|
Post by George Mabry on May 19, 2007 9:13:46 GMT -6
Wild,
No, that comment was in response to a statement made by Mike. While I don’t disagree necessarily with your statement, I don’t believe it applies in Reno’s case. I don’t think Reno was so pressed for time that the situation became a now or never proposition. Reno’s biggest advantage was his organization, discipline, and training which he surrendered when he launched himself in reckless abandon from the timber.
I don’t quibble over Reno’s decision to enter the timber or leave the timber and I’m admittedly using hindsight when I say that. I can only guess what Reno saw when he charged toward the village and I can only guess what Reno saw in the woods that made him think the position was untenable so I’m taking the easy way out when I defer to his judgment as the commander in the field. His method of extraction is an entirely different matter. Conz, Keogh and others have some good points in regards to Reno staying put and they have offered some interesting scenarios as to possible outcomes if Reno had stayed. I’m not convinced as yet, but I am rethinking my position. This has been a good debate inspite of our vituperative expressions.
George
|
|
|
Post by Dark Cloud on May 19, 2007 9:44:22 GMT -6
First, I posted an article url from the local paper about the Ward Churchill fiasco here in Boulder, for which I'd bet there is interest, under the Custeriana Chickenhawk thread.
Mabry,
Keogh doesn't. He's apparently offering what Reno did (see Harpskiddie). Also, I look and see no casualty estimates. You? That's the point. Lesser casualties.
1. "They are not going to dig in and prepare defensive positions are they? If you bust out, they are going to step to the side." To hit you from the sides, yes, maybe.
2. "So? Call it a run for your life if you choose but do it with some military order and control. And yes DC, the Indians will shoot at you with or without your order and control." So? Are they being graded? What's at stake here is retaining the most men AND mounts for further use. Unless the time and static positions mandated by covering fire results in less casualties of your own, and doesn't damn those stopped, what is the point? Photo op?
3. "I haven’t mistaken your plaintive cry. For the year that I’ve been on this board I’ve seen you consistently wring your hands and cry that Reno couldn’t have done better." Provide an example in context. That's a falsehood. I say continually that those who call a decorated soldier and officer of the United States a coward are obligated to show how he could have knowingly done it better or shut up about it.
4. "I’ve consistently seen you whine that Reno and Benteen aren’t given the benefit of a doubt yet you never give the benefit of a doubt to Custer." That's well nigh a lie. I give Custer the benefit of the doubt about crossing the divide, dividing the command, about everything up to MTC, although I don't understand some of what he did (the micromanagement of Benteen), where I think it likely he, or one of his family, was wounded, and the actual command structure took over with different allegiances. THAT's not giving him benefit of the doubt?
5."It’s apparent in your statement “If he could do that, why couldn't he have done that in the other direction.” That statement ought to embarrass you but my bet is that it doesn’t." It doesn't. If you read, it's clearly stated as what Custerphiles would say if Reno had done the supposedly superior withdrawal. You understand it's not my position but the suspected one of others after an altered fact? No, you missed it.
6. Ryan said the 7th didn't fight well on horseback. He didn't specify, just in general. That's what I was referring to, assuming if Ryan knew, so did Reno and other officers. You say you are offering those at the ford the option of mounted or dismounted, again with no accompanied casualties. How long would it take, how superior the result?
|
|
|
Post by wild on May 19, 2007 10:20:50 GMT -6
George I defer to his judgment as the commander in the field. That's about the most sensible thing I heard here for some time. I agree all things being equal the commander gets the benifit of the doubt and certainly in Reno's case where all things were unequal.
