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Post by mcaryf on May 16, 2007 3:31:04 GMT -6
There are a number of posters on here who argue strongly that Reno should have stayed in the timber.
I would be interested to know what length perimeter they think this would entail defending?
Regards
Mike
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Post by shatonska on May 16, 2007 6:17:11 GMT -6
HI Mike
from Where Custer Fell it seems possible that the position in the wood was inside a loop of the river , a sort of triangle with the river on two sides , it would seem a good position , maybe that's why indians couldn't understand why he left the wood , just suppositions anyway
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Post by crzhrs on May 16, 2007 6:40:16 GMT -6
There were some Indian accounts that said they set fire to the timber/brush to get the soldiers to move out into the open where they could be kiled easier.
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Post by d o harris on May 16, 2007 6:49:18 GMT -6
The position was in a loop on the river, water on three sides, and the open side was an old river bed which had the effect of being a natural trench several feet below the level of the prairie. There is some indication Reno did not end here by accident, but chose it because of the natural protection it offered for the held horses.
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Post by AZ Ranger on May 16, 2007 7:03:50 GMT -6
The perimeter required spacing where the troopers could not see each.
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Post by mcaryf on May 16, 2007 8:40:33 GMT -6
Hi All
The diagram included in Kuhlman's Legend into History shows that the trees did not entirely fill the loop of the river so that the position was actually L shaped following the boundary of the timber and then not quite reaching to the river at one end of the L. Both arms of the L seem to be 2-300 yards long.
The river itself was about 50 yards wide at this point with brush and fallen timber providing cover on the opposite East bank. In Kuhlman's diagram the warriors apparently had clear fields of fire from the opposite bank to enfilade the ends of both arms of the L.
Is Kuhlman's diagram thought to be accurate these days? Apparently he derived it as a result of a get together of the Custer experts of the day. If it is then the position looks very hard to hold as the river frontage would also need to be manned to deter the enfilade and any risk of warriors being able to cross.
Regards
Mike
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Post by harpskiddie on May 16, 2007 9:10:07 GMT -6
mcaryf:
At which point was the "river itself...about 50 yards wide?"
Gordie, how deep is the ocean? how high is the sky?
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Post by crzhrs on May 16, 2007 9:57:23 GMT -6
Wasn't it "how high the moon"?
--Les Paul and his wife?
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Post by Banned on May 16, 2007 10:44:27 GMT -6
Reno attracted the Indians by attacking them, and Fred Gerard and Sergeant Davern, Reno's orderly, said that it was exactly what Custer wanted : "to bring Indians to battle" (Gerard). Not to "charge the village", as Reno said in 1879, but to "charge", as Reno wrote it in 1876. Indians were believed to be fleeing, Custer had to force them to stop. To bring them to battle. And it worked.
Reno's position in the timber was strong, much stronger that Reno said afterwards to explain his rout. Lieutenant Hare testified at the Reno Court of Inquiry (RCOI) that the troops were not fighting the entire Indian forces and that the field itself was good for fighting: deep woods, with a kind of breastwork which protected the soldiers from the Indian fire. Indians had a lot of difficulties to go in the timber, suffered casualties (two warchiefs) and didn't want to fight around Reno anymore. Red Feather testified that the position was very good and that the Indians were frustrated to be shot down without hurting the soldiers. Cheyenne chiefs told George B. Grinnell that if Reno had hold the timber, they would have never defeated him, an opinion which was shared by Lieutenant Hare, Lieutenant DeRudio (the position was "impregnable", Reno could have hold it "four hours"), Fred Gerard and almost all the officers of the batalion. Indians testified that chiefs even warned their warriors not to attack the timber.
When Reno left the timber without any organization, Indians were very surprised by the movement and most of all told interviewers that it was the strangest movement of the battle. They didn't understand why Reno had left while he was in the strongest position. It was a tactical disaster.
