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Post by johnson1941 on Jul 19, 2024 20:47:15 GMT -6
What was debunked? (And by whom?)
Troopers still retreating up? Which Benteen and Martin saw from Martin's ridge. Martin "We kept on General Custer’s trail, and after we got on this ridge where I saw Major Reno fighting in the bottom. About this time we got there I saw Major Reno’s battalion retreating to the same side of the river we were on."
The wounded? Certainly they were there on the hill, wanting water, etc. Moylan had at least 7. McDougall Q. Do you know how many wounded Captain Moylan had? A. I think there were seven men, some were being carried in blankets and some on horses. Edgerly When we reached the summit we found Colonel Reno and his battalion there, with several wounded men crying anxiously for water
The packs? Which Hare said was about 40+minutes getting to & back (1-1.5mile behind), with D already moved out when he returned. "Reno made him acting adj. Benteen came up about 10 min after Reno got to top of bluffs, and 10 min after this Reno sent him to the packs...met packs north of north fork of Sundance creek...a mile or not much more...was gone from Reno about 20mins..."
The Indians?
??
What would a rush look like and when should it have occured? "ASAP"? Of course - but when was that?
Thanks for the suggestions...Yep - there a few good reads there. Among others.
I also like Harper's Companion, WMC, Hammer, Graham, Edgerly, Miller, Wooden Leg, Arikira/Scouts, the RCOI - I like primary sources the best.
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Post by mikegriffith1 on Jul 20, 2024 4:09:19 GMT -6
What was debunked? The arguments you made. By whom? By nearly ever historian/scholar who has written about the battle in the last 20 years. I recommended six of the better and more-recent books on the subject, one of which won the Pulitzer Prize. I notice you said nothing about those books in your reply. In fact, I'm not aware of a single book written by a professional historian over the last 20 years that blames Custer and exonerates Reno and Benteen. You have to go back into the 1990s to find such a book (e.g., Ambrose's book), and even then, most of the books published in the 1990s reject your arguments.
Lieutenant Edward Godfrey, after interviewing many of the Indians who had fought in the battle, wrote that the Indians had initially decided to flee the village when they discovered Custer's movement but that they changed their mind when Reno fled from the timber:
The Indians say if Reno’s position in the valley had been held, they would have been compelled to divide their strength for the different attacks, which would have caused confusion and apprehension, and prevented the concentration of every able-bodied warrior upon the battalion under Custer; that at the time of the discovery of Custer’s advance to attack, the chiefs gave orders for the village to move, to break up; that at the time of Reno’s retreat, this order was being carried out, but as soon as Reno’s retreat was assured, the order was countermanded, and the squaws were compelled to return to the pony herds; that the order would not have been countermanded had Reno’s forces remained fighting in the bottom. (As quoted in Harold Baker, Misguided by Experience: A Defense of Custer’s Actions at the Little Bighorn, Master’s Thesis, LSU, 2002, pp. 45-46)
General Nathan Miles, an experienced Indian fighter, noted that the timber formed "a natural rifle pit" and offered excellent cover and concealment, and that Reno never should have left the timber (Personal Recollections of General Nelson A. Miles, p. 208).
The Indians were not about to go into the timber to take on the soldiers. As they themselves noted, if they had done so, they would have suffered many casualties. And, as experienced Indian fighters noted, Indians just did not do that sort of thing as a matter of practice. They were fighting a harassing and sniping action to give the village time to bug out.
However, having no experience fighting Indians, Reno just panicked and decided to retreat from the timber and flee to the bluffs. In contrast, Herendeen, an experienced Indian fighter, knew from experience that the timber was the best place to try to hold out (and Herendeen and some dozen others who stayed in the timber survived and later joined Reno's command on Reno Hill). Captain French was so disgusted with Reno's order to leave the timber that he considered shooting him on the spot.
