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Post by jodak on Jul 18, 2015 9:30:12 GMT -6
Dan,
It has been fairly recently, say within the last 20 years, that the notion that Custer had even divided his immediate command into two battalions has really taken hold. Prior to that the thinking was largely that he retained personal command of all 5 companies and sort of shed them as he went along. Your theory sort of dove tails with that and could have some validity.
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 18, 2015 10:13:04 GMT -6
Jodak/Dan,
It's also politicised now, at least west of the pond. The very idea of GAC intending to put greater distance between himself with all 5 companies and the rest of his regiment. As opposed to Keogh (potentially, amongst other things) vainly waiting at the southern end of Battle Ridge for help that never came....
WO
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Post by dave on Jul 18, 2015 14:36:47 GMT -6
Troy Welcome to the board and enjoy Fred's book. I have reread mine several times and is all marked up with yellow hi-liter and pen. You will find answers to questions you never had. I have enjoyed your posts. Regards Dave
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Post by Beth on Jul 19, 2015 18:14:39 GMT -6
I hate to say it but I have actually worn my hard copy of Fred's book out. It is battered and bruised. It is not a book one reads once and puts on a shelf because it has a pretty picture on the cover--which it does--It's a book you keep by your side to reference and refer to whenever you read or discuss LBH.
The only complaint I will ever have about Fred's book is that the font on the tables is way to small. I often have to ask nearsighted hubby or kid2 read what it says. I understand why though work around it with my nearsighted family or a magnifying glass.
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Post by fred on Jul 19, 2015 18:58:47 GMT -6
The only complaint I will ever have about Fred's book is that the font on the tables is way to small. I agree completely. Absolutely completely. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by callmeconrad on Jul 20, 2015 6:23:00 GMT -6
Thoughts on C Company, Finley-Finkle Ridge, and low-probablity scenarios. One of the things that's always nagged me about Custer is how he left Ford B completely uncontested behind him; a perfect ingress point to split his five companies from the rest of the command. His appearance by the river served as a notice that there was another close threat to the village and as the Reno fight wound down and the word got around, warriors started crossing Ford B in large numbers and infiltrating Deep Coulee. Keogh's battalion, left around Calhoun Hill, started taking fire from Greasy Grass Ridge, Henryville, and from closer range via the multiple cuts and ravines. C Company charges. The common (and most likely) scenario is something like this: C goes down Calhoun Coulee, gets chopped up, flees to FF Ridge then back to Calhoun Hill. As I was looking at the artefact maps in Douglas Scott's " Uncovering History", I noticed this in Figure 35, the artefact distribution of .44-caliber Indian fired weapons. The red circle is mine. A nice line of 44 bullets like someone was carefully shooting at an individual or small group that is running. Which got me thinking...running to, or from, FF Ridge? So I tried to think how the opposite of the common scenario would occur. Be warned, this is mostly hokum, an extremely low probability!!!
As Fred mentioned in his recent message to Michael, "you can rationalize several Indian accounts claiming the battle began on FFR" ( he goes on to state why this is incorrect). More importantly, a move to lower FFR would be closer to a range able to fire at the Ford B environs. It's a pretty bad position, but it wouldn't be the first time in warfare that troops have been moved into an untenable location. Archaeology seems to say no, but the area has been heavily trafficked for years. So what if C moved down closer to the ford to make the crossing tougher, and instead of getting jumped in Calhoun Coulee, they suddenly found themselves exposed on an open hilltop? If they found themselves being fired at from three sides and cracked quickly, you could see most try to run back for Calhoun Hill while a few on the northern side were perhaps cut off and ran north, leaving that line of bullets and the bodies below Greasy Grass Ridge. Something like this: Note: Arrow for cavalry retreat north should be closer to Greasy Grass Ridge, but I was too lazy to move it.
Low probability, but not physically impossible. Then Michael's post yesterday got me thinking again, and I decided to go back and look at the real evidence one more time. Once again, looking at artefact finds in Scott's "Uncovering History", I noticed something I'd glossed over before; those .45 bullets and cases on Greasy Grass. I see two possibilities. First, the cases on Greasy Grass were from pistols fired at the running C Company men and the bullets on Greasy Grass were fired from the running cavalry heading to (or from) FF Ridge. However, there are no cases or bullets below the ridge to match this firefight and it would be a better range for a rifle or carbine. I see a greater likelihood that they were fired by a soldier who ended up on the ridge, possibly mounted. If C Company had gone straight down Finley-Finkle, faced the maelstrom, then broke, why would someone run right to the top of GGR when that's where a lot of the fire is coming from? Instead, a charge down Calhoun Coulee, along with a runaway mount, will put you right on top of Greasy Grass, surrounded, shooting at whatever you see. Cases and bullets explained and, at least in my mind, a final reason that C Company must have gone down Calhoun Coulee. Cheers, conrad
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Post by fred on Jul 20, 2015 7:38:08 GMT -6
Conrad,
Beautifully done.