US general in chief Miles, Reno Court of Inquiry chairman Jesse Lee, Colonel Gibbon and most of the officers of Reno's batalion (except Captain Moylan, who had left the woods with Reno, and McIntosh, who was killed during the rout) agreed that the position was good. Lee even said that it was the strongest position of all the battlefield, and Lieutenant Hare, of Reno's batalion, said that holding the timber was evidently made to support Custer's flank attack against the village.
But no flank attack was ever made, because Reno left the village after only 30 minutes of light fight (Fred Gerard spent 21 bullets, the men in general 30 to 40 according to Gerard, Davern spent 13, Culbertson spent 20) - and Custer's attack was already failing, but not because of Custer's plan.
The plan was good - attacking in front of the village, to stop the body of Indians, an attack in the flank, to surprise and defeat them. According to bugler Martini, Custer's plan was this (Martini heard Custer telling this to his subordinates) : Reno in the fron of the village, Benteen in the center and Custer in the extreme opposite. Altough Benteen and Reno later said that Custer didn't tell us anything, in fact, he did, and Martini heard it.
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Post by d o harris on May 16, 2007 11:10:17 GMT -6
The opposite bank was critical to the position. Gibbon stated the timber was a better defensive position than the hilltop, but if Indians occupied the opposite bank they would have to be cleared out, or the position would be untenable. To do this, I believe, was one of the reasons Reno led G into the woods.
Whatever we think today about difficulties of terrain, etc., we must concede those who were there and actually saw the terrain, timber, possible perimeter, etc., know better than we. All officers who served under Reno said he did the right thing by running when he did. The two most experienced Indian fighters with Reno, the civilian scouts, Gerard and Herendeen, said the position could have been held. Gibbon, with the caveat above, thought the position could have been held. Benteen thought the position could have been held on the 25th.
From a purely military standpoint arrived at by dispassionate observation, the judgements of Gibbon and Benteen are probably best. Their answer would be the position in the woods could have been defended, and Reno had adequate forces to man the necessary perimeter.
In any event, Reno rendered the question moot when he led a "Hussar" style charge out of the woods to the bluffs.
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Post by Tricia on May 16, 2007 11:13:14 GMT -6
DO--
You have employed a wonderful turn of phrase in the above: dispassionate observation ...
--t.
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Post by d o harris on May 16, 2007 11:15:19 GMT -6
Thanks, tricia. I intended to convey they were not under the pressure's Reno faced.
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Post by crzhrs on May 16, 2007 11:24:23 GMT -6
Any observations AFTER the battle do not compare to what was actually happening at the time. Whether the timber was a a defendable position is moot AFTER the battle.
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Post by Dark Cloud on May 16, 2007 11:32:36 GMT -6
Exchange Reno and Custer.
If Custer in Reno's role had done the same and taken to cover, then bolted, he'd be covered by "Cavalry on the defense dies a slow death. Instantly recognizing that once surrounded he'd take increased hits to the the mounts that would soon erase any possibility of taking the offensive again, Custer wisely ordered a surprise break for high ground, leaving the Indians unsure of his intent, and drawing them further from the village. This courageous gambit, removing defenders, the too cautious Reno failed to take advantage of at the shallow MTCF, where only a few teenagers stood guard."
It's all in the spin.
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Post by mcaryf on May 16, 2007 11:53:26 GMT -6
Hi Gordie
Maguire testified at RCOI that along the stretch by Reno's skirmish line the river width varied between 30 and 75 yards. I took 50 yards from that as a broad approximation.
In any event that would make it within range for warriors with repeaters to shoot across and cause a degree of damage with cross fire against the troops defending the treeline and certainly against any seeking access to water.
I find it hard to understand Gibbon's argument that this far bank would have to be cleared when there was really no possibility of doing that with the resources Reno had. This does not correlate with his opinion that the timber could be held.
Of course if the river was only 30 yards wide in places then it would be within arrow range as well with I suppose some potential to start fires.
I have not seen any reply yet that indicates whether some more modern writer than Kuhlman has produced an analysis of the timber position.
Regards
Mike
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