Reno’s biggest advantage was his organization, discipline, and training These are characteristics of a system but when that system becomes overloaded control passes to the enemy and the options remainng to your organisation are few. The nature of Reno's flight does not lend itself to organisation.All that was required was that each trooper was aware that they were departing and that they should follow Reno ,everything else is superfluous. Flight is not encouraged by the military for obvious reasons but remember America's greatest soldier took to his heels in a manner of speaking and lived to return another day.
|
|
|
Post by mcaryf on May 19, 2007 12:20:46 GMT -6
Hi George Mabry
I certainly did not intend to reverse myself re the dust but perhaps I was unclear. My position was and is that the dust cloud thrown up by the leading cavalrymen and indeed the warriors getting out of their path would make any fancy manoeuvres for and by those following a waste of time because there would not be enough visibility for one unit to provide covering fire for the next.
Hi Keogh
First I have to congratulate you on at least attempting to describe some sort of formations the companies might have followed. Unfortunately I now have to go on to say that I think the formations you propose might have been totally ineffectual.
The big threat was always likely to be to the flanks as the warriors typically moved out of the way of an oncoming charge. By adopting a formation in line, you minimise your defensive effort on the flank to one trooper who would soon expend his six shots. With the column formations adopted by Reno the flank is protected along its length by the firepower of a series of troopers. The other big problem with the line is one that does require a degree of hindsight but might have been anticipated by a sensible commander and this was access to the river. The objective was to ford the river this was unlikely to be possible in line and in fact was not. There was a single exit on the far bank that the troopers attempted to use and this is where crowding occurred and a number were killed or drowned. By adopting a formation in line abreast you maximise the number arriving at the river at the same time and hence the difficulty of an orderly crossing.
Hi Clair
Unfortunately we fundamentally disagree with respect to the likely duration of the Custer fight. You have convinced yourself that it lasted until around 7pm by ignoring all the substantial evidence that actually exists as to a finish around 5pm and interpreting warrior statements to mean that just the last 30 or so minutes lasted 30 or so minutes (?!) and drawing unlikely conclusions from Varnum and Edgerly's remarks about how long they were on Weir Peaks.
Plainly you are able to derive all sorts of heroic manoeuvres in the 3 hours you have to fill. Unfortunately I am left with a relatively short and brutal affair lasting about one third of your 3 hours.
This has nothing to do with my opinion or otherwise about the fighting ability of the troopers with Custer. I think their commander led them into a situation where they stood no chance. I understand why he might have had various good reasons for the actions he chose but unfortunately on the day things did not go his way and the risks he took were very severely punished. At some stage, well before the end, I am sure that many of his men and officers would have become aware that their number was up and their best hope was for a quick death. I guess men react in different ways to this sort of knowledge and some may have fought like tigers to the end whilst others certainly succumbed to panic and flight. I do not think any of us could put our hands on our hearts and say how we would behave in such circumstances and I would not criticise any of them on a personal basis for what they did or didn't do.
Regards
Mike
|
|
|
Post by mwkeogh on May 19, 2007 13:06:07 GMT -6
According to Moylan's testimony, companies A and M were formed , in column of fours, OUTSIDE THE TIMBER, and was conducted very militarily, with Reno even pointing out where they were to head. I'm not going to quote it all - it's on p217 Nichols, p70 Graham Abstract. Reno similarly testified p214-215 Graham Abstract . Hare and Wallace both testified as to the columns of fours, but apparently missed the formation outside the timber part [Casey Stengel]. Herendeen mentioned the dust.
Gordie, if a man could be two places at one time................................................Thanks Gordie, for this enlightening post. After reading some of wild's postulations regarding the near complete incompetence of the 7th cavalry to execute even the most basic maneuvers in a combat situation, I was beginning to wonder if his overall view of the 7th Cavalry was not formed after watching too many video's of that hollywood movie "Little Big Man".
|
|
|
Post by d o harris on May 19, 2007 13:13:34 GMT -6
Gordie, on that post keogh likes, was that bulge in your cheek a wad of Red Man chewing tobacco, or was it something else.
