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Post by Dark Cloud on May 18, 2007 18:28:46 GMT -6
It wasn't presented as a comprehensive list. In any case, it bears zero comparison to what is suggested for Reno in duration, situation, or opponent. So long as the French left, the Russians weren't hell bent on wiping them out - counting on Winter to do that - or probably able to. And, of course, the Russians had their own Hussars to impede all doable missions and waste time.
I'm sure the cavalry battles between the French Rear Guard and the Russian Advance Guard was absolutely thrilling, and the my breathing grows heavy at the thought. But really, what was at issue except ego, so the Russians could be seen to drive them out to inspire their serfs, and the French to drive them back? The campaign was lost when they left Moscow.
They had better weapons and men for the job at Beecher, were far better shots and had discipline based on experience. Not many wasted shots. Second, duration wasn't the point or goal for either. Both survived, but Reno's men left still on the offensive and pursued the mission. The Beecher guys disbanded. Except for Roman Nose dying, not a real big deal, over all.
The Beecher guys weren't in sight of the village, whereas Reno was camped at the kitchen window of a far larger group. Based upon all the Reno could have known, staying there absent rescue was a death sentence, and Custer's and Benteen's and the train's non appearances weren't indicative of the attack going swimmingly to that point. Which, of course, it was not.
We don't know what happened, but many believe Custer never attacked at all, in "support" or otherwise, but was bumped north against his will, and despite fighting rear guard actions, was wiped out with two more companies than Reno had in the timber. Nothing in the markers or accounts received to 1879 damage that image.
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Post by George Mabry on May 18, 2007 20:31:14 GMT -6
A “fighting withdrawal” from the timber is one option but the simple model I proposed on Reply #4 to the thread “Years and counting“ would hardly be called a fighting withdrawal.
Wild stated: Reno had to break through the Indians in order to effect his escape. A rearguard must be placed between the main body and the persuers and this could not be done until Reno was clear of the Indians.The next step would have been for the one of the troops to have halted and gone into skirmish line.Never in the history of mounted warfare has this manoeuver been successfully accomplished while in close contact with the enemy.
I’m with you on the first sentence and that would have been easily accomplished. According to the model I proposed, the companies would have charged from the timber on as much of a line as possible. Any Indians between the timber and Ford A would have peeled off to the sides as the charge passed. The second and third companies would have been following behind and the Indians would have still stayed off to the side.
Take another look at that model. Just to give you a quick summary, it calls for the lead company to stop short of the crossing at Ford A and turn around. The lead company covers the other two companies as they cross and then the lead company follows the last company over. Does anyone honestly believe that a movement as simple as this was beyond the capabilities of the 7th Cavalry?
I still hear DC’s plaintive cry that no one can guarantee him that Reno’s battalion would have sustained less causality in an orderly withdrawal. As we’ve discussed before, the point in my proposing a more orderly was not to demonstrate how he could have reduced his causalities. No one can guarantee the end result of a gunfight anymore than they can guarantee the end result of a boxing match (outside of Louisiana). But what I can guarantee you is that a lot of the criticism heaped on Reno would have been deflected had he made an orderly withdrawal instead of being at the head of a panicked rout.
Mike wrote that he thought that there would have been too much dust in the air to cover a withdrawal. You’re really reaching Mike. Besides, if I’m trying to withdraw I’ll take all the dust in the air that I can get.
George
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Post by Dark Cloud on May 18, 2007 21:10:45 GMT -6
The problems are:
1. "as much a line as possible..." I'm not seeing it really possible at all, certainly not forming in the woods and maintaining on the way out, and certainly not forming outside, on the run. You're telling them what's happening, and they'd react, probably appropriately.
2. "the Indians would have stayed off to the side" And you say mcaryf is stretching? Why would they not enjoy taking shots at close range and doing what they did in reality and attack them real close? They could shoot from horseback at speed with bow or gun. Buffalo hunt. No comparable training for the 7th. And for the vast majority of the trip, nothing is different than the bolt.
3. it is unlikely the soldiers' order would have maintained all the way to Ford A under fire anyway.
4. You mistake my plaintive cry. I don't think it would deflect criticism at all. "If he could do that, why couldn't he have done that in the other direction? They when Custer invaded from the east in .......well, an hour, they'd have won." But if there is no reason to think this would have resulted in fewer casualties, Reno should be cut slack.
5. Throughout you neglect a gait. Recall that someone, I think Ryan again, said that some of the soldiers had never ridden as fast in their lives as they did during Reno's initial charge and, eh, other charge.
