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Post by wild on Jan 6, 2019 18:40:17 GMT -6
And that AZ is exactly what Custer did;allow himself to be fixed ,surrounded and destroyed. No one forced him into MTC but once in ,the door slammed behind him. And with his command strung out over a mile and his entire flank exposed to the main axis of enemy attack he was easy pickings. The absence of any organised horse holding suggests no time just dismount fight on foot no cohesion, end , finito. Best Richard
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Post by wild on Jan 7, 2019 8:21:49 GMT -6
Nowhere on the battle field was there a sufficent concentration of carbines to keep the Indians at bay. That was only achieved on Reno Hill , not on Reno's first skirmish line , not in the timber, not on Weir point, not battle Ridge and not on LSH. Custer's command managed but two points of resistance; LSH and Keogh's stand. My guess is that Keogh was still resisting for some time after Custer was over run. Once the Indians closed with Custer's extended line, forced them to dismount and got among them it was game set and match. One tactical error by both Custer and Keogh was that they did not stay mounted and attempt to close up. And of course the carbine was outclassed at close quarters. Cheers
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Post by benteen on Jan 7, 2019 14:32:28 GMT -6
Nowhere on the battle field was there a sufficent concentration of carbines to keep the Indians at bay. That was only achieved on Reno Hill , not on Reno's first skirmish line , not in the timber, not on Weir point, not battle Ridge and not on LSH. Custer's command managed but two points of resistance; LSH and Keogh's stand. My guess is that Keogh was still resisting for some time after Custer was over run. Once the Indians closed with Custer's extended line, forced them to dismount and got among them it was game set and match. One tactical error by both Custer and Keogh was that they did not stay mounted and attempt to close up. And of course the carbine was outclassed at close quarters. Cheers Richard, I agree, in addition I believe their mindset had a lot to do with it. I remember either Col Montrose or Col Quincannon said something that stuck with me, "Dont just prepare for what you think the enemy will do, but prepare for what the enemy can do" They were prepared for what they felt the enemy would do (Try to escape) but not for what the enemy could and did do (Attack) Do I think Custers command would have had a victory if they were prepared for an attack...NO The regiment was to fragmented and there were just to many warriors, but I dont think it would have been the slaughter it turned out to be. Be Well Dan
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 7, 2019 19:32:59 GMT -6
When the 7th dismounted at the Yellowstone they had shooters and when the Indians got close their horses and themselves were hit causing them to back off. At the LBH Sgt Ryan states even Custer would not fight the 7th mounted. They couldn't ride and/or shoot while moving. There is no indication that Custer tried to use the 5 companies as cavalry fighting mounted. The horses were merely transportation. Regards AZ Ranger That is the point. My point would be to bring shooters to a gun fight. If you rely on paper ballistics alone you will lose against a determined enemy. Regards AZ
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Post by noggy on Jan 8, 2019 3:09:58 GMT -6
Custer's command managed but two points of resistance; LSH and Keogh's stand. Would you not count Calhoun Hill, as in before they had to divide they firepower after C Company`s charge? L Company seems to have held the NAs at bay early on, inflicting casualties on some bold warriors like Hump and also hitting several of their ponies. The firing may not have been the most effective but did suppress the enemy for a good while. All the best, Noggy
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Post by herosrest on Jan 8, 2019 6:38:40 GMT -6
Nowhere on the battle field was there a sufficent concentration of carbines to keep the Indians at bay. That was only achieved on Reno Hill , not on Reno's first skirmish line , not in the timber, not on Weir point, not battle Ridge and not on LSH. Custer's command managed but two points of resistance; LSH and Keogh's stand. My guess is that Keogh was still resisting for some time after Custer was over run. Once the Indians closed with Custer's extended line, forced them to dismount and got among them it was game set and match. One tactical error by both Custer and Keogh was that they did not stay mounted and attempt to close up. And of course the carbine was outclassed at close quarters. Cheers The Reno Hill fight was a 'traditional' Indian on military fight with the wagon's circled and surrounded. My understanding of the Chief's strategy was of limited assaults and waiting for ammunition to deplete and thirst to take effect. You may be correct with Keogh's fight post dating the Custer Hill fight and that is a part of rationalising the flow of battle. Keogh was found in a hollow or buffalo wallow with one assumes, hiscompany in cover about the perimeter. There were dead horses, evidenced in period photographs but where were the held horses? Going with this flow and the Kuhlman retreat theory with a movement south to north to open a corridor for Benteen, then a re-read of participant evidence makes different sense of Hunkpapa Iron Hawk's account in Black Elk Speaks. I am fond of this account for detailing aspects of Little Bear's fight and movements but equally interesting is interpretting the action for the north to south. We saw soldiers start running down hill right towards us. Nearly all of them were afoot, and I think they were so scared that they didn't know what they were doing. They were making their arms go as though they were running very fast, but they were only walking. Some of them shot their guns in the air. We all yelled " Hoka hey!" and charged toward them, riding all around them in the twilight that had fallen on us.