Check out marker 128. It answers your theory.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by callmeconrad on Jul 21, 2015 8:28:25 GMT -6
Conrad, Beautifully done. Check out marker 128. It answers your theory. Best wishes, Fred. Hit on his right side even! Circumstantial of course, but yet another little bit of evidence. Cheers, conrad
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Post by fred on Jul 21, 2015 8:41:11 GMT -6
Hit on his right side even! Circumstantial of course, but yet another little bit of evidence. Nicely done... as usual! Marker 128—Isolated; behind Greasy Grass Ridge. • Both human remains and battle related artifacts were found. • Almost a complete burial discovered at this site; the most complete set of human remains recovered during the 1984 – 1985 archaeological excavations. • Lower right leg articulated, its foot bones encased in a cavalry boot. • Other bones had been re-buried after the flesh had decayed. • Male, between 19 – 22 years old, and approximately 5' 6¾" tall, with a range of 5' 5¾" – 5' 7 7/8"; or, 66.8" ± 1.18". Individual was stocky with well-developed musculature [Scott, et al., Archaeological Perspectives, p. 268]. Right-handed. Because of its presence in this area, the likelihood of the remains belonging to a trooper from C Company is the highest: o F. Meier (C) o J. Shea (C) o J. Thadus (C) o N. Short (C) • Evidence of two gunshot wounds in the chest, one from the right, one from the left. Also, massive blunt-force trauma to the skull at about the time of death. • Bullet fragment in lower left arm. • Three parallel cut marks on thighbones and another on collarbone. • Vertebrae showed congenital defect, probably causing the individual pain when he rode his horse for long periods. • Blouse and trousers buttons found; underwear cloth; hooks and eyes, probably from his campaign hat. • Because of the way the bones were dispersed, the individual had to have been re-buried, probably in 1877 or 1879. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by montrose on Jul 24, 2016 7:14:48 GMT -6
1. Purpose. Discuss command, control, and decision making by CPT Keough. 2. Situation. The Keough battalion deployed on the southern end of Battle Ridge. L Company was the main effort of the unit. It was on Calhoun Hill facing south. C Company was on their right flank facing west. I Company was in reserve a considerable distance to the northeast, over the crest of the ridge in a swale. 3. Command Post. CPT Keough was found with his company headquarters element in the swale. He was not in position to properly execute command and control of Companies C and L. 4. I Company disposition. I Co was overrun while still in Bn reserve. The unit was never committed to answer the numerous enemy counterattacks. 5. C Company attack. The C CO attack led to the collapse of the US defense and the annihilation of the Bn. The attack went too far, which is not unusual in cavalry attacks. a. BN Commander should have supervised this attack. He should have been on Calhoun Hill, or accompanied the attack. b. A local counterattack is actually the job of the reserve. I Company should have conducted this attack. This leaves C Co still in position to react to Lame White Man's counterattack into the gaping hole left by C Company. c. Because Keough was so far away, sending a messenger for permission would cost time. CPT Keough was so far away that a lone messenger may not be able to get there and back. Crazy Horse and others were conducting bravery runs between the gap between the fighting companies and the reserve. 6. The Keough Bn fought as 3 companies. There is a distinct absence of anyone executing the functions of battalion command and control. a. Reno gets ravaged for his decisions. Yet ever since being designated as advance guard, he clearly was managing his 3 companies and issues a variety of orders. Keough seems more like a deer caught in the headlights of an oncoming car (Jeep Cherokee?). As conditions changed on the south end of Battle Ridge, he was trapped in inertia and failed to respond. b. A more competent commander would have organized a coherent all round defense as enemy forces surrounded his position. Indian attacks that swept the position came through both of the gaps between the reserve and the main line of resistance. Crazy Horse and crew from SW, Lame White Man and crew from NE. c. The errors made meant that US forces collapsed faster than they should have, and inflicted less casualties. The argument that regimental forces should have moved faster in the south ignores the poor defense on Battle Ridge. 7. Summary. Would a more coherent defense on south Battle Ridge have made a difference? Why does Keough not get the same scrutiny for his performance as Custer, Reno, and Benteen? v/r William 5 years later, and I still hold the same views.
