. • Lieutenant Colonels commanding battalions or units in a brigade outrank the Brigade Major and the Deputy Assistant Adjutant & Quartermaster General • Brigadiers commanding brigades in a division outrank the Colonel GS and Colonel AQ • Major Generals commanding divisions outrank the Brigadier GS and Assistant Adjutant General and Assistant Quartermaster General at a Corps HQ This ensured a clear chain of command, and reinforced the idea that staff do not command, but exercise control on behalf of their commander. By contrast, in the American system, commanders are frequently outranked by staff officers. For example, within a battalion the S3 is a major while company commanders are captains.
Am I forgiven?
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 1, 2014 18:02:54 GMT -6
Why Ian, should there be any need for forgiveness. Armies are evolutionary in that they learn from their mistakes , most of the time. I think most of these anti-staff outlooks have their genesis in World War I where --- 1) Staffs as we know them today were just starting to be developed, and---- 2) Armies were in a transition period from the command style of an Armistead to the battle manager of today. These things take time, lots of time. Many mistakes are made, lots of them. Eventually procedural best practices emerge, and what was, is no more, except in the minds of Captain Dress Up of the Queen's Know Nothings.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 2, 2014 2:50:11 GMT -6
Good morning all, I am off work with a trapped nerve in my neck, walking around like Igor at the moment, anyway;
Staff Sergeants (also referred to as Colour Sergeant) in the British army were classed a rank above a platoon Sergeant, and just below a Warrant Officer, but I don’t think they command any combat units as such.
Staff Sergeants US Army are a different kettle of fish, and are Squad Leaders.
So I think a British “Staff” would be classed as higher than a US “Staff” or E-6.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 2, 2014 10:29:31 GMT -6
Ian: As I understand it the Staff Sergeant in British usage denotes a sergeant that serves in some capacity on a staff at battalion level and above. We have similar positions in Sergeant First Class and Master Sergeant. Those two ranks are E-7 and E-8 respectively, as are their chain of command counterparts Platoon Sergeant (E-7) and First Sergeant (E-8_ You will also note that a Sergeant Major is a staff position, for instance an operations sergeant at brigade or higher level, whereas a Command Sergeant Major, indicated by a wreath around the star, is in a chain of command position. We also call Platoon Sergeants, First Sergeants, and Command Sergeant Majors green tabbers, indicating combat leader. That green tab was worn on the shoulder loops of the dress uniform. Don't know if it is still done with the change over to the blue uniform. I will have to check on that.
The ranks in the USA of Staff Sergeant was originally an indicator that these NCO's served in some capacity on a staff. That has morpfed over the years to where it is now just a title
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Post by welshofficer on Apr 5, 2014 0:35:20 GMT -6
It's interesting to see the US perspectives on this website, with some very informative posters indeed. Custer clearly had an outline "plan", at least in his head, because he seemed to be on the offensive throughout with both wings (attacking with his right wing if never assaulting, as one excellent poster put it). It was just a rough plan that imploded for a number of reasons before fruition.
(1) He did not have sufficient intelligence on the hostile camp and/or the surrounding terrain (hence the apparent river crossing reconnaissance probing of his right wing, when he needed to assault at Ford D or Ford B if he was going to support Reno and who was advised Custer would support him from behind rather than flank assault or from the opposing end) - he really needed to know the terrain and river crossings if he was going eastwards up to the bluffs. (2) He seemed to operate on the sole assumption (not without cause as a primary assumption on the basis of plains warfare) that the primary mischief to remedy was that the hostiles would retreat and disperse with apparel from the 7th, but fatally with little or no thought as to what to do if the hostiles gave battle. (3) He split a weak regiment into 2 wings, the right wing into 2 battalions and the left wing effectively into 3 independent battalions (Reno, Benteen, McDougall), and dispersed them widely. The right wing was separated and completely isolated, once it ascended the eastern bluffs. (4) He didn't seem to communicate even his outline plan to the left wing commanders (non-Custer clan?) - Reno's force turned out to be too weak to attack the southern end of the village unsupported, but Benteen's force was too strong purely for a pure reconnaissance to the west (and could only sensibly serve as a fighting force block to hostile dispersal in that direction, when Custer/Reno didn't have the firepower from 8 weak companies/troops to force that dispersal), and McDougall's pack train was far too close to the action behind Reno and this appears to have suddenly become an issue at the last moment.
