alanw
Junior Member
Posts: 74
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Post by alanw on May 16, 2007 12:24:08 GMT -6
OK, so what if Reno made a stand in the timber. He may have been able to hold out for x number of hours, but he could have easily been surrounded and again nullified as an attacking force. The Indians would probably have positioned men on or near Reno Hill and would have seen Benteen and possibly the pack train approaching. If so they could have prevented any assistance reaching Reno and potentially threatened the pack train. 300 (probably less) well positioned Indians should comfortably be able to pin down Reno's command. That would still leave 600 to join the others.
Alan
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Post by harpskiddie on May 16, 2007 12:32:15 GMT -6
mccaryf:
Actually, he testified that it was 30 to 40 yards wide to the right of Point C, which latter denoted the supposed anchor position of Reno's skirmish line, and so would closely approximate the position in the timber. The "75 yards along there" is rather amorphous.
I have walked along the river from Reno's actual initial fording place at what used to be the mouth of Ash Creek to the railroad bridge, up one side and down the other. This was not done in 1876, and as we all know, there have been many changes over the years, both natural and man-made. I did not, however, see any place where the river was 75 yards wide, except possibly where it broke into two branches around an "island."
This was probably the case in 1876 as well. The LBH is not an imposing river, and even 40 yards width is doing it more justice than it likely deserves. There was an island in the river not far from the timber position. Some men actually crossed there during the retreat, and one may have been killed there.
Given the quality of McGuire's observations in general, and the fact that he also stated it was not necessary for him to see all of the terrain himself, I find his estimation of river width rather doubtful.
As to later studies, I think several writers have paid it lip service, but I'm willing to bet that there are a few studies dedicated solely to this facet of the fights, and they probably appeared in places like the Research Review, Greasy Grass, LBHA Newsletter, and similar.
crzhrs: There is also an old standard titled "How Deep Is The Ocean" recorded by [perhaps] Perry Como or Russ Columbo -
"How much do I love you? I'll tell you no lie. How deep is the ocean? How high is the sky? How many times a day do I think of you? How many roses are sprinkled with dew?"
"How far would I travel to be where you are? How far is the journey from here to a star? And if I ever lost you, how much would I cry? How deep is the ocean? How high is the sky?"
Gordie, mother got the shipfitter blues, and loving you has made me bananas.......................................................
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Post by mcaryf on May 16, 2007 12:50:53 GMT -6
Hi Gordie
You are probably right about the river's width being less than my 50 yards but of course the narrower it is the less easy it is to defend the left bank from Indians on the right bank who cannot be charged and had apparently good cover.
regards
Mike
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Post by mwkeogh on May 16, 2007 13:19:02 GMT -6
Exchange Reno and Custer. If Custer in Reno's role had done the same and taken to cover, then bolted, he'd be covered by "Cavalry on the defense dies a slow death. Instantly recognizing that once surrounded he'd take increased hits to the the mounts that would soon erase any possibility of taking the offensive again, Custer wisely ordered a surprise break for high ground, leaving the Indians unsure of his intent, and drawing them further from the village. This courageous gambit, removing defenders, the too cautious Reno failed to take advantage of at the shallow MTCF, where only a few teenagers stood guard." It's all in the spin. Actually, Custer did assume Reno's role in his 1st Yellowstone battle against the Sioux in '73. Custer, greatly outnumbered by a warrior force, dismounted his men and took position in a timbered area with the Yellowstone River to his rear. He managed to hold out for about 4 hours or so until reinforcements began to arrive. When his ammo supply began to diminish, he mounted his men and charged the hostiles. Despite being greatly outnumbered, the hostiles skedaddled and Custer finished the show with his version of the "Camptown Races". And, yes, the hostiles did attempt to set fire to his defensive position, but this threat did not seem to panic GAC as much as it did Reno.
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Post by crzhrs on May 16, 2007 13:22:39 GMT -6
I don't think the Hostile force at the Yellowstone number the same as a LBH village. Nor were the Indians as close to Custer as they were for Reno.
Still, Custer survived unscathed but under different circumstances.
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Post by mwkeogh on May 16, 2007 13:24:01 GMT -6
(Mike:) I find it hard to understand Gibbon's argument that this far bank would have to be cleared when there was really no possibility of doing that with the resources Reno had. This does not correlate with his opinion that the timber could be held.
Of course if the river was only 30 yards wide in places then it would be within arrow range as well with I suppose some potential to start fires.
Mike, I think Gibbon meant that the area would need to be cleared by laying down a field of fire across the river, not actually going there in person to roust out the warrior positions. The cavalry carbines had a much greater range and a much greater firepower (.45/55's). Yes, a river only 30 yards wide would be within arrow range as well, but they neednt worry too much about that threat unless the warriors were wearing Roman Nose's bullet proof shirts that day.