Reno Hill was not only easily flanked but was quickly surrounded, and the hill offered very little protection. Reno suffered 28 casualties on the hill--7 dead, 21 wounded--in just 3 hours on the 25th because the hill was such a poor defensive position:
The lack of protection would prove costly: 7 men were killed and 21 wounded before Indian fire finally slackened about 9 o'clock. (Ron Nichols, In Custer's Shadow: Major Marcus Reno, p. 196.)
Reno lost quite a few more men the next day because of the paucity of cover on Reno Hill. In contrast, Reno had very few casualties in the timber, only a handful at most.
The Cheyenne warrior Wolf said that he could never understand why the soldiers left the timber and that "if they had stayed there, they would have been all right" (Larry Sklenar, To Hell with Honor, p. 242).
In Vanishing Victory, Bruce Liddic cites considerable Indian testimony to the effect that the Indians were baffled, and pleasantly surprised, that Reno left the timber.
The fact that the timber was an excellent defensive position was admitted even by Benteen, was noted by General Miles, and has been discussed by numerous scholars. And, as many scholars have observed, at the Battle of Beecher Island, Captain Alexander Forsyth held off 600-900 Indians for several days with only about 50 men by staying in a wooded area that offered less protection than the timber offered Reno.
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Post by johnson1941 on Jul 20, 2024 5:51:50 GMT -6
??
I replied that your list had a few good reads. It did. And there are others. As i listed some. And why l like them. {Most historians/scholars can’t even agree on Custers trail.}
I also notice, again, you didn’t answer my question. Which had no mention of “timber”.
No worries…the various takes re: the timber is certainly intereting stuff… Benteen too (his RCOI call, typically, was…curious)…much appreciated!
Q. State, in your opinion, whether or not 100 men with an average of 60 rounds of ammunition per man could have held that position any considerable length of time. A. They could have held it 5 or 6 hours, depending altogether upon the number of the opposing force. Q. From the character of the enemy they were engaging at the time, and the manner in which Indians usually fight, say those 900 there? A. They might have been reinforced by 900 more in a short time, and early the next morning they would all have been killed.
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Post by lakotadan on Jul 20, 2024 16:06:55 GMT -6
O.K. So mikegriffith1 states that “However, having no experience fighting Indians, Reno just panicked and decided to retreat from the timber and flee to the bluffs.” What is not stated is that Reno had one of his scouts, Bloody Knife, who was shot through the head while next to Reno. From this website- en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bloody_Knife“Reportedly, Bloody Knife was standing next to Reno, who had motioned for Bloody Knife to approach him so he could ask Bloody Knife what the Indians would do when his command began to move away from their village. Bloody Knife was shot in the head and killed while mounted on his horse before making a reply. Reno, his face smeared with the gore from Bloody Knife's wound, panicked and ordered a withdrawal”. So, Reno (after his scout's head exploded next to him) may have been spitting out pieces of skull and brain matter. How would that affect someone’s decisions in the moment?
