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Post by George Mabry on Jan 26, 2007 11:43:26 GMT -6
Wild,
I agree with you that once the rout had begun, any chance of tactical maneuvering was next to nil and by the time Reno’s troops reached the river, they were already in rout. My point was to show how Reno’s charge could have been conducted where it wouldn’t have been viewed as a panicked flight. The 7th could have been such a poorly trained and disciplined regiment that nothing beyond the very basics, if even that, was possible. Such tactics as breaking contact, crossing danger areas etc., although basic is still something that has to practiced beforehand if you expect to pull it off under fire. It’s hard to believe that such training wasn’t conducted considering the number of combat vets in service at the time. But maybe not.
George
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Post by wild on Jan 26, 2007 14:43:39 GMT -6
Hi George My point was to show how Reno’s charge could have been conducted where it wouldn’t have been viewed as a panicked flight I think nature has provided for moments like this.Panic is a great extra when in flight.It saves time,jetisons all the time wasting bureauracy and concentrates the mind on the one object which is escape.Anything else requires more time in contact with the enemy. And as always the numbers involved precluded any effective rearguard being effective. Slan
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Post by crzhrs on Jan 26, 2007 14:48:38 GMT -6
<Panic is a great extra when in flight>
Panic may work of you were part of a herd of Zebra being chased by lions . . . kinda hard to pick out one Zebra in all the confusion with all the black & white striping.
However, Reno's command was supposed to be a organized, disciplined unit with training in rear guard action and fall back in stages.
Varnum had the sense to urge command structure . . . even a doctor . . . all other officers seemed to be like the Zebra.
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Post by wild on Jan 26, 2007 16:32:54 GMT -6
However, Reno's command was supposed to be a organized, disciplined unit with training in rear guard action and fall back in stages. Well first off they had to get through the cordon which the Indians had established.You cannot do this in stages.Now bearing in mind that 3 troops in skirmish line could not hold their position you are suggesting that one troop could do this with 1/4 of their number holding horses.So thats 30 troopers left to hold off 900 [Benteen's estimate]. Where there is such an overwhelming imblance in opposing forces the pressure of the greater numbers will bring about the collapse of all organised resistance. That point was reached when Reno tried to hold the timber. Slan
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 26, 2007 21:21:51 GMT -6
I believe that the odds are that he would have sustained less That is why the military has established procedures for dealing with this exact type situation. The Army can’t guarantee your survival. They simply give you a procedure/guidelines to follow that will give you the best odds possible. So if you find yourself in Reno’s position, you shouldn’t be surprised when you fall under some criticism when you step outside these procedures. That is especially true when dealing with disasters.
Are these procedures for US Cavalry for 1876 and earlier recorded somewhere where we can all look at them. If you are completely surrounded and also among your troops by say 3-5 to 1 odds and with only 3 companies and have to maneuver a steep jump off into water, cross a river, and climb out at steep bank, then continue up a steep hill horseback it is matter of hanging on and complete tunnel vision for most of the riders without being able to defend themselves. I don't think the 3 companies Reno had that day could have provided enough supportive fire protection even if they let them cross one at a time.
AZ Ranger
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Post by mcaryf on Jan 27, 2007 6:05:13 GMT -6
Hi Wild
I have realised I did not respond to your last point about me thinking messengers should only be used in "safe" environments, hence Benteen not sending one to Custer on receipt of the Martini message.
Plainly I am not alone in thinking that messengers should not be risked without due cause. I have only to refer you to Custer's adjutant who advised Martini that it was not essential for him to return if it was not safe. As Martini's horse had been wounded on the way to Benteen I think it would be fair to judge that a return would not be safe. As Cooke was describing precisely the situation as it actually occurred we can only assume he would have agreed with Benteen's decision not to send a reply/confirmation of receipt.
Regards
Mike
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Post by wild on Jan 27, 2007 9:24:18 GMT -6
Mike Plainly I am not alone in thinking that messengers should not be risked without due cause. But he did send him with what you describe as "due cause".Do you feel that Benteen's decision not to "come on" was due cause for risking a trooper?
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Post by mcaryf on Jan 27, 2007 11:27:28 GMT -6
Hi Wild
I was referring to your original complaint about him not immediately responding to the receipt of Custer's message from Martini. We have already discussed the subsequent situation.
Regards
mike
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Post by wild on Jan 27, 2007 14:55:04 GMT -6
Hi Mike No trooper should be asked to risk his life without due cause. I believe that knowledge of Benteen's position, considering he had terminated his recce was of the utmost importance to Custer.Martin's health must have been of paramount importance to Benteen as he would not even contemplate him carrying the urgent message through to the packs.
Cheers
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Post by mcaryf on Jan 27, 2007 18:10:27 GMT -6
Hi Wild
As I pointed out the originator of the message himself had said it was not important to return. From this one might deduce that Custer already knew where Benteen was - he had after all just sent a messenger straight to him.
WRT the packs, Benteen had just sent on a messenger with similar information not 15 minutes previously. The time to send a messenger to the packs was when Benteen knew more about what was happening and where the packs should go. This was of course the situation once Benteen joined Reno's command on the Hill and I have demonstrated in another thread that the likelihood is that a messenger was sent promptly from there.
