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Post by noggy on Jun 23, 2023 11:29:16 GMT -6
I think that the critical decision at LBH was the decision to abandon the regimental attack in the valley and head into the badlands east of the Indian camp. --------- I am disgusted that posters blame the trailing units with how long it took them to mov to the linkup point, when the linkup point kept moving farther away, on increasingly worse terrain. There are numerous outcomes of the battle which would could have been seen as advantageous (right word?) from the US perspective. Even 8 companies could have achieved many of them. To this day, it is for me the most mind-boggling, not which creek or dried out riverbend E Company took a rest at. As for blaming the trailing units, I have noticed how many of these people feel Reno/Benteen should have known where GAC was and "saved" him, while they have no issues with GAC leaving Reno alone in the valley. (Ofc, when on Reno Hill some sort of attempt tomake contact should have been done earlier but these people almost think Benteen telepatically should have teleported to GAC and Reno's breakout should have been straight towards the hero and man of the hour) Hope you are doing well, sir. All the best, Geir
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Post by noggy on Jun 23, 2023 11:54:08 GMT -6
I think that the critical decision at LBH was the decision to abandon the regimental attack in the valley and head into the badlands east of the Indian camp. I believe most folks here do not understand the effect of fatigue. If a tank is low on fuel, you add fuel. If a man is fatigued on a long march, you can motivate a man to keep going with words. If an animal is overfatigued, they give up and drop out and die. The US force had been putting enormous stress on animals. The decision to move to the badlands shows an incompetent officer. Horses started falling out within minutes. Moving into the badlands would significantly impact the trailing Benteen and McDougal battalions. I do not mean minutes, I mean hours. I am disgusted that posters blame the trailing units with how long it took them to mov to the linkup point, when the linkup point kept moving farther away, on increasingly worse terrain. We have animal experts her. Rosebud and AZranger, what say you? What is the judgement on Crook's "Horsemeat March"? Geir
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Post by crzhrs on Jun 24, 2023 10:38:47 GMT -6
Hero, I am responding to your inquiry about the impact of Washita on LBH. AT Washita the Indians had spread out the villages in a wide area. They were not in supporting distance of one another, nor did they have an integrated defense plan. There was safety in having several villages in the same area. The Indians had resource issues if they were too close, their deployment was a compromise, that failed. LTC Custer found an outlier village and organized a successful pincer attack. He had not scouted the surrounded area and had no idea of the other villages. A vastly superior Indian force showed up too late to save the outlier camp. They then sat on their asses. They were there to protect their own camps. SO when Major Elliot moved in their direction, his patrol was destroyed. They would react to an attack. When Custer withdrew they made no effort to interfere. SO Washita had a profound impact at LBH. LTC Custer was looking for a repeat. He was looking for an outlier village he could destroy. The first attack he made on a templated village at the intersection of Reno Creek and SFRC is directly based on Washita. Benteen would get into the SFRC valley to block flight, disrupt the horse herds and attack the flank. (This spot was a common camp site, and had been the camp the Indians used for the Rosebud fight. And the grazing locations used here were in SFRC). But this was a dry hole, this whole thread is about how his decision making steadily collapsed after this moment. And, of course, the Indians were also at Washita. The Indians at LBH put the villages in mutual supporting distance. They developed a common defense plan, an attack on one tribe was an attack on all. The Indian defense plan was a reasonable response to a decentralized decision making process. There was to top Indian commander, there was just an extensive middle management who decided on their own. Since everyone new the common plan, the individual leaders could use their own judgment to fit the plan. It is like punching a hornet nest. There is no need to have a hornet general to know you are about to be stung. There were major differences between Custer's attack at the Washita and the LBH: 1: At Washita Custer attacked in the morning during winter, at LBH it was summer and mid-day. LBH village was awake and quickly overcame their surprise unlike at Washita when the Indians had to scramble from sleeping. Ever try to get your senses when you are unceremoniously awoken from a deep sleep? 2: At the Washita it was the hapless Black Kettle who took the brunt of the attack; 3: At LBH the majority of Indians were hard core non-reservation warriors led fierce fighters; 4: By June 1876 bitterness between Custer and some of his officers had grown that may have caused the command not to have the "esprit de corps" needed for their best effort either consciously or sub-consciously; 5: The LBH warriors were supremely confidant after taking on Crook that they could handle any force that came against them unlike the Washita where Indians seemed oblivious to anyone hitting them.