6. Ryan says they couldn't fight well on horseback. He was there, he'd know as an NCO. If anything, he smooths over the abilities of his guys. They're cavalry, supposed pro's, and they can't fight on horseback in aggegate. What does that suggest about their unit skill level?
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Post by mwkeogh on May 19, 2007 1:05:30 GMT -6
Hi Keogh I wish you had bothered to consult some of the reference material before you posted this: Thus, there really is no mystery at all concerning the "incredible shrinking Co. G". They were sacrificed by their commander to allow the rest of the battalion to escape with their lives and reach the hill. This was in response to my pointing out that Lt Wallace reported G company as being various numbers between 3 and 7 available for duty. The total casualties for G were of the order of 16 throughout the two days of battle, the total number of troopers who came out with Herendeen was 11 and might have included some "A" company men, O'Neill hiding with de Rudio was also "G". Even assuming that 7 "G" men were busy with the pack train, you still have some problem in accounting for the 44 or so that "G" started with and there should certainly have been 3 times the 3 or 4 Wallace reported present when asked by Benteen to form part of the defense on Reno Hill. Regards Mike Hi Mike. I certainly did consult my reference material. Co. G had 7 troopers listed with the pack train and 1 trooper was with Custer's command, thus leaving 38 total men & officers in the valley fight with Reno. Of those men, 14 were killed in action and 4 wounded, thus leaving a total of 20 men in the company. Of these Wallace counted 6 besides himself ready for duty on the hilltop. By subtracting 7 from 20, we can arrive at the number of 13 men of Co. G abandoned by Reno in the timber, no doubt mostly belonging to the platoon sent to guard the river bank behind their position. Therein lies the answer to the so-called "Incredible Shrinking Co. G." Not really so incredible at all when you break it down properly.
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Post by mwkeogh on May 19, 2007 1:17:16 GMT -6
Mike, you forget to mention that Reno had told Capt French only a few moments before that he intended to hold the timber. It came as quite a surprise to the latter when he changed his mind so quickly. Let us remember that the majority of the senior officers and scouts there that day (with the exception of Moylan) felt the timber position should have been held. The junior officers might have felt their knees begin to quiver, but French, Weir, DeRudio, Benteen, Gibbon, Miles, Herendeen & Girard (and no doubt Charley Reynolds and Isaiah Dorman if they could) all voiced their opinions criticizing Reno's decision to cut and run from a good defensive position. Against this array of officers you bring up "Aparaho Mitch" Moylan, two 2nd Lieutenants? I would think Reno would need more support than that trio to convince the majority that he was right to skedaddle that day.
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Post by mwkeogh on May 19, 2007 1:27:11 GMT -6
A “fighting withdrawal” from the timber is one option but the simple model I proposed on Reply #4 to the thread “Years and counting“ would hardly be called a fighting withdrawal. Wild stated: Reno had to break through the Indians in order to effect his escape. A rearguard must be placed between the main body and the persuers and this could not be done until Reno was clear of the Indians.The next step would have been for the one of the troops to have halted and gone into skirmish line.Never in the history of mounted warfare has this manoeuver been successfully accomplished while in close contact with the enemy. I’m with you on the first sentence and that would have been easily accomplished. According to the model I proposed, the companies would have charged from the timber on as much of a line as possible. Any Indians between the timber and Ford A would have peeled off to the sides as the charge passed. The second and third companies would have been following behind and the Indians would have still stayed off to the side. Take another look at that model. Just to give you a quick summary, it calls for the lead company to stop short of the crossing at Ford A and turn around. The lead company covers the other two companies as they cross and then the lead company follows the last company over. Does anyone honestly believe that a movement as simple as this was beyond the capabilities of the 7th Cavalry? I still hear DC’s plaintive cry that no one can guarantee him that Reno’s battalion would have sustained less causality in an orderly withdrawal. As we’ve discussed before, the point in my proposing a more orderly was not to demonstrate how he could have reduced his causalities. No one can guarantee the end result of a gunfight anymore than they can guarantee the end result of a boxing match (outside of Louisiana). But what I can guarantee you is that a lot of the criticism heaped on Reno would have been deflected had he made an orderly withdrawal instead of being at the head of a panicked rout. Mike wrote that he thought that there would have been too much dust in the air to cover a withdrawal. You’re really reaching Mike. Besides, if I’m trying to withdraw I’ll take all the dust in the air that I can get. George Excellent description here George. This is exactly what Reno should have done had he determined on a retreat from the timber (which I still disagree with from a tactical point of view). Retreating should be a last option after a determined resistance had been attempted first. Had your scenario above been followed, Reno would certainly have sustained far fewer casualties than his disgraceful rout produced (in my view).
