The Problem of Luce Ridge

[mchlwilson]

I have spent some time thinking since my first post about my view of the actions in MTC and and the many replies I received. I realize now that there is one thing that doesn't sit quite right with me, and that is Custer's decision to move of at least some of his companies onto Luce Ridge. This decision has been presented by many as a decision Custer made for sound military reasons of his own free will and not one dictated by the presence of Indians threatening his command. I find myself doubting this.

I could understand that Custer would want to move up Luce for a good view if he had entered MTC from the east. But he came from the south and therefore had already been afforded every opportunity to view the village and the surrounding area from his choice of position on the bluffs, any of which would have been nearer to the ford and the village than Luce Ridge.

I don't dispute that Custer did have men on Luce Ridge. The cartridge cases and the JSIT oral history is sufficient evidence for me. But why did they go there?

I often feel that many of us, myself included, are overthinking this battle. It seems to me that if a commander has five companies in a major avenue of approach to a river ford across which sits his objective, then surely the assumption most likely to be correct is that he hoped to cross the river at that point. That he did not do so was because something unexpected occurred.

Furthermore, why would a commander parade his troops on the skyline for all the village to see if it was not necessary? The best available information on Custer's approach has him descending Cedar Coulée. We are therefore asked to conclude that Custer followed a difficult route off the bluffs to MTC because of the concealment it afforded, only to climb onto the skyline of Luce Ridge and thereby announce his presence to the village.

Surely there must be an explanation that can better account for what happened!

I spent the better part of a day in MTC last fall. I walked around the eastern peak of Weir Point and followed a finger all the way down into MTC. I climbed up onto the lower reaches of East Ridge (aka "traditional Luce Ridge") It was like I was on a picnic! Nothing difficult about it. It took perhaps 20 minutes to stroll of Weir and find myself on East Ridge and waving to the horses. So surely Custer and his mounted men could have done it much more quickly! And why wouldn't he, if showing his presence to the village was of no importance?

Yet he didn't. He took a covered and concealed route, which is why I find it hard to believe he ordered his men up onto the Luce skyline from MTC of his own free will.

If you have ever been it MTC you will understand why it is so easy to believe Custer ordered them up there. There is a wide carpet of grass behind the pond that beckons to you. It looks so gentle. "Climb me" it says. I wanted to so badly and would have if I hadn't feared I'd be charged with trespassing.

From a military standpoint I think Custer would have been fine moving the main body down MTC to the ford without first scaling Luce because he had already been on the bluffs for a view and per Thompson he had five vedettes from F Company acting as an advancing recon to the north and east. If these vedettes had met him in MTC and told him that the ground north of Luce was free of Indians, then it would be safe to advance on the ford. Once nearing the ford it would of course make sense to move troops onto the higher ground on the lower reaches of the NC-Luce complex.

Here's where my thoughts have led me: it seems to me possible that the vedettes got in trouble. JSIT oral history tells us that Wolf Tooth saw soldiers on the high ground and followed them. Surely those men were the vedettes! The vedettes in turn led the Indians to the main body in MTC. Perhaps the sound of firing from the north or the sight of the vedettes in distress forced Custer's hand, requiring him to move men up Luce, much against his original plan.

What do you think?

Michael

[Deleted]

Aug 22, 2015 9:07:01 GMT -6 mchlwilson said:

I don't dispute that Custer did have men on Luce Ridge. The cartridge cases and the JSIT oral history is sufficient evidence for me. But why did they go there?

This has always interested me. From what I've been told many of the bullets are to the north so Wolf Tooth's band must have been a pest. I'm no military genius, but it would seem to me you'd want to see what was "over the hills and far away" anyway, kind of like Benteen's left oblique. LBM

[fred]

Michael Wilson—

You are, in my opinion, taking things out of context; not intentionally, mind you, but in the way you are approaching things: I think you are making too many assumptions based on what you know now and what Custer didn’t.

My definition of context is that actions and motives can never be truly understood until the full circumstances of events are brought to bear on the discussion. In this case you must look at what Custer knew; what he had seen; and what he was thinking. While that may seem impossible, we have enough evidence to make extremely detailed and intelligent assumptions. We also need to look at it from what Custer was trying to do, what he was trying to accomplish.