I met a soldier on horseback, and I let him have it. The arrow went through from side to side under his ribs and it stuck out on both sides. He screamed and took hold of his saddle horn and hung on, wobbling, with his head hanging down. I kept along beside him, and I took my heavy bow and struck him across the back of the neck. He fell from his saddle, and I got off and beat him to death with my bow. I kept on beating him awhile after he was dead, and every time I hit him I said "Hownh!" I was mad, because I was thinking of the women and little children running down there, all scared and out of breath. These Wasichus wanted it, and they came to get it, and we gave it to them. I did not see much more. I saw Brings Plenty kill a soldier with a war club. I saw Red Horn Buffalo fall. There was a Lakota riding along the edge of the gulch, and he was yelling to look out, that there was a soldier hiding in there. I saw him charge in and kill the soldier and begin slashing him with a knife.Now cherry picking the Eli S. Richter, May 13, 1907 account; When Custer was retreating toward Custer Hill, Indians followed along picking up arms and revolvers and ammunition and went to using these instead of clubs and bows and arrows. From Custer Hill a lot of soldiers broke and ran toward the river when the Indians pressed in on them, and they were killled in trying to escape.12 Two men on this hill wore buckskin suits; another wore such suit at the other end, which means Calhoun Hill.Thus Company I retreated toward the river from Last Stand Hill along Battle Ridge after the gray horses ran away.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 8, 2019 11:58:06 GMT -6
HR
That confused me.
I think E company was on Cemetery Ridge and driven off by Indians from the Ford D area. I think there is a good chance that since CR and LSH are connected that the running soldiers came off CR rather than LSH. Seems to me that there would be more markers between LSH and a line drawn to the south of CR. If you stand on CR facing SSL it matches up well with a skirmish line moving to Deep Ravine. I think they were moving to the eastern travel corridor which leads back to MTC. Some fell into the Deeper part and could not get out but there are markers south and west of Deep Ravine.
The waving arms would be within a normal reaction when moving down a steeper slop with a carbine attached.
Regards
BE
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Post by herosrest on Jan 10, 2019 13:16:27 GMT -6
Basically I ran down the Kuhlman scenario. Companies holding BRE and deployed below BR as his SSL and then the companies retrograding along the ridge towards CH. This is basically the 'clockwise' military theory from 1877. E get hammered on SSL with no reason to be there and the other companies are overwhelmed moving south to north towards CH from the BRE. When it all falls apart the survivors flee north south back towards LSH.
I agree that the windmillinging arms observation suggests descending a steep slope. There is comment amongst the tombe that the troopers boots were leather soled which performed poorly on the greasy grass for which the valley and its river are named. The grass was slippery.
E Company may have deployed to the National Cemetery terrain, they may have fought there, but as all the responsible archaeologists who have worked the ground have said, there is no evidence of this to corroborate what is the second hand tribal accounts as history which underpin modern thinking and artistry. There is no proof that companies deployed or fought there. That is Fox and others minds eye consideration and hindsight.
In 1890, Capt. Sweet found absolutely no evidence for a presence on CR. There is evidence of cavalry at GGH and the mouth of Deep Coulee.
