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Post by Beth on Apr 5, 2015 15:43:31 GMT -6
Thanks Ian
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Post by montrose on Jul 15, 2015 22:32:56 GMT -6
I use this thread to discuss Keogh, and specifically the actions of the 3 companies on the south end of Battle Ridge.
Situation. Keogh was left with 3 companies for a temporary task. Wait here until Benteen arrives with the Benteen and MacDougall battalions. Escort them north to link up with LTC Custer. Because of the slow speed of the trains, task would take 30-45 minutes.
The threat was low, but not zero. There were a few scattered Indians east of the river, and hundreds more still in the village.
Analysis. LTC Custer gave reasonable orders, with respect to the specific situation on Calhoun Hill in a five minute window. What I mean here is the fiasco on Calhoun Hill is Keogh's fault, not GACs.
The command and control was horrible.
Keogh was not in a position to know what the other 2 companies were doing. He also placed himself where he did not know what the Indians were doing. The greatest threat was the village, and he placed himself where he had no way of knowing what was happening there.
So when the situation changed vicinity Calhoun Hill, he knew nothing, and did nothing.
Keogh's incompetence led to 3 companies being overrun, all out of supporting distance of each other. Bad tactics led to the deaths of everyone there, with minimal Indian casualties.
Calhoun and Harrington were brave, competent officers. All evidence showed they fought well and died hard. Keogh's company was overrun in a swale, in an admin posture. Keogh died with his senior leaders near him, looking like an orders group. You can make a case that the majority of Indian casualties here were friendly fire, with very little fight put up by company I.
A competent officer in charge of these 3 companies would make an enormous difference in outcome.
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Post by benteen on Jul 17, 2015 14:10:30 GMT -6
As to my thoughts on Capt Keoghs battalion and my opinion that Custer didnt put them there, I submit the following. The genesis of my opinion is where the bodies were found. Capt Benteen said " It was a rout, men were scattered as if you threw a hand full of corn on the ground" I felt there was something terribly wrong with this. So rather then start at the beginning and work my way back, I started at the end and worked my way forward. I am assuming that Capt Keogh was at least a competent Officer. If he was told to take a position deep in enemy territory (In fact there is a raging battle going on) and told to hold or stay there for an undetermined amount of time, I believe he would set his men in the best possible defense position available to him, in order to repel any attack which at this stage may be very likely It would appear that these men werent prepared at all. My only conclusion to this is that this engagement happened purely by accident. Keogh was not prepared nor did he expect a battle at this location. I will give my theory on what happened in another post. I dont want to get to long winded in this one Be Well Dan
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Post by tubman13 on Jul 17, 2015 16:13:49 GMT -6
Benteen, I continue to give Keogh, the crutch of early wounding. I think initially he was front and center with his command and my have had them deployed in the beginning of a of a reasonable defensive position. He had too many junior officers he was tending to. He was wounded and the rest were overrun quickly. Panic set in and hence the corn.
Regards, Tom
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Post by benteen on Jul 17, 2015 16:40:03 GMT -6
Benteen, I continue to give Keogh, the crutch of early wounding. I think initially he was front and center with his command and my have had them deployed in the beginning of a of a reasonable defensive position. He had too many junior officers he was tending to. He was wounded and the rest were overrun quickly. Panic set in and hence the corn. Regards, Tom Tom, That is certainly a valid opinion, and may very well be what happened. Be Well Dan
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Post by benteen on Jul 17, 2015 16:40:44 GMT -6
OK, you have all waited long enough for my theory, I wont make you suffer anymore It is just that an opinion not based in fact. I believe that after Ford B the command got together on Battle Ridge. Boyer told Custer of another possible crossing at what we call Ford D. Custer intended to go there and if he could he would attack across this ford. But he was going to do it with all 5 companies not just 2. The order of march would be HQ, Co E, then F, or F then E, doesnt matter.What does matter is that they were followed in order by Co I, then C, then L. I think that as they started out Keogh noticed Warriors coming from the Reno fight which would threaten the rear of the column. While Cos I & C remained mounted, he had Co L form a line and fire a couple of volleys. (The volleys heard on Reno Hill) Here was his mistake. He felt the Indians would scatter and run back to the village (Indians always run dont they) Co L would then mount up and they would quickly catch up with Custer. Only problem was, the Indians didnt run. In fact they kept coming, ditched their ponies, and engaged Co L. This was not what Keogh expected. To make matters worse, he sees Indians pouring into Calhoun Coulee from the village which would threaten CO Ls flank. Either Harrington on his own, or Keogh sends him, to check the warrior advance. Only problem was that the Indians werent just going into the Coulee, they were already in it. When Co C mens boots hit the ground they were hit hard,unable to form a skirmish line. To be polite, they retreated. In reality they ran like Hell (Who can blame them) Co L sees this and they start to run, The rout is on. Be Well Dan