|
|
|
Post by mwkeogh on May 19, 2007 13:15:50 GMT -6
Just reading Keogh's choreography for an organised withdrawal through 900 warriors.His plan requires A troop alone to perform 4 changes of formation and 4 manoeuvers all this in time with two other units performing a similar ballet. The 7th from its formation up to the battle of the LBH exercised twice as a regiment and this contributer seriously suggests that a battalion under pressure and within coup counting distance can with precise timing produce a military quck step of 32 seperate movements.The order to put this set of actions in motion would be impossible to articulate. Methinks you give the 7th Cavalry far too little credit for being able to execute basic military commands. The officers and their troopers were not all incompetent morons. The 7th had a reputation for being one of the best drilled and trained regiments in the army. They spent hours every day working and perfecting these very drills to the point where it became second nature for them to execute. It seems that your vision of our military men of the day would have them all playing poker and getting drunk and fat at the post sutlers or hog heaven, rather than spending upwards of 4 hours a day drilling and practicing maneuvers in the field.
|
|
|
Post by mwkeogh on May 19, 2007 13:30:12 GMT -6
Hi Mike, regarding your comments above, you are correct that the right flank of Reno's Companies would be an inviting target for a warparty to strike, however, this possibility is severely diminished when the said warparty notices the arrival of the 2nd (and later 3rd) Company in their immediate rear. This would cause said warparty to defer from closing in to engage the right flank of at least the first 2 companies down the valley. I proposed that their formations remain in line as opposed to column all the way to the river at least for the 1st company (A), as this formation would facilitate their dismounting and forming a skirmish line on the west bank to protect the approach of the 2nd and 3rd Companies. I grant you that the 2nd and 3rd Companies, on their approach to the river, should be formed into column formation to facilitate an easier crossing. I disagree with our colleague 'wild' who thinks this maneuver far beyond the capacity of troops who have trained in the field for hours each day doing just such maneuvers, but then again, I am more of an optimist (or perhaps even a bit of a hussar....(say it ain't so!)
|
|
|
Post by wild on May 19, 2007 14:35:25 GMT -6
Keogh Methinks you give the 7th Cavalry far too little credit for being able to execute basic military commands Does not matter how basic they were you cannot expect 3 small units of troops to perform mounts/dismounts/skirmish line 32 times in coordination with each other in the presence of an audience of 900 warriors. Just as a matter of interest how old are you?
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on May 19, 2007 15:37:04 GMT -6
Reno demonstrated that if done quickly his charging out of the timber worked as well as can be expected. What he could take into account and no one from outside the battalion could know was the rapidly deteriorating mental condition of the battalion if it was occurring including himself. Sometimes you need to regroup. It was not going to happen in the timber. He had no reason to believe that the increasing number of Indians was going to stop and then make it impossible to leave the timber. Timing is everything when the enemy has much larger numbers than you do.
Were these three companies stationed together before FAL?
AZ Ranger
|
|
|
Post by harpskiddie on May 20, 2007 0:07:57 GMT -6
d o:
Re: tongue in cheek? Not really. I was just posting some of the relevant testimony, since people seem to find testimony so compelling. I've always found it interesting how Moylan and Reno described the careful alignment of the two companies outside the timber [perhaps the Indians were taken aback by the careful dressing], while most everyone else describes a mad dash starting inside it.
Do I believe Moylan and Reno? I tend not to, but Hare describes the columns of fours [although he does say all three companies were in the formation - which is pretty much a crock], and Varnum also said that a column of fours was the best formation to cut through the warriors. Obviously, the formation, whatever it may or may not have been, didn't last very long.
all:
About the dust - if it served as a smokescreen, as someone posted, it was one that could not be effective in the circumstances The purpose of a smokescreen is to screen not only the force employing it, but also their movements and direction of movement. In the instance, the warriors knew full well that the troops were within the dust cloud, and all they had to do was shoot into it, since the screen was moving with the troops.
It certainly didn't do much to protect the soldiers, and didn't keep the warriors from closing on them when they felt like it.