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Post by mcaryf on May 19, 2007 1:27:12 GMT -6
Hi Keogh
According to Benteen's account Wallace reported 3 men in "G" ready to be placed on the line after the withdrawal from Weir Peaks, this was after the return of the men from the timber with Herendeen. The 14 killed and 4 wounded was the total at the end of the battle thus are you assuming none killed in the hilltop fight?
However, you look at it there were a lot of men in "G" unaccounted for and probably skulking with the packs.
French is also reported as having said at the time that they should get out of the timber and of course in later life that Custer should never have fought the battle in the first place.
As I pointed out before, the expert witness Gibbon was not even prepared to guess at the dimensions of the timber and Miles' judgement was rendered from an armchair somewhere. Girard's main focus was apparently on getting some whiskey and subsequently his personal feud with Reno. Herendeen was very experienced in Indian fighting which Reno was not and I suspect his conclusion was based on what Indians were likely to do in the circumstances rather than the true defensive quality of the position. As the warriors had behaved atypically at the Crook fight and again at LBH we cannot say whether Herendeen's judgement would have been right or not on the day.
Hi George Mabry
The account of William Slaper ascribes the survival of so many men from Reno's dash across the valley floor to the dust which reduced visibility to 50 feet. I am happy to take the opinion of someone there rather than describe it as "somewhat of a stretch". If you accept his account then it is quite difficult to suggest a more sensible manoeuvre for the cavalry other than keep on travelling through the dust. Obviously some warriors would have entered the dust clouds but at 50 feet visibility it really had to be every man for himself during the dash. The fact that so many of Reno's men made it to the other side of the river seems to me to add credibility to Slaper's conclusion.
Keogh and others here like to use the example of Godfrey covering the withdrawal from Weir but if you look more carefully at that there is a completely different conclusion to be drawn. Edgerly wanted to go back and save Vincent Charlie but once his men had started moving rapidly away from the threat on horseback there was no real way of stopping them so Weir did not even try. Godfrey had dismounted his men and sent the horses back so they pretty well had to stand and fight.
if you read the more realistic accounts of the Custer engagement rather than the careful manoeuvres dreamt up by some posters on here, then you see details of soldiers in panic withdrawal not stopping to fight and the scattered bodies away from their officers tends to support these accounts.
Regards
Mike
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Post by mwkeogh on May 19, 2007 2:06:19 GMT -6
The problems are: 1. "as much a line as possible..." I'm not seeing it really possible at all, certainly not forming in the woods and maintaining on the way out, and certainly not forming outside, on the run. You're telling them what's happening, and they'd react, probably appropriately. In my model, Co. A would ride out of the timber in column formation at a stiff trot or slow gallup. The warriors would fall back and give way to an apparent charge, just as they in fact did. This company would then change from column to line formation (yes, this is something they were trained to do, and in fact did do on their earlier short-lived charge into the valley). Once they formed into line formation, the order would be given to charge and away they would go at an all out gallup. As Co. A was forming into a line, Co. M would exit the timber in column fomation on their right flank, also at a stiff trot or slow gallup. Their appearance would keep the warriors in check from closing in on Co. A's right flank as they formed into line formation. Co. M would then shift into line formation and follow Co. A down the valley directly behind them, thus preventing any warrior warparty from closing in on Co. A's rear as they move down the valley. Co. G now exits the timber in column formation on Co. M's right flank, thus protecting the flank until Co. M swung into line and moved into a full gallup down the valley towards the ford. Co. G would now swing into line and follow the other two companies in a full gallup down the valley, keeping the warriors from closing in on Co. M's rear ranks (each Co. would be moving in double ranks). Co. G, of course, being the last company out, would have no one to cover its flank or rear, however, the warriors would be hesitant to close in on them immediately as they would have no idea if a 4th Cavalry company would make a sudden appearance out of the timber. This would give Co. G time to get a full head of steam down the valley before the warriors attempted to engage in their buffalo hunt. As the distance to the ford was only a mile, by this time Co. A would have reached the banks of the ford and dismounted to form a skirmish line on either side of the ford on its western bank. As Co. M crossed over the river, protected by skirmish fire from Co. A, they would dismount on the east side of the river and form a skirmish line with 1st platoon who would form outside of Co. A's flank to provide a field of fire against the warriors closing in on Co. G's rear and flanks, while its 2nd platoon would wheel about and provide a covering fire against the few hostiles who managed to scale the bluffs to their rear. The greater range of the troopers carbines would suppress any fire from the Indians few rifles they had that day. With the support of this sustained skirmish firing, the warriors woudl peel off their attack against Co. G, who would ride straight across the river and move up the heights