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Post by mikegriffith1 on Jul 21, 2024 7:51:54 GMT -6
O.K. So mikegriffith1 states that “However, having no experience fighting Indians, Reno just panicked and decided to retreat from the timber and flee to the bluffs.” What is not stated is that Reno had one of his scouts, Bloody Knife, who was shot through the head while next to Reno. [SNIP] So, Reno (after his scout's head exploded next to him) may have been spitting out pieces of skull and brain matter. How would that affect someone’s decisions in the moment? One, your arguments here indicate that your reading on the battle has been limited. All of the lame excuses for Reno's retreat from the timber have been addressed by numerous scholars for decades now. Two, the death of Bloody Knife was no excuse for Reno to panic. The fact that Bloody Knife's death panicked Reno only proves my point that he was inexperienced and unfit to command in combat. If you lose your nerve and order a disastrous retreat from a strong position just because a man standing next to you gets shot, you have no business leading troops in combat. Three, Reno had not suffered a single casualty in the timber until he started to have his men gather in the clearing in the middle of the timber to prepare to flee. This is when Bloody Knife got shot. As for the argument that Reno could not leave Reno Hill sooner because he had to care for the wounded, that is sheer nonsense. Reno made this shameful claim at his court of inquiry (RCOI), and scholars began refuting it in the 1950s. As a 21-year Army vet, I find that excuse downright obscene. Reno only had a handful of wounded when he arrived on Reno Hill. You don't dawdle for an hour or more to treat a handful of wounded when you know there are 200 men fighting for their lives at a location you can reach in about 20 minutes (General Miles proved this in his reenactment). As soon as Reno read Custer's "come on . . . be quick" order, he should have packed up his wounded and headed toward Custer. This is exactly what Reno did when, after stalling for a good hour, he finally moved toward Custer because he was shamed into doing so by Captain Weir. Another long-debunked excuse that Reno-Benteen apologists still float is that Reno had to wait for the pack train to arrive and that the pack train did not arrive until at least 90 minutes after Benteen reached Reno Hill. However, Reno's battle report said the pack train arrived " soon" after Benteen joined Reno. Reno dramatically changed his story at the RCOI and claimed that it didn't arrive until about 90 minutes later. But several sources said the pack train arrived shortly after Benteen arrived, as in about 10-15 minutes after Benteen's arrival, including one of the packers who was with the pack train (Churchill). Lt. DeRudio, who was with Benteen's unit, likewise said the pack train arrived "soon after" Benteen arrived. Scholars began to debunk these lame excuses clear back in the 1950s, especially regarding Reno's foolish retreat from the timber. Even Edgar Stewart, who strained mightily to paint Reno in a positive light, admitted that Reno could have held the timber "for several hours without any difficulty" ( Custer's Luck, University of Oklahoma Press, 1955, pp. 359-360). Yet, we have people in 2024 who get on Internet forums and argue that Reno was justified in leaving the timber.
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Post by johnson1941 on Jul 21, 2024 12:19:08 GMT -6
?? Who what now?
Churchill said, he was up 8-10minutes (went 2 miles?!) and then the pack train: "...came up pretty quick. They kept stringing along a few at a time, but it was only a short time till all were up"
From Hare, Mathey, Varnum and Moylan - seems it was about 45minutes till the packs came up (after Benteen). Martin had them there after an hour, Benteen "over an hour". Wallace wasn't sure but figured 'well on to' 50mins. Godfrey mentioned 30-45minutes for the 1st packs to arrive. Reno “in a short time the pack-train came up”.
Hare "Reno made him acting adj. Benteen came up about 10 min after Reno got to top of bluffs, and 10 min after this Reno sent him to the packs...met packs north of north fork of Sundance creek...a mile or not much more...was gone from Reno about 20mins..." ... A. I was gone probably 20 minutes. Q. Did you see the ammunition packs come up? A. No, I got back before any of the packs came up. I rode to the pack train and back as fast as I could.
Mathey Q. After starting the ammunition pack mules with Lieutenant Hare, how long was it till you arrived with the pack train? What time of day was it? A. Something less than a half hour, probably 20 minutes. I think it was about 3 o’clock when we reached Major Reno’s command.
Moylan "In a few moments he came up with his {Benteen} three companies. In a half or three-quarters of an hour afterward the pack train came up. I saw Captain Weir’s company move out and move down to the stream..
Varnum Q. How long after Captain Benteen came up did the pack train come up, and did it come from the same direction that Captain Benteen did or a different one? A. It came from a different direction and I estimate it three-quarters of an hour after, possibly more or less.
Wallace We waited there, I don’t know exactly how long, for the pack train to come up, the dust from which we could see. After it did come up ammunition was distributed and we attempted to move on but Captain Moylan could not move his wounded. It took six men to carry one and the Indians were coming up thicker... ... Q. How long was [it] after Major Reno’s command had taken position, on the hill till Captain Benteen arrived and how long till Captain McDougall arrived? A. I don’t think it was more than 10 minutes till Captain Benteen came up. It was well on to an hour before the pack train came in.