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Post by troybrickman on Jul 17, 2015 18:10:07 GMT -6
OK, you have all waited long enough for my theory, I wont make you suffer anymore It is just that an opinion not based in fact. I believe that after Ford B the command got together on Battle Ridge. Boyer told Custer of another possible crossing at what we call Ford D. Custer intended to go there and if he could he would attack across this ford. But he was going to do it with all 5 companies not just 2. The order of march would be HQ, Co E, then F, or F then E, doesnt matter.What does matter is that they were followed in order by Co I, then C, then L. I think that as they started out Keogh noticed Warriors coming from the Reno fight which would threaten the rear of the column. While Cos I & C remained mounted, he had Co L form a line and fire a couple of volleys. (The volleys heard on Reno Hill) Here was his mistake. He felt the Indians would scatter and run back to the village (Indians always run dont they) Co L would then mount up and they would quickly catch up with Custer. Only problem was, the Indians didnt run. In fact they kept coming, ditched their ponies, and engaged Co L. This was not what Keogh expected. To make matters worse, he sees Indians pouring into Calhoun Coulee from the village which would threaten CO Ls flank. Either Harrington on his own, or Keogh sends him, to check the warrior advance. Only problem was that the Indians werent just going into the Coulee, they were already in it. When Co C mens boots hit the ground they were hit hard,unable to form a skirmish line. To be polite, they retreated. In reality they ran like Hell (Who can blame them) Co L sees this and they start to run, The rout is on. Be Well Dan Benteen, I believe your hypothesis is possibly the closest to reality that I have read to date. I would be very surprised if Custer intentionally left Keogh to defend that ground while he continued north. I agree that his intentions were for the 5 companies to cross together. With regards to the Keogh collapse, I think it was simply dominos. Harrington movement was the first domino. On a side note, Fred's book arrived today. Excited to read his theories. Troy
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Post by benteen on Jul 17, 2015 18:14:47 GMT -6
Benteen, I believe your hypothesis is possibly the closest to reality that I have read to date. I would be very surprised if Custer intentionally left Keogh to defend that ground while he continued north. I agree that his intentions were for the 5 companies to cross together. With regards to the Keogh collapse, I think it was simply dominos. Harrington movement was the first domino. On a side note, Fred's book arrived today. Excited to read his theories. Troy Troy, Thank you. I know you will enjoy Capt Freds book. Welcome to the forum. Look forward to exchanging ideas and opinions with you. Be Well Dan
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 17, 2015 18:16:58 GMT -6
Benteen,
I think it is far more likely that GAC ordered Keogh to hold the southern part of Battle Ridge with his battalion; cover the rear of GAC/Yates as they moved towards Ford D, draw the attention of any (limited number of) hostiles crossing at Ford B, and effect the (still anticipated?) link-up with Benteen/McDougall.
With the benefit of hindsight, particularly the mass crossing of Ford B by hostiles and the Reno defeat, it would have been better if GAC had proceeded to Ford D with all 5 companies. That would have retained concentration, and provided a northerly evacuation option towards Terry.
WO
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Post by troybrickman on Jul 17, 2015 20:26:17 GMT -6
Benteen, I think it is far more likely that GAC ordered Keogh to hold the southern part of Battle Ridge with his battalion; cover the rear of GAC/Yates as they moved towards Ford D, draw the attention of any (limited number of) hostiles crossing at Ford B, and effect the (still anticipated?) link-up with Benteen/McDougall. With the benefit of hindsight, particularly the mass crossing of Ford B by hostiles and the Reno defeat, it would have been better if GAC had proceeded to Ford D with all 5 companies. That would have retained concentration, and provided a northerly evacuation option towards Terry. WO Welshofficer, Could Custer realistically have expected a timely link up with Benteen? Having traversed the bluffs, he could hardly have anticipated Benteen and the pack train covering that ground in any sort of excelerated timeframe. Or was the expectation for Benteen to link with Reno and join the valley fight? The questions that have me so perplexed with this battle!!! Agree whole heartedly on the northerly evacuation option, however I doubt the thought ever really entered Custer's mind that fateful afternoon. I get the impression he became so transfixed on the trees he never saw the forest. Troy
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 17, 2015 21:28:11 GMT -6
Troy,
Welcome to the board. The balance of evidence points towards GAC appreciating, at 3411, that he ideally required Benteen's battalion in order to assault a village of this enormity. Reno was applying pressure in the valley from the south, so redirect Benteen/McDougall away from that fight and have 75% of the combat battalions plus the pack train parked on the eastern bluffs ready for his own assault. Two problems occurred. Reno folded in the valley, and the hostiles came up the eastern bluffs and assaulted GAC in unimagined numbers (including those released by Reno's defeat). The hunter became the hunted, and wasn't prepared.
