|
Post by herosrest on Jul 7, 2023 9:30:29 GMT -6
It is decidely unlike me to suffer confusion as has recently been exhibited with your north fork interpretations.
I have it on some aithority that the visiting Arapaho band, not those married and living with the families of their Sioux and Cheyenne wives; were equiped with early prototype versions of the UC M48 Tactical Tomahawk which made a huge advantage to their fighting on that day.
Quite a breakthrough.
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Jul 7, 2023 9:51:42 GMT -6
in the late April 2nd Cavalry scouted LBH valley with two companies which reported a huge vacant camping ground on the mouth of Lodge Grass about 10 miles above Ford A. This premise, of the Sioux camping there again informed Terry's planning and expectation given the caveats inherent with the instructions issued to Custer.
The camp was on the mouth of Long Otter Creek instead and intending to go to Lodgegrass. The chiefs changed their minds and went GO instead.
The village sighted 25th June was to the west and not the south. An idiot, and only a complete idiot, would continue up the Rosebud in that situation.
The flaw in planning was expecting the army to remain undetected.
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 7, 2023 10:30:36 GMT -6
I believe the scouts also saw smoke in Reno Creek. That is an assumption on your part The Crows would know of the south fork of Reno Creek, as did Herendeen. True....But not asked of anyone and not known to CusterThat is an assumption on your part He fought a battle there two years prior against about 600 of the same Indians. True but irrelevant. Herendeen was not asked You don't know thatso it does not matter. It was a well-known travel corridor that could lead to Lodge Grass or the Rosebud. Even if true, Custer does not know this and never did.Again you don't know that but we know Benteen was sent in a direction where he could cut SFRC if Indians were and he was ordered to pitching into them and report to Custer if he did Crazy Horse used it to get to the battle of the Rosebud. Big deal!! It still has no relevance to the decisions of sending Benteen to the leftIt goes to the widespread use of SFRC which Heredeen experienced against 600 of the same Indians We know that Reno was sent after Indians that were running down Reno Creek. Since Custer was ordered not to let them escape to the South, it was problematic, and I believe that was the reason for sending . Yes, we agree...That is why Custer was sent to prevent Indians from escaping to the South. You are about the only one that thinks they will be using SFRC. Everyone else knows that Benteen was sent to prevent escape up the LBH. They already know the Indians are on the LBH. There is zero evidence of what you state. Benteen was valley hunting not river hunting. If he was hunting the river there was no need to send the second messenger to tell him to continue past the line of bluffs first ordered. The line he traveled only works to block SFRC. If he continued that line he would be way up the LBH (10 miles) and could never reach the morassas ahead of the pack train. If you can show us that Benteen was ordered to the LBH that would make the second messenger unnecessary. If you read what Benteen actually did it fits perfectly with a concern about SFRC. He follows a line that puts him upstream SFRC about 5 miles from Reno Creek. That gives opportunity if the were fleeing up SFRC. Gibson and detail were the only ones that looked in SFRC. They saw no Indians and so Benteen moves downstream noname to Reno Creek.
Continue the line that Benteen was given to the river since you believe that is where he was sent and share how far upstream on the LBH that would be located? Give us an estimate of time to continue to the river and then how long it would take to move downstream to Ford A area. I think if you try this exercise it will confirm Benteen was not sent on a line to reach the LBH.
You are entitled to your opinion, even if everyone else knows different. Benteen...Godfrey....Edgerly.... They all say the LBH was the destination. There is evidence that a scout was sent ahead and looked into the LBH valley. This shows that they know what they were sent to do.
Show us where Benteen or anyone hears Benteen was ordered to the river. Benteen states he was valley hunting and was given a line of bluffs to ride to in the distance. Shortly after they left another order was given to continue past the first order. Did the river move? It would be a simple order to state ride on this line until you hit the river and then turn downstream and join the regiment.
Thanks for your concern about details it certainly gives people a chance to sort things out for themselves.
Justin
Regards Steve
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 7, 2023 10:36:44 GMT -6
in the late April 2nd Cavalry scouted LBH valley with two companies which reported a huge vacant camping ground on the mouth of Lodge Grass about 10 miles above Ford A. This premise, of the Sioux camping there again informed Terry's planning and expectation given the caveats inherent with the instructions issued to Custer. The camp was on the mouth of Long Otter Creek instead and intending to go to Lodgegrass. The chiefs changed their minds and went GO instead. The village sighted 25th June was to the west and not the south. An idiot, and only a complete idiot, would continue up the Rosebud in that situation. Only an idiot would listen to you without fact checkingThe flaw in planning was expecting the army to remain undetected. Again you are confusing people. A different Indian group from Lodge Grass was not the same as those that Custer followed.
|
|
|
Post by johnson1941 on Jul 7, 2023 11:26:38 GMT -6
Valley Hunting Fun via Camp, as often is usual... Attachments:
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 7, 2023 18:40:08 GMT -6
Valley Hunting Fun via Camp, as often is usual... If you read Roger Darlings Benteen Scout to the Left, it puts all the information in one place. We used that when we rode in that area. Benteen remained in noname, and Gibson climbed the ridge dividing SFRC and noname. On a flat map, it is not far, but on a horse, it is steep and narrow at the point Gibson marked on a map.