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Post by herosrest on Jun 30, 2023 3:46:06 GMT -6
I'm in near complete agreement with the views expressed by Montrose in the Washita comparisons and decision points into LBH, keeping in mind that the first hand information is biased. I do not hold the view that 7th Cavalry had any significant chance to capture the villages they charged upon.
Where I maintain an open mind is with the attack itself and simply becuase the views expressed are that no plan of battle existed does not mean that was so.
Theorists pushing Ford D have a number of motives and none are good, and that includes them being worthwhile. I have not been so entertained for a long time as reading about rolling block finds at Willy Bends. This is entirely desperate curmudgeon.
On the forks of Reno Creek's south branch, this battle was lost. Te decision to close rapidly and attack across the river was fatal. The route accepted by history as that followed by Benteen's battalion off into the hinterlands of the south fork is heavily salted caramel baloney. His battalion left flanked the advance down Reno Ck. I'm not getting into a bun fight over it but simply state that W.A. Graham adopted Benteen as his hero and spent decades polishing his armor.
At the south fork junction, Custer knew the village was standing and not running. He sent the scouts to raid the pony herds. That would not have been ordered had the camp benn moving and running away since he knew he could only pursue and try to close during long marches, as per 1873. If he sat on his duff, 1873 had instructed his regiment would be attacked.
Montrose's recent posts are very good. I am not a genius. His expressed views are long understood by myself and most students of the battle. Everything logical with Custer, should indicate he repeated his Washita tactics with four battalions striking the camp along seperate routes.
Fin
Regards Gents.
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Post by herosrest on Jun 30, 2023 3:51:23 GMT -6
From the Crow's Nest, one Crow scout was sent ahead of the advance to observe the valley and that scout, Hairy Moccasin, returned to Custer during advance along Reno Ck. to advise the village was in place and was not in uproar, breaking up, or running. Account's of Hairy Moccasin's scout are several through the decades following the battle such that doubt is eliminated. I would like to know the source......Date and all that stuff. Made up stories years after the battle are not proof, no matter how many times they might repeat the tale. Proof exists in the reality that the camp was not in uproar, breaking up, or running; with men sleeping in and women ranging far in parties digging tipsina. I always get a chuckle when I see that some think the men were sleeping in. It is well past noon and they are out and about. There were a few taking a nap after their swim in the river. Wooden Legs seems to be one of these.I would suggest also, that Custer's attempts to have the Ree scouts range ahead into the hostile herds suggests he expected a standing camp which the scouts presence on its periphery would trigger any threat in place. Another twisted arrangement to fit the battle as some want it. How about this.....That was part of the deal....The Ree got to steal horses while the soldiers were occupying the Indians. All I read, that was the deal all along. The treasures of battle. Just like Boston Custer and Reed. They were there for some souvenirs to take home. I feel that the Rees' understood this and the risks to them in advance. It seems that they raised the: 'We ain't cannon fodder issue'. I like that you can dig up so much information. It seems that sometimes you dig up a few Buffalo chips thinking you have found a real treasure. I need muck boots to follow you around. Hip waders that fishermen use might be on the list. It does get pretty deep at times. Thanks HR, you do keep me entertained! Rosebud The Crow scout was sent ahead and viewed the camp in the valley. If you don't know that or missed it in your research then surely you are getting a li'l sloppy. Of course, I entirely disagree with the White Man Runs Him idea that Custer sat watching Reno overwhelmed before trotting off to do it properly on Battle Ridge, but that's horses for courses. White Man Runs Him was one of those who told of Hairy Moccasin being sent ahead, observing the camp and valley, and returning to update Custer in Reno Ck. Such is life. WMRH was a compliated hero.
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Post by lakotadan on Jul 4, 2023 19:00:36 GMT -6
A new guy to the forum and a new student of the battle.
So, I have been reading a couple of books on the subject.
Now, the bottom line is that the Native Americans won and the 7th calvary lost. Perhaps nothing that Custer could have done differently may have changed that outcome.