WO
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Post by troybrickman on Jul 18, 2015 5:45:44 GMT -6
Troy, Welcome to the board. The balance of evidence points towards GAC appreciating, at 3411, that he ideally required Benteen's battalion in order to assault a village of this enormity. Reno was applying pressure in the valley from the south, so redirect Benteen/McDougall away from that fight and have 75% of the combat battalions plus the pack train parked on the eastern bluffs ready for his own assault. Two problems occurred. Reno folded in the valley, and the hostiles came up the eastern bluffs and assaulted GAC in unimagined numbers (including those released by Reno's defeat). The hunter became the hunted, and wasn't prepared. WO Thank you for the welcome Welshofficer. While the balance of evidence points towards GAC appreciating the need to bring Benteen to the fight, there is little to no evidence to suggest to whom Benteen was to go to. Looking at the terrain, and Custer having ridden it, I do not think he would have placed Keogh to defend that awful terrain while waiting possibly hours for Benteen to arrive with the train. Thanks Troy
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Post by callmeconrad on Jul 18, 2015 6:03:20 GMT -6
OK, you have all waited long enough for my theory, I wont make you suffer anymore It is just that an opinion not based in fact. I believe that after Ford B the command got together on Battle Ridge. Boyer told Custer of another possible crossing at what we call Ford D. Custer intended to go there and if he could he would attack across this ford. But he was going to do it with all 5 companies not just 2. The order of march would be HQ, Co E, then F, or F then E, doesnt matter.What does matter is that they were followed in order by Co I, then C, then L. I think that as they started out Keogh noticed Warriors coming from the Reno fight which would threaten the rear of the column. While Cos I & C remained mounted, he had Co L form a line and fire a couple of volleys. (The volleys heard on Reno Hill) Here was his mistake. He felt the Indians would scatter and run back to the village (Indians always run dont they) Co L would then mount up and they would quickly catch up with Custer. Only problem was, the Indians didnt run. In fact they kept coming, ditched their ponies, and engaged Co L. This was not what Keogh expected. To make matters worse, he sees Indians pouring into Calhoun Coulee from the village which would threaten CO Ls flank. Either Harrington on his own, or Keogh sends him, to check the warrior advance. Only problem was that the Indians werent just going into the Coulee, they were already in it. When Co C mens boots hit the ground they were hit hard,unable to form a skirmish line. To be polite, they retreated. In reality they ran like Hell (Who can blame them) Co L sees this and they start to run, The rout is on. Be Well Dan Hi Dan, Definitely a possible scenario, my questions would be time-based: Would Custer have enough time to get to Ford D and back, and would L have been on Calhoun Hill long enough to account for the number of cartridges on Greasy Grass and at Henryville? Cheers, conrad
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 18, 2015 7:15:51 GMT -6
Troy, Welcome to the board. The balance of evidence points towards GAC appreciating, at 3411, that he ideally required Benteen's battalion in order to assault a village of this enormity. Reno was applying pressure in the valley from the south, so redirect Benteen/McDougall away from that fight and have 75% of the combat battalions plus the pack train parked on the eastern bluffs ready for his own assault. Two problems occurred. Reno folded in the valley, and the hostiles came up the eastern bluffs and assaulted GAC in unimagined numbers (including those released by Reno's defeat). The hunter became the hunted, and wasn't prepared. WO Thank you for the welcome Welshofficer. While the balance of evidence points towards GAC appreciating the need to bring Benteen to the fight, there is little to no evidence to suggest to whom Benteen was to go to. Looking at the terrain, and Custer having ridden it, I do not think he would have placed Keogh to defend that awful terrain while waiting possibly hours for Benteen to arrive with the train. Thanks Troy Troy,
I agree that the Cooke note was appallingly worded, but Martini was assigned to the RHQ and that's where Benteen would have naturally headed towards. His orders came from GAC, with a note from GAC's adjutant.
Time became an issue because the hostiles went on the offensive against Reno and against GAC, rather than just screening the southern end of the village and the river fords to their east.
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 18, 2015 7:17:47 GMT -6
OK, you have all waited long enough for my theory, I wont make you suffer anymore It is just that an opinion not based in fact. I believe that after Ford B the command got together on Battle Ridge. Boyer told Custer of another possible crossing at what we call Ford D. Custer intended to go there and if he could he would attack across this ford. But he was going to do it with all 5 companies not just 2. The order of march would be HQ, Co E, then F, or F then E, doesnt matter.What does matter is that they were followed in order by Co I, then C, then L. I think that as they started out Keogh noticed Warriors coming from the Reno fight which would threaten the rear of the column. While Cos I & C remained mounted, he had Co L form a line and fire a couple of volleys. (The volleys heard on Reno Hill) Here was his mistake. He felt the Indians would scatter and run back to the village (Indians always run dont they) Co L would then mount up and they would quickly catch up with Custer. Only problem was, the Indians didnt run. In fact they kept coming, ditched their ponies, and engaged Co L. This was not what Keogh expected. To make matters worse, he sees Indians pouring into Calhoun Coulee from the village which would threaten CO Ls flank. Either Harrington on his own, or Keogh sends him, to check the warrior advance. Only problem was that the Indians werent just going into the Coulee, they were already in it. When Co C mens boots hit the ground they were hit hard,unable to form a skirmish line. To be polite, they retreated. In reality they ran like Hell (Who can blame them) Co L sees this and they start to run, The rout is on. Be Well Dan Hi Dan, Definitely a possible scenario, my questions would be time-based: Would Custer have enough time to get to Ford D and back, and would L have been on Calhoun Hill long enough to account for the number of cartridges on Greasy Grass and at Henryville? Cheers, conrad Conrad,
I tend to agree that the available evidence points towards a pre-engagement deployment by Keogh, particularly L Company.
WO
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