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Post by montrose on Jun 26, 2023 10:12:43 GMT -6
1. Purpose. Discuss command, control, and decision making by CPT Keough. 2. Situation. The Keough battalion deployed on the southern end of Battle Ridge. L Company was the main effort of the unit. It was on Calhoun Hill facing south. C Company was on their right flank facing west. I Company was in reserve a considerable distance to the northeast, over the crest of the ridge in a swale. 3. Command Post. CPT Keough was found with his company headquarters element in the swale. He was not in position to properly execute command and control of Companies C and L. 4. I Company disposition. I Co was overrun while still in Bn reserve. The unit was never committed to answer the numerous enemy counterattacks. 5. C Company attack. The C CO attack led to the collapse of the US defense and the annihilation of the Bn. The attack went too far, which is not unusual in cavalry attacks. a. BN Commander should have supervised this attack. He should have been on Calhoun Hill, or accompanied the attack. b. A local counterattack is actually the job of the reserve. I Company should have conducted this attack. This leaves C Co still in position to react to Lame White Man's counterattack into the gaping hole left by C Company. c. Because Keough was so far away, sending a messenger for permission would cost time. CPT Keough was so far away that a lone messenger may not be able to get there and back. Crazy Horse and others were conducting bravery runs between the gap between the fighting companies and the reserve. 6. The Keough Bn fought as 3 companies. There is a distinct absence of anyone executing the functions of battalion command and control. a. Reno gets ravaged for his decisions. Yet ever since being designated as advance guard, he clearly was managing his 3 companies and issues a variety of orders. Keough seems more like a deer caught in the headlights of an oncoming car (Jeep Cherokee?). As conditions changed on the south end of Battle Ridge, he was trapped in inertia and failed to respond. b. A more competent commander would have organized a coherent all round defense as enemy forces surrounded his position. Indian attacks that swept the position came through both of the gaps between the reserve and the main line of resistance. Crazy Horse and crew from SW, Lame White Man and crew from NE. c. The errors made meant that US forces collapsed faster than they should have, and inflicted less casualties. The argument that regimental forces should have moved faster in the south ignores the poor defense on Battle Ridge. 7. Summary. Would a more coherent defense on south Battle Ridge have made a difference? Why does Keough not get the same scrutiny for his performance as Custer, Reno, and Benteen? v/r William Years later, I still have the same question.
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Post by noggy on Jun 30, 2023 14:45:18 GMT -6
1. Purpose. Discuss command, control, and decision making by CPT Keough. 2. Situation. The Keough battalion deployed on the southern end of Battle Ridge. L Company was the main effort of the unit. It was on Calhoun Hill facing south. C Company was on their right flank facing west. I Company was in reserve a considerable distance to the northeast, over the crest of the ridge in a swale. 3. Command Post. CPT Keough was found with his company headquarters element in the swale. He was not in position to properly execute command and control of Companies C and L. 4. I Company disposition. I Co was overrun while still in Bn reserve. The unit was never committed to answer the numerous enemy counterattacks. 5. C Company attack. The C CO attack led to the collapse of the US defense and the annihilation of the Bn. The attack went too far, which is not unusual in cavalry attacks. a. BN Commander should have supervised this attack. He should have been on Calhoun Hill, or accompanied the attack. b. A local counterattack is actually the job of the reserve. I Company should have conducted this attack. This leaves C Co still in position to react to Lame White Man's counterattack into the gaping hole left by C Company. c. Because Keough was so far away, sending a messenger for permission would cost time. CPT Keough was so far away that a lone messenger may not be able to get there and back. Crazy Horse and others were conducting bravery runs between the gap between the fighting companies and the reserve. 6. The Keough Bn fought as 3 companies. There is a distinct absence of anyone executing the functions of battalion command and control. a. Reno gets ravaged for his decisions. Yet ever since being designated as advance guard, he clearly was managing his 3 companies and issues a variety of orders. Keough seems more like a deer caught in the headlights of an oncoming car (Jeep Cherokee?). As conditions changed on the south end of Battle Ridge, he was trapped in inertia and failed to respond. b. A more competent commander would have organized a coherent all round defense as enemy forces surrounded his position. Indian attacks that swept the position came through both of the gaps between the reserve and the main line of resistance. Crazy Horse and crew from SW, Lame White Man and crew from NE. c. The errors made meant that US forces collapsed faster than they should have, and inflicted less casualties. The argument that regimental forces should have moved faster in the south ignores the poor defense on Battle Ridge. 