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Post by montrose on Oct 31, 2019 15:31:27 GMT -6
1. Purpose. Discuss LBH decision points.
2. Decision Point 1.
a. Location Divide. b. Situation. Enemy village believed to be at the intersection of South Fork Reno Creek (SFRC) and Reno Creek. c. Decision. Main attack with Reno, Keough, and Yates battalions following avenue of approach Reno Creek. Benteen Battalion to move to left to SFRC and then follow this to attack village from this flank. McDougall battalion with trains following to linkup at village. d. Who knew. All five BN commanders knew the plan. e. Outcome. Dry hole, enemy village not at SFRC/Reno Creek. Next estimate of village is vicinity Ford A.
3. Decision Point 2.
a. Location. SFRC/Reno Creek intersection. b. Situation. Enemy village template now across Ford A. Benteen and McDougal Bns are trailing. c. Decision. Attack with Reno Bn in the lead, followed and supported by Keough and Yates Bn. d. Who Knew. Reno, Yates, Keough did, Benteen and McDougall did not. e. Outcome. Main body conducted 3 BN movement to contact towards Ford A.
4. Decision Point 3.
a. Location. Vicinity lone tepee (there are more than one lone tepee, this is after SFRC and before Gerard knoll). b. Ituation. Enemy village close, and known to be north of Ford A. c. Decision. Regimental attack with Reno Bn advance guard, supported by Keogh and Yates Bn. Trailing Bns expected to follow trail across Ford A with linkup vicinity village. (You will be supported by the whole regiment). d. Who Knew. Reno, Yates, Keough knew; Benteen and McDougall did not. e. Outcome. Reno Bn surges ahead to Ford A, trailing Bns are a few hundred yards back, as per doctrine and tactics.
5. Decision Point 4.
a. Location. Vicinity Gerard knoll. b. Situation. Enemy village definitely north of Ford A, but farther downriver than expected. Enemy in contact in small numbers, 50-ish and fleeing down river. c. Decision. Reno Bn is committed to attack as advanced guard, crosses river and attacks down the valley. LTC Custer stops supporting his advance guard. He instead does not cross the river. He takes the supporting battalions downriver east of the river, looking for a Ford on the flank or behind Indian village. d. Who Knew. Yates and Keough knew, Reno, Benteen, McDougall did not. e. Outcome. One Bn attacking west of river, isolated and without support. Two Bns not in contact, moving east of river. Two Bns trailing far in the rear.
6. Decision Point 5.
a. Location. 3411. b. Situation. Enemy village location now known, most of it is visible. The northern edge is out of sight to the north. Reno has all 3 companies on line, using river to protect his right flank. His left flank is in the air. The Indians have a dismounted line in Otter Creek blocking his advance. A mounted element of 8-900 is sweeping past his open flank, and has cut him off from Ford A. No significant Indian force east of river or defending Ford B. c. Decision. Main body moves to Luce/Nye/Cartwright Ridge (all part of same terrain feature) to create a linkup position for trailing Bns. Messages sent to trail Bns to follow LTC Custer's trail east of river, and not follow Reno into the valley (where they would have run head on into Indian main body between Ford A and Reno BN). Main body sends scouting elements towards ford B and Battle Ridge. d. Who knew. Yates and Keough did, Benteen, Reno, McDougall did not. e. Outcome. Reno forced to flip his line to protect his open flank, attack culminates and transition to defence. Keogh BN moves to L/C/N ridge, opens long range fire on scattered Indians east of river. Scouts out.
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Post by montrose on Oct 31, 2019 15:48:18 GMT -6
7. Decision Point 6.
a. Location. Unknown. Decision took place after 3411 and before movement from LCN Ridge to south end Battle Ridge (Calhoun Hill). b. Situation. No significant defence of Ford B. Village extends nort of Ford B, north edge not visible. Village itself surging with activity as horse herds move in, and civilians running around, Main body unable to monitor valley fight or status of trail battalions. c. Decision. Move regimental linkup point from L/C/N ridge to south end Battle Ridge/Calhoun Hill. Launch a large reconnaissance to find north end of enemy village, while waiting for arrival of trailing units. Link up will be late afternoon assuming no enemy action on trailing units (good assumption, since there was none; but with Ford A open, it was possible). d. Who knew. Yates and Keough. e. Outcome. Reno is defeated in the valley since the main body abandoned the advance guard. Main body sat in plain sight of village with Keough Bn sitting still and Yates Bn wandering around the prairie. Trail Bns still moving towards an unknown link up point.
