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Post by herosrest on Jul 29, 2024 12:29:38 GMT -6
This is helpful questioning, J41. Don't think I am joining a posse after you, or taking Reno lightly. Who would? 1) what were Reno's orders? 2) How was Custer supposed to support Reno (if he was)? 3) Why didnt Custer press his attack from the flank? 4) After falling back, he retreated to points north and east - why?1) Given the conjectural nature of participant comment about Reno's orders, besides his own take on them given that Custer could not corroborate what MAR said and that significantly, men with Reno who heard the orders - disagree Reno basically and fundamentally; besides Reno having lied about what happened and this becoming official record on 27th June 1876; then it is safe to accept that Reno crossed the Little Bighorn river into its valley to advance nearly three miles and open an offensive action against the Sioux camp which sat beyond the big loop in the river where Garryowen stands today and by some accounts of men there, quite a bit further downriver and where the old railway halt stood. Judging by Custer's later orders to his command (perfectly reasonable), it was his intention to have Benteen reinforce Reno's action, whilst the five companies awaited that development before crossing the river and attacking the lower camp. Thus dividing the engaged defenders with the inherent possibility they would break and run, leaving the camp to 7th Cavalry; who would then destroy the tipis and property. Before Reno was advanced across the river, Custer had tasked (ordered) his force of scouts to go forward and raid the Sioux pony herds. This indicates that at the time those scouts were employed in such fashion; that Custer believed he had a standing camp in front of him. You cannot catch or close with a running herd 15-20 miles ahead. T'is impossible. There is a bit more but as an outline situation for Reno, what do you think? Is it worth considering what is known of the deployment or leave that dog, sleep............ nice puppy. The rail linkhalt Garryowen The terrain has altered considerably since the time Cartwright owned the store and the roadworks of the 1970's raised GO and the roads to 24 feet above the valley.
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Post by herosrest on Jul 29, 2024 16:28:20 GMT -6
No worries HR - THESE ARE SIMPLE QUESTIONS - that haven't been answered, by those in discussion, about CUSTER'S actions. We know about Reno's. And Benteen's.
I think you nail them right most of the time.
The rail link halt was confirmed - by someone WMC interviewed (I think)....something about 'right where the station is now'.
1 question for you - you have often mentioned the "shoot and scoot" timing of Reno in the valley.
Can you be more specific? time-wise.
Varnum seems very reasonable - he has:
A. I have always stated the distance to Major Reno’s skirmish line was about two miles as near as I could judge it, and from there it was about 800 yards to where the nearest tepees were in a bend of the river.
Q. After Major Reno’s command crossed the river, how much time elapsed till they were halted and deployed as skirmishers? A. Fifteen or 20 minutes I should think, more or less.
Q. Can you give a judgment of what length of time the men were on the skirmish line before being withdrawn into the timber? A. I have no idea. I must have been on the skirmish line myself from 10 to 15 minutes.
Q. How long were they in the timber all together? Have you any estimate to give? A. It could not have been more than 10 or 15 minutes, I think.
Q. How long was it from the time the men were deployed in line till they left the timber on their way back to the river? A. I estimate that at about half an hour.
Q. How long after you saw the Gray Horse Company as you have stated till Major Reno retreated from the timber? A. It must have been about half an hour.
Q. Then you say for about 30 minutes Major Reno remained in the timber and created a diversion, on the part of the Indians? A. Yes, sir.