So, we have a goal, a mission… standard stuff, known from the beginning of the campaign; and we have the beginnings of Custer’s intelligence estimate: the data he needed to know (to gather) in order to make the decisions necessary to achieve this mission. So what had he seen; what did he know? He saw Reno in the valley doing his job: drawing Indians to him as they attempted to set up a screen to give the families time to run. He also knew the village was quite large, but he did not know how large or what he was going to face other than his own preliminary estimate: 1,300 warriors. He could also see—from 3,411—the upper valley was clear of Indians, so he sent for Benteen and the packs to bring his entire force into the operating theater. In order for him to continue accomplishing his mission Custer needed now to go north: that is where his enemy was heading. So he started down what appeared to be the easiest route north: Cedar Coulee.

It is irrelevant what his precise route was: down the coulee bottom; up its sides; both; cutting across at some point… makes no difference. What does make a difference is the amount time it took him to traverse difficult terrain (Dark Cloud always brought out the difficulty of this particular area and I believe Steve Andrews verifies it). Now, let’s not forget how little intel Custer had at this point, so he needed to get closer to the enemy to get more. This is where Luce Ridge and Ford B come in.

The whole idea of reconnaissance is to get as close to the target area as possible; height does you no good if you are too far away or you have intervening terrain features. Close height, obviously, is the best (this is precisely why Custer never went to Sharpshooters’ Ridge… those who claim he did have no understanding and possess no evidentiary basis for their belief). The Luce Ridge complex (forget the old Luce/new East Ridge business: Custer never went there either… why would he?) was now an obstacle as well as a route and Custer sought an easy way up… while still needing to move closer to the river to see what he could in the valley. At this point he still had no idea of the village’s extent or the number of people he would be dealing with.

Obviously, he caught the village by surprise and at this stage of the battle, the Indians’ focus was on Reno, very few warriors understanding or realizing the threat to their north. We know for certain there were very few Indians east of the river in the vicinity of Weir Point-Reno Hill (probably around 22, by name) and with the way Indians fought, it would take time to muster any sort of defense for the northern threat. At this stage of the battle Custer was under absolutely no threat himself and his trip to Ford B proves it. Indian accounts there and subsequently are very clear on this. And the artifact fields on Luce and Nye-Cartwright indicate controlled firing, which in turn indicates volley firing. And volley firing was used for specific purposes, i. e., against massed formations, against a burgeoning threat, etc., both of which were possibly beginning when Keogh ordered it. We have the Wolf Tooth business in upper MTC and the increasing presence of Indians on the east side of the river, ostensibly coming from the direction of the Reno crossing… and let’s not forget the handful or two of warriors beginning to dog Custer as he departed Ford B. All of those “threats” would invite a measure of volley firing.

I also think you are viewing this whole thing from a more static perspective when you claim Custer had “every opportunity to view the village….” His view from 3,411 was limited and he did not go to Weir, simply because it was too far out of his way (1,000 yards, round trip, over difficult terrain) and like his move down Reno Creek, speed was of the essence: these Indians were “scattering,” heaven knows where to and Custer had to head them off. He had little or no time for side trips and with high ridges to his north he could accomplish two things at once: speed and proximity.

Also, he did not “parade” his troops anywhere. The men on Luce were a mile from the village and the village extended barely ¼ – ½ mile below Ford B, so one had to have height to see Keogh’s command: it was certainly not seen from the village proper. You are also making an assumption Custer wanted to hide his presence and that’s why he took Cedar Coulee. He took Cedar Coulee because it was a natural route north… or so he thought when he went into it. Moving 225 men, however, down a ravine loaded with junipers is not as easy as it seems or as easy as moving a dozen riders on leisurely stroll…. And at speed, if at all possible. By this time in the fray, stealth and hiding were no longer needed: it was all about speed and reconnaissance. The latter was uppermost and once fulfilled dictated the former.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[montrose]

I believe LTC Custer overreacted to the handful of Indians east of the river. At 3411 GAC knew Reno was facing vastly superior numbers, that the pony herds were off to the west, and that a massive consolidated village was west of Ford B. So he takes 5 companies, the regimental main body, to LCN Ridge?

