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Post by johnson1941 on Jul 24, 2024 20:00:31 GMT -6
Custer also failed to press an attack on the flank, as supposedly Reno thought he would in support…why?
{Already corrected your take of the timing on the packs, but yes there was still some delay for the rest of the command to move}
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Post by herosrest on Jul 25, 2024 12:12:02 GMT -6
The packtrain's progress behind the advance became a grey area of expertise based upon study by John S. Grey affording a 3-3.5mph advance over some 14 miles. Unfortunately, this is complete ******** by assine research. That command was reasonably capable of twice Grey's purdah. This was a mounted column with everyman mounted and one whose purpose and own security lay with the companies they served.
The companies east of the river whilst a battalion ooened the attack, did not have the time to make a crossing over the river before the attack in the valley was pulled out in wham bam thank you mam haste. That's how that happened. A brief embarrassing action in the valley lacking determination. The question is why? It became a catalogue of excuses, and again the question for me is why?
Before drifting this into the acrimony that attends discussing Reno, Fetterman's disaster should always attend consideration of the action. That said, 7th Cavalry were not in a like situation and had battle experience of fighting the entire Hunkpapa tribe with 10 companies.
Whether Reno ran, lost his head, or was tediously realistic about prospects for a success; his battalion fought a brief and limited, confused action which doomed the give companies downriver.
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Post by herosrest on Jul 25, 2024 12:20:52 GMT -6
I doubt that Custer did not forsee Reno halting his advance. That was a legitimate tactic for any commander going into battle. Custer observed the valley from terrain giving good view of the route to GO (Garryowen) and saw the timber fringed river which offered cover and defence if required.
Custer intended to make a crossing from east of the river and capture the village. Any consideration of the tactical fight excluding this prerequisite is practicing an immaturity worthy of considerable fred. 🤭
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Post by mikegriffith1 on Jul 25, 2024 13:01:37 GMT -6
I doubt that Custer did not forsee Reno halting his advance. That was a legitimate tactic for any commander going into battle. Custer observed the valley from terrain giving good view of the route to GO (Garryowen) and saw the timber fringed river which offered cover and defence if required. Custer intended to make a crossing from east of the river and capture the village. Any consideration of the tactical fight excluding this prerequisite is practicing an immaturity worthy of considerable fred. 🤭 Oh, I'm sure Custer foresaw that Reno would eventually halt his charge. Of course. But I don't think Custer expected that Reno would halt the charge so soon. As long as Reno was charging, the Indians were keeping their distance and moving away. Even Edgar Stewart doubted the wisdom of Reno's decision to halt his charge so soon after it began. Stewart cast doubt on Reno's claim that he could see a ravine 10 yards wide and 3 or 4 yards deep about 300 yards ahead full of Indians. He noted that Lt. Hare said that Reno could not have seen the Indians in the ravine ahead and that the Indians did not start to emerge from the ravine until after Reno had halted ( Custer's Luck, p. 350). So Reno may have invented the Indians-in-ravine excuse to justify halting the charge so soon. Stewart also said the following about Reno's halting of the charge: The Major has been severely, and not entirely unjustly, criticized for not obeying his orders, which incidentally gave him no discretion, and charging the village. Lt. Edgerly later wrote: "If Reno had charged through the village, Custer would have joined him in a very short time, and Benteen later, and we might have had an expensive victory." Mrs. Spotted Horn Bull, who was in the hostile camp, agreed that Reno struck too soon and that if he had charged the camp as ordered, the power of the Sioux would have been broken. (Custer's Luck, p. 351)The ammo packs began arriving about 15-20 minutes after Benteen showed up. The pack train did not arrive all at once, given its length, but ammo packs started arriving "shortly after" Benteen did, just as Reno indicated in his battle report. Also, as Gordon Harper noted, very little ammo from the ammo packs was distributed to Reno's men, suggesting that Reno's alleged ammo shortage was minimal at worst.
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Post by johnson1941 on Jul 25, 2024 20:49:25 GMT -6
Thats a good point about Reno’s halt, and failure to charge the village.