I think most give 10-15minuts or so for the retreat to the hill.One strand of battle study at the time and amongst those serving in 1876, considered the conundrums of timings which broadly considered the actions of 25th June, 1876; as consecutive. The consequence is a period of delay from 20 minutes to more than an hour during which the 7th Cavalry's right wing esat of the river were idol, or errant. In consequence, Reno's witterings about not being supported were seeded and have flowered ever since without real challenge or competance applied despite exhaustive analyss of Trumpeter Martin (in particular) and Sgt. Kanipe, making trips over the bluffs to Benteen. What we do know which remains generally unfuddled and incontrovertible, is that the advance east and west of the river, to contact, was in tandem with the eastern move having a mile and a half further to ride to reach Maguire's 'B'. Custer was beyond Maguire's 'B' by the time that Reno drew in his skirmisher's et al. So, how long did that take? Walter M. Camp mulled this, as did Godfrey, Frey and many others but the underlying bedrock was Reno's cry for sympathy and understanding that he was not supported in his action. I maintain, based on Custer's known intention, that his focus was the Real Bird ford for a crossing and that his presence was disrupted by packets of Indians east of the river before the general response developed as Reno's battalion recoiled from attack. Taking Reno's bleating goat out of the realities, provides a perfectly sensible and understandable model of events to develop. We arrive later to the first, and primary observation of Custer's battleground by Weir and then his company, and it was over. Despite the longing sighs and noble fiction, an avalanche of opposition deluged 7th Cavalry's right wing and drowned it out. You are perfectly right to poke and prod Reno's account of it - it is mandatory as far as I am concerned because it turns out that nothing the guy said holds any value or worth. Point at the map - Reno fought here. Custer arrived here (Greasy Grass Hill). Benteen arrived here (Ford A). Reno went here (Reno Hill). Custer still here (GGH). All Indians go here (GGH). Here Note how rapidly the carbine's ammo can be shot away. That is what happened on Reno's gunline. Unfortunately, we know from DeRudio at Chicago and without reason to doubt it - that weapons were jamming after 8-10 rapid rounds fired. That is brilliant for morale. Ammo being depleted and weapons jamming is...... chaos on steroids. For me that's what happened. Poo hit pants, they were outta there. Given that scenario, I cut Reno slack for saving his guys. However, he did not urgently advise Custer of his retreat and if the weapons syatem was a problem - that was not passed on either. It turned out the problem was carried rounds, those on the belt and in the ready use boxes which were corroding with verdigris in damp weather. Hence a part of the interest in getting the reserve ammunition. Of course, the saddlebag rounds were bright shiny new and fit for purpose but, getting to the saddle bags depleted the strength of the fighting line which simply drifted out of the valley into cover and the horses. Reno then lost his head but around half his men survived. What took place on Reno Hill immediately subsequent to arrival was unforgivable. Reno and Terry, were the guys for the army and the cavalry, on the Small Arms Board which adopted the Springfield weapon system. Shoot, scoot.
Recounted to A.B.Welch by White Cow Walking, in Dakotah language with no interpreter, at Mandan, N.D., November 2nd, 1922 and accompanied by three hand-drawn ‘maps’
This is the Greasy Grass Creek (1). I was with the Hunkpapa camp which was right in the bend. After them was the camp of the Oglala. Here the Sheyenne were camped. The Sihasapa came next with the Miniconjou and beyond them were the lodges of the Itazepechos and the Sicangu. Beyond them the Mahkpia To (Arapahoes) and the Oohenopa. (He marked each place and dotted between them).
Here were high hills (2). Our leader was Pizi (Gall). When the horse soldiers were crossing the stream, he did not move. He sat in his lodge. After a little while he came out. He was crying loudly, to fight them down there.
Then a Dakotah came running on horse. He cried very loud that Pahanska (Long Hair – Custer) was going to come down on our end of the village. Gall said, ‘All right. Wait. The plan is good. We will fight him when he comes down the hill. They will all be killed there. When we have those other men killed, I will come back.’ And he sung a war song as he jumped on his horse and went toward the south through the lodges.
Everybody was running. Some went to the south and others went to the north and east across the stream. We hid ourselves along a little waterway. There was no water in it. Custer would come close to it when he came. Some went to the other side of the hill and waited. Soon there was much shooting south of us. We knew they were driving the enemy. It was very satisfying to us as we hid in the long grass there.
Then Pahanska came. He rode down the hill between the waterway and the other side. They yelled very loud, those soldiers. Their horses were different than ours. They were fast for a short distance. Then the shooting commenced. We rode out from the hiding places. Many of us had good rifles. Many had bows and arrows. We all had clubs, too. Just as the fight begun, I saw one of his Arikara scouts leave them and start toward the high hills. I went after him. I killed him with a club. I took off his hair (3).
Then I went back fast. The soldiers were in different places. We surrounded them and rode around like a buffalo surround. They did not last long. We rode in close and jumped off. We used clubs then. Here is where Pahanska came and here is where his soldiers laid dead (4-5).