The decision shows very bad tactical awareness, and piss poor judgment. Time is currency in combat, and it needs to be spent wisely.

The LCN excursion wasted time, and ammunition. Can anyone identify a single casualty from the hundreds of rounds fired here? Beside Martini's horse.

Remember the scouts were also fired on by these elements.

I am in full agreement with your view. After 3411 LTC Custer made bad decision after bad decision.

Montrose

[montrose]

Lol, Fred and I posted very different views of the post 3411 decision making, 2 minutes apart.

I am watching a Patriots preseason game at the moment, which is as useless an effort as LCN ridge.

So tomorrow I will take a deep look at Fred's post, and generate a response. Please note that neither Fred nor I are Monday morning quarterbacks. We do not look at final outcomes and work backwards. We look at the intelligence estimate available to the commander at the point in time where he made a decision.

And yet our analysis leads to two totally opposite points of view.

Of course my bottom line was GAC saw 1500 plus warriors in the valley and committed his regimental main body to chase the 22 identified by Fred.

Respectfully,

William

[fred]

Aug 22, 2015 20:08:49 GMT -6 montrose said:

Lol, Fred and I posted very different views of the post 3411 decision making, 2 minutes apart...


And yet our analysis leads to two totally opposite points of view.

Not always.

Yet you remain the very best, Will.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[montrose]

But I would say our differing opinions are at the heart of the best use of the internet. You and I are not fanboys, we have no personal attachment to any of the participants in this battle. (Unless Steve posts pictures of you dressed as Reno, chugging a half gallon of whiskey at a Squaw stripper bar).

GAC was not the MacClellan of the Indian Wars, he had good and bad qualities.

I approach this campaign from the perspective of what would a reasonable officer do. What makes LBH a great case study is officers who fought different enemies in different environments were brought in to fight the very same GAC opponents. So we get to see Crook, Gibbon, Terry, Mackenzie, Miles; all as case studies to compare to GAC.

Terry played a significant role in the LBH failure, and yet I do not see this as recognized within the LBH literature. His performance after LBH is pathetic.

Just a reminder, Crook and Terry were peers, commanding Departments. LTC Custer was one of many subordinate commanders in Terry's department, and not even the senior officer.

So this opens an interesting discussion.

[wild]

Hi Fred et al
He saw Reno in the valley doing his job: drawing Indians to him as they attempted to set up a screen to give the families time to run.

That is a very positive view of Reno's status .
If you take a negative view [which in fact was the case] it alters the dynamics with knockon effects further up the line.
Taking the size of the village into account and the numbers of indians converging on Reno, "screen" is not the term that comes to mind .
Would we not be justified in using hindsight here and allowing our hero to guess correctly that Reno was up sh1t's creek without a paddle and the wind against him?
If we can allow an alternative view then we have two possible solutions as to Custer's dimise.
Cheers

[wild]

Further
If it is suggested that Custer misreads the Reno situation then the onus is on the suggester to provide an explanation.
If Custer has not misread the situation and ....... He saw Reno in the valley doing his job: drawing Indians to him as they attempted to set up a screen to give the families time to run.
Is this not a fix in another guise? ,well at least a first cousin to a fix ; a passive fix ?

Let's tidy up this issue

Cheers

[fred]

Aug 23, 2015 2:08:02 GMT -6 wild said:

Is this not a fix in another guise? ,well at least a first cousin to a fix ; a passive fix ?

Let's tidy up this issue

This may be your issue, my boy. I have no interest in getting into a "terminology" discussion. Montrose can carry that torch for me. Or even better, you may want to re-argue the point next door. Boy, you talk about pounding your head into a wall...!!

Best wishes,
Fred.

[fred]

Aug 23, 2015 0:27:11 GMT -6 wild said:

That is a very positive view of Reno's status .
If you take a negative view [which in fact was the case] it alters the dynamics....

Yes, it does; but, please, let's not forget "context" here. Again, this is one of my biggest bug-a-boos: placing things in their proper context.

What did GAC know at the time? When he saw Reno in the valley, Reno was advancing and GAC believed things were going swimmingly.

Please, please, please!!!! Wild, you are smart and savvy... and I spent almost five solid years doing those timelines: use them, please!!!

