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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 16, 2007 11:13:36 GMT -6
Keogh If they only wanted to fire for effect then why move at all?
Reno fullfilled his obligation to keep the Indians from fleeing and coming to battle. The main complaint by people against Reno is that they only wanted Reno to be the receiver of the battle.
AZ Ranger
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Post by mwkeogh on Sept 17, 2007 1:55:24 GMT -6
Keogh If they only wanted to fire for effect then why move at all? Reno fullfilled his obligation to keep the Indians from fleeing and coming to battle. The main complaint by people against Reno is that they only wanted Reno to be the receiver of the battle. AZ Ranger Only Reno himself could answer that question Ranger. But short of that, I would suggest that since his orders were to charge the village, he might have felt an obligation to at least move up to within rifle range of the village so that he could at least say he attacked the village, especially if the warriors continued to fall back in front of his advance. I know you don't agree that Reno was acting as an advanced guard for the other battalions of Custer's Regiment, but one expectation of an advanced guard is to make contact with the enemy and to advance forward (so as to maintain that contact) if the enemy attempts to withdraw his force. Perhaps Reno was doing just that at the beginning of the valley fight.
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Post by blaque on Sept 17, 2007 4:22:28 GMT -6
I for one wouldn’t trust Wallace’s time-clocks any more than those of his fellow officers. Let’s not forget that he changed not once, but twice, one of the time-clocks in his official itinerary. Which one? Source? Note that I am in agreement with you, but this changed time-clock is a new one on me. I am always willing--nay, eager--to learn more. Erkki, Lt. Wallace to Dr. Knoblauch, July 4, 1876: “In order to cross this divide without being seen, we moved at 12 p.m. 24”. D. Westfall’s Letters from the Field: Wallace at the LBH, p. 41: Lt. Wallace to General Humphreys, January 27, 1877 (official report): “June 24, 1875: …General Custer determined to cross the divide that night, […] but we did not get off till near 1 a.m.” Carroll’s Gen. Custer & the battle of the LBH: The Federal View, p. 65. Lt Wallace’s testimony, January 16, 1879 (RCOI): “We started again at 11 o’clock that night and moved on until about daylight”. Nicholl's Proceedings of the RCOI, p. 71. These discrepancies could be explained by assuming that perhaps the head of the column started out about 11, the bulk of the force was on the move about 12, and the cumbersome train was unable to join the cavalcade till near 1. But they make me suspect that Gray’s blind trust in the accuracy and reliabily of Wallace’s time readings may be somewhat undeserved.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 17, 2007 6:44:53 GMT -6
Wasn't Wallace under an obligation more than others to keep time? Certainly his field notes would not reflect 3 different times. If he used them to refresh his memory for testifying at RCOI then It would be most accurate. If he did not record it in his field notes it is an estimate only and subject to memory loss or enhancement.
If the order came at 11 I could see it taking 2 hours to get everything moving in the dark.
AZ Ranger
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Post by crzhrs on Sept 17, 2007 7:48:24 GMT -6
Reno was not ordered to attack a stationary village. He was told the Indians and/or village was running and to bring them to battle.
Custer based his plan on the assumption the Indians were running.
If Custer knew the village was stationary the entire plan may have been altered.
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Post by Vern Smalley on Sept 17, 2007 21:35:15 GMT -6
Just a final post-script, then I'll leave you folks to argue it out. I recommend you don't use the "Godfrey" map found on page 126 of The Custer Myth for much anything, especially the location of Reno's skirmish lines. Godfrey didn't make the map; it was made by Lt. James Wilson a year after the battle, and God knows who Wilson talked to. He didn't tell us. But Godfrey wasn't with Reno either, so he wasn't a good source for what Reno did or didn't do. In fact, Godfrey tended to report things in a twisted sort of way that put Reno in bad light. Likewise Vaughn wasn't there either. Whatever Vaughn said about the skirmish line locations was just speculation. We know today where the skirmish lines were exactly because of Jason Pitsch's finds in 1992-1995.
Adios.
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Post by blaque on Sept 18, 2007 3:11:16 GMT -6
Wasn't Wallace under an obligation more than others to keep time? Certainly his field notes would not reflect 3 different times. If he used them to refresh his memory for testifying at RCOI then It would be most accurate. If he did not record it in his field notes it is an estimate only and subject to memory loss or enhancement. If the order came at 11 I could see it taking 2 hours to get everything moving in the dark. AZ, Wallace says in his official report that after the arrival of the scouts at 9, Custer ordered the regiment to move out at 12; but that it was impossible to start the march till after one hour later, “near 1 a.m.” Then two years later he says under oath that the regiment started out at 11 o’clock… Perhaps his fellow officers convinced him that his own estimate of the starting time was unaccurate. Most eyewitness accounts put the starting time at 11 o’clock, or between 11 and 12 (85% in my count). As to the time when the order was given, Lt. Gibson remembered that “boots & saddles” came at 10 p.m.; Herendeen and Kanipe told that the column “packed up” at 10 p.m.; and both Pvt. O’Neille & Pvt. Taylor stated that they were “ordered to saddle up” at 10 p.m. If the column started 60 or 80 minutes later –as most witness agree– this would fit with Wallace’s recollection that there was a one-hour delay after the order to move was given. But his official recording (at least in this comparatively unimportant matter) would be wrong, as he himself admitted under oath.