I may have missed it, but where in Benteen's testimony does it say he was first ordered to the river? From the point Gibson viewed, you can see the trees along the river but not across it. I took a picture from that point if you want to see it. So ask yourself, if Gibson thinks he cleared the river, why did they go back and move approximately five miles down noname?
Gibson cleared SFRC and all the way to Reno Creek.
The morass is fed by SFRC.
Regards
Steve
|
|
|
Post by johnson1941 on Jul 8, 2023 6:12:26 GMT -6
I don't see any such direct testimony either; and w/o REALLY knowing which "river" and which "valley" FB is referring to...(also, FB is consistent when he says Custer wasn't sure where the camp was yet)...anyway FB seems quite clear he did not find 'THE valley of the river'.
Benteen 4 July 1876 Report Sidenote: instructions/orders to return to trail, in contrast to his RCOI testimony
Benteen July 2, 1876
Benteen July 4th 1876, Montana, Harper, Gordon. The Fights on the Little Horn Companion: Gordon Harper's Full Appendices and Bibliography (p. 44). Casemate Publishers (Ignition). Kindle Edition.
small stuff, RCOI:
Q. Was the order you received from General Custer to send him word if you found anything as indication at the time he gave the order that he did not know the exact location of the hostile village? A. He did not believe there was a village there according to my belief. ... Q. State whether the successive orders you received from General Custer after leaving his command indicated that he did not expect you to be beyond reasonable communicating distance from him and that he expected to control your movements as far as possible . A. If I had went to the first valley and found nothing as I would not as I know now and had gone on to the second valley I would have been 25 miles away I don't know here I would have been as it was I was certainly too far to cooperate when he wanted me .
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 8, 2023 8:59:38 GMT -6
I believe the valley to be the only travel corridor away from Reno Creek that the Indians could escape in numbers to the south. That would be the south fork of Reno Creek. If Benteen were told to go to the river, it would be river hunting, and it wouldn't matter how many ridges he had to cross to get there. Benteen can't reach the LBH River following the line given before Custer moved down Reno Creek. He can reach SFRC 5 miles upstream ahead of where Custer would be visible to those Indians observed in Reno Creek.
Of the two choices, SFRC seems doable, but going to the river on that line is no help. It would be faster to keep Beenten with him and send him, ahead of the main body, up the drainage just before the river and have him move to the river from there.
Regards
AZ Ranger
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 9, 2023 7:51:02 GMT -6
I believe the valley to be the only travel corridor away from Reno Creek that the Indians could escape in numbers to the south. That would be the south fork of Reno Creek. If Benteen were told to go to the river, it would be river hunting, and it wouldn't matter how many ridges he had to cross to get there. Benteen can't reach the LBH River following the line given before Custer moved down Reno Creek. He can reach SFRC 5 miles upstream ahead of where Custer would be visible to those Indians observed in Reno Creek. Of the two choices, SFRC seems doable, but going to the river on that line is no help. It would be faster to keep Beenten with him and send him, ahead of the main body, up the drainage just before the river and have him move to the river from there. Regards AZ Ranger Hi Steve You are entitled to your opinion. You are probably the only one that thinks that. But that is OK. Rosebud Hi Justin
I am used to your style. Not sure why you attack with comments such as "You are probably the only one that thinks that," but it's your style. In my work, you would be an amateur in what people call us. We always consider the source and/or their motive. You attempt to increase your status by putting others down. How is that working for you?
You didn't understand how identification was used, or you would have asked by case or bullet. Instead, you went off on an ownership or possession tangent. If we used your standards, we couldn't do a photo lineup. If we found a license plate at the scene of an accident, it wouldn't identify a vehicle. Would you throw out fingerprints? Tape recordings?
69 carbines have been identified in the literature. All were identified by cases found on the battlefield. That five more were identified by the same method didn't change how things have been done. Did you think they had all 69 carbines? Tool-marked cases identify all 69, and it is a common practice methodology. I doubt they use bullets since it would incorporate a different database since the marking are made from the weapon's barrel. So that leaves only tool-marked cases methodology to identify the Springfield weapons.
If you didn't know that was the only method used to identify a unique firearm on the battlefield, it only means you weren't aware of the techniques used. That is the reason some of us come to these boards. We want to learn and share. Bullets help to identify the potential type of firearm, but I don't believe they have been used to identify individual firearms on the battlefield.
Regards
Steve
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 9, 2023 8:08:14 GMT -6
Hi Steve
You are entitled to your opinion. You are probably the only one that thinks that. But that is OK.
Rosebud
Justin
This comment shows you don't read what others have written on the boards or are presenting your opinion that is not supported by fact. Look up Montrose and SFRC and see what comes up for discussion. He was a Special Forces officer wounded in action serving his country. He is one of my heroes.