The rest, as they say, is history. It could well be that Yates battalion was still in offensive mode, with Custer unaware of the impending peril he was really in, when Keogh's battalion started to unravel. If Harrington got himself into trouble, it wouldn't take long for a concerted effort to overwhelm him and Calhoun and Porter (I suspect Keogh's "horse" wound suggests he was already down wounded - he would certainly have been an invited mounted target). With the only escape route even further northwards away from the left wing and towards Custer and the Yates battalion, any "C", "L" and "I" survivors of the flight along battle ridge were just delaying the inevitable and not for very long. I don't think "F" on LSH and "E" lower down towards deep ravine lasted very long at all. It was over mercifully quickly, if we listen to the modern archaeological findings.
I have always had the impression, maybe wrongly, that Custer at the LBH was more like his earlier Civil War cavalry general self and deploying formations as if he had regiments rather than a regimental commander deploying platoon strength companies/troops. He either had to assist Reno, with the hostile dispersal consequences of an assault from the south only, or make sure he could assault from the east or north and equally ensure that Benteen supported Reno'e assault instead (I suspect Benteen was irritated to receive Cooke's written order via Martini, and downright exasperated to discover upon reaching Reno that Custer was operating independently). Custer took neither action.
It's all rather perplexing. Custer was no fool, despite caricatures, and yet he kept advancing northwards beyond Ford B and further and further away from his left wing and supplies. You only have to look at the age he attained brevet general. Sheridan and Terry wanted him leading the 7th, and maybe Sherman, but in any event Grant and Sherman did not ultimately block despite the politics. Neither was Benteen a mug, whatever his personal attitude to Custer over Elliot. Reno did not perform well, at least after Bloody Knife's brains were splattered across his face, but he was also no novice. It is surprising how many 7th cavalry officers were detached from the regiment in 1876, and how many depleted companies/troops had a single officer and/or were being commanded by a lieutenant.
But take a look at us British at Isandlwana 2.5 years later for how to really get intelligence/reconnaissance completely wrong against a numerically superior native force!
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Post by Dark Cloud on Apr 5, 2014 7:52:38 GMT -6
welshofficer,
There were no wings after Custer took command again. They were maintained under Terry, who gave orders to Reno directly for his scout. Part of Custer's punishment, perhaps, but he had no command till dispatched south. Had there been, he would have divided forces at the divide according to wings rather than divide by company after conference with Cooke.
Your confident assurance that Custer was on the offensive throughout is contradicted by your own observations of fact. We all get to that point. What Custer did after MTC makes no sense. What explains everything introducing no Custer new to history is he was wounded while descending MTC towards the village to render the support promised, and all else up to LSH was a series of attempts to delay and then escape unexpected numbers attacking them. Messy.
All the detailed scenarios of this company or that's tactics is simply fan fiction: there is no evidence that points to one scenario and not others, and in truth, no evidence, just wishful thinking.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 5, 2014 9:16:20 GMT -6
Welshofficer: As fine a summation of events as I have seen.
DC is correct that there were no formalized wings once Custer left the Powder River Depot, HOWEVER that is not I suspect how you meant to use them. If I read you correctly you were using them to denote units that initially operated on the right and left flanks of the total operation. Correct me if I am wrong.
As for the rest of DC's post, if there is wishful thinking abroad, it is contained in the last two of his three short paragraphs.Custer being wounded is DC's own form of fan fiction, for when pressed he has no basis for it, only a reason presented as a simplistic explanation for what followed.