Martin Q. Were you with your company when it joined Major Reno’s command? A. Yes, sir. Q. How long did you have to wait till the packs came up? A. Probably 10 or 15 minutes. I mean the packs made a long string and in 15 minutes everything was up. … The rest of us stayed there until the packs all arrived. The ammunition mules came first, in about fifteen minutes; but it was more than an hour before the last pack-mule was up.
Godfrey A. Some of the ammunition packs came up, I think, in probably half or three-quarters of an hour after we joined Major Reno.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 21, 2024 12:41:30 GMT -6
Yet, we have people in 2024 who get on Internet forums and argue that Reno was justified in leaving the timber. Personnaly I would have liked Reno to stay in the timber, it had cover it had water, my main point is ammo, what do you do when it runs out, we dont know how many rounds had been fired but going om Company M they had fired off over 50%. That is the only point I am making, well also that Reno stopped at the right time. The benifits of Reno staying in the woods are it troubled the Indians plus it gave a focal point for Benteen to concentrate as he could have secured the pack train and added Company B to his force and harressed the Indians. this may have kept hundreds of Indians fixed in the valley along with Crazy Horse. Not saying it would have helped Custer that much but some of his command might have broken free. Ian
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Post by lakotadan on Jul 21, 2024 14:01:43 GMT -6
All right then!
About Reno and the woods.
Didn’t Custer tell Reno (before Reno attacked the village) that he would be supported by the whole outfit, or he will have the support of the entire 7th cavalry (or something like that?).
Well, I guess Custer must have meant that figuratively and not literally (but failed to advise Reno of that important fact!).
So, there is Major Reno fending off the Native Americans waiting for the promised support from Custer. Where was Custer? So, Reno is probably thinking “why isn’t Custer supporting me as he stated he would?
Reno obviously made a bad tactical decision retreating from the woods (for whatever reason). But if the support from Custer (as told to Reno) was forthcoming, maybe things would have turned out differently?
O.K. let’s move on to something off topic.
What kind of egomaniac takes 4 relatives of his into a possible battle situation?
Yes, 2 of his relatives were officers. I can see his brother Thomas wanting to be with the 7th and his brother GAC. Maybe James Calhoun (the brother-in-law) wanted to be with the 7th to be in on any glory that GAC could provide.
But how about the younger brother Boston Custer? Didn’t GAC give him some sort of fictitious title so that he could tag along with the 7th? The same goes for the nephew, Harry Reed.
Why didn’t Custer at least split up his relatives and leave some with Reno or Benteen? At least they might not have all gone into battle, or if they did (as actually happened) maybe some would have survived.
But no! Custer wanted all of his relatives with him to see his great victory over the Native Americans!
Well, that never happened!
Has anyone ever brought up this topic before?
Of course, this is just all my opinon!
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Post by mikegriffith1 on Jul 22, 2024 3:48:14 GMT -6
Let us read what Dr. Robert Utley, one of the deans of Custer scholarship, said about Custer, Benteen, and Reno's conduct at the battle. He exonerated Custer and placed considerable blame on Reno and Benteen. First, his comments on Custer:
No sooner had Custer's body been buried on Custer Hill than all the principals--Terry, Gibbon, Brisbin, Reno, Benteen--began to recompose the history of recent events. Eager to explain the calamity and avert any culpability of their own, they conveniently forgot some things that had happened and remembered some things that had not happened. Their efforts freighted the historical record with firsthand evidence that threw the blame on Custer and powerfully influenced historical interpretation for generations to come.
This self-serving evidence is not without historical value. But only by rigorously comparing it with evidence dating from before the fatal last hour on Battle Ridge can a true understanding of the dynamics of the disaster be reached. A vital step in such an analysis is to strike out any facts, however plain now, unknown to Custer then. At each critical decision point the test is what he knew and what he could reasonably be expected to foresee.
In such a comparison and analysis most of the charges against Custer collapse. . . .
