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Post by shatonska on May 17, 2007 15:00:15 GMT -6
DC you are right read this , the Uncpapa iron hawck
"Presently, Crazy Horse, having collected his warriors, made a dash for the soldiers in the timber and ran into them; when the warriors assembling close to the bank saw this movement and heard the yells of Crazy Horse's men they also advanced furiously with great yelling, coming down on the flank.6 The soldiers broke and ran in retreat, the Indians using war clubs as the principal weapon, a few using bows and arrows, most of the execution being by knocking the troopers from their horses, the Indians moving right in among them.
The Uncpapas were the first Indians reached when Reno began his attack. Iron Hawk says the Indians were so thick that Reno's men would have been run over and could not have lasted but a short time if they had stood their ground in the woods."
That Crazy Horse was really crazy ;D
don't worry DC i don't take these accounts too seriously ;D
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Post by Dark Cloud on May 17, 2007 16:38:43 GMT -6
Whenever I see the word 'flank' in an Indian account.......
Gee, Markland, we have the reliable McGuire sand tracings, and within a few years others committed to paper the ground. They couldn't be way off, could they? They're hauled out to prove Custer's movements, and everyone nods like demented bassets.
Use the photos in WCF, they wouldn't be way off, combined with McGuire's peyote trip, and Philo Clark's interpretations.
Again, I'm only asking that Reno be given the same benefit of doubt Custer is. These guys, according to Ryan - who'd know - couldn't fight well on horseback, and we know they weren't much at shooting, and overall horsemanship could have been betterl, but a rear guard action - we assume to benefit - has been suggested.
Fine. Show how and where it would be done and how it would result in less casualties and leave them in better shape. I realize nothing could be proven, but show what leads you to conclude something more beneficial could have been done on map, and duration of these thrilling maneuvers. Saying "provide covering fire, and then remount and rejoin the command" is not compelling absent details and lack of casualty estimates. And everything should be within known abilities of the 7th, with no wishful thinking or Ninja Lords each on their Pegasus scorching about fully watered and energized.
If you've favored hoary old cliches about 'nobody turns their backs on Indians and lives' and the like, make sure you apply them equally here.
People won't do it because it sounds
just
like
what
Custer
did.
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Post by mwkeogh on May 17, 2007 23:18:32 GMT -6
(crzhrs:) Beecher's Island was a different battle.... The experienced men, firepower, and good military leadership saved the command, even though the situation looked dire for them.
Crzhrs, I agree with your statement above. And those very same qualities you mention would have served Reno well in his defense of the timber, had he a notion to do so.
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Post by mwkeogh on May 17, 2007 23:31:40 GMT -6
Regarding your observations above, I would suggest that the terrain was regarded as well suited for defense by nearly all the officers in attendance, and several others who examined it later on. The morale of the defenders is the responsibility of the commanding officers. If the troopers see their commanding officers shirking or acting with a noticeable lack of confidence, then their own morale will certainly suffer. As far as the comments regarding the incredible shrinking Co. G, who only had 7 or so members on Reno Hill, I would point out to you that Co. G was the company which had half of its members abandoned in the timber (no doubt the poor souls who were sent to the rear to suppress hostile fire from across the river). The other half of Co. G, which managed to get out, were the last Co. to leave the timber and were more or less massacred on the grand buffalo hunt to the rear, since the good Major decided he neednt put out a rear guard for them. Their commander, Lt. McIntosh was killed along with the majority of his company in this rout. Thus, there really is no mystery at all concerning the "incredible shrinking Co. G". They were sacrificed by their commander to allow the rest of the battalion to escape with their lives and reach the hill.
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Post by mwkeogh on May 17, 2007 23:42:10 GMT -6
Of course not, but to later say the timber was a great place to hold after they had initially ran is a disservice to Reno. Not at all. They attempted to run with Reno because the entire command was ordered to vacate. They had no choice but to attempt to comply. No doubt, if they had tried to run with Reno, they would have suffered the same fate as Charley Reynolds and Isaiah Dorman. The point they tried to make at the RCOI was that the entire command should have remained to defend the timber, not 2 men.
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Post by mwkeogh on May 17, 2007 23:48:02 GMT -6
I think most of us would agree that Reno was not in the best frame of mind that day, neither in the timber, nor on the hilltop later on when it became apparent that Benteen was the one others looked to for their survival. I would have had more respect for Reno's courage if he had remained at the rear of his command instead of leading the race to escape the valley that day. Those at the end of the camptown races (mainly Co. G) certainly suffered a terrible slaughter that those in the front ranks managed to avoid.