Reno orders per Rcoi Reno Per Reno report
But still doesnt answer to why Custer halted (or delayed) HIS supporting attack. Custer had no real notion of what Reno was doing after passing down the coulee, unless he was indeed told by his scouts in MTC, i.e. Bouyer.
Could that be why he retreated from the ford? He knew Reno was skirmishing? Yet that would seem counter to the whole notion of support…Reno was in need of it. Custer knew from or soon after his 1st view from Weir Hill/pt 7 it was a “BIG village” and they werent running.
IF IF IF Custer never intended to attack asap, as some historians figure (Kuhlman - Custer…Saga, despite lots of contrary primary statements which maybe he wasnt aware of), but instead was set on waiting for Benteen on the upper NE ridges, that would knowingly leave Reno in the lurch a LONG time.
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Post by herosrest on Jul 26, 2024 3:27:23 GMT -6
Confusion attends what is derived from study of these events and I have long conjectured that, then and now, that suited all parties since the full story can never emerge. Given what the surviving seniors and expedition commander felt was on the line for careers and future - their bent in responsibility shifted towards the dead CO, who was ultimately to blame. That blame however was always unlikely to stick to Sir Charge-a-lot's burnished brilliant armor. Given the recriminations and distrust inherent to the rivalries and open hatreds between the senior triumvirate of 7th Cavalry, then they could not caste themselves in poor light - and did not. History, students, and members of the related dynasties still mull this swamp today and advocate for their interests. No-one wants a yellow cur in the family history, or idiot general, or bilious obnoxious knowit all arrogant. The cause of the disaster east of the river was a very brief shambles in the valley. It's that simple. In further point, on 27th June 1876, Terry knew precisely where Benteen's battalion went. Today, and since Chicago, this is no longer so and has become the inheritance of W.A. Graham's shambolic study of the movement based upon his work with the Chicago investigation. His 1926 map, is a joke and one which no-one yet finds amusing. Benteen didn't know where the valley was and couldn't find it. Find me a log...... Right, I think it's time for a coffee break. I've thrown together disparate data which, no matter how hard you try, will never be fathomed and not even at six feet under. A luxury not aforded any member of the companies destroyed by the Great Sioux revenge of late June 1876. They whooped the army so bad...... that there should be a monument somewhere to the victory. ![(rofl)](//storage.proboards.com/forum/images/smiley/rofl.png) Of course, life doesn't work like that does it. Enjoy your coffee
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Post by johnson1941 on Jul 26, 2024 5:15:10 GMT -6
Ha - LOVE this: Brig. General Marshall, Crimsoned Prairie
He also quotes Col. Graham - and agrees, the attack on Custer started before Reno's retreat.
"The logic of the whole situation, its time element and the distances traversed and the fact the fully 3/4 of the entire indian force were waiting for Custer at the end of the village to ambush him as soon as he turned toward the river, implies the belief that the attack on him commenced before Reno retreated."
See Martin as I quoted in another thread. Who confirms just this.
"I got on the same ridge where General Custer saw the village the first time. On going back over that ridge I looked down into the bottom, and I saw Major Reno’s battalion was engaged." .... "I did not follow Dry Creek all way back to coulee running north and south but cut across the high ground. When I got up on the elevation I looked behind and saw Custer's command over on the flat and Indians over in the village riding toward the river and waving buffalo hides. The battalion appeared at this time to be falling back from the river."
Nice.