8. At this point the initiative has been handed to the enemy. The Indians have a central position, and from this point forward no US attacks on village will occur. With the village safe, and scattered enemy elements all in isolated positions, a counterattack is inevitable. LTC Custer not only loses the ability to know what the Indians are doing, he has lost any ability to command and control his own regiment. He dies in command and control of a single company.
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Post by shan on Nov 1, 2019 12:30:15 GMT -6
Sorry, I know this is off point, but I have a few questions I'd like to ask.
With regards to the duration of the Custer's part of the battle, I think we do have a few clues apart from a number of Indian statements which talk about it being all over pretty quickly.
Let me start by saying that I'm afraid I haven't got a good head for holding onto facts, so I'm more than happy for anyone to correct me if I'm wrong. First things first, Benteen arrived pretty much around the same time as the last of Reno's stragglers were scrambling up the hill. Now if we allow that Reno had been in action for around 45 minutes or so, where does this place Custer's force around this time? If we choose to go with the short fight scenario, personally, I suspect that he's already moving back towards Calhoun to rejoin the rest of the command.
Now I know there are a lot of arguments about this, but Weir probably left for Weir Point some 20 to 30 minutes later, and would have been observing the field some 15 minutes after that, and from the few reports we have, what he witnessed was the aftermath of the fighting around Calhoun: mounted Indians riding around shooting at objects on the ground, and large numbers of non combatants; squaws and suchlike already present in the vicinity. All of which indicates that the fighting around there had been over for some time, and that what fighting there still was, must have been going on elsewhere.
Now as far as I'm aware, and please correct me if I'm wrong, there was no direct reference to them hearing large volumes of firing coming from that direction, by which I mean the Keogh sector, or even L.S.H. which, if correct, means that the heaviest fighting was either over, or else coming to an end. And by the way, I don't think this has anything to do with distance, for people were hearing firing back where Reno and Benteen were still located, so one would imagine that had there been heavy firing, then it would have been easier to hear from Weir Point.
By the time that the rest of the command came up, and again, there seems to be some dispute as to how much later this was, but I'm going to choose 45 minutes later, I'm pretty sure the fight was over and that all they could hear was some mopping up activity. Again, I maybe wrong about this, but I don't recall reading reports of them hearing heavy firing either, which in itself raise some questions.
Given that they could see nothing going on other than Indians moving about, why then did they stay there for another hour or so? Surely, if they thought that Custer's command were still alive and fighting, then they were obliged to go to their aid, but they didn't make a move. Which indicates, either they knew what had happened, and that it was all over, or else they thought that he had fled the field and was moving off towards Terry. In either case, why did they stay there so long after that, rather than moving back and securing the spot that they'd chosen as a defensive position?
Shan
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Post by montrose on Jun 7, 2023 7:34:36 GMT -6
The battle involved a series of decisions by LTC Custer, each based on previous decisions. This battle is a classic death spiral decision making process. This means a series of decisions that keep making the overall big picture situation worse, while the leader is overly focused on an increasingly narrow part of the space and time of the battlefield.
Remember, Custer had a few weeks serving in a company before going to staff. He never commanded a company. He had little or no experience at company and field grade. in ACW, he served as general's aide and then right to brigade and division commander.