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Post by mwkeogh on May 18, 2007 0:01:30 GMT -6
And it comes round again..... If a 'rearguard' was to be formed and utilized, show on the maps and photos where, who, for how long, and exactly what they were to do. Utilize only what Reno knew at the time. Utilize realistic casualty figures for soldiers that, per Ryan, could not fight on horseback very well. If this were to be sequential stops and dismounts, show them all. Of course, if it doesn't improve the survivors and lessen the casualties, what would be the point over a surprise break for it? No matter your decision, people will die and others blame you and coulda done it better. No more talk, show it. Sign it. It trips off the tongue so easily, yet NOBODY has dared show a map with times, distances, who, when, all that stuff. It's roughly the equivilant of saying "Reno shoulda formed a winning plan." Well? What would it be? It's just blather, otherwise. You are asking for a "by the book" recitation of military tactics regarding a rear guard action. Rather than calling conz to the table here for further clarification on the matter, I would suggest you look at two simple examples. Godfrey's use of a dismounted skirmish line in the retreat from Weir Point and Reno's own skirmish line which operated out in the open valley against the 900 or so hostiles (ie: "the very earth seemed to grow Indians!"). Strangely enough, despite being greatly outnumbered in both cases, the warriors did not charge into the teeth of the skirmish lines, nor did they run them down and massacre them all, as DC would like all to believe was inevitable. If they did, then Godfrey's K Co. would have been easily overrun in its retreat from Weir Pt, and Reno's battalion would have never made it into the timber to begin with. There is no need for times, distances, maps, etc. Just look at Godfrey's rear guard action (dismounted) and factor in all the casualties he suffered in executing this very simple maneuver. (For those too lazy to look it up, it was zero.)
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Post by wild on May 18, 2007 1:04:30 GMT -6
Just look at Godfrey's rear guard action (dismounted) and factor in all the casualties he suffered in executing this very simple maneuver Reno had to break through the Indians in order to effect his escape. A rearguard must be placed between the main body and the persuers and this could not be done until Reno was clear of the Indians.The next step would have been for the one of the troops to have halted and gone into skirmish line.Never in the history of mounted warfare has this manoeuver been successfully accomplished while in close contact with the enemy. Conz being a huzzar will explain to you the vulnerability of mounted troops while changing from one formation to another.And you expect 40 troopers to pull this off in the midst of 900 warriors. In civilized warfare Reno would have had the option of surrender here however all that remained to him was flight.And it was a panic flight.It was not taken with some military objective in view.Let there be no mistake flight was taken to save his life along with those of his men and I have no problem with that. We are badly served by our military analysts here.Is seems that all that is required is the use of a military term --be it advance guard,flanks,feints to demonstrate how it should have been done.Yet with teems of time their hero Custer could not even effect the simplist of defence formations and left nothing but a foul smelling stain for military historians to pick over.
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Post by mcaryf on May 18, 2007 5:58:24 GMT -6
Hi Keogh
I wish you had bothered to consult some of the reference material before you posted this:
Thus, there really is no mystery at all concerning the "incredible shrinking Co. G". They were sacrificed by their commander to allow the rest of the battalion to escape with their lives and reach the hill.
This was in response to my pointing out that Lt Wallace reported G company as being various numbers between 3 and 7 available for duty.
The total casualties for G were of the order of 16 throughout the two days of battle, the total number of troopers who came out with Herendeen was 11 and might have included some "A" company men, O'Neill hiding with de Rudio was also "G". Even assuming that 7 "G" men were busy with the pack train, you still have some problem in accounting for the 44 or so that "G" started with and there should certainly have been 3 times the 3 or 4 Wallace reported present when asked by Benteen to form part of the defense on Reno Hill.
Regards
Mike
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Post by Dark Cloud on May 18, 2007 7:16:47 GMT -6
Beecher Island doesn't support it either. To start with, it was composed mostly of non-military men, professional scouts and hunters and a few wannabes hired for limited time. Their level of shooting was way above the 7th's abilities. Second, for all the rah-rah, they didn't accomplish much, and they took huge losses per capita, and could not have escaped absent the Buffalo Soldiers rescue, because they'd lost right off most of their mounts once they went to defense, which was immediately.
Had they decided to walk out, they'd have to have left the wounded, and been slaughtered en route. Had they not been rescued, they'd still be there.
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Post by mcaryf on May 18, 2007 8:00:26 GMT -6
Hi DC
You know those who think the move from the timber could have been done better tend to disregard the impact of the dust. If you read accounts of the move to the river they tell how the visibility was limited to about 50 feet for those down the column. This means that any attempt to set up a rearguard or whatever would really have been a waste of time as they would not have been able to shoot effectively with that visibility.