Best wishes,
Fred.

[montrose]

Fred,

I am using your timelines, and I still disagree.

Things were not going "swimmingly" in the valley. The Reno Bn attack had culminated. The Shoulder Creek band of Indians were on Reno's flank. Hundreds of Indians were pouring down Reno's open left flank.

The decisions LTC Custer made after 3411 help us to understand his decision making process. The order (orders based on how you evaluate Kanipe) to the Benteen and MacDougal BN reflect GAC's estimate of the situation. He did not want either element to enter the valley. The Indians that were moving into Reno's rear were between Reno and Ford A.

In my opinion, GAC's decisions prove he was aware of the massive enemy counterattack on Reno. But reinforcing Reno and fighting the main battle in the valley was now a problem. GAC had not sent a scout element to 3411, as any competent tactician would do. He sent the regiment main body. So now that he knew what to do, he had positioned his forces where they could not respond.

I understand your well thought out views on GAC's MDMP (Military Decision Making Process, google it) where his intent Reno Creek and beyond was to work an intel collection plan. At what point does gathering data become irrelevant, and fighting the enemy becomes a priority? My theory is GAC did not understand this at all in this battle, maybe in his last 60-180 seconds before death.

I do not believe Custer deliberately decided to sacrifice the Reno BN. He decided to assume away the enemy and hope for an outcome that his IPB showed was impossible. The only offensive action GAC took at LBH was to order Reno to conduct an unsupported Thunder Run on a village that GACs own IPB expected 1300-1500 warriors. GAC took no offensive action in the northern sector, ever.

Very Respectfully,

William

[wild]

Fred
If you post an offering then it is up for discussion ,admiration is optional.
Our discussions here are cyclical not linier .If they were linear we would long ago have packed up our tents and departed.
The issue is game changing . If as Montrose has suggested Custer was facing a crises then the excursion North has to be rethought .


Montrose
He decided to assume away the enemy and hope for an outcome that his IPB showed was impossible.
I owe WO a reply to his on this very issue .His take on it is identical to your's .
But how can you have a productive discussion when the topic is taken into the realm of Custer's mental health.
What is wrong with an honest "we don't know" but here are the probable possibilities?
Cheers

[AZ Ranger]

I rode three of the routes SSR , Cedar Coulee, and the park road drainage. I personally reject SSR because to seems to far away from the bluffs and allows several travel corridors for Indians to move with cover and concealment. Why would you give that up.

We rode down Cedar Coulee staying on the left side and just below Weir. You can ride with concealment easily. Why any who looks at the bottom and states you can't ride there is beyond me. Why would you want to? Most of the vegetation and water activities occur there and no matter what type of riding you are doing it is not a normal use of terrain.

We also rode down Cedar Coulee and jumped over to the next drainage which follows the road. Either of the two seem likely to me. Timing would not change much. Look what ridge is directly across from this location.

I think one could suggest Martin went down one and came back the other.

Donahue will have this route in his new book.

When talking with Fred regarding timing it doesn't really change much of anything. SSR seems to me to add additional time. The smooth route everyone talks about on SSR is on top of the ridge in plain view. Anyone see a problem with that for military use. Its a great ride but to far from the village and to much exposure for troops and incoming bullets.

Regards

AZ Ranger

[AZ Ranger]

I think some of this what's in Custer mind needs to be addressed. Some think we can't know and therefor that is the only answer.

Isn't part of everything we do in the military and law enforcement is to learn to work together and for that you need to know what the other person will do. This is not a random gathering of individuals out for a ride.

We have in the last few brought different agency officers together to learn to work as a team. Each agency had trained differently so when the individuals got together you had no idea what they we will do.

That being said this a single cavalry regiment and they should if battle ready know what the other thinks and how they react given the same situation.

Our investigations here are what Custer had to work with and what choices he made.

I would agree that some can state I don't know what Custer was thinking and others might look at the situation and predict what input would trigger the action taken.

I made a spot lighting stop last night or actually early this morning. I told the other officers where they turned and they knew exactly what to do. They knew what I was thinking because they had the same input that I had. Spot lighting at Demotte Park on the north rim of the Grand Canyon. The meadow was full of deer.

Regards

AZ Ranger