But one conclusion seems plain. George Armstrong Custer does not deserve the indictment that history has imposed on him for his actions at the Little Bighorn. Given what he knew at each decision point and what he had every reason to expect of his subordinates, one is hard pressed to say what he ought to have done differently. (Custer: Cavalier in Buckskin, University of Oklahoma Press, 2001, pp. 156, 162)
As mentioned, Dr. Utley assigned significant blame to Benteen and Reno. Let's start with some of his comments on Benteen:
Benteen counted himself out. . . . Had he moved at the same pace as Custer, and had he responded to the messages brought by Kanipe and Martin with the swiftness that Custer expected, Benteen might well have fought alongside Custer. . . .
A likely explanation [for Benteen's "laggard pace"] is distrust of Custer coupled with a rising suspicion that Custer, hoping to keep him out of the fight, had sent him on a useless errand. Keogh or Yates would have signaled a gallop as soon as they received Sergeant Kanipe's report. (p. 159)
And some of his comments on Reno:
Reno also failed Custer, as well as every test of leadership. His retreat freed large numbers of Indians to concentrate on Custer just as Yates approached the mouth of Medicine Tail Coulee. Had Reno continued to fight in the valley, the pressure on Custer would have been lessened, perhaps decisively. . . .
Likewise vulnerable was Reno's management of the hilltop operation. He should have rushed to Custer's aid no matter what the odds, and even at the risk of disaster to his own companies. The written orders to Benteen, now Reno's by virtue of his superior rank, explicitly required such a move. (p. 159)
By the way, historian Edgar Stewart, who bent over backward to be fair to Reno, was equally hard on Reno for his failure to move quickly to help Custer, noting the "total lack of support by Reno":
Throughout this period of inactivity [on Reno Hill] the officers seem to have alternated between trying to decide what to do next and trying to justify their failure to do anything whatsoever. During this time, with not an Indian in sight, Reno and Benteen are said to have "strode up and down their lines swearing and damning." Whether this incident is true or not, the fact remains that there was every indication that Custer was heavily engaged, and yet there was a total lack of support by Reno, who thus violated one of the most elementary precepts of military science: in the absence of orders, march to the sound of firing. (Custer's Luck, University of Oklahoma Press, 1955, p. 395)
After dawdling for over an hour, Reno finally moved toward Custer, but only because Weir and then Benteen had moved toward Custer, and only after Weir and Benteen had ignored Reno's orders to stop their movement. Only after all this did Reno finally move toward Custer. Yet, Reno had the gall to claim in his battle report that he had ordered the move toward Custer.
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Post by johnson1941 on Jul 22, 2024 4:44:49 GMT -6
Yep - we needn't blame Custer.
Whether it Reno stall, collapse & retreat up, Benteen 'coming quick' to find Reno retreating, the packs behind, the late and stalled advance down the coulee/bluffs, his own troops moving/located/lingering @whatever points north/east, the thousands of Indians and THEIR actions...
He just failed to foresee all the things that actually happened.
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Post by herosrest on Jul 22, 2024 7:37:27 GMT -6
For those who accept that the record of events left by survivors was earnestly truthful, there is of course a problem. It is a very simple problem since had either Terry, or his ADC, Smith, testified at Chicago with Terry's then little known of 'Painful Duty' first report of the battle, in evidence (at Chicago) then the story which testimony provided would not read as it does. It's pointless getting into why, since that will dissolve into the usual cunning stunts which obscure simple realities.
It is I believe, fair to say that abysmal performance though it was, Reno's tediously brief stand in the valley and his retreat into oblivion.... sorry, a river in full flow - over twelve (12) feet high banks, without knowing there was exit from the opposite banks, was his call as the battalion commander with responsibility for his men. It was his call and he made it. 101 other officers out of a hundred officers would have stood their ground and awaited the promised support but Reno did not and he was in command of the battalion, which some say he invited to join him in the escapade. It crossed my mind that Benteen would have been somewhat miffed had he known that the stream was full of flounder.