I am old now and do not remember how loud the guns were. I can not think how the blood smelled. I remember many men were dead. We took off their clothes. We cut off the boot tops for moccasins. Many Dakotah were barefooted. Their moccasins were worn out. I did not see Pahanska. We caught many good horses then. When Gall came up, the soldiers were dead. Many were wounded and were crawling around. Some women killed them then.
Then I was dead for three days (Mind was a blank and he never was able to think of a thing which happened during those three days, he often told me).
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Post by herosrest on Jul 30, 2024 2:09:32 GMT -6
This is helpful questioning, J41. Don't think I am joining a posse after you, or taking Reno lightly. Who would? 1) what were Reno's orders? 2) How was Custer supposed to support Reno (if he was)? 3) Why didnt Custer press his attack from the flank? 4) After falling back, he retreated to points north and east - why?2) Given the known record of 7th Cavalry's patrols, figths, raids and attacks, and marching on the Plains against considered hostile Indian bands and domains - we can move beyond surmise to assume that Custer intended the five companies which marched east of Little Bighorn river, to attack into and capture the Indian village at Little Bighorn. There is thinking and theory today and for some time that Custer explicitly decided to take hostages, and in effect coerce Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse to do as he told them to do, which was probably along the lines of make the 'Graet Father' smile. Now, that might have worked, it might not have, since seven tribes in peaceful congregation never ended well, let alone romping about after Reno's attack with guns cocked, arrows bowed, knives wielding, lances levelled, and knives to hand. Then of course there was Tommy Hawks flashing in the sun and quirts dangling. Besides that of course, the right wing troops east of the river were detected by women folk who fled across the river from the valley and then back across to go south and west as far as possible away from the marauders, as was possible. Thus, an immense exodus took place with the residents fleeing west by south across the valley onto hills which gave a view of what was what and what was going on east, west, north and south. Of course, those hills were strewn and littered with the tens of thousands on ponies constituting the tribal herds. Thus, there was not one hope in hell of 7th Cavalry taking hostages at Little Bighorn, once the population fled across the valley onto the hills where their ponies grazed. Only those who remained in the camps would have been taken - had Custer had the time to undertake his battleplan. There was a battleplan and it was told of by John Martin, who was at the briefing of the right wing, by Custer, on the bluffs before they galloped down into Medicine Tail Coulee. They would have arrived there within five minutes of Lt. Varnum sighting the companies on the bluffs as he dismounted to join the skirmish line in the valley which fought on foot. We know beyond any doubt that the 7th Cavalry's right wing arrived to MTC. From there onwards, events for that force are conjectural but we do, completely know what Custer intended to do (his battleplan) and we know precisely where the companies went despite the modern penchant for fictional history which scatters it like seagull's waste across history's broad and broadening shoulders. George B. Grinnell positively identified the ford where the cavalry halted, dismounted, and the fighting began. Reno's companies in the valley were already gone at that time, thus it can have taken 15-20 minutes from Varnum's sighting of the grey horse company, to the right wing being jammed up on Deep Coulees mouth, but it may have been less. Might have been ten minutes, might have eight, might have beentwelve. That's what happened - Reno ran away from his support and then became worse than frugally challenged with truth, honesty, reality, and the price of apple pie. He exampled to history the very worst of personal traits. Lying through all orifices about brave men who suffered terrible demise - because of him. Given this analysis of events, study of evidence discovered in later years, decades and centuries can be settled into a realistic outlook over what actually happened, witha force commited near the river - detail outposted on Luce Ridge and the ballance of companies fighting an action on the Nye-Cartwright (owner of GO store) ridge - before a large force of Indians including Minniconjou White Bull, galloped down from Weir Peak across Medicine Tail Coulee to attack the soldiers east of the river.
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Post by herosrest on Jul 30, 2024 3:05:31 GMT -6
I plump upon the topic Bruce Brown's undertaking (study) of White Bull's account of it, given to Campbell Vestal during the summer of 1930. This was when Big Beaver drew his map of the battle, two years after spending a few days walking the ground and explaining stuff to Joseph A. Blummer, who worked at the GO (Garryowen) store. The map is squirrel'd away on the Friend's site somewhere, and the battle account is worked on Astonisher. With anything from 800-1,200 rounds expended along Luce NC towards Calhoun Hill, something significantly relevant took place, beit combat or an almighty hoax by twisted souls scattering peppercorn relics. Accepting the relics as evidence of activity during the battle, then progress across the field, consequent events and the brutal but just fates of the right wing's companies moves to log mode. You know, fall off this rather than the tawdry holier than thou evil which stalks the history as Reno's saviour. He's dead. The only significant mystery with the guy is how the hell he got that tail of his into the uniform!