to attain the bluffs as the lead unit. Once attained, they would then dismount and provide covering fire to allow the remaining companies to scale the heights unimpeded by hostile fire from the bluffs. Once G Co. was safely across the river, M Co. would swing its 2nd platoon to the west to provide additional cover fire across the river to allow A Co. to mount up and cross the river. Once across, they would again dismount and set up a skirmish line half way up the bluffs to provide cover fire to extract M Co. from their position along the eastern bank of the LBH river and fall back to Co. G's position at the top of the bluff. Once there, A Co. would retreat to the top, being covered the entire way with fire from G and M. Because the Indians fell back and retreated when they thought the soldiers were charging them. They only attempted to close in for their buffalo hunt when they saw the soldiers turn their back and run for the hills with no cover. In my model above, there would have been 2 more mounted companies emerging from the timber, each having the effect of causing the hostiles to fall back and freeze until they could determine whether the crazy soldiers were going to attack them or run away. It is the responsibility of the officers to see that they did maintain relative order and not allow the disciplined retreat to turn into a rout. And these type of maneuvers are something which the 7th would have spent hours in the field training for. It is not something entirely unfamiliar to either the enlisted men, nor their officers. I think there is no question that an organized retreat would result in far fewer casualties, and you would end up with a battalion that was still battle ready with morale not shattered. The only time an all out gallup (charge) would be ordered is after the companies were formed into line formation, not before. They handled it just fine in their initial charge into the village (with the exception of 4 troopers). They would have little need to fight on horseback if they used my model above. The warriors would only have had the ability to chase the last company (G) and only for a short distance before coming under a blistering fire from a very deadly dismounted skirmish line facing their direct front. This would have caused the warriors to peel away from G Co's flanks to avoid heavy casualties, just as they kept well away from Reno's first skirmish line on the valley floor.
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Post by mwkeogh on May 19, 2007 2:38:16 GMT -6
It possible Mike, but I prefer to go with Wallace's own statement that he could round up no more than half a dozen of his troopers. This would make a total of 7 if we count himself. I have found Benteen to be very flippant when it comes to precise figures that day. He was prone to exaggeration....(ie. 9000 warriors in the village.....Custer already dead when Martini gave him his message, etc.) Perhaps, but I think that many were left in the timber that day. Clearly more so than any other company. Pvt. Davern testified at the RCOI that very few of G Co. Troop were able to get mounted. This seems to be in contradiction to French's well known statement: "What made Major Reno run away when he did I cannot positively know, and he did not tell me....To turn ones back on Indians without being better mounted they, is throwing away life. When he started to that hill, he had told me, not one minute before, that he was going to fight---this was in reply to a question of mine." And yet Gibbon was there and saw the timber position for himself. Perhaps he was not willing to say too much that would give the US army any more of a black eye than they already were getting from the press during the RCOI. Miles judgement was certainly not from an armchair. He actually went out to the location of the battlefield in 1877 and examined it in great detail to ascertain for himself the lay of the land and the distances involved. Your view of Girard's main focus on procuring more whiskey would indicate that he may have had a good deal more in common with Major Reno than we realize. And I am glad that you admit that Herendeen was an experienced Indian fighter, yet you ironically then dismiss his advice as being of less value than Major Reno, who had little experience in that category.
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Post by George Mabry on May 19, 2007 6:36:21 GMT -6
DC, Keogh has already covered most of the points you mentioned and probably did a better job at it than I would have but there are a couple of things I’d like to add.
“…as much a line as possible…” No one here knows the exact lay of the land inside the timber. We can only guess. The line I’m talking about is not going to be parade ground neat. They would just have to do the best they can. The purpose is to align in as much of a charge formation as is possible. It doesn’t matter if the Indians see you forming. They are not going to dig in and prepare defensive positions are they? If you bust out, they are going to step to the side.
DC: “And for the vast majority of the trip, nothing is different than the bolt.”
Mabry: So? Call it a run for your life if you choose but do it with some military order and control. And yes DC, the Indians will shoot at you with or without your order and control.
DC: “You mistake my plaintive cry.”
Mabry: I haven’t mistaken your plaintive cry. For the year that I’ve been on this board I’ve seen you consistently wring your hands and cry that Reno couldn’t have done better. I’ve consistently seen you whine that Reno and Benteen aren’t given the benefit of a doubt yet you never give the benefit of a doubt to Custer. No DC, I’m very familiar with your plaintive cry. It’s apparent in your statement “If he could do that, why couldn't he have done that in the other direction.” That statement ought to embarrass you but my bet is that it doesn’t.
