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Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 23, 2015 21:19:54 GMT -6
Further If it is suggested that Custer misreads the Reno situation then the onus is on the suggester to provide an explanation. If Custer has not misread the situation and ....... He saw Reno in the valley doing his job: drawing Indians to him as they attempted to set up a screen to give the families time to run.Is this not a fix in another guise? ,well at least a first cousin to a fix ; a passive fix ? Let's tidy up this issue Cheers Block -- keep the other force from moving in one direction --- that would describe Indian keeping Reno from entering the village Fix-- keep the other force from moving in any direction --- That would not describe anything that Reno would be capable of doing in the valley , most likely it occurred on the Custer Battlefield You can distract an enemy but if they are free to move they are not fixed. The village was so large that there was sufficient numbers to handle any small number of troops that were thrown at them. As soon as any danger was posed to their families elsewhere they were free to leave. They could move through the village faster than the troops could cross the river. Regards AZ Ranger
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Post by welshofficer on Aug 24, 2015 17:45:46 GMT -6
AZ,
Do you know which individual first made reference on these LBH boards to Reno having "fixed" hostiles, so I can castrate the miscreant...?
WO
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Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 25, 2015 5:40:34 GMT -6
AZ, Do you know which individual first made reference on these LBH boards to Reno having "fixed" hostiles, so I can castrate the miscreant...? WO It came from the other board by two previous members keogh and Conz. Bill Rini is keogh and a reenactor background. Clair Conzelman is a West Point graduate and fancy himself a Hussar. My belief is that Rini does not care about definitions unless it serves his purpose. Regards Steve
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Post by welshofficer on Aug 25, 2015 13:31:03 GMT -6
AZ,
Ah, the amateur board. There is no excuse for a re-enactor, let alone a West Point graduate (who really should know better).
WO
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Post by mchlwilson on Aug 30, 2015 13:37:05 GMT -6
We have the Wolf Tooth business in upper MTC and the increasing presence of Indians on the east side of the river, ostensibly coming from the direction of the Reno crossing… and let’s not forget the handful or two of warriors beginning to dog Custer as he departed Ford B. All of those “threats” would invite a measure of volley firing. Hi Fred, More to think about! Thanks for all the time and effort you took in replying to me. I have a couple of questions: 1. What evidence exists that indicates that the firing on Luce Ridge was at Indians in MTC? I see you reference the impact field in your book but it's unclear to me who discovered the bullets. 2. None of Custer's surviving officers surmised that military tactics would call upon Custer to move up Luce Ridge. Even Godfrey saw the trail but failed to recognize it for what it was. What do you think is the reason for their failure to recognize this? Thanks! Michael
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Post by wild on Aug 30, 2015 23:31:52 GMT -6
Michael
1. What evidence exists that indicates that the firing on Luce Ridge was at Indians in MTC? I see you reference the impact field in your book but it's unclear to me who discovered the bullets. In the years following the battle there were live demonstration firings on the field by military units. I doubt they picked up their empties. Cheers
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Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 31, 2015 6:47:03 GMT -6
Michael 1. What evidence exists that indicates that the firing on Luce Ridge was at Indians in MTC? I see you reference the impact field in your book but it's unclear to me who discovered the bullets.
In the years following the battle there were live demonstration firings on the field by military units. I doubt they picked up their empties. Cheers Luce Ridge is not located where it would be accessible from the road and is not in a good viewing area for the public. It is directly across from one of the routes of Custer to be released in Donahue's new book. The findings are consistent with ammunition used in 1776 and not that of Fort Custer or military use a short time later. The photo evidence though not conclusive shows only those areas close to the current cemetery area and the monument. There were Indian cartridge cases also found in close proximity to cavalry location on Luce. You can find it in Fox's book. I doubt that Indians were ever involved in shooting live rounds back at troops for demonstrations purposes anywhere after the battle. Riding horses toward the village on the Weir side of MTC would require more climbing up and down due to the way that terrain drains. Similar to a Benteen route. If you climb up to Luce the ridge follows MTC right to the Butler marker. I don't see how any military commander would allow such a great travel corridor left open to Indian use. There is no evidence that any demonstration shoots were done by the military in that particular area. The map of Indian and cavalry cases and bullets has red markers indicating Indian fire within range of the cavalry cases that were found on Luce and Blummer -NC. For me the Indian cases found within range of the cavalry cases strongly indicates that it was not a latter day demonstration using correct ammunition. Regards AZ Ranger
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Post by montrose on Aug 31, 2015 7:20:15 GMT -6
AZRanger, and Mike,
I have no doubt that the Luce and NC ridge firing incidents were do to a response to Indians east of the river.