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Post by harpskiddie on Sept 18, 2007 9:09:43 GMT -6
Vaughn was there the same as Jason Pitsch was, except he was there 30 years previous to Jason's "finds." His deductions or speculations have every bit as much validity as do Pitsch's.
Gordie, I'm workin' it out with BB King, in my John Lee Hooker shoes..................................
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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 18, 2007 16:55:44 GMT -6
I'm not sure, logically, what can be believed from either. How many cases does Vaughn need to see a line?
I would think we'd need to know:
1. What the benefit would be to the owner of the land where the lines are 'verified,' and a historic battle site claimed.
2. How many cases, obtained when and where, verify the claim.
You look at the photos, and the claimed lines, and there's a railroad, a federal highway, two frontage roads and farmland. Just discovered?
Even if found where claimed, and I grant they've all been vetted for manufacture date and appropriate firing pin markings, how many would justify a line manned by soldiers solely at the time of Reno's advance? (And: have they been objectively vetted?)
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Post by markland on Sept 18, 2007 21:26:20 GMT -6
I'm not sure, logically, what can be believed from either. How many cases does Vaughn need to see a line? I would think we'd need to know: 1. What the benefit would be to the owner of the land where the lines are 'verified,' and a historic battle site claimed. 2. How many cases, obtained when and where, verify the claim. You look at the photos, and the claimed lines, and there's a railroad, a federal highway, two frontage roads and farmland. Just discovered? Even if found where claimed, and I grant they've all been vetted for manufacture date and appropriate firing pin markings, how many would justify a line manned by soldiers solely at the time of Reno's advance? (And: have they been objectively vetted?) If you haven't read the book, quit talking about Vaughn. His primary interest was NOT the Custer Cluster by any stretch of the imagination. Make a visit to your local library (after checking the on-line catalog for the book) and read the chapter before trying to denigrate someone who was a better historian than most on this board (including I) could ever aspire to be. Billy
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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 19, 2007 7:03:34 GMT -6
What are you talking about, Markland?
I know how to use a library and computer, thanks. I'm not reading another damned Custer book in the immediate future. Nowhere do I try to denigrate Vaughn. I asked how many cases he felt confident indicated a line. What's the big deal?
I remain highly suspicious of the stated Pitsch finds for the reasons I stated.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 23, 2007 8:48:28 GMT -6
Having an efficient and fast Library system, I have unexpectedly been granted the joy of Vaughn's book, have read it, and remain entirely puzzled.
First, let's just say that the amount of possibly relevant artifacts is not high or much above negligible. Second, he points out, in chapters different from the Reno one, that flooding moves relics and negates ability to pinpoint locations. Then, he mentions in passing that the LBH floods periodically and at one point the flood was a mile - dwell on this - across the valley where Reno's lines were.
Although he does not explain his methodology using the metal detector, it apparently was little more than obtaining through research descriptions of where various lines might be, and scanning the area. What is apparent is that he includes virtually everything manufactured previous to the battle as battle related. References to cases become references to anything metal to fluff up the total. Buckles, stirrups, horseshoes are solemnly announced as in use by the Army of 1876. That they were used by the Army and others previously and for years after isn't admitted.
He also states that Reno's line was formed, then moved forward to his furthest north position and THEN commenced firing. He doesn't claim to know where the first line was formed, although he does claim to have figured out where the timber was, which was directly east of that first line. He references this as one line, but contends after it swung back to face mostly west, it was a second line. This can be confusing as some call the initial line formation the first line, the furthest north location the second.
I'm puzzled, because I don't see how the very, very few artifacts found denote much of anything. Yes, farmers told him they'd been digging up stuff - a lot of stuff - and that proved thus and so about the battle but it does no such thing. We have photos of huge groups of people on this land, and they could have lost a horse shoe or a nail or a button or, yes, a casing from a few celebratory firings and it has zippo to do with the battle.
Further, he must have - it would be odd if he did not - have puttered across the area where Jason Pitsch has claimed to have found the supposedly new and accurate lines. I don't find anything to support either one's contention and cannot believe anyone really does.