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Post by herosrest on Jul 30, 2024 6:53:26 GMT -6
If I recall without hunting it up, WMC was interested in remains found and buried on GGH or ridge. This was Col. Fred Grant, the President Grant's son. One of the scouts out ahead of Terry's advance gave five bodies. Doran worked over the Company C angle in his book with that terrain providing Company C and Harrington and escape route after their situation exploded. If I recall, i'm in a bit of an overload at the moment with more than nine things going on simultaneously; he arrived at fourteen or fifteen men making the break which compares well with Gall's information that fourteen men escaped - although details don't compare greatly.
In terms of Reo's fumble in the valley, fumbles it was without a shadow of doubt, then as I have given previously and despite testimony at Chicago which in fairness had nothing to do with actuality and focused entirely on dismantling the published accusations in Whittaker's book, and making things simply go awy since no-one wanted the Custer thing dragging on further. Reno thrusting it back into the public domain wasn't greatly appreciated by the army but every peacock must have its day.
Reno feeling that 'he' was abandoned in the valley, is straightforwardly ripe pussycat, so embarrassed and threatened by his performance, that he dribbled drivel to Terry in CYA (Cover your Arse). He had not a clue about events beyond the timber and in there only second hand news from those he had scurrying back and forth at his bidding.
There was something happened up on the terrain named for Luce. Modern, and I mean modern Cheyenne recounting has provided information of a hunting party arriving in MTC, on the right wing's six. There was other stuff going on such as White Shield seeing the troops from his tipi in the Cheyenne cresent, and Yellow Nose romping across the river to give battle. There was no clear view into the valley from anywhere in MTC until moving further downriver clear of the bluffs running down from Weir. In 1873, fighting the Hunkpapa tribe which attacked 7th Cavalry's camp of 10 companies on the Yellowstone near Ft. Pease; a detail of twenty men and one Officer, were sent in a race with the Sioux, to take and hold high ground which dominated the cavalry positions.
What we know of Luce's finds indicates a similar situation from MTC, onto Luce's ridge. That is a brief contact with what was either the WolfTooth and Hump bands of Sioux and Cheyenne, or the latterday hunting party told of by Cheyennes recently. As far as I am concerned, a detail of twenty men moved out from MTC and drove Indians of Luce Ridge. It may be that Custer had videttes on that ground and they tripped into the Indians and were then supported.
For Custer, with surprise lost and enemy in unknown strength to his rear or right flank - he responded. I have already given how. We then have troops at the river moving parallel downriver because the village extended beyond Maguire's B. That march is best understood by viewing the map of movement left by E.S. Curtis in 1908. Did the entire wing go down towards the river? No. Two or three companies paralleled along Nye-Cartwright ridge.
That's a less than 20 minutes scenario and gues what, Reno's battalion were gone from the valley, Benteen got hung up on Ford A, Indians were swarming back downriver to meet the new threat east of the river. Those Indians who remained in the valley, checked and awaited developments. They then divided and a half went down the valley and the others crossed the river below Weir Point and attacked across MTC. It is impossible that Custer did not place observers on Greasy Grass Hill and they would have spotted movement upriver from Weir Point and then realised that it was an Indian force coming down on them. You can imagine some surprise at that. What to do?...........
Pick it apart. Please do.