But, why did he have Reno attack the south side of the village first? Then Custer rode north to reach the north side of the village (I guess at his first attempt to cross the LBH river he only saw the middle part of the village). Why was it not a more coordinated attack?
I would think that he would tell Reno something like “let’s coordinate watches” (or something!). “Give me one hour to go north (or however long he thought that it may take him to reach the north side of the village) and then you and Benteen (who would have probably completed the task assigned to him by Custer in that time or given a time to stop his task and join Reno) join forces and attack the south side of the village”.
Even if Custer in one hour reached the river and only came upon the middle of the village, he could have still crossed it and attacked, or at least he would probably still have time to move further north to make the crossing without the Native Americans “on his heels”.
It is also my understanding that Sitting Bull knew the calvary was there (from his scouts). But he did not know if they had come to talk or make war. So, they were still in a kind of “holding pattern” (until they were attacked!).
And as is known by what actually happened in the battle Reno attacked and retreated. He was joined by Benteen. Then during the attack on Reno and Benteen’s position the Native Americans became aware of Custer and his troops, and the rest is history!
Like I said, a new student of the battle and I am probably missing some several key points!
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Post by johnson1941 on Jul 4, 2023 20:59:37 GMT -6
“AT THAT TIME I was twenty-four years old, and was an enlisted scout under Gen. Custer's command. Mitch Boyer was our interpreter. I was sent ahead. Custer said, "You go and find that village." I went to a butte at the head of Reno Creek, from where I could see the village. I reported the camp to Custer. He asked if any were running about away from the camp. I said "No." We then came on down to the forks of Reno Creek. When we stopped there to divide up I could hear the Indians in camp shouting and whooping.”
Hairy Mocassin The Custer Myth
“At the head of Reno Creek we came to a butte from which we saw the village. We went down the creek to the forks, where we separated, the scouts going with Custer to the right…”
WMRH
is this butte the Crows Nest or something else?
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Post by johnson1941 on Jul 5, 2023 12:17:25 GMT -6
Some related info re: scouts and buttes...
Curly interview Sept. 30, 1913 Thomas LeForge interpreter. re: WM Camp
The reason White Swan and Half Yellow Face went with Reno was that at about the time Custer left the divide he ordered these two Crows to go to a certain high point on a butte and take a look. They did this and, instead of coming back to Custer and reporting they went over to Reno's battalion and remained with him. The other four Crows remained with Custer until we got to ridge south of Medicine Tail coulee. Here Hairy Moccasin, White Man Runs Him, and Goes Ahead left us and Mitch and I went on. We joined Custer on Medicine Tail Coulee as he was advancing toward the village. ...
Why Half Yellow Face and White Swan went with Reno. Custer ordered two Crows to go with Reno and find the best route to the LBH, so says Hairy Moccasin
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Post by montrose on Jul 5, 2023 17:29:14 GMT -6
“AT THAT TIME I was twenty-four years old, and was an enlisted scout under Gen. Custer's command. Mitch Boyer was our interpreter. I was sent ahead. Custer said, "You go and find that village." This shows that Hairy Moccasin was sent to find the village while Custer was camped near present day Busby. I went to a butte at the head of Reno Creek, The butt at the head of Reno Creek can only be the Crows nest from where I could see the village. I reported the camp to Custer. So far so good. Everything is as expected He asked if any were running about away from the camp. I said "No." OOPS....Did Custer actually ask that question or did he ask if the village was running away ...or on the move? Translation can be the problem here with no intention of actually giving wrong information....From 12 miles, people running around or away from the village would not be possible to see. From the Crows nest the actual village was not in clear view. We then came on down to the forks of Reno Creek. When we stopped there to divide up I could hear the Indians in camp shouting and whooping.” Now we know that he had REAL good ears.Hairy Mocassin The Custer Myth “At the head of Reno Creek we came to a butte from which we saw the village. Again...This would be the Crows nestWe went down the creek to the forks, where we separated, Does not say what separation. Benteen, Reno, Custer? or later when Reno and Benteen separate......I would expect the later because he used the term forks.... But one could argue that there are forks in the Creek where Benteen was sent to the left. the scouts going with Custer to the right…” WMRH is this butte the Crows Nest or something else? Due to the explanation of both HM and WMRH.....It can only be the Crows NestThanks for that post 1941. I think some are under the wrong impression that these scouts went and looked over the bluffs and then returned to Custer, telling him that the Indians were all sleeping, or running around with their [pants down] All that are expressions that have been taken literally by some not smart enough to clearly understand the crazy way the English language is used. www.youtube.com/watch?v=wZyvwIapyBs These actions took place very early in the decision making process.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 6, 2023 12:34:43 GMT -6
I believe the scouts also saw smoke in Reno Creek. The Crows would know of the south fork of Reno Creek, as did Herendeen. He fought a battle there two years prior against about 600 of the same Indians. It was a well-known travel corridor that could lead to Lodge Grass or the Rosebud. Crazy Horse used it to get to the battle of the Rosebud.