What took place on the bluffs subsequently, was unforgivable and is actually the core of accusations against Custer's pair of senior subordinates. Some stand for Custer, some for Benteen, and an unfortunate line hump the memory of Reno's leg. It is what it is but by Terry's pen anyone studying this battle knows that Reno was a bare faced and probably deeply embarrassed entity, lying himself blue in the face and believing that he should fill Custer's boots.
My best assessment of events, based upon Terry's disclosures is that Custer delayed and waited for Benteen to renew the valley attack. That was fatally silly by Custer who was hit by an avalanche. I believe that that occurred along the line from Greasy Grass Hill, to Calhoun Hill. If a battalion had meanwhile travelled further north as modern fantasy theory proposes for numerous reasons unrelated to the realities which I see - then Reno and Benteen were entirely derelict in their duty. There is no evidence whatever that Custer formulated a battleplan and or repeated the specific tactics which he employed at Washita, to attack Sitting Bull on Greasy Grass. Such evidence does not exist and can only be questioned by questioning every surviving officer's veracity. Depite Reno's lies and propensity for deity, he was a rat.
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Post by johnson1941 on Jul 22, 2024 13:03:16 GMT -6
HR,
What is in Terry's Report that would have affected testimony given at the RCOI? How would "it" have affected it?
Philadelphia, July 8, 1876 General William T. Sherman, Washington, D.C.:
The following just received from Drum, and forwarded for your information, ---------- Chicago, Ill., July 7, 1876 --- 1.10 a.m.
General P. H. Sheridan, U.S.A., Continental Hotel
The following is General Terry's report, received late at night, dated June 27:
"It is my painful duty to report that day before yesterday, the 25th instant, a great disaster overtook General Custer and the troops under his command. At 12 o'clock of the 22nd instant he started with his whole regiment and a strong detachment of scouts and guides from the mouth of the Rosebud; proceeding up that river about twenty miles he struck a very heavy Indian trail, which had previously been discovered, and pursuing it, found that it led, as it was supposed that it would lead, to the Little Big Horn River. Here he found a village of almost unlimited extent, and at once attacked it with that portion of his command which was immediately at hand.
Major Reno, with three companies, A, G, and M, of the regiment, was sent into the valley of the stream at the point where the trail struck it. General Custer, with five companies, C, E, F, I, and L, attempted to enter about three miles lower down. Reno, forded the river, charged down its left bank, and fought on foot until finally completely overwhelmed by numbers he was compelled to mount and recross the river and seek a refuge on the high bluffs which overlook its right bank.
Just as he recrossed, Captain Benteen, who, with three companies, D, H, and K, was some two (2) miles to the left of Reno when the action commenced, but who had been ordered by General Custer to return, came to the river, and rightly concluding that it was useless for his force to attempt to renew the fight in the valley, he joined Reno on the bluffs. Captain McDougall with his company (B) was at first some distance in the rear with a train of pack mules. He also came up to Reno.
Soon this united force was nearly surrounded by Indians, many of whom armed with rifles, occupied positions which commanded the ground held by the cavalry, ground from which there was no escape. Rifle-pits were dug, and the fight was maintained, though with heavy loss, from about half past 2 o'clock of the 25th till 6 o'clock of the 26th, when the Indians withdrew from the valley, taking with them their village.
Of the movements of General Custer and the five companies under his immediate command, scarcely anything is known from those who witnessed them; for no officer or soldier who accompanied him has yet been found alive. His trail from the point where Reno crossed the stream, passes along and in the rear of the crest of the bluffs on the right bank for nearly or quite three miles; then it comes down to the bank of the river, but at once diverges from it, as if he had unsuccessfully attempted to cross; then turns upon itself, almost completing a circle, and closes. It is marked by the remains of his officers and men and the bodies of his horses, some of them strewn along the path, others heaped where halts appeared to have been made.