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Post by mwkeogh on May 16, 2007 13:29:41 GMT -6
I don't think the Hostile force at the Yellowstone number the same as a LBH village. Nor were the Indians as close to Custer as they were for Reno. Still, Custer survived unscathed but under different circumstances. You are right, the hostile force was smaller than at LBH, but so was Custer's force, which numbered about 80 men all told, so the proportional difference was not that much different at all. GAC successfully conducted his defense there the same way that many of us are theorizing that Reno should have conducted his defense in the timber.
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Post by mwkeogh on May 16, 2007 13:39:02 GMT -6
OK, so what if Reno made a stand in the timber. He may have been able to hold out for x number of hours, but he could have easily been surrounded and again nullified as an attacking force. The Indians would probably have positioned men on or near Reno Hill and would have seen Benteen and possibly the pack train approaching. If so they could have prevented any assistance reaching Reno and potentially threatened the pack train. 300 (probably less) well positioned Indians should comfortably be able to pin down Reno's command. That would still leave 600 to join the others. Alan But the fact is that the warriors did not send a large force to block the advance of Benteen's battalion, and I think we are giving them too much credit for this kind of tactical maneuvering. The fact is that nearly all of the warrior force was focused on fighting Reno in the timber and was not aware of the danger of the other 2 approaching battalions. The grave mistake made in many of these types of models is the theory that the hostiles would suddenly learn how to fight a multi-front battle, when their entire history of plains warfare indicated that they were incapable of doing so. Remember, they had no generals or field commanders to order detachments here or there. They simply reacted to whatever threat was to their immediate front. Likewise, I do not believe you can equate equivalency in numbers to their effectiveness as a fighting force either. It is true that 300 Confederates would do a good job of pinning down Reno's force in the timber, but 300 warriors, most of whom are equiped with bow and arrow, are not to be compared to 300 Confederates. The warriors would need far greater than 2 to 1 odds to intimidate a battalion of cavalry. They did defeat Custer's battalion, true, but they did so with closer to 10 to one odds.
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Post by d o harris on May 16, 2007 14:00:34 GMT -6
Obviously, Gibbon, an experienced infantryman, felt the Indians could have been dislodged. Apparently, Reno did also. He sent part of G toward the river for some reason. What else but to drive the Indians away from the far bank? When Gibbon and Benteen both state the position could have been defended, that closes the issue for me. The question open to debate is why Reno was unable to do what was possible? Did something occur that added an im- to the possible? If so, what was it? The quickest and easiest solution is to deem Reno a coward, but because it is quick and easy doesn't imply it is correct.
keogh - at the first fight on the Yellowstone, hadn't Custer actually gone into camp, been in camp for two hours, napping in the shade of the cottonwood trees, caught, perhaps literally, with his pants down, after having cut a trail, and having been advised by Bloody Knife, there would be a fight, this day or the next? When running low on ammunition he did charge, and the Indians did what they always did in that situation, melt away from the front and attempt to envelop the flanks. Essentially, the version of the first Yellowstone fight that comes down to us is Custer's version, curlicues included.
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Post by wild on May 16, 2007 16:42:35 GMT -6
The numbers Reno had plus the advantage of the cover provided by the timber would have allowed Reno to have held for a certain time.That time is a matter of conjecture but what is not in dispute is that he could not have held indefinitely. Units unless they are the creme dela creme of the elite do not fight to the last man.Most will become ineffective after as little as 20% casualties.In Reno's case moderate casualties would have rendered that unit non functional and facing 900 warriors with the equivlent of incoming the unit would have collasped Decision time----- All communication with Custer lost.No immediate support visible.No flanking attack in evidence.Overwhelming numbers of Indians. The best part of an hour has passed since he got his attack order.If he was indecisive as to what to do then the contents of BKs skull on his shirt decided the matter
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Post by mwkeogh on May 17, 2007 0:02:40 GMT -6
You are correct 'd o', GAC did get caught "napping" that day... , I find your literary descriptions very funny....curlicues included.... ;D. But I would question whether the hostiles that day made any effort to truly envelope his flanks. If they did, they failed miserably as he chased them for over 5 miles up the valley until they won the race....with no casualties sustained.
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Post by mwkeogh on May 17, 2007 0:05:53 GMT -6
The numbers Reno had plus the advantage of the cover provided by the timber would have allowed Reno to have held for a certain time.That time is a matter of conjecture but what is not in dispute is that he could not have held indefinitely. Units unless they are the creme dela creme of the elite do not fight to the last man.Most will become ineffective after as little as 20% casualties.In Reno's case moderate casualties would have rendered that unit non functional and facing 900 warriors with the equivlent of incoming the unit would have collasped Decision time----- All communication with Custer lost.No immediate support visible.No flanking attack in evidence.Overwhelming numbers of Indians. The best part of an hour has passed since he got his attack order.If he was indecisive as to what to do then the contents of BKs skull on his shirt decided the matter I suppose Reno had never heard of Beecher's Island? Or perhaps he did not fancy himself as another Major Forsythe. BTW, how many minutes did the defenders at Beecher's Island manage to hold on for before they were overwhelmed by odds far greater than what Reno faced that day?