We know that Reno was sent after Indians that were running down Reno Creek.
Since Custer was ordered not to let them escape to the South, it was problematic, and I believe that was the reason for sending Benteen.
Regards
Steve
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 6, 2023 12:42:36 GMT -6
4,000 Indians moved from Lodge Grass down the LBH, according to Gordon Harper's research. Custer never followed them, but he would have observed their trail if he had followed Terry's order. I guess it boils down to do we believe all the Indians were in one camp or did they come together at the known location on the LBH.
Regards
Steve
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Post by herosrest on Jul 6, 2023 13:30:35 GMT -6
Prior to setting up at Garryowen, the entire camp was sprawled along the river from Ford A all along up stream along the east bank, to the mouth of Long Otter Creek for several days. The Cheyenne led the marches and they were located highest upstream, at the mouth of Long Otter ck. It is difficult to see that they marched to Garryowen from Long Otter Ck. by travelling back along the east bank. They would have crossed the river and travelled downstream west of the water.
Harper identified a huge contingent which left before the battle and moved out towards Powder River during night time which would avoid them being spotted by dust trails of observations from high ground. His numbers on this travelling group are astounding.
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Post by johnson1941 on Jul 6, 2023 13:54:00 GMT -6
Per Wooden Leg...
Leg, Wooden; thomas B. Marquis. Wooden Leg: A Warrior Who Fought Custer (p. 97). Arcadia Ebooks. Kindle Edition.
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Post by johnson1941 on Jul 6, 2023 18:45:37 GMT -6
More scouting - Hairy Moccasin sent ahead...
"WMRH told Curtis that before Custer left the Crow's Nest to put his regiment in motion, he sent Hairy Moccasin ahead with instructions to ride down Reno Creek and seek a closer look at the Sioux village. Now the Crows conducted Curtis along the path they said HM had followed on his solitary ride. They indicated where he passed a Sioux tipi, and pointed out a pine-clad hill he climbed for a better view of what lay ahead. From there, as WMRH put it HM "saw the Sioux everywhere across the Little Bighorn". Turning back, he met Custer and told him of the size and location of the Sioux village. The Sioux he said, were not running away as had been feared.
A little later, when Custer arrived at a point on Reno Creek about 3 miles distant from the LBH, it began to look as though the Sioux..."
Little Bighorn Remembered Viola; Edward Curtis and Custer's Crow Scouts
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 7, 2023 9:11:10 GMT -6
Prior to setting up at Garryowen, the entire camp was sprawled along the river from Ford A all along up stream along the east bank, to the mouth of Long Otter Creek for several days. The Cheyenne led the marches and they were located highest upstream, at the mouth of Long Otter ck. It is difficult to see that they marched to Garryowen from Long Otter Ck. by travelling back along the east bank. They would have crossed the river and travelled downstream west of the water. Harper identified a huge contingent which left before the battle and moved out towards Powder River during night time which would avoid them being spotted by dust trails of observations from high ground. His numbers on this travelling group are astounding. You are confusing people again. The Cheyennes did not lead but one group. Are you saying Cheyenne led the way from Lodge Grass? Are you saying the Indians that went down Reno Creek that Custer followed were near Long Otter Creek? These were all different groups and came and moved from various locations. Which group were the Southern Cheyenne and Arapaho in?
AZ Ranger
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