Custer was impatient and had a sense of urgency. He could not wait for trailing units to catch up, but kept pushing far out of support range with smaller and smaller elements. The speed of the pack train was slower than the companies. Benteen was behind because he followed Custer's orders to conduct a flank movement into the hills and valleys of the south fork of Reno Creek. The time it would take him to catch up was something any company and field grade officer would know, due to years of experience. I distinctly remember the very boring classes on march tables in the officer basic course plotting out your subunits varying rates of march and getting folks from point A to point B. Followed by 3 years in a mech unit in Germany where I led 37 convoys and 18 railheads, plus the numerous Hohenfels, Reforgers, etc. The time it would take to reassemble the command would be known to experienced, competent officers and NCOs. Moving the assembly point farther (and farther) north not only extends this time for a line company, but greatly extends this time for aa slower moving element, like the pack train and any unit moving wounded personnel and animals.
As Custer impatiently kept moving forward with ever smaller forces, he basically lost his ability to act. What exactly can 2 companies at Ford D do to defeat the Indians at LBH, hours from support of any other US element.
This battle was winnable, if a regimental attack had occurred IAW LTC Custer's own regimental attack order. It failed because he disobeyed his own order. He abandoned the regimental attack. He did not tell Reno that the advanced guard was to be abandoned, nor why, and what was Reno supposed to do when 5 companies abandoned the fight, and took part in no offensive action for the rest of the battle. You do not succeed in an attack when only 3 companies at LBH take any offensive action.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jun 7, 2023 10:03:39 GMT -6
I believe the decision point where Custer moves to the bluffs to be the beginning of the end. My question is, why didn't Custer move into the valley following his advanced guard?
Regards
AZ Ranger
Good to see you posting, William
William is one of my heroes. I hope all of you pay attention to what he has to say.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jun 7, 2023 10:05:13 GMT -6
I am heading to the battlefield Monday. Is there anything I can do there to help this discussion?
Regards
Steve
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Post by montrose on Jun 7, 2023 16:34:14 GMT -6
I am heading to the battlefield Monday. Is there anything I can do there to help this discussion? Regards Steve I think that the critical decision at LBH was the decision to abandon the regimental attack in the valley and head into the badlands east of the Indian camp. I would like to know why GAC made this decision. The information he had available was limited. At the place he made this decision he had already deployed the regiment to attack a templated village at the intersection of Reno Creek and South Fork Reno Creek, that was a dry hole. It had been a valid village location, but had been occupied and left a few days prior. Evidence pointed to an a very large Indian village very close, in the LBH valley. The issue was whether the village was north or south of the intersection of Reno Creek and LBH river. The best village locations were south, and the village had gone there after the Reno creek/SFRC camp. The Indians had relocated to the 25 June battle camp in response to elk herds in that area. This means uncertainty based on knowledge of local terrain and known Indian behavior from the hired scouts. So let's look at the decision, and work back. GAC ordered a regimental attack with 3 companies up and 5 back. The order templated an Indian village 2 miles away, one and a half miles from Ford A, across the LBH river, and north. It quickly became obvious there was no village that close to Ford A, but farther north. How far, and what was the terrain? The decision to move to the bluffs implies a belief that the village was north of ford A, and south of Ford B and that Ford B existed. This can only come from scouts familiar with this area, and with Indian camp sites used before. (The Gibbon scouts had been here just a few weeks ago). I believe LTC Custer saw an opportunity to have 3 companies attack the templated village from the south, while he took the other 5 across Ford B and attacked from the north. Dust and smoke signatures are affected by atmospheric conditions. This means they can move like wind, but also the density can change and the length of time they remain visible. Their are likely scientific terms here, I can just say from many years experience, that there is an art and a science here, I can read dust signatures and tell you what they mean, but can not explain rationally why. The whole worms argument back at the divide. So what data did he have when he made this decision. The total number of Indians his force had found was 50. They definitely went north from Ford A, and there was smoke and dust in the LBH valley, north of A, vicinity Ford B. But I think I am missing a piece. Something helped trigger GAC's mind. Is there any line of sight from Gerard's knoll or in this area that could have helped convince GAC that the village was north of Ford A and south of Ford B? Direct line of sight we can sort out using terrain software, which means no. But this will not reflect smoke and dust signatures. I spent 2 deployments scouting in deserts, dust signatures matter. The Indian horse herds were west of Ford B, west of the LBH valley. 10000 plus horses would leave a signature. The Reno BN attack was, in part, defeated because a hunting party of a few hundred was in the badlands west of the LBH valley, north of Ford A, and south of ford B. Again, they would have a signature. So for your trip, my interest is not direct line of sight. I want to know what can you see ABOVE direct line of sight. And let's focus on folks who we know provided data to GAC. Girard and Girad's knoll, Godfrey and his scouts, Godfrey and Keough, who only went to Ford A, and did not cross. GAC is reckless, and a gambler who lost far more than he won. But he was not a fool. He must have received some data point that convinced him he had an edge, an all in bet all your chips moment. I think the key to understanding LBH is here, not anything that followed. Very Respectfully, William
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Post by herosrest on Jun 10, 2023 8:19:08 GMT -6
If I may, what are your views on Custer's Washita tactics - advantages and risks.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 10, 2023 9:06:29 GMT -6
As I can remember William, Custer didn't know anything about the situation in the valley, the only info he received was from Cooke who met with Gérard, Gérard had been informed by Ree scouts that Indians where moving up the valley to meet Reno.