DC: “Throughout you neglect a gait.”
Mabry: I neglected a lot of details in my proposal. I didn’t mention how, when you begin to form-up in the woods, you’re going to have to shrink your perimeter either. As I said earlier, my model is a simplistic model and it was offered for the purpose of demonstrating one way to leave the woods other than as a dog pack.
DC: ”Ryan says they couldn't fight well on horseback.”
Mabry: I assume you are referring to the soldiers manning the blocking force at Ford A during the withdrawal. I realize it can be painful for you to read another’s opinion but had you done so you would have seen that I didn’t recommend the blocking force remain mounted. They could remain mounted. It’s a simple matter of choice. I would have dismounted them.
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Post by wild on May 19, 2007 6:39:24 GMT -6
Just reading Keogh's choreography for an organised withdrawal through 900 warriors.His plan requires A troop alone to perform 4 changes of formation and 4 manoeuvers all this in time with two other units performing a similar ballet. The 7th from its formation up to the battle of the LBH exercised twice as a regiment and this contributer seriously suggests that a battalion under pressure and within coup counting distance can with precise timing produce a military quck step of 32 seperate movements.The order to put this set of actions in motion would be impossible to articulate.
A.N.Other Second, duration wasn't the point or goal for either. Both survived, but Reno's men left still on the offensive and pursued the mission. Let's not over play our hand here.Reno's men disappeared off the sand table.Their only mission after leaving the timber was survival.In fact their defeat ment Benteen's withdrawal from the mission.
Hi GeorgeThe lead company covers the other two companies as they cross and then the lead company follows the last company over. Does anyone honestly believe that a movement as simple as this was beyond the capabilities of the 7th Cavalry The charge from the timber desolved into a devil take the hindmost.Troop formation broke up with the stronger horses taking the lead meaning that by the time they reached the river there was no lead troop.If the rout option is decided upon there is no point in compromising the dynamic of it with forlorn rearguards.You go hell for leather.
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Post by George Mabry on May 19, 2007 6:52:19 GMT -6
Mike,
Did you reverse yourself on the dust issue? Where do we differ when it comes to the account by Slaper in regards to the dust? Any dust clouds thrown up in a retreat would have been to our benefit. Modern armies us chemical smoke screens to accomplish the same thing don’t they?
The “soldiers in panic” you describe is exactly what you are trying to prevent when you bring order and control into the mix. Reno’s loss of control and the willy nilly withdrawal, not the tactical situation, spread panic throughout his command and rendered his battalion ineffective. I’ve no doubt that at points during the fight on LSH and vicinity, there were incidents of panicked flight. Any time the leaders go down (or lose control), unless someone else steps up and takes control, you’re going to have panic. And I would imagine that there came a point toward the end of the battle that no one, regardless of leadership ability, could have exerted control over the remaining men.
George
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Post by wild on May 19, 2007 7:11:08 GMT -6
The “soldiers in panic” you describe is exactly what you are trying to prevent when you bring order and control into the mix Not sure this was addressed to me George however--- I'v posted this before systems have a breaking point.With no advantage in mobility,firepower,numbers or time an attempt to effect order under those circumstances would compromise the one remaining option which was flight.The quickest way out of the timber to Reno hill was go like hell and don't stop.
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Post by conz on May 19, 2007 9:09:35 GMT -6
if you read the more realistic accounts of the Custer engagement rather than the careful manoeuvres dreamt up by some posters on here, then you see details of soldiers in panic withdrawal not stopping to fight and the scattered bodies away from their officers tends to support these accounts. Regards Mike Do you really hate Soldiers so much? The lack of respect for the rank and file Troopers of the 7th Cavalry is astounding around here...some of you guys will jump on any little excuse to make them a bunch of frightened children. You can't do good history with a pre-conceived attitude like this, I think. Try using a model that gives these men a little more credit... Clair
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Post by harpskiddie on May 19, 2007 9:12:07 GMT -6
According to Moylan's testimony, companies A and M were formed , in column of fours, OUTSIDE THE TIMBER, and was conducted very militarily, with Reno even pointing out where they were to head. I'm not going to quote it all - it's on p217 Nichols, p70 Graham Abstract. Reno similarly testified p214-215 Graham Abstract . Hare and Wallace both testified as to the columns of fours, but apparently missed the formation outside the timber part [Casey Stengel]. Herendeen mentioned the dust.
Gordie, if a man could be two places at one time................................................
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