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Post by mikegriffith1 on Jul 26, 2024 6:41:08 GMT -6
Thats a good point about Reno’s halt, and failure to charge the village. Reno orders per Rcoi Reno
Per Reno report But still doesnt answer to why Custer halted (or delayed) HIS supporting attack. Custer had no real notion of what Reno was doing after passing down the coulee, unless he was indeed told by his scouts in MTC, i.e. Bouyer. Could that be why he retreated from the ford? He knew Reno was skirmishing? Yet that would seem counter to the whole notion of support…Reno was in need of it. Custer knew from or soon after his 1st view from Weir Hill/pt 7 it was a “BIG village” and they werent running. IF IF IF Custer never intended to attack asap, as some historians figure (Kuhlman - Custer…Saga, despite lots of contrary primary statements which maybe he wasnt aware of), but instead was set on waiting for Benteen on the upper NE ridges, that would knowingly leave Reno in the lurch a LONG time. The repetition of these timeworn arguments might suggest immunity to persuasion. Have you read any of the books on the battle written by professional historians over the last 20 years, not to mention the books written by longtime Custer scholars such as Gordon Harper (whose book was universally favorably reviewed in military journals and by professional historians) and Larry Sklenar (who spent years working as a military analyst for the DOD and whose book was likewise very favorably reviewed)? Every one of your above assumptions and arguments has been addressed in those works. You take the word of one of the most dishonest, self-serving sources on the battle--Major Reno--and then go from there. Reno's battle report is full of falsehoods, distortions, and omissions, but his RCOI testimony is even worse, because when he wrote his battle report he didn't yet realize all the lies he needed to tell. How can anyone trust Reno given his RCOI lies: no one told him they heard heavy firing to the north; he heard no heavy firing; he had no idea what Custer intended to do; he never saw Custer after he and Custer separated; he was not drunk nor under the influence; he saw hundreds of Indians in a ravine over 300 yards away during his brief charge; he could not leave Reno Hill sooner because he was low on ammo; the pack train didn't reach Reno Hill until 90 minutes after Benteen arrived; the timber was indefensible; he ordered Weir to advance toward Weir Point; many of his men were new recruits; he could not leave Reno Hill sooner because of the wounded; his dash from the timber was a well-ordered charge; he wanted to move toward Custer as soon as feasible; etc., etc. Ditto for Captain Benteen. Benteen's first letters after the battle belie his later claims about Custer's orders regarding Benteen's scouting mission. Benteen's RCOI testimony is not only unbelievable but nakedly self-contradictory. For example, on his first day on the stand, he said when he arrived on Weir Point, Custer was still alive and that he planted a guideon to attract the attention of Custer's command. But, on his second day on the stand, amazingly, he said that Custer's command was already destroyed when Martin arrived with the verbal and written orders from Custer--about 3 hours earlier. Custer did not leave Reno in the lurch. Reno and Benteen left Custer in the lurch, even though they knew that he wanted Benteen to quickly join him and that Custer was engaged in a serious fight. Reno ended his charge far too soon because he was drunk and lost his nerve, and he made things far worse by leaving the timber without even trying to make a stand there, enabling the Indians to concentrate their forces on Custer. Further compounding his sins, Reno shamefully stalled for a precious hour or more on Reno Hill while Custer's men were fighting for their lives just 20 minutes away.
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Post by johnson1941 on Jul 27, 2024 2:59:22 GMT -6
Yep - as I have stated before. I have read quite a few, including a few of the ones you list/ed. You will also realize I prefer not to let "historians" tell me what I should think. I saw early on that by just simply contrasting one to the other when at odds, or to the actual witnesses, one of them is wrong if the other is right, as often happens on various points. Besides adding their own spin, the possibility of "garbage in garbage out" is alive and well, as they (and others) all refer to one or the other to the other to the other, over time after time after time.
Try figuring out Custer's trail per "historians" - have fun!
As I said, Harper was good - but I enjoyed his Companion even more. Lets you do YOUR OWN thinking with access to the same primary information he used. Donavan, Philbrick, Kuhlman, Liddic, Utley, Gray, Hardorff, Wagner, etc etc are all good/decent starts for overviews, but I like the RCOI. Graham. Hammer. WMC. Scout & NA narratives. Godfrey, Thompson. Windolph. Edgerly. etc. etc. IOW, overviews are fine, even better when back up by PRIMARY witnesses, as I prefer people who were actually there to tell me what happened.
Luckily, there are lots of primary sources available these days. Yay internet!!