My question has always been why commit your main effort to respond to 30 Indians, east of the river, while ignoring the 1500 plus west of the river.
Rini and Conzelman make an excellent case for mindsets. That because of a cavalry mindset, Custer was incapable at commanding a combat unit, or of understanding tactics. So the battle was lost because the commander was incapable of commanding .
I do not think the loss is so easily explained. GAC was not alone out there. How did his subordinate officers screw the pooch? When officers make bad decisions, subordinate officers and NCOs have a vote.
I wish I had some audio recordings of 2 NCOs I worked with. Both made CSM. They had a unique ability to use the term "sir" as a complement and an insult, sometimes in the same phrase.
My main theory is that the 7th could, and should have won LBH. Sidebar on what winning means. But certainly could have achieved a better outcome.
The LCN ridge actions speak volumes to why and how I formed my views. Reno was sent with 3 companies to defeat all enemies west of the river (1500 plus). Keogh was committed with 3 companies to defeat enemy scouts east of the river (30, maybe) while 2 other companies scouted and were in close support. Ohh, and Custer's commitment of 5 companies against 30 Indians produced ZERO enemy KIA, WIA.
LTC Custer's decision making was very, very bad at LBH. What was the critical decision that caused this battle to swing from easy victory to hopeless loss? The decision not to support the regimental advanced guard in the valley, which was the regiment's main effort. The hussar amateur theorists are incapable of explaining how the commander of the main body did not support his own attack. The obvious explanation is that he was unfit for any command in the US Army, or any Army, above company.
We kill a lot of electrons on these boards, to ignore obvious truths.
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Post by wild on Aug 31, 2015 9:03:41 GMT -6
Hi Will
My main theory is that the 7th could, and should have won LBH. I do not agree. I do not agree for lotsa reasons but principally because Custer unlike Crook had no mule infantry. Mule infantry were your insurance against defeat ,they were your foot on the ground ; your fire base ,rally point. The 7th were a bog standard cavalry regiment.Totally unsuited to anything else other than charging broken Confedrates and a spot of flank guard and vandalism. Tactically you don't take a regiment into a running battle/melee with Indians.Far too slow in mobility and far too slow in reaction.And they did not really have a horse weapon. Man for man the Indians were better and far more aggressive and multiply that by 4. I even think the Indians won the fire fight on Reno hill. And the Indians had to win ; it was just another day at the office for the 7th. And just in case it escaped attention the best operation of the campaign was executed by the Indians ; their fielding a force of several hundreds in their preemptive attack against Crook .For 6 hours or so keeping their cohesion they entertained a field force of cavalry.infantry and auxhilaries. Cheers
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Post by montrose on Sept 1, 2015 6:57:46 GMT -6
Bear with me, I may not explain this well. And my thoughts may belong in the scouting thread.
Part of hiring indig personnel is to gain insight into how they fight. The US and Indians had very different command and control systems. I have linked my grad school thesis on this topic, but the NPS site is more restricted. If anyone has an online link to my thesis, link it.
I believe the 7th had very little understanding of how Indians behaved under combat. If an Indian saw you at location A at time B, how long until this data gets back to Indian decision makers, and how long until they respond.
Examples:
1. 7th Cav leaders repeatedly thought they were under enemy observation due to seeing numerous smoke signals. Ends up these were clouds. Paranoid.
2. 7th Cav was spotted by stray Indians at the divide. This provided urgency to US decision makers. The reports of these Indians did not hit Indian decision makers until dusk. Commanders must understand own and friendly decision cycles. Google Boyd's Observe-Orient-Decide Act or my numerous posts on this topic.
The decision to push forward at the divide does make sense from decision cycle analysis. The decisions from lone tepee and beyond make no sense whatever.