There are accounts from the scouts of troopers getting dismounted because they came unexpectedly through the dust to ditches or old water courses. The idea of any sort of controlled military action in this environment is not very sensible.
Hi Keogh
I do not know which of the officers, who were there, that you claim thought they should have stayed in the timber. With the exception of De Rudio, who of course did stay having initially entered the timber without orders to do so, there is some evidence for most of them that indicates they supported the move.
Thus an example quote from Varnum "If we had remained in the river bottom twenty minutes longer, not a man of us would have escaped."
With respect to Reno, his decision had already been taken to leave when Bloody knife's brains spattered him. That was why the troops were formed up mounted in the glade. It is possible that he set off rapidly after that but up until then there were no reports or suggestions that questionned his personal behaviour and a rapid move off was indicated with the warriors already in the timber. Given that the movement was both a charge through an enemy and a withdrawal there was no right or wrong place for the commander to be and I see no opprobrium in his being in the lead against the warriors in front. The only serious criticism I might have was the failure to sound a trumpet but there is no evidence one way or the other as to whether a trumpeter was to be found. The possibility that it was not possible to find a trumpeter and the fact that not all men heard the order to leave is a very good illustration of the weakness of the timber position in terms of being able to effect proper command and control.
Regards
Mike
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Post by Dark Cloud on May 18, 2007 8:17:51 GMT -6
It again thrills me to see the joy with which American officers are so readily damned by those who've never been in combat or even the military. It doesn't especially thrill me to see other soldiers do it, but they rarely do, knowing being there and having responsibility for life can be wearing. Especially officers with a not unimpressive record like Benteen and Reno, who'd deserve doubt's benefit.
Reno may have been as bad or worse that day than Philes portray him, but they - in turn - should display a modicum of the courage they claim he lacks and show - on paper, signed - how he could have done it better. A strong case could - and has - been made that bolting was no worse - and maybe a lot better - than the hypothetical staged withdrawal by troopers untrained for such things.
I read a fighting retreat is the most difficult thing to do under any conditions, and people who are good at it - Lee, Johnson, the Germans in two wars, Marines in Korea - drive their opponents absolutely ape. When Johnson was replaced by Hood, who was rah-rah Charge and Hussar Tea after, that Army collapsed in record time, wasted by a delusional Hussar type, which history and Lee hesitates to call an idiot, but the damnation is there. The German Army obtained favorable casualty exchanges either under attack or making attack. That's a real good army.
The 7th in 1876? Under Lee or the Archangel Gabriel or anyone, not so much.
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Post by wild on May 18, 2007 9:29:03 GMT -6
I read a fighting retreat is the most difficult thing to do under any conditions Durnford at Isandlawana was a classic but he had the advantage of firepower,time and mobility all of which Reno lacked.
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Post by mwkeogh on May 18, 2007 17:44:13 GMT -6
(DC:) I read a fighting retreat is the most difficult thing to do under any conditions, and people who are good at it - Lee, Johnson, the Germans in two wars, Marines in Korea - drive their opponents absolutely ape. When Johnson was replaced by Hood, who was rah-rah Charge and Hussar Tea after, that Army collapsed in record time, wasted by a delusional Hussar type, which history and Lee hesitates to call an idiot, but the damnation is there. The German Army obtained favorable casualty exchanges either under attack or making attack. That's a real good army.
You forgot to mention Marshall Ney (certainly a great hussar by anyone's standards) and his fighting retreat in command of Napoleon's rear guard from the withdrawal from Moscow during that terrible winter of 1813.
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Post by mwkeogh on May 18, 2007 17:54:03 GMT -6
Beecher Island doesn't support it either. To start with, it was composed mostly of non-military men, professional scouts and hunters and a few wannabes hired for limited time. Their level of shooting was way above the 7th's abilities. Second, for all the rah-rah, they didn't accomplish much, and they took huge losses per capita, and could not have escaped absent the Buffalo Soldiers rescue, because they'd lost right off most of their mounts once they went to defense, which was immediately. Had they decided to walk out, they'd have to have left the wounded, and been slaughtered en route. Had they not been rescued, they'd still be there. Beecher's Island does indeed support it in my view. Granted, they were frontiersmen as opposed to troopers, but they had a far worse defensive position to defend, and only 50 dismouted men against hundreds of mouned hostiles outnumbering them at least 10 to one, perhaps a lot more. Yet despite these handicaps they managed to hold their defensive position for how many hours? or should I say, how many days???
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