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Post by johnson1941 on Jul 30, 2024 7:11:04 GMT -6
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Post by herosrest on Jul 30, 2024 7:11:08 GMT -6
I have been in discussions which enthused that it was not possible to make a crossing of the river along the area from Maguire's "b" on down to Realbird area and beyond. This is simply not so and hogwash. Yes, the water slows progress and turns riders making the crossing into little duckies in a row. So, after a hundred years of constant unmittigated bloody warfare, the US Army had not way, means, or chutzpah, to force across a 40" wide river crossing. Three company front with flanks dismounted to volley across the river into opposition as the centre pushed a platoon over to bridgehead. The woodpecker efforts of Sioux and Cheyenne to rear and flank would have been a concern because despite being able to force a crossing, the one situation to avoid at all costs is being pushed into the river with significant hostile forces threatening from both sides of the river. That is, troops in the water and enemy on both sides shooting into them. Once the hostile forces approaching from Weir Point were detected, there was no possibility of making or forcing a crossing. Reno and Benteen were concentrating on Reno Hill but 7th Cavalry's right wing did not know that, and had nowhwere to go but north by west to unite and stand. They didn't make it.
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Post by herosrest on Jul 30, 2024 7:48:03 GMT -6
There is also stuff from Fred Server, who was 2 Cavalry and scouting the left flank of the advance down the wibbly wobbly wiver valley. There's a recent book about him and of course, he was the translater who got under Benteen's skin 1886, and ran the hotel at Lima Bravo. ISYN. I doubt the pea for Benteen went under the mattress...... Server was a vet, and serving in Company G - Custer's old company and he did not like like fred. My kinda guy@ First to Arrive - An historical biography based on the life of First Sergeant Frederick E. Server, great-grandfather of the author. Eighteen year old Fred Server came to the Montana Territory as a new recruit in the U.S. Cavalry. Arriving for duty at Fort Ellis in September 1873, he began a ten-year adventure that includes exploring the pristine wilderness of the Yellowstone, our first National Park, an ill fated 1876-77 mid-winter survey of the Snake River, and selected to be part of an Arctic Expedition to the North Pole; as well as suppressing the hostilities of the Northern Cheyenne, Lakota Sioux, Nez Percé, Bannack, and Cree Indians; and building a life as a Montana pioneer. Fred Server was among the first to come upon the remains of Lt. Colonel G. A. Custer's Seventh Cavalry on June 27, 1876. Fred Server was the first of the author's family to settle in Montana. Following his military duty, he and his wife Anna operated a hotel on the Crow Indian Reservation until Fred Server's death in 1911. Fred Server is buried at the Custer National Cemetery adjacent to the Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument. The biography is dedicated to the descendants of Montana Pioneers, Indian and non-Indian alike, who continue to make the Big Sky Country their home.
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Post by justinterested on Aug 1, 2024 23:44:40 GMT -6
Hi, HR.
You gave some explicit answers to 1 and 2 from J41's good set of questions. I generally agree with those answers, in particular the orientation of Custer intending to capture the women and children and coerce the Indian fighting force to comply as a result. That "tactic" (capturing women and children), was what he appears to have known about Indian fighting.
From there I get a little lost in the tangents (my problem, not yours). I think, but would ask you to confirm, that you are saying that this is the answer to J41's "3)" as well, i.e. from your text Custer realized that he was not going to achieve the non-combatant capture because they stopped heading north as they started to on Reno's attack, and instead moved SW to the western rises. Do I understand you correctly in that?
If so [tbc], is your answer to "4)" the events on Luce Ridge? "4) After falling back, he retreated to points north and east - why?"
I have never understood why Custer did not attempt his own link-up with Benteen (and Reno). I don't believe he sat there waiting for them to come to him, especially not without attempting some further communication with Benteen and/or Reno.
Thanks
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Post by mikegriffith1 on Aug 2, 2024 6:07:22 GMT -6
Hi, HR. You gave some explicit answers to 1 and 2 from J41's good set of questions. I generally agree with those answers, in particular the orientation of Custer intending to capture the women and children and coerce the Indian fighting force to comply as a result. That "tactic" (capturing women and children), was what he appears to have known about Indian fighting. Custer knew a lot more about Indian fighting than just the tactic of using women and children to persuade an Indian force to comply. He was a student of battles with the Indians, as we see in his autobiography. For example, he took note of the 1868 Battle of Beecher Island, where a small force of 50 dismounted cavalry soldiers held off an Indian force that was at least four times larger. I might add that the Beecher sandbar offered less cover and concealment than the timber provided to Reno's unit. Custer had no reason to believe that Benteen would disobey his thrice-repeated order to get to him quickly. Kanipe told Benteen that Custer wanted him at his position as soon as possible. About 15 minutes later, Martin arrived with Custer's written "come on . . . be quick" order, and Martin told Benteen the same thing Kanipe did (that Custer wanted him at his loc quickly), and he added that Custer was under fire. Also, when Boston Custer returned from getting a new horse, not long after Custer sent Martin with the written order, Boston would have told Custer where Benteen was, and Custer logically would have assumed that Benteen would be arriving in another 30 minutes or so. Boston Custer had passed Benteen's detachment just as it reached the main Indian trail, and he was able to reach his brother's command just after Martin had been sent back with the message to Benteen. Surely Custer never dreamed that Benteen would so flagrantly disobey a direct written order that had been reinforced by two verbal messages. In addition, Greg Michno says he personally verified that Custer could have seen Benteen as Benteen was approaching Reno Hill, and that this could explain Custer's subsequent actions ( Lakota Noon, p. 108).