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Post by johnson1941 on Jul 27, 2024 3:07:05 GMT -6
SO now you question Reno's orders. Ok - simple enough: What were they?
You question whether Custer was supposed to support him. OK - simple enough: What was Custer supposed to do? What could Reno expect in support? Why didn't Custer press an attack?
Hare A. The supposition was that General Custer would support Major Reno by following him up. He knew that he had not done that. There was plenty of time for him to follow Major Reno and everybody supposed that he would attack the village somewhere, if he did not follow up, he would attack it somewhere else… {psst … Custer failed in this}
No he didn't. He said he planted a Guidon, “at the highest point”. It wasnt at Weir POINT, as it was at Weir HILL, identified as the highest point numerous times by numerous witnesses. Though Benteen was…iffy re: the marked points...'I suppose this figure “7” is intended for that point' and all. (“highest point 7” is actually his "G", as he knew) Benteen was a cunning witness indeed…(just as Harper pointed out).
Benteen, letter July 4 '76 Weir's Company was sent out to communicate with Custer, but it was driven back. We then showed our full force on the hills with Guidons flying, that Custer might see us, but we could see nothing of him, couldn't hear much firing, but could see immense body of Indians coming to attack us from both asides of the river.
RCOI When you met Trumpeter Martin did he report to you on which side of the river General Custer’s column was? A. Not at that time. He did after we had reached that highest point at the figure “7.” … A. Then I knew it because I asked where General Custer was. ... "I planted a guidon at the highest point that looked over that country. Some of the officers say that the battlefield was in sight, but I know positively that it was not, having gone over it two or three times since ... Q. State whether at that highest point you saw any evidence of fighting or hear the sounds of any firing. A. I saw no such evidence nor heard any firing. Q. What was the purpose of placing the guidon, on that high point? A. To present an object to attract the attention of General Custer’s command, if it was in sight. Q. Then in your opinion his command was then alive? A. I thought so. ... Q. How far was that point to which yourself and the advance of the command arrived from Major Reno’s position, on the hill? A. About a mile. ... Q. How far down the river was the furthest point reached by any company under Major Reno? A. About half a mile below that highest point.
Weir's HILL is about half a mile above Weir Peaks...it is where "Captain Weir" went to directing Edgerly, where Reno went to during the advance, where Hare went to converse with Reno, and where Benteen met Reno after his brief time at the Peaks when they decided to retreat. It is also "G". (And "pt 7". See Edgerly, Martin, DeRudio, and “5”. See Hare). A guidon was planted here.
Weir POINT is the extent of the Weir/Edgerly advance...and is about a mile below Reno Hill. (It is also "pt 9". See Edgerly).
Reno, RCOI Q. Do you remember about a guidon being placed at a point termed Captain Weir’s hill? A. It was done.
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Post by johnson1941 on Jul 27, 2024 3:08:09 GMT -6
Yep - At the RCOI, he said he "I believe" - THEN - in 1879 - i.e. by 1879 he stated he now believed that Custer et. al. was already dead. By 1879, he had also changed his notion of Custer's route, actions at the ford, & about Weir bravado. Oh the horror!
A. I received an order to “Come on, be quick, big village, bring packs, bring packs.” He then had found-... I wish to say before that order reached me that I believe that General Custer and his whole command were dead. ... ...I did so and followed down the gorge thinking that was the route taken by General Custer on the 25th of June. Now I am satisfied that was not his route … A. Captain Weir sallied out in a fit of bravado, I think, without orders.
7/4/76 Whether the indians allowed Custer's column to cross at all, is a mooted question, but I am of the opinion that nearly if not all of the five companies got into the village -- but were driven out immediately …. Weir's Company was sent out to communicate with Custer
Read through all the latest discussions, like the post a few above, and the Benteen take in July '76, you just may understand why (right or wrong) he might have the impression of GC being dead (which I don't agree with myself).
Custer had failed to press an attack in Reno's support for some reason. It is shown his command was already under attack and falling back. But very likely GC wasn't dead yet in the 3/4-hour Martin said he took going back (at least not his whole command)...too much firing going on.