There is abundant evidence that a gallant resistance was offered by the troops, but they were beset on all sides by overpowering numbers. The officers known to be killed are General Custer; Captains Keogh, Yates, and Custer, and Lieutenants Cooke, Smith, McIntosh, Calhoun, Porter, Hodgson, Sturgis, and Reilly, of the cavalry. Lieutenant Crittenden, of the Twelfth Infantry, along with Acting Assistant Surgeon D. E. Wolf, Lieutenant Harrington of the Cavalry, and Assistant Surgeon Lord are missing. Captain Benteen and Lieutenant Varnum, of the cavalry are slightly wounded. Mr. B. Custer, a brother, and Mr. Reed, a nephew, of General Custer, were with him and were killed. No other officers than those whom I have named are among the killed, wounded, and missing.
It is impossible yet to obtain a reliable list of the enlisted men killed and wounded, but the number of killed, including officers, must reach two hundred and fifty. The number of wounded is fifty-one. The balance of report will be forwarded immediately."
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Post by mikegriffith1 on Jul 22, 2024 15:23:20 GMT -6
Yep - we needn't blame Custer. Whether it Reno stall, collapse & retreat up, Benteen 'coming quick' to find Reno retreating, the packs behind, the late and stalled advance down the coulee/bluffs, his own troops moving/located/lingering @whatever over points north/east, the thousands of Indians and THEIR actions... He just failed to foresee all the things that actually happened. That's an overly "kind and gentle" way of framing what happened. Custer failed to "foresee" that Benteen would disobey a thrice-repeated peremptory order. Custer failed to "foresee" that Reno would halt his charge prematurely and would then be so foolish and incompetent as to leave the timber and free up the Indians to concentrate their forces on Custer. Custer failed to "foresee" that Reno and Benteen would dally about an hour before making any attempt to assist him after joining forces on Reno Hill. With just four more companies to support him, Weir could have moved from Weir Point and occupied Blummer Nye-Cartwright Luce Ridge. This would have supplied the support needed to sustain Keogh's defensive perimeter on Calhoun Hill, which in turn would have changed the overall outcome substantially. The packs issue is a false issue. The packs were close behind Benteen, as even Reno admitted in his battle report. When Reno wrote his battle report, he didn't realize all the things he would need to lie about, so he admitted that the packs arrived "shortly after" Benteen did. Several witnesses said the same thing. However, later, at the RCOI, when Reno realized the damning implications of this fact, he markedly changed his story and claimed that the packs didn't arrive until 90 minutes after Benteen did. There were not "thousands" of Indians. There were about 1,500, no more than 2,000.
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Post by herosrest on Jul 24, 2024 16:18:06 GMT -6
Concerning the content of Terry's initial report, he understood the siege of Reno Hill to have commenced at about 2:30pm. He gained that impression from someone and so who did he debrief?
Set the scene. He arrives on the hill, aware that Custer and a whole bunch of troopers are in demise. 'Well, what the hell happened, I have a campaign to fight.
You there, yes, wounded packer off your head for lack of water and looking as though someone has slapped you around. What happened?......
Reno did not dig in at 2:30pm under a hail of deadly gunfire. That document would prevent confusions over time of the place and related events, if in evidence at Chicago in 1879.
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Post by johnson1941 on Jul 24, 2024 19:10:42 GMT -6
Curious indeed - as this from Reno's official:
"I saw Benteen moving farther to the left, and, as they passed, he told me he had orders to move well to the left, and sweep everything before him. I did not see him again until about 2.30 p.m."
Wallace A. In compliance with the orders of Major Reno, I mounted by horse and rode down across the ford where we had retreated and met General Terry beyond the point where our skirmish line had fallen back. I reported to him that I had been sent out by Major Reno to show him the approaches to his position. He then asked me who was there. I told him Major Reno with seven companies and he went on to ask me in detail what had occurred, how the fight had commenced, and the result.
I dont think it is as big a deal as you. The rcoi was to find out what actually happened.
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