We can't make you read all the posts, but it shows you didn't. But that is OK. I plead guilty to not reading all the posts or even completing a post.
Regards
Steve
Here is little help, my friend.
"LTC Custer was looking for a repeat. He was looking for an outlier village he could destroy. The first attack he made on a templated village at the intersection of Reno Creek and SFRC is directly based on Washita. Benteen would get into the SFRC valley to block flight, disrupt the horse herds and attack the flank. (This spot was a common campsite and had been the camp the Indians used for the Rosebud fight. And the grazing locations used here were in SFRC)."
|
|
|
Post by johnson1941 on Jul 9, 2023 8:37:21 GMT -6
Wonder when Custer finally realized the real village...and did Cook know?
"WMRH told Curtis that before Custer left the Crow's Nest to put his regiment in motion, he sent Hairy Moccasin ahead with instructions to ride down Reno Creek and seek a closer look at the Sioux village. Now the Crows conducted Curtis along the path they said HM had followed on his solitary ride. They indicated where he passed a Sioux tipi, and pointed out a pine-clad hill he climbed for a better view of what lay ahead. From there, as WMRH put it HM "saw the Sioux everywhere across the Little Bighorn". Turning back, he met Custer and told him of the size and location of the Sioux village. The Sioux he said, were not running away as had been feared.
A little later, when Custer arrived at a point on Reno Creek about 3 miles distant from the LBH, it began to look as though the Sioux finally learned of his approach and were commencing to flee. Gazing ahead, WMRH saw a big cloud of dust on the west side of the LBH..." ... 'Now Custer ordered...Reno with 3 companies to push ahead...'
Viola, Little Bighorn Remembered.
While Reno reported...'
"As we approached a deserted village, and in which was standing one tepee, about 11 a.m., Custer motioned me to cross to him, which I did, and moved nearer to his column until about 12.30 a.m. when Lieutenant Cook, adjutant, came to me and said the village was only two miles above, and running away; to move forward at as rapid a gait as prudent, and to charge afterward, and that the whole outfit would support me. I think those were his exact words. I at once took a fast trot, and moved down about two miles, when I came to a ford of the river. I crossed immediately, and halted about ten minutes or less to gather the battalion, sending word to Custer that I had everything in front of me..."
|
|
|
Post by wild on Feb 22, 2024 11:08:16 GMT -6
A possible reason for the destruction of Custers command was that it was divided into companies under an officer who could act independently of HQ. Each company was actually a fault line which when under attack could take independent local action resulting as shown by their final positions in the total fragmention of the command. Custer ended up with fewer than 40 or so men on LSH. Where were the other companies? That they were detached in penny packets to undertake imaginare useless tactical/scouting chores is withour logic. Calhoun [tailend] first to call a halt and be over run. Keogh brought two companies to a halt, a fatal decision resulting in defeat in detail and then the hopeless situation on LSH with various officers leading desperate breakout attempts. There were more men lost in the vicinity of LSH than actually on it. Without a drill Custer at the end had zero control and fought as no more than a trooper. Best Richard
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Feb 23, 2024 5:00:30 GMT -6
I could certainly agree with your outline but it suggests that a concrete and defacto understanding of what happened, has happened. There are serious researchers still.......... running around developing Ford D's theory when all it means is that the tactics used previously and understood by the regiment, were adopted as best option, once Custer decided to ram it home. I can give you bodies located precisely where the markers are, modeling companies to B, and D, and on Luce, when the fans are turned off. The D unit is recalled. The B unit moves to support them. The Luce unit moves north and get nailed last. Small packets of survivors all over the ground doing escape into the river as far away from the camp as they can get - ie.... Ford d's. A four battalion attack was penny-packet, I believe that the senior subordinates advised Custer to keep the regiment together. Of course, they were not in command. All thirteen companies attacking across Ford A was a sure fire way to wipe them all out, since we know from Reno that the timber was indefensible, and the only highground was the hill at Garryowen. I agree with you though. Each company had its own commander and some of them were tediously experienced warriors. OH_014_004.pdf (383.86 KB) I'm not sure what's going on with laptop. It just went funny and is clicking and doing very weird stuff. Exterminate. Exterminate......... Help
|
|
|
Post by wild on Apr 13, 2024 5:48:07 GMT -6
Custer actually had the battle won strategically when from the crows nest he saw that he was in striking range of the village . He lost it tactically when he decided to attack. A village of that size could not run or scatter it was in fact strategically pinned in place. The Indians could not have defeated the regiment or put another way 600 carbines. All Custer had to do was to be a threat and await the arrival ot Gibbon
|
|
|
Post by noggy on Apr 13, 2024 8:11:37 GMT -6
The Indians could not have defeated the regiment or put another way 600 carbines. All Custer had to do was to be a threat and await the arrival ot Gibbon Agreed. The operational goal of the Summer campaign could be achieved by many means, being a constant threat would be a huge factor in NA decision making. All the best, Noggy
|
|