Regards
Mike
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Post by wild on Jan 28, 2007 9:04:05 GMT -6
Hi Mike You support your contention re military communications by quoting Cook. The Cook message has been the subject of much debate owing to it's imprecise instructions.Cook was also part of the team who gave us the annihilation.So you are aligning yourself with some heavy duty military expertise there. Whether Cook required a reply is not the issue.The position of Benteen's command and direction of progress was due cause for a messenger to return to the column.A messenger reaching Custer with a message that Benteen was responding would have committed Benteen to do just that thus changing the dynamics.
Benteen had just sent on a messenger with similar information not 15 minutes previously. The messages were not similar thus the packs were acting under a different set of orders. It is possible that the packs could have continued directly on to Custer. Cheers
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Post by crzhrs on Jan 28, 2007 10:22:51 GMT -6
There is Indian statements that once Reno left the timber many warriors drew back thinking the soldiers were attacking, when the Indians saw Reno command wasn't, there came at then.
Apparently there was a period of time when some sort of defensive fall back could have been established rather than a pell-mell ride to safety.
And once the command ran they could not make it back to the original crossing, but instead had to follow a buffalo trail along the river leading them to a steep bank where horses backed up until horses from behind forced them into the river. Still no one was taking any command position. While Reno was in charge it was also a military given that junior officers were in charge of their own companies. None of them--other than Varnum--seemed to be trying to get some control of the men.
Several times throughout the battle, not just with Reno, but with Custer's command, volley fire forced warriors back. Godfrey's action during Weir's "retreat" hold warriors off long enough for the command to have enough time to get back to Reno Hill and it may have worked with Reno if someone cool enough had the sense.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jan 28, 2007 11:28:14 GMT -6
What company was Varnum in charge of at the crossing?
What definite evidence do we have "volley fire" forced anything back from Custer? Given he got wiped out and all? Nothing approaching evidence exists. Only wishful thinking.
Godfrey was moving back in one direction to safety and was not remotely surrounded. He also had to threaten to shoot any man who ran.
It's not argued that a "defensive fall back" couldn't have been made. It's argued that it would likely condemn those that made it. They could also have sung hymns and danced at some point. But the only important "point" is whether it would have resulted in fewer casualties, and hence been a better move. If so, show how.
If not, lay off Reno.
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Post by crzhrs on Jan 29, 2007 8:09:34 GMT -6
DC:
Indian statements from the Custer battle supports volley fire which forced Indians back. There is also statements about Co. C making a charge in the early stages of the battle toward Indians which forced them back also.
Varnum was not in charge of any company at the crossing but made the statement during the beginning of Reno's retreat which was the time organization was critical . . . not after the running was in full force.
While Godfrey was not surrounded he apparently was the only officer that called for skirmishers to form up. It slowed down Indians enough to allow the rest of the command to get back in safety with no casualties other than Vincent Charley.
Reno's command was not surrounded . . . there're may have been some warriors flanking the command and a few Indians had infiltrated the woods . . . but the command was not in imminent danger. It was only when a small group of Indians, using Winchesters & Spencer carbines fired into the group with Reno, BK, et al. that command structure crumbled.
Apparently Godfrey's threat of shooting anyone who ran worked . . . maybe if Reno and or other officers threatened to shoot any man running things would have been different.
Since you condemn any one who criticizes Reno's action after BK was killed what would you have done in his position?
PS: It is not your place to tell anyone to "lay off" making critical observations.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jan 29, 2007 9:50:06 GMT -6
Where do "Indian statements" support "volley fire." What would the term "volley" connote to a Sioux? Where is there a single statement about "Co.C" from the Indians, and how would they know?
Why was organization only critical at the beginning of Reno's retreat? Would it not be critical at the river crossing then?
It's an open question how hard the Indians were trying to get through Godfrey, since you admit they hadn't surrounded him and had not even, apparently, even flanked him.
Participants with Reno say they were taking fire from all fronts, including the eastern bluffs. Intelligent officers would not wait till danger was imminent. What in the world is the believable source for Wichester AND Spencer carbines alone firing into Reno's command? Since Reno was in command and gave orders the majority heard, what crumbled again? The command structure? Explain.
Of course things would have been different if everyone threatened to kill men who ran. Things would be different if someone sneezed and a bullet missed. It's most likely they all would have been killed if they hadn't run, since nobody in 130 years has shown - using maps and photos and knowledge of land Reno could not have had - how things should have been done different to better result.
Also. Hands. Who thinks officers threatening to shoot their own men is the sign of an elite or even remotely competent unit? Hands? Anyone? Hands?
"Since you condemn any one who criticizes Reno's action after BK was killed what would you have done in his position?" That's not remotely the case, but to the point I myself would have surrendered, used the wounded as cover, and turned state's evidence and begged on my knees to return home, promising money and children and women, good looking women and a lot of them. But I'm a disgusting coward and rather cheerfully so. I only condemn those who call others cowards without showing the meaningful alternative.
See the difference? I admit to being a coward. I do not try to imply virility and glory to myself - which I'd be doing if I, with no combat experience, somehow felt qualified to question the performance of others in combat. Especially others long dead with a generally impressive record.
It's my place and anyone's to call out those who condemn Reno or any soldier without offering instruction on how they could - no, should - have done better. "Better" being fewer casualties and preserving more of the command to address the mission.
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