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Post by mikegriffith1 on Aug 2, 2024 7:58:48 GMT -6
Hi, HR. You gave some explicit answers to 1 and 2 from J41's good set of questions. I generally agree with those answers, in particular the orientation of Custer intending to capture the women and children and coerce the Indian fighting force to comply as a result. That "tactic" (capturing women and children), was what he appears to have known about Indian fighting. Custer knew a lot more about Indian fighting than just the tactic of using women and children to persuade an Indian force to comply. He was a student of battles with the Indians, as we see in his autobiography. For example, he took note of the 1868 Battle of Beecher Island, where a small force of 50 dismounted cavalry soldiers held off an Indian force that was at least four times larger. I might add that the Beecher sandbar offered less cover and concealment than the timber provided to Reno's unit. Custer had no reason to believe that Benteen would disobey his thrice-repeated order to get to him quickly. Kanipe told Benteen that Custer wanted him at his position as soon as possible. About 15 minutes later, Martin arrived with Custer's written "come on . . . be quick" order, and Martin told Benteen the same thing Kanipe did (that Custer wanted him at his loc quickly), and he added that Custer was under fire. Also, when Boston Custer returned from getting a new horse, not long after Custer sent Martin with the written order, Boston would have told Custer where Benteen was, and Custer logically would have assumed that Benteen would be arriving in another 30 minutes or so. Boston Custer had passed Benteen's detachment just as it reached the main Indian trail, and he was able to reach his brother's command just after Martin had been sent back with the message to Benteen. Surely Custer never dreamed that Benteen would so flagrantly disobey a direct written order that had been reinforced by two verbal messages. In addition, Greg Michno says he personally verified that Custer could have seen Benteen as Benteen was approaching Reno Hill, and that this could explain Custer's subsequent actions ( Lakota Noon, p. 108). I should add that when Boston Custer was riding to his brother's command, he encountered James Martin as Martin was heading toward Benteen to deliver Custer's written order to "come on . . . be quick." Keep in mind that Boston Custer, along with Autie Reed, rode from the pack train to Lt. Col. Custer's command after Kanipe arrived and told the pack train's commander that Lt. Col. Custer wanted the pack train to hurry to his command.