In all probability Custer had already decided to go up the bluffs by then, this news off Cooke would have added to his decion.
Ian
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 10, 2023 9:11:48 GMT -6
If I may, what are your views on Custer's Washita tactics - advantages and risks. May I add to this HR, do you think that if Custer was fully informed then he would have still attacked the village from various points? He attached at the washita three places, so at the lbh he could have: Reno up the valley with 3 coys Custer Ford b with 5 coys Benteen Ford d with 3 coys Ian
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Post by herosrest on Jun 11, 2023 16:36:54 GMT -6
The issue of Custer ascending the bluffs and then using that route to progress downriver was the result of a decision on his part. I have no reasons to doubt the Crow scouts accounts, or that of trumpeter Martin so both groups (Martin with Custer, and the scouts with Bouyer) went up. Sticking to this rather than messing about with pedantic timing of parallel movements (Reno and Custer) - Custer arrives to a vantage point and can see the valley below. There will have been an assessment of what lay downriver and ahead along the bluffs. He will also have looked to Ford A for Reno, and up Reno Ck. for Mathey and McDougall. Movement was kicking up dust which was visible and this was certainly true of 7th Cavalry and specifically the rearguard and packtrain which Custer had messaged about dust during the move through Reno Ck.
Comment by Kanipe about his ride back with instructions for Mathey and McDougall, told that from the bluffs where he was sent back in the area of Benteen's 'G' - 3411, he could see the dust of the packtrain.
Comment by Kanipe about the ride to the bluffs, indicates Custer was aware of a party of hostiles in the direction of the bluffs or on them, and a party of size such that could not be ignored. Whether such was a figment of Kanipe or not draws opinion and disregards but should not be ignored.
From the terrain upriver of Weir's peak, Custer could not see the entire encampment and pretty much anyone and everyone agrees this because that's the way it was.
There is reason enough, given above, to sweep along the bluffs if there was a crossing below within reasonable distance. There was. Moving along the bluffs to the B Fords protects McDougall and Mathey. Benteen was not a part of the equation. Move the five companies across Ford A to re-inforce the strike down the valley and the packtrain and rearguard are offered jeopady. It may have been this simple and I'm sure this insight has been provided many times during the past 146 years, so obviously I am missing something although hopefully not a brain.
In the situation outlined and based upon what Custer knew, could see, and extrapolate, including Martin's comment the village was calm, unruffled and lacking apparent threat; surely Custer catered for the possiblity that the hostiles reported by Kanipe, were lurking and could follow across Ford A, or interfere with the following train and rearguard. I don't think there is serious calculation involved if Custer had been told there was a good crossing place within reach. You certainly would expect Reno to be messaged. Reno messaged Custer. Reno and Custer were seeing different things - which is a problem that elevates the problem into silly.
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Post by herosrest on Jun 11, 2023 16:59:13 GMT -6
There is corollary regard to what Custer knew at the time of seperating Reno across Ford A. It is broadly held in considered opinion that fear of the encampment running in scatteration (Godfrey), was extant in 7th Cavalry at the time Reno was given his attack mission. This was not so, up until the time Custer ascended the bluffs. What Gerard and others knew is moot since only Bouyer interpretted the Crows.