Gordie, so I smile and say, when a lovely flame dies, smoke gets in your eyes......................................
|
|
|
Post by d o harris on May 20, 2007 3:01:46 GMT -6
OK, Gordie. Nonetheless, I detect a chuckle, - an inaudible one, that remains deep in the stomach. I suspect you do not believe this columns of fours stuff any more than I.
I am presuming something here, a little presumption, and that is that you and I have come to similar conclusions as to what happened in the valley. Reno was done in by the failures of subordinates. At least one. This doesn't mean he was the most courageous man who ever lived, simply that if he had been given ten minutes more the valley fight would have been significantly different.
|
|
|
Post by mcaryf on May 20, 2007 3:51:39 GMT -6
Hi Gordie
I pretty well agree with you about the opportunity for the warriors to shoot almost at random into the dust.
My point really was about the other way round and whether it would have been effective for the soldiers to execute any sort of fancy manoeuvres to enable themselves to cover colleagues coming along behind. My thought is that it probably was not since their own vision to the rear would be impaired so the best bet is for all of them to keep heading South until they reached the river. It might have been possible to organise some sort of covering party on the far bank as was suggested to Captain French but I think it would have been very difficult to exercise command over the men at that stage. This is why I used the Godfrey providing cover and Edgerly not going back for Vincent Charlie example. Edgerly's men had started to run and it would have taken a lot to stop, reform them and return. Fortunately Godfrey gave them the opportunity to reform but not to return.
There is the old quote "men do not run because they are afraid they become afraid because they run". Not always true but certainly sometimes true and I think it was the case with most of Reno's men.
Regards
Mike
|
|
|
Post by wild on May 20, 2007 7:23:15 GMT -6
D O H et al I suspect you do not believe this columns of fours stuff any more than I In a column the pace is dictated by the weakest horses in a stampede the pace is dictated by the fastest horses. In a stampede movement forward is instantious, in a column it takes time for the momentum to reach he rearward ranks. A coulmn presents a nice orderly double flank,in Reno's case perhaps 100 yards long a stampede on the other hand has no formal flank.Another disadvantage of the column is that its direction is plain to determine, a stampede appears so disorganised as to confuse everyone. I see Reno having too much good sense to attempt such nonsense.Any statements by himself or his officers on the formation of the withdrawal was I'm sure just to appease the regimental officers mess.
|
|
|
Post by conz on May 20, 2007 7:31:16 GMT -6
I proposed that their formations remain in line as opposed to column all the way to the river at least for the 1st company (A), as this formation would facilitate their dismounting and forming a skirmish line on the west bank to protect the approach of the 2nd and 3rd Companies. I grant you that the 2nd and 3rd Companies, on their approach to the river, should be formed into column formation to facilitate an easier crossing. I disagree with our colleague 'wild' who thinks this maneuver far beyond the capacity of troops who have trained in the field for hours each day doing just such maneuvers, but then again, I am more of an optimist (or perhaps even a bit of a hussar....(say it ain't so!) I agree with this method as the best mounted one. It is a rather standard drill for cavalry as well...first rank in line, second rank(s) in column. My opinion is, of course, that withdrawal was not even a viable option, and should have been discarded. Reno should have hunkered down in the timber as the best way to both preserve his command and to accomplish his mission. But if the assumption is that you WILL withdraw... I would have withdrawn with most of my command dismounted...like a "moving square," with most of the power towards the open valley. Perhaps a small mounted reserve moving with the held horses between the dismounted skirmish line and the bluffs, to handle stray enemy to the north and east. A dismounted formation retains the most control, there is less likelihood of losing cohesion on the move, you can drag all your wounded and dead with you, and it retains firepower that the Natives had always shown couldn't overwhelm such a line. As long as time is not a factor, and indeed, here a slower withdrawal would actually perform the mission better than a faster one, and still get you wherever you might be going, this is the best technique, I judge. Comments? Clair
|
|