Benteens orders

[Deleted]

Ian,
I wouldn't have a clue on how to reconcile Google Earth and the McElfresh map but I think the high ground behind would be SSR. Someone more familiar with the terrain could verify though.
Best,
c.

[Yan Taylor]

Hi Chris the map was one of yours that you sent to Richard and then posted to me, I have never used Google Earth to find 3411, but I know when Google did a street map of Widnes they caught me walking up the drive of our old house in Squires Avenue, just think the back of my head will be seen all over the world.

Ian.

[Deleted]

Ian,
If G/E caught the back of my head and used a flash..... so much for that photo!

Nice that the map is passed around. That was my intent for the original offer.

Best,
c.

[fred]

If you look at the McElfresh map, look for the DeWolf marker. Then go up at about 10 PM and you will see a contour figure, somewhat in the shape of a dagger. That would probably be 3,411 on that map. If you notice, you will see hash marks just below that dagger and those marks would indicate a sharp fall-off in the bluffs. And yes, SSR is behind 3,411 on the Google map.

A couple of other interesting things here... go to the area of Reno's timber and look for the McIntosh marker. Just below that and slightly in the timber is probably where DeRudio spotted Custer & boys on 3,411.

Another interesting thing... look for the "Garryowen Loop." Below the "container" of the loop you will see dry river channels. That is what the Indians used to hide in gathering men before entering Reno's timber. You will also see the "Otter Creek bed." That's the ravine that was one of the primary causes of Reno's halting. It is also known as "Kuhlman's Ravine."

Also... do not be fooled by the notation, "Last sight of Custer's command." That has nothing to do with 3,411.

There are a couple of errors on this map-- I think-- but by and large it is superb. You could learn to understand the entire fight just from this map. It is so good, in my opinion, that I had a copy of it framed.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[benteen]

Capt Fred,

I just orderd the McElfresh map. As to 3411 you have a map which provides its exact location in your article in the 2010 "Research and Review" which you were kind enough to send to me before I became a member of the LBA Association. I look forward to my next copy with some hints of your upcoming book in it.

Be Well
Dan

[jag]

May 18, 2013 14:29:12 GMT -6 quincannon said:

JAG: I do. My reference in this instance was for a specific, very specific employment of Benteen, as to time, place and method. I believe that at the time the note was written that this was still a work in progress. Nothing at all wrong with that. You bring someone up where they are handy, and you can employ them as the situation develops. Done all the time. The key word(s) then was not plan, rather "that amount of detail"

Custer was by nature impatient. I can't see him sitting at any one place awaiting the arrival of anyone. I believe he would use any and all time available to him in what he thought to be productive.

I don't know where Custer was when Benteen reaches Reno. My guess is he was screwing around down at Ford B, with Keogh back up on L-N-C. But his location is not the point. Him not waiting is the point, and it was meant to further support my contention that he had no specific plan (the when-where-how) to employ Benteen. Not yet. I think he did make such a decision and that decision was overcome by events.

I think what most people here tend to forget is those instructions to Reno. Something to the effect of this little bejeweled detail,"....and the whole outfit will support you..." Benteen was a major part of that whole outfit. The pack train was a major part of that whole outfit. Of course he expected, needed, wanted Benteen to march to the sound of the guns. He also expected, needed, wanted the Packs to be secured from capture. If he wasn't going to wait, he wouldn't have expected any less from either of his junior officers either. You reference the fact that Benteen needed something very specific for Benteen to do as to time, place and method. You have to understand where that place was, how much time was involved to secure the method in question. Yet you state this was a 'work in progress', giving the distinct impression Custer was doing all of this blind as a bat while on said fly. Do you know the place where each part of the command was when that note was sent to Benteen? Martin stated it took him about 20 to 25 minutes to get back to Benteen. During that same amount of time Benteen was advancing towards those bluffs where not 5 to 10 minutes later he would top those bluffs and see Reno's men in retreat... Yeah, yeah, yeah, (I know) but first observed in private this ordeal from his lonely position at ford "A". The relationship of one battalion to the other can't be minimized to the level you refuse to see. You refuse to see each of these battalions in a time-motion environment that yields rich abundance to the time, place and method that was employed. ...and the whole outfit will support you... ironically they all did, except Custer's own, even then. Something. That yet to this day isn't looked for beyond the mission changing need to save old Iron butt.    

PS I'll say this. Looks mighty pretty this here forum with all them fancy gadgets and thingamajiggers. As to functionality and re-upping your membership here. About as enjoyable for a 2 year stint in VN and then being duped into another year horse dodging punji stakes, ak slugs, and human waves dressed in black at nite.