From the Crow's Nest, one Crow scout was sent ahead of the advance to observe the valley and that scout, Hairy Moccasin, returned to Custer during advance along Reno Ck. to advise the village was in place and was not in uproar, breaking up, or running. Account's of Hairy Moccasin's scout are several through the decades following the battle such that doubt is eliminated. Proof exists in the reality that the camp was not in uproar, breaking up, or running; with men sleeping in and women ranging far in parties digging tipsina.
I would suggest also, that Custer's attempts to have the Ree scouts range ahead into the hostile herds suggests he expected a standing camp which the scouts presence on its periphery would trigger any threat in place. I feel that the Rees' understood this and the risks to them in advance. It seems that they raised the: 'We ain't cannon fodder issue'.
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Post by montrose on Jun 22, 2023 10:59:36 GMT -6
This is Bill Smith's interpretation of the battle ridge fight. I like this for the visuals showing terrain and units. It should be noted that neither Fred or myself agreed with some of his facts and most of his opinions, but this involves several hundred posts that is too tedious to review. www.youtube.com/watch?v=0XcLt-iGEogMy intent is to give a visual aid to frame a discussion of decision making in this sector. A reminder: battles involve two opponents. Indian decision making in this sector was far superior to the US, with a decentralized unorganized mess of a decision making process. My thesis in grad school was about the differences in organization design and decision making process with respect to unconventional warfare. calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/31274
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Post by montrose on Jun 22, 2023 11:27:05 GMT -6
Hero,
I am responding to your inquiry about the impact of Washita on LBH.
AT Washita the Indians had spread out the villages in a wide area. They were not in supporting distance of one another, nor did they have an integrated defense plan. There was safety in having several villages in the same area. The Indians had resource issues if they were too close, their deployment was a compromise, that failed.
LTC Custer found an outlier village and organized a successful pincer attack. He had not scouted the surrounded area and had no idea of the other villages. A vastly superior Indian force showed up too late to save the outlier camp. They then sat on their asses. They were there to protect their own camps. SO when Major Elliot moved in their direction, his patrol was destroyed. They would react to an attack. When Custer withdrew they made no effort to interfere.
SO Washita had a profound impact at LBH.
LTC Custer was looking for a repeat. He was looking for an outlier village he could destroy. The first attack he made on a templated village at the intersection of Reno Creek and SFRC is directly based on Washita. Benteen would get into the SFRC valley to block flight, disrupt the horse herds and attack the flank. (This spot was a common camp site, and had been the camp the Indians used for the Rosebud fight. And the grazing locations used here were in SFRC).
But this was a dry hole, this whole thread is about how his decision making steadily collapsed after this moment.
And, of course, the Indians were also at Washita. The Indians at LBH put the villages in mutual supporting distance. They developed a common defense plan, an attack on one tribe was an attack on all. The Indian defense plan was a reasonable response to a decentralized decision making process. There was to top Indian commander, there was just an extensive middle management who decided on their own. Since everyone new the common plan, the individual leaders could use their own judgment to fit the plan.
It is like punching a hornet nest. There is no need to have a hornet general to know you are about to be stung.
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Post by montrose on Jun 22, 2023 12:05:14 GMT -6
I think that the critical decision at LBH was the decision to abandon the regimental attack in the valley and head into the badlands east of the Indian camp.
I believe most folks here do not understand the effect of fatigue. If a tank is low on fuel, you add fuel. If a man is fatigued on a long march, you can motivate a man to keep going with words. If an animal is overfatigued, they give up and drop out and die.
The US force had been putting enormous stress on animals. The decision to move to the badlands shows an incompetent officer. Horses started falling out within minutes. Moving into the badlands would significantly impact the trailing Benteen and McDougal battalions. I do not mean minutes, I mean hours. I am disgusted that posters blame the trailing units with how long it took them to mov to the linkup point, when the linkup point kept moving farther away, on increasingly worse terrain.
We have animal experts her. Rosebud and AZranger, what say you?
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