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Post by herosrest on Jan 13, 2024 9:10:30 GMT -6
Just a final post-script, then I'll leave you folks to argue it out. I recommend you don't use the "Godfrey" map found on page 126 of The Custer Myth for much anything, especially the location of Reno's skirmish lines. Godfrey didn't make the map; it was made by Lt. James Wilson a year after the battle, and God knows who Wilson talked to. He didn't tell us. But Godfrey wasn't with Reno either, so he wasn't a good source for what Reno did or didn't do. In fact, Godfrey tended to report things in a twisted sort of way that put Reno in bad light. Likewise Vaughn wasn't there either. Whatever Vaughn said about the skirmish line locations was just speculation. We know today where the skirmish lines were exactly because of Jason Pitsch's finds in 1992-1995. Adios. Wilson did not indicate the skirmishline position on his map, or any battle related data other than Custer Hill, Reno Ck. and Yates Ck. Ex-Sgt. Jame E. Wilson (Corps of Engineers and later 2nd Lt. %th Infantry) also laid waste to the Otter Ck. myth related to the valley skirmish. No significant impediment to march existed where the gulley now runs and it was constructed under the supevision of Walter A. Graves when the valley was irrigagted using funds allocated to the Crow Tribe. Otter Ck, near Garryowen, is an irrigation ditch dug after the battle and improved by a construction team including members of the Weibert family, shortly before the 1926 semi-centenary. The remains of a soldier were discovered during that digging. Link Title Map of Custer's battleground by James E. Wilson, top assistant Creator Barry, D. F. (David Francis), 1854-1934 You will notice that Medicine Tail's Coulee is here named Reno's Creek and obviously he was never up it. The Denver Library digital representation is zoomable (lovely word) to remarkable detail. A lovely artwork. Note also Yates' Ck. For obscure reasons, I am reminded of one of, my favorite films - Blow up. Well worth a couple of hours of your down time. Topographic Assistant James E. Wilson BIGHORN CANYON NATIONAL RECREATION AREA MONTANA-WYOMING HISTORY BASIC DATA by EDWIN C. BEARSS VOLUME 1 Link p282/28330· GO 2, July 4, 1879, NA, RG 98. Wilson and his party had previously surveyed the Fort Custer Reservation and the Custer Battlefield Reservation. 31· Wilson to Chief Engineer, Dept. of Dakota, April 7, 1880, NA, RG 98 34· Ibid. From Fort Custer, Wilson continued on to St. Paul, where he arrived on October 29, 1879. 35· Granville Stuart, Forty Years on the Frontier., As Seen in the Journals and Reminiscences of Granville Stuart .. . , edited by Paul C. Phillips, 2 vols. (Cleveland, 1925), 1., 119-120.
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Post by herosrest on Jan 13, 2024 9:14:29 GMT -6
Walter H. Graves , the man who irrigated the valley. Map of Walter H. Graves - Irrigation Engineer - Crow Indian Reservation - SourceLink to U.S. Geo 1 - Little Bighorn valley Custer Battlefield. Bottom left of document details the data sources drawn upon in completing the map. W.H. Graves provided the river meanders data. The Graves sketch map above does not include the C.B.& Q railway line and therefore predates 1894. Graves took up post in 1891. In May last, Walter H. Graves, of Denver, Colo,, was appointed Sperintendent og Irrigation for this reservation and soon after entered upon the discharge of his duties. He has been given full authority for the employment of the assistants necessary a careful and thorough examination of the work necessary to be done, in order to furnish as complete a system of irrigation as can be constructed within the limit of the funds set apart for that purpose. He has as yet submitted no reports showing what progress he has made. Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior, Volume 1 Bureau of Indian Affairs U.S. Government Printing Office, 1891 linkOn the Crow Reservation, in Montana, a very extensive system (irrigation) was being constructed under Department supervision. This system was then well advanced with 12 miles of canal finished and the head gate well under way. The Indian appropriation act for the fiscal year 1899. approved July 1, 1898, provided for the appointment of an Indian inspector, who "shall be an engineer competent in the location, construction, and maintenance of irrigation works." Walter H. Graves, an engineer, who had for several years been in charge of the construction and operation of irrigation works on the Crow Reservation, Mont., above mentioned, was appointed to the position of engineer inspector, as provided for in said act, and all the irrigation work on the various reservations was, during the year 1899, carried on under his supervision and advice. During this year (1899) the Crow Indians made an agreement with Inspecor W.H. Graves, by which the sum of $100,000 of teir grazing funds was set aside for the completion of their irrigation system. Walter B. Hill, of New Hampshire, was appointed to superintend the work. The appropriation of $40,000 for the year 1900 was the same as for the year 1899. Work continued on the Big Horn ditch on the Crow Reservation, and the results were very satisfactory, the head gate having been finished and the work on the ditch having progressed so far as to make practically 18 miles of the Big Horn valley irrigable therefrom. Unfortunately, during the latter part of this fiscal year (1904), the investigation of existing systems and the extension of the work on the other reservations were seriously hindered by reason of the illness and subsequent resignation of Irrigation Inspector W.H Graves. Several important projects therefore had to be suspended until a new inspector could be appointed and enter upon duty. Mr. W.H. Code was appointed, but did not begin work until after the close of the fiscal year. The Abridgment: Containing Messages of the President of the United States to the Two Houses of Congress with Reports of Departments and Selections from Accompanying Papers, Volume 2 link
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Post by herosrest on Jan 13, 2024 9:16:56 GMT -6
A corroboration of Wilson's topographical detai - [a href=" link"]link[/a] Wilson could not map - what wasn't there.
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