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Post by elisabeth on May 17, 2007 2:22:18 GMT -6
To be fair to Reno (or try to), the big difference between this and either the Yellowstone fight or Beecher's Island was the village. These Indians were never going to get bored with the game and go away as they had done on those two occasions. There was no "away" to go to.
Perhaps a closer analogy is Washita, where in a sense Custer did something very similar. OK, when Custer does it it's "deep cunning and clever tactics" versus Reno's "panic run" -- but in both cases they're saved by (1) a feint that drives warriors back and (2) getting out of there as fast as they can. If Custer had chosen instead to fort up in the remains of Black Kettle's village, he'd most likely have met the same fate as Elliott.
The dynamics are surely very different when it's warriors defending a village.
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Post by mcaryf on May 17, 2007 4:22:12 GMT -6
Hi d o harris and Keogh
Reno sent G to stop the warriors infiltrating via the strip of trees running South from the main timber which they could reach both by looping all the way round the command's left and from the East bank via a ford in the LBH.
If you read Maguire and Gibbon's testimony carefully you will find that they describe the brush on the bank opposite Reno's timber as providing perfect concealment with lots of fallen timber which would provide more solid cover. The idea of Reno being able to lay down substantial fire on it is also somewhat problematic as he had to keep the bulk of his troops facing West, South and North rather than East, it also assumes he had loads of ammunition to waste on the off chance that they might hit something in the 300 or so yards of East bank frontage that they faced.
The bank that provided some defensive benefit was a mixed blessing being some 12 feet high and not easy to negotiate, this very height exposed them to fire from across the river. This from Lt Wallace "The Indians commenced firing within 50 yards of us across the stream and in our rear in the timber. There was no protection offered on that side and on the other there was a bank." If the troopers failed to occupy the bank they could not repel the warriors to the West but if they did they were exposed to those to the East. The fact that Wallace withdrew from this area resulted in the warriors infiltrating the timber from the South and firing the volley that killed Bloody Knife and a trooper.
With respect to Gibbon's judgement as to whether it could be held, one must exercise a degree of caution since he was unable even to hazard a guess for any dimensions for the timber except for his 50 yard estimate for the width of the glade. Perhaps his remarks were more inspired by the thought that a given number of troopers could defy any amount of Indians rather than a full understanding of the terrain.
I suspect Benteen's reported comment that Reno should have stayed was more a question of principal in terms of staying near the camp and providing a threat for longer rather than a careful assessment of the potential for defence.
Possibly more important even than the terrain was the morale of Reno's men. We had one clear example of part of Company A abandonning the line for the timber with their officer de Rudio following happily rather than leading. Later these same men disobeyed his direct orders. The nature of the timber was such that proper control over the men would not really be possible. The timber frontage would have the men at about 5 yard intervals and probably invisible from one to the next as well as to anybody exercising command and this pays no regard to any idea of laying down heavy fire on the opposite bank.
I think the key to understanding what would have happened differently is to think about the choices the Indians actually had. They were in no immediate position to give up and withdraw since their noncoms had fled from the lower end of the camp and would take some time to return. The warriors in the vicinity of Reno's timber would actually have been that much closer to react to Custer's approach. There were substantial numbers of warriors without mounts in the timber to the North of Reno and these would have been easily capable of defending the near end of the village from any offense from Reno. Thus why would the Custer fight turn out to be much different?
If we try to take what ifs further to think about Benteen's likely action the argument becomes increasingly speculative with a major consideration being to know what delayed Custer. If, as I think, he was aware of Reno's flight, then that explains part of his delay. If Reno had not fled then perhaps Custer might have attacked earlier (before 4pm?) and been destroyed even quicker before Benteen was in position to make any difference (Benteen was probably 30 - 40 minutes away from the timber at the time Reno left it given that he still had a river to cross possibly against some opposition).
regards
Mike
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Post by shatonska on May 17, 2007 5:46:15 GMT -6
i can agree with you Mike but it seems that Reno even tryed to build a defense of the wood
warriors across the river could be a little danger because they could not charge , could not use arrows looping because of the trees , they could only do what they did fire a few shots, when oglala arrived they discharged the winchesters , the oglalas were the most well armed , at this point they didn't have guns and ammunitions from the soldiers , so even the indian fire could not be dangerous , infact until oglalas discharged their rifles we have no soldier's accounts of a great indian fire
so what could warriors do? charge the wood from the open ? 2 or 3 sides seems protected by the river , Gibobn and Benteen gave their accounts because they saw the exact reno's position in the wood , indian accounts confirm that could not charge could not use arrows thay could only use rifles but with no much ammunition to waste against soldiers under trees they could only try to set fire and infiltrate the wood
to me it seems the position could be defended , i think it was a huge mistake to leave the wood but i can understand why Reno moved away , it must have been a terrifying situation , probably the Bloody Knife's killing was the turning point that brought to the well known outcome
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