7. Summary. Would a more coherent defense on south Battle Ridge have made a difference? Why does Keough not get the same scrutiny for his performance as Custer, Reno, and Benteen? v/r William Years later, I still have the same question. If I may chime in. Just a thought: To me, the difference is that we know the least about Keogh during the battle. At least that is how I view it. Reno is pretty clear cut, as far as actions go. We have most of the facts here. We can critique and defend thereafter. GAC we know led 5 companies, including Keogh, for some time. All logic says he died with two companies around LSH. But Keogh? We know where he died, but not when. Or how, apart from being killed by NAs... There was long range firing from the East side of Battle Ridge for quite some time, if you believe several NA accounts. Was he killed early on, do we know he actually had any sort of command over the three companies? If he actually had the time to on his own say that it was wise to place one company CH (L), one og the east side of BR (I) and one as make-shift Company used for a tactical reserve or whatever (C), he would be placed in the gallows. But so should TC, who left his company, while being a much more competent company commander than Harrington (as far as I have read). Without having been there and therefor asking people who have been to te field: How would a concentration of 3 companies on/around Calhoun have worked? I and C Company without support range of each other (sorry, my Norwegian is kicking in again) seems strange and if on Keogh alone, a gigantic blunder. I do wonder if it is that clear-cut, PS: No, you lurkes. not on-board on the South-North train All the best, Geir
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Post by montrose on Jun 30, 2023 15:18:01 GMT -6
Calhoun Hill is an odd position to place a combat element. It is too far from Ford B area to interdict any crossing. It can in no way have been a detachment left in contact (DLIC), LTC Custer was not withdrawing to the east, which would be by definition for DLIC. Custer headed north, parallel to and not away from enemy village. In other words, he headed deeper into enemy territory, and away from any support from the regiment (-). It makes sense as a temporary linkup point for trailing units. Cooke's ambiguous note orders the Benteen and McDougall Bns to leave Ash Creek and join Custer. The location at Calhoun Hill fits this order, and not much else. I believe the Keogh battalion (Bn) served as a linkup point for the Benteen and McDougall Bns, including the pack train. The local enemy threat was too high for the trains. The deployment of the Bn reflects this. L Company was on the military crest of Calhoun Hill, facing south. Archeology shows they were engaged with Indians in the Henryville and surrounding areas. C Company was on their right, facing west towards the Ford B avenue of approach. There is little evidence of their being engaged until they conducted a mounted charge to clear a rising threat in their sector. I Company was in reserve, in an area that is an excellent staging area to conduct a mounted charge to clear a path towards Weir peaks, when the trailing Bns arrive. If the Indians were fleeing, then this is a reasonable plan to link with the trailing units. The problem is the Indians were not following LTC Custer's plan. CPT Keogh was in position to identify approach of trailing units and respond. He was not in position to see the rising threat from Ford B, and died oblivious to the threat, the C Company attack and rout, and the subsequent attempt to change front of L company and their being overrun. His company was overrun still in their assembly area, like a deer caught in the headlights of a Jeep Cherokee. Never assume away a threat, or an enemy response.
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Post by tubman13 on Jul 1, 2023 3:49:15 GMT -6
Will it is good to hear from you.You know I disagree on this point, I think he was hit broadside while attempting to help open a retreat corridor for the northern column.
I am going to a get together for a recent MOH recipient, Col. Paris Davis,this afternoon. Someone you may know?
Regards, Tom
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Post by montrose on Jul 1, 2023 5:26:07 GMT -6
I am going to a get together for a recent MOH recipient, Col. Paris Davis, this afternoon. Someone you may kn Regards, Tom Paris Davis is a living legend in Special Forces. He earned the MOH as a team leader in Vietnam with 5th SFGA. I met him in the 1980s when he commanded 10th SFGA. He is a remarkable man. I started out in SF commanding in an A team in his first BN, but in the company next door.
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Post by tubman13 on Jul 2, 2023 9:02:26 GMT -6
He was a Marshall of our 4th of July parade, in Reedville,Va. He has some health issues. ASF medic rode with him. He was presented with a Quilt of Valor afterwards at our Legion post.He lives here in Reedville.
Regards, Tom
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