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Post by tubman13 on Jul 24, 2016 8:06:03 GMT -6
1. Purpose. Discuss command, control, and decision making by CPT Keough. 2. Situation. The Keough battalion deployed on the southern end of Battle Ridge. L Company was the main effort of the unit. It was on Calhoun Hill facing south. C Company was on their right flank facing west. I Company was in reserve a considerable distance to the northeast, over the crest of the ridge in a swale. 3. Command Post. CPT Keough was found with his company headquarters element in the swale. He was not in position to properly execute command and control of Companies C and L. 4. I Company disposition. I Co was overrun while still in Bn reserve. The unit was never committed to answer the numerous enemy counterattacks. 5. C Company attack. The C CO attack led to the collapse of the US defense and the annihilation of the Bn. The attack went too far, which is not unusual in cavalry attacks. a. BN Commander should have supervised this attack. He should have been on Calhoun Hill, or accompanied the attack. b. A local counterattack is actually the job of the reserve. I Company should have conducted this attack. This leaves C Co still in position to react to Lame White Man's counterattack into the gaping hole left by C Company. c. Because Keough was so far away, sending a messenger for permission would cost time. CPT Keough was so far away that a lone messenger may not be able to get there and back. Crazy Horse and others were conducting bravery runs between the gap between the fighting companies and the reserve. 6. The Keough Bn fought as 3 companies. There is a distinct absence of anyone executing the functions of battalion command and control. a. Reno gets ravaged for his decisions. Yet ever since being designated as advance guard, he clearly was managing his 3 companies and issues a variety of orders. Keough seems more like a deer caught in the headlights of an oncoming car (Jeep Cherokee?). As conditions changed on the south end of Battle Ridge, he was trapped in inertia and failed to respond. b. A more competent commander would have organized a coherent all round defense as enemy forces surrounded his position. Indian attacks that swept the position came through both of the gaps between the reserve and the main line of resistance. Crazy Horse and crew from SW, Lame White Man and crew from NE. c. The errors made meant that US forces collapsed faster than they should have, and inflicted less casualties. The argument that regimental forces should have moved faster in the south ignores the poor defense on Battle Ridge. 7. Summary. Would a more coherent defense on south Battle Ridge have made a difference? Only if he was stationed there hot if he was returning from the north as part of a retreat.Why does Keough not get the same scrutiny for his performance as Custer, Reno, and Benteen? v/r William 5 years later, and I still hold the same views.
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Post by montrose on May 3, 2017 21:14:07 GMT -6
Read the beginning of this thread.
A battalion in 1876 was simply a collection of two or more companies. Senior officer took command.
There were 3 companies at south end of Battle Ridge, so by definition they were a battalion.
The problem is they acted as 3 independent companies, with no leadership. CPT Keogh was not on Calhoun Hill and exerted no leadership or influence on the actions of C and L Company.
He died with his company in the swale, out of sight and knowledge of any other element of the 7th. His company was overrun in an administrative halt, and put up little to no resistance to the Indians. Keough was the most incompetent officer at LBH, and remember he was competing with both Custers and DeRudio.
He failed disastrously as battalion commander. He was not where he should have been, and he was main cause of the loss of 5 companies with minimal enemy casualties.
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Post by wild on May 4, 2017 11:44:24 GMT -6
He failed disastrously as battalion commander. He was not where he should have been, and he was main cause of the loss of 5 companies with minimal enemy casualties. One can but ask what unit was where it should have been? All in all a cheap shot not worthy of our best Colonel poster. For that accusation to have any credibility you must first eliminate from the equation two negative forces to wit 2000 Indians and Custer, either of which on their own could conjure up a rout but together gave us an apocalypse. Best Regards Richard
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Post by tubman13 on May 4, 2017 15:32:26 GMT -6
Wild,
How about Keogh was only in charge of his own company, on the retreat from the Ford D environs and hit broadside. C,L,I, in that order were cutoff and down.
Regards, Tom
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Post by wild on May 5, 2017 9:37:29 GMT -6
Hello Tom how are you ?
My firm belief is that you must dispell the probability of the command being caught in motion ,in line astern with no time to take counter measures before you cnan progress on to the more exotic. I know I'm a spoilsport ..there are great stories to be writ out there on Battle Ridge but..... Best Regards Richard
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