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Post by herosrest on Jul 27, 2024 7:23:53 GMT -6
Custer did attackand engage the Indians. That allowed the 'being demolished' retreat by charging of high banks into a river, by the battalion in the valley - to avoid being wiped out in the open by the superior numbers of a highly mobile enemy force which swarmed into it. That could not have happened had the troops remained under cover. Court will shortly consider the motion to change Marcus to Wally.
The presence of five companies east of the river, once detected by the village, was sufficient to draw the Indians attacking Reno onto Custer. Describing, understanding, or accepting other ilk of explanation is the churlish befuddle which attends high office. The retreat by helter-skelter from the timber was as dumb as a flock of ducks sitting in a field and quacking at their hunters. Some have postulated that Custer was shot at, or in, the ford. Some of those say it was a ford three and some miles below Maguire's B on period maps and is Ford D. I surmise that Custer was shot in the bottom. Later, apparently, he was shot in the front of the bottom. With an arrow. At battle's close, Custer's hearing was severely impaired with awls. He could even then, though, hear considerably better than Reno or Benteen upriver.
Custer intended Benteen to reinforcw Reno in the valley. Reno ran. Bentten was tardy and arrived too late to join Reno in the valley and 'decided' to disobey Custer's order to pitch in to anything he found. He went instead onto the bluffs, joined Reno's battalion and had his unsaddle their horses. Yes, Benteen arrived to Reno and unsaddled his battalion. That obviously P'd Weir off. So Indian'son the high ground saw and fully comprehended what that meant. It meant something or other...... any idea what.
Have you ever read the letter which Benteen wrote to Maguire, shortly before the inquiry in 1879?
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Post by herosrest on Jul 27, 2024 8:11:17 GMT -6
Let's see if we can get you over it. Flat B sharp on a G string. It's worth viewing in 32K. I was wondering..... one of people's traits is inherent ability to blame others for their own faults and failings. Elliot was Benteen's battalion commander at Washita. You don't think fred's ego was so big that he just couldn't accept that 'he' screwed the pooch and caused the Major's death?
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Post by mikegriffith1 on Jul 29, 2024 10:49:47 GMT -6
Yep - as I have stated before. I have read quite a few, including a few of the ones you list/ed. You will also realize I prefer not to let "historians" tell me what I should think. I saw early on that by just simply contrasting one to the other when at odds, or to the actual witnesses, one of them is wrong if the other is right, as often happens on various points. Besides adding their own spin, the possibility of "garbage in garbage out" is alive and well, as they (and others) all refer to one or the other to the other to the other, over time after time after time. Try figuring out Custer's trail per "historians" - have fun! As I said, Harper was good - but I enjoyed his Companion even more. Lets you do YOUR OWN thinking with access to the same primary information he used. Donavan, Philbrick, Kuhlman, Liddic, Utley, Gray, Hardorff, Wagner [Griffith emphasis] etc etc are all good/decent starts for overviews, but I like the RCOI. Graham. Hammer. WMC. Scout & NA narratives. Godfrey, Thompson. Windolph. Edgerly. etc. etc. IOW, overviews are fine, even better when back up by PRIMARY witnesses, as I prefer people who were actually there to tell me what happened. Luckily, there are lots of primary sources available these days. Yay internet!! I'm hearing echoes of someone else who summarily dismissed the scholarly consensus because that consensus contradicted his views. So you're another one who basically says to just never mind that every professional historian who has written a published work on the battle over the last 20 years has reached the same conclusion about Reno, Benteen, and Custer. Wagner? ![???](//storage.proboards.com/forum/images/smiley/huh.png) Wagner was unserious, uneducated, and unbelievably biased. Go read our exchanges on the Little Big Horn Associates Message Board. Go read his exchanges with anyone else who disagreed with him on that board. Go read the many times Bill Rini ran circles around him. Wagner recommended books that he clearly had not read, such as when he recommended, to me, that I read Donovan's book, apparently not realizing that Donovan rejected every key claim that he made. Wagner was not even