Custer was engaged throughout until the very end offensively, attacking, but not assaulting, the carrying of the attack forward to its ultimate conclusion. He miserably failed to reconnoiter, He failed miserably in the task organization he chose. He failed to focus on a specific objective. He failed to exercise command and control over his regiment, electing instead to place himself much to far away and out of contact to exercise that control.. And yes you are correct. He was operating like a brigade commander with regiments at his disposal, or possibly as a division commander, having brigades, Instead he showed his complete lack of experience at the level he was assigned by employing battalions and companies (in reality platoons and companies) as if they were regiments or brigades.
Everything Custer did is perfectly understandable under two scenarios:The first is that had he been the covering force for a much larger main force. The second is if he was in command of a brigade or division.
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Post by fred on Apr 5, 2014 9:49:07 GMT -6
Custer clearly had an outline "plan", at least in his head, because he seemed to be on the offensive throughout with both wings (attacking with his right wing if never assaulting, as one excellent poster put it). It was just a rough plan that imploded for a number of reasons before fruition. I find your comment, above, quite good, and I would agree with it 100%. [quoter](1) He did not have sufficient intelligence on the hostile camp and/or the surrounding terrain (hence the apparent river crossing reconnaissance probing of his right wing, when he needed to assault at Ford D or Ford B if he was going to support Reno and who was advised Custer would support him from behind rather than flank assault or from the opposing end) - he really needed to know the terrain and river crossings if he was going eastwards up to the bluffs.[/quote] I am not quite sure I fully understand what you are driving at here. I think by the time Custer left 3,411, all thought of "supporting" Reno per se, had dissipated and Custer was now on a specific, solitary mission of getting behind the fleeing Indians. The entire campaign was driven by this and Custer now believed he had the chance to fulfill that mission. To me, this constant emphasis on supporting Reno is a mistake. It was valid until Fred Gerard's report to LT Cooke. That report changed everything and precipitated new "plans" in Custer mind. As long as people hold on to the myth of "support," it will sully the objectives of Custer's "new" plan. I would agree with this. Your use here of "wings" tends to complicate things and I do not believe it serves you well. Your dispersal premise is correct, however. Completely correct. I do not agree Benteen's force was meant strictly for a reconnaissance. Also, I am not sure how your figuring of the pack train's proximity factors into anything. I think this to be a pretty good depiction of things. Nicely done. I like what you say here. To me it shows a very objective and knowledgable understanding of the three main individuals involved in the battle. I am particularly impressed by your comment regarding Reno, especially your prescience regarding the timing of his performance breakdown. Very nicely done. Welcome! Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 5, 2014 10:03:03 GMT -6
Welshofficer: I neglected to add my welcome. May I assume you have served or are presently serving in the Royal Welsh or any of its distinguished predecessors?
Fred: You are not agreeing with something Welshofficer did not say. What he said was the Benteen force was to strong for a strictly reconnaissance mission. Therefore, it must have had a another purpose, which it did, to both find and fight, a classic definition of armed reconnaissance.
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Post by fred on Apr 5, 2014 10:27:43 GMT -6
Fred: You are not agreeing with something Welshofficer did not say. What he said was the Benteen force was to strong for a strictly reconnaissance mission. Therefore, it must have had a another purpose, which it did, to both find and fight, a classic definition of armed reconnaissance. You are correct... but I agree with what you said, above. And perfectly stated, as well. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 5, 2014 12:02:24 GMT -6
I should probably elaborate on DC's fan fiction. The trouble with what DC postulates is that the Custer known to history, was itself fan fiction, a manufactured hero at a time when a hero was in need of manufacturing. In other words a useful idiot. He was a most immature man child, more fit to carry the hod then wear the shoulder strap. Also it is well to keep in mind that one Ohshit wipes out any and all attaboys achieved, and Custer has at least seven Ohshits appended to his name, by my count.
Lest anyone still wonder I have absolutely no use for any officer that places his own wants and desires above that of the welfare of him soldiers or the needs of the Army in any form or fashion including self promotion, self serving interests, self indulgence, or making a buck. NONE.
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