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Post by justinterested on Aug 2, 2024 14:36:15 GMT -6
Hi, HR. You gave some explicit answers to 1 and 2 from J41's good set of questions. I generally agree with those answers, in particular the orientation of Custer intending to capture the women and children and coerce the Indian fighting force to comply as a result. That "tactic" (capturing women and children), was what he appears to have known about Indian fighting. Custer knew a lot more about Indian fighting than just the tactic of using women and children to persuade an Indian force to comply. He was a student of battles with the Indians, as we see in his autobiography. For example, he took note of the 1868 Battle of Beecher Island, where a small force of 50 dismounted cavalry soldiers held off an Indian force that was at least four times larger. I might add that the Beecher sandbar offered less cover and concealment than the timber provided to Reno's unit. Custer had no reason to believe that Benteen would disobey his thrice-repeated order to get to him quickly. Kanipe told Benteen that Custer wanted him at his position as soon as possible. About 15 minutes later, Martin arrived with Custer's written "come on . . . be quick" order, and Martin told Benteen the same thing Kanipe did (that Custer wanted him at his loc quickly), and he added that Custer was under fire. Also, when Boston Custer returned from getting a new horse, not long after Custer sent Martin with the written order, Boston would have told Custer where Benteen was, and Custer logically would have assumed that Benteen would be arriving in another 30 minutes or so. Boston Custer had passed Benteen's detachment just as it reached the main Indian trail, and he was able to reach his brother's command just after Martin had been sent back with the message to Benteen. Surely Custer never dreamed that Benteen would so flagrantly disobey a direct written order that had been reinforced by two verbal messages. In addition, Greg Michno says he personally verified that Custer could have seen Benteen as Benteen was approaching Reno Hill, and that this could explain Custer's subsequent actions ( Lakota Noon, p. 108). Hi, Mike. There are a lot of assumptions in there, so I'll just leave it alone.What I am interested in, and asked HR about, was the last two questions of these 4 from J411) what were Reno's orders? 2) How was Custer supposed to support Reno (if he was)? 3) Why didnt Custer press his attack from the flank? 4) After falling back, he retreated to points north and east - why?I don't know why Custer didn't press the attack at Ford B, nor do I know why he went N and E instead of trying to hook up with Benteen. HR had some thoughts I was trying to get a better understanding of on these two issues, if he has follow-on thoughts.Custer was gong to support Reno, and he did not. If we take your assumption that Reno knew Custer was going to support from the flank (an assumption, but OK let's take it for now), why didn't he press that attack home?That's '3', and it's a good question. '4' is also a good question, and one I've always wondered about. I don't accept that Custer sat there waiting for Benteen to show up, even if he saw him (an assumption). I'm interested in understanding this, and I think HR had some thoughts on it after giving explicit answers to '1' and '2'. That's what I was after.
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Post by herosrest on Aug 3, 2024 3:32:24 GMT -6
The eas t ridge relics finds are an aspect of the battle which Ian, on this board, has looked into in regard to various theories about the tactics. Hope fully, his sojurn will end shorly. There were two cluster's of relics at eastern end of the finds, and a tactical outline of what was found on the ground. In essence, a skirmish line position existed along the military crest of Luce Ridge, leading up to it from MTC. The two artifact cluster's bred some confusion with interpretation and that then is a problem because interpretations become actualaity in some minds. In regards Custer setting out to take hostages, this is a timing matter and one of few of any importance other than Reno's brief fight (shoot and scoot) in the valley. I'm going to step outside for a moment - link - so, I believe that those who authorised the code are currently hanging from yew trees by their thumbs and the intention is to let them down on Christmas eve. 2122. The retreat from the valley, prevented Custer and 7th Cavalry's right wing from supporting the attack in the valley. This is very simple stuff. You cannot support a force which is not where it was sent. There is no, Custer didn't support Reno, that is rather Reno's CYA insanity. He was nuts and thought that he was special but of course, not in the way that Napolean was. It was stated that Custer intended to capture the village. This was shortly before marching off the bluffs to do it. One can therefore imagine nee accept that the intention in sending Reno into the valley to attack, was to empty the village. The one is an absolute consequence of the other. Attack a village and the occupants run away in the opposite direction - usually. So, when Reno opened his attack, the intention was to capture the camp. That is the tipis, property, supplies, and any people unable to flee who were not killed in the fighting. That was precisely what happened at Washita, if that operation is considered. When the disaster of Reno's retreat and Benteen not arriving to fight in the valley happened, that released the Indian forces to attack the battalions with custer and do it unmolested by Reno and Benteen. At that point, Custer may have contemplated trying to take hostages. If he did, it went well - didn't it. Ford D offensive theory is plain flat silliness. As daft as it gets. Thank you.
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Post by herosrest on Aug 3, 2024 3:57:01 GMT -6
It occurred to me that sorting out the fallout, of the code problem, is going to monitored to death by thise who wish the west harm. A great way to uncover top level command and control channels from decision making on down into engineering pricess and back up to disruption. Stop using computers to talk. It multiplies problems by factors and is not secure.
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Post by herosrest on Aug 3, 2024 4:07:25 GMT -6
In essence, older hardware systems will be modernised into state of the art now. Priceless. I bet you a few people with antiquated systems would love getting that engineering for........ free. Work on UK's Whumph bomb is going well. It is 17 miles of solid steel. We are still figuring out a delivery method but once that is done, the World is ours.
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