close to being in the same class as Hardoff, Utley, Liddic, Philbrick, Donovan, etc. Graham was a diehard Benteen apologist who frequently twisted facts--and transcripts--to conform to his position. Kuhlman was better than Graham, but not by much, and he wrote before a full and accurate publication of the Indian sources had occurred. Kuhlman was at least willing to admit that Reno was under the influence of alcohol during the battle and that the effort of Reno's attorney to discredit the witnesses of Reno's drinking was unfair. Wagner, in contrast, would not even acknowledge this much. Kuhlman was also willing to admit that Custer did not disobey General Terry's orders. He even wrote a short book on the subject and argued that Custer did not disobey Terry by any rational, fair, contextual reading of Terry's orders. But, oh, Wagner insisted that Custer did violate Terry's orders, and in his silly tome he did not even cite Kuhlman's work. On the other hand, Kuhlman defended Reno's ridiculous arguments about the timber, ignoring the testimony of the two witnesses who had far more experience in Indian fights, ignoring RCOI recorder Lt. Lee's arguments about the timber, and ignoring General Nathan Miles' analysis of the timber based on Miles' personal examination of the timber and on his discussions with Indians about the timber. Of course, we now have considerable Indian testimony that Reno's command would have been much safer in the timber. You are here making arguments that have been far outside the scholarly consensus for at least two decades. It's as if you were to get on a WWII forum and argue that Admiral Kimmel was entirely to blame for Pearl Harbor being caught by surprise on December 7, 1941, and as if you brushed aside the fact that that verdict has been overturned by the vast majority of scholars since the 1990s. Yes, of course, we should all read the relevant sources and reach our own conclusions. But, when we do so and then reach conclusions that have been soundly rejected by every professional historian and recognized scholar on the subject for the last 20 years, that should tell us there is something seriously wrong with our approach. Tell me, do you believe Reno's RCOI claim that Custer's command was destroyed by the time Reno left the timber? Do you believe Benteen's RCOI claim that Custer's command was destroyed by the time Martin arrived with Custer's written order? Do you believe Reno's RCOI denials of hearing heavy firing to the north? Do you believe Reno's RCOI claim that no one told him they could hear heavy firing to the north, even though his battle report said he and others heard firing and knew it had to be Custer? Do you believe Benteen's RCOI claim that he heard no heavy firing to the north either? Do you believe Reno's RCOI portrayal of the retreat from the timber as a well-organized charge? Do you believe Reno's RCOI claim that during the battle he expected Custer to support from the rear--and only from the rear, even though his battle report said he knew Custer would attack from the flank? Do you believe Reno's RCOI claim that he did not have a drop of alcohol to drink until the evening of the 25th? Do you believe Reno's later tale that during the Civil War he caught Custer hiding behind a tree during a battle? You see, these are issues that there should be no question about because the evidence on them is so clear and compelling. We should be moving on and discussing other issues about the last stand, but you and a handful of others insist on repeating the Reno-Benteen version of the battle.
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Post by johnson1941 on Jul 29, 2024 11:18:28 GMT -6
No - as I pointed out at least 3x already.
Hare A. The supposition was that General Custer would support Major Reno by following him up. He knew that he had not done that. There was plenty of time for him to follow Major Reno and everybody supposed that he would attack the village somewhere, if he did not follow up, he would attack it somewhere else…
Gordon Richard The usual tactic against a standing village was envelopment, whereby a holding force would engage the enemy while other parts of the command swung to the left and/or right to hit him in the rear or on the flank
1) What were Reno's orders? 2) HOW was Custer supposed to support Reno (if he was)? 3) Apparently Custer's flank attack failed and he retreated...WHY? 4) Custer did not press an attack at the flank. see 3. WHY? 5) After his attack failed, Custer left Reno in the lurch on his own & moved to & lingered at points north and east - WHY?
And on a side note: Who? WHich 2?
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