[quincannon]

JAG: Custer went beyond the capabilities of his regiment, and to compound the error overreached with the unit under his immediate control to the point where he could not recover, and was killed. It really is a simple story, which one might dissect, disembowel, and tear limb from limb, but it all comes down in its most simplistic form to what I just said

[mac]

I agree completely with quincannon. It is just as simple as he relates it. We can enjoy discussing the why and wherefore but there it is!
When stated in that form we can see that no matter who did what, the day was always going to end badly for the cavalry.

[quincannon]

Mac: If mystery is what people seek in Custer and LBH they really come to the wrong place. If you want a mystery waiting to be unraveled take up the search for Amelia Earhart.

[alfakilo]

Jun 4, 2013 7:05:46 GMT -6 quincannon said:

If you want a mystery waiting to be unraveled take up the search for Amelia Earhart.

It certainly is!

tighar.org/

[mac]

Darn quincannon! Looks like I ordered the wrong map.
Seriously I think it is coming from the US by carrier pigeon into a head wind.

[quincannon]

Well Mac, I would be in no great hurry to order a chart of Howland Island either.

[jag]

Jun 4, 2013 8:27:26 GMT -6 quincannon said:

Well Mac, I would be in no great hurry to order a chart of Howland Island either.

Ahem... I never said there's a mystery here. Go look for it. I never said it.

I can back up everything I've said here, the mileages including the times, they're all in stated testimony at the COI.

None of those battalions had a lot of free time on their hands to do what you make claim to - happen. There's only a 30 minute window of opportunity between Custer departing the bluffs and Benteen's appearance there those same 30 minutes later. Its that same window for Reno stopping to set up the SL and the time, some 30 minutes later, they were on the run to the bluffs. The confirmation of this time being when Reno set up the SL when Custer's men, the white horse troop, was on the bluffs. This also being confirmed by another sighting on the same bluffs within 5 minutes of the other. All that being framed by the time Benteen arrived there abt. 30 minutes later watching Reno's men in retreat up those same bluffs.

There's little to no leeway on this thing. And what little wiggle room there is on it places the time constrictions on anything happening, had to have happened during this same time frame. Because the least distance/time configuration for Custer's troops would not have been less than 2.6 miles from where Martin departed Custer. Nor any more than 6 miles from the same point of departure at best speed. All contained within that same 30 minute, 2.6 to 6 mile constraining moments of time and place.

You place the burden and blame on Custer. But there is no reason to warrant the conclusions you do based upon the time/distance constraints of all four battalions in relation, one to the other, when and where the said events took place. Benteen was no further from Custer than 2 and 1/2 miles, at any time while Custer was on those bluffs. You go to 3411, go there, and tell me what you as Custer couldn't see 'back there' within 3 miles of that position? And more to the point, 2.5 miles to be exact. Benteen is seen moving on towards the same bluff's Custer is on. 2.5 miles. When Custer sends the note back to Benteen that same relationship existed, 2.5 miles. As it took Martin 20 to 25 minutes to reach Benteen at a jog trot. A trot consistent with 6.3 mph. We're not talking huge blocks of time or space here as has always been assumed. You give Reno more time in the valley, this not to exceed 40 minutes, then you have to give the same to Custer and Benteen. Similarly, if you take away those minutes from Reno, not to exceed 20 minutes, then you must take away those same minutes from Custer and Benteen. [Fact] Custer was less than a mile and a half away from Reno when Reno set up his SL. [Fact] Benteen was not over 2.5 miles from Custer when Custer was up there viewing Reno set that SL up. And you're blaming this one on Custer. Are you for real?

[quincannon]

JAG: I don't believe you have ever served in the Army or in any of the military services to my knowledge. That is of no consequence.

What is of consequence is that had you served you would realize that when a unit fails, the commander is always responsible. ALWAYS. I am not going to get into a time and distance discussion, or any other discussion about what I posted. It stands and will forever stand, because of the principle of command responsibility. That too is simple. It is the iron rule of command = The commander is responsible for everything a unit does or fails to do. It can be no other way.

[Yan Taylor]

Hello everyone; I myself have just witnessed a mystery, concerning Steve McNamara’s reluctance to pick Danny Brough in his twenty man squad, but there you go.

Going back to the maps; Chris sent me a great book which contains over 50 maps, the book is called ‘’Drawing Battle Lines’’ by Michael Donahue.

Jag; that mile and a half you said was between Reno and Custer may as well have been x number of miles, the bluffs and the river formed a barrier between the two Battalions, and this barrier was to split them even further when GAC went north, so when Custer sees that Reno has formed Skirmish Lines he must have had a good idea that he was fixed into place and any prospect of him moving forwards had for now past, so any move north by GAC would distance him further.


Ian.