3. LCN ridge. LTC Custer was trying to go north from 3411, without creating a strong Indian response. MAJ Reno's effort in the valley was the main Indian focus, beyond any shadow of a doubt, from the 3411 observations. The movement to LCN ridge was to counter a handful of Indians, who had no ability to provide data to the Indian decision making process to influence the battle. The significance of the Wolf Tooth band is in explaining why LTC Custer made very, very bad decisions. It does not justify those decisions.
Look at Indian accounts of how they understood they had a threat to the east, that demanded a stronger response then the threat to the south. It comes down to the attack by a single company at Ford B, and seeing US forces on LCN ridge. Tis is mind boggling. Why show your units in the open when there is no tactical requirement to do so?
The Thompson account makes this worse. If LTC Custer could conduct personal reconnaissance all over this area, with zero threat, then so could any US scout element. So telling the enemy where you are by moving in the open or firing is completely out of line with battle focused analysis (BFA), or competent decision making.
LTC Custer committed 60% of his combat power to LCN ridge. Since he kept his own element in support, and then ordered the Benteen and McDougall detachments to stay away from the valley, and move here: this was the regiments main effort.
Understanding LCN is vital to understanding LBH. After 3411 Custer's main effort was not the valley fight, it was not Ford B, it was not the Indian warriors, it was not the village, it was not the animal herds, it was not the Indian women, children, elderly.
Obviously, GAC had some intention of conducting an action after massing forces in the northern area. His orders meant he intended to link up the Benteen and McDougall Bns with the Keogh Bn at south end Battle Ridge.
4. So regimental commander decision at the divide creates an impression that he could operate inside the enemy OODA loop decision making. But the problem is dozens of subsequent decisions show that he did not understand how the enemy fought, he had no idea how his own regiment fought.
5. Wolf Tooth Band theory. Can anyone show a causal relationship between the observations of this element, and any subsequent action of the Indian main body? I would say you will not, because you can not.
Custer over reacted to irrelevant stray Indians. His overreaction caused a response by Indian main body, they destroyed his command. If he had a better understanding of US and Indian tactics, and decision making; he would not have made these gross errors. The majority of his peers would have made better decisions, at least 30 of 35.
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Post by crzhrs on Sept 1, 2015 13:24:07 GMT -6
1. 7th Cav leaders repeatedly thought they were under enemy observation due to seeing numerous smoke signals. Ends up these were clouds. <Paranoid>.
AHa! Paronoid. This was the main fault of Custer. He thought the command was spotted. He thought the Indians were about to run and he would never be able to accomplish what he intended. Defeat the last, large free-roaming Indians in North America. The last opportunity for glory, the last chance for any Military Officer to defeat the last "wild" Indians and catapault himself into the nation's limelight. All his decisions were based on Indians running away and getting away, leaving him with mud on his face! I better hurry up and catch these cowardardly savages. It doesn't matter what the numbers are . . . there aren't enough Indians to defeat the 7th Cavalary. Over-confidence, under-estimating your enemy, over-confidence in the ability of your officers and men to do what you think is a "no-brainer" results in the last major battle, the last major defeat of US Regular Military by the hands of untrained, uneducated, wild-men. Not a very good way of going down in history GAC!
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Post by wild on Sept 2, 2015 12:28:06 GMT -6
Hi crhyzw Over-confidence, under-estimating your enemy, over-confidence in the ability of your officers and men to do what you think is a "no-brainer" results in the last major battle, the last major defeat of US Regular Military by the hands of untrained, uneducated, wild-men. No not quiet the last.Happened again at the Yalu river and again at ............ Cheers
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Post by wild on Sept 3, 2015 0:15:56 GMT -6
In actual fact there is a striking simliarity between the LBH and the Yalu river. A 3rd world peasant army devoid of modern sophistication ,artillery ,naval or air support ,clad in trainers and woolworth jackets v a first world army with total air and naval supremacy ,armour,artillery and mobility. But one with numbers and savage aggressiveness ,the other with poor leadership and troops who thought they were fighting laundry men. When you read the list of reasons our friend AZ offers to cover Benteen's passiveness ;anything but attack ,you can see that a ford D excursion is just not necessary to explain Custer's dimise. Custer's firepower dependent as it was on a manually opperated single shot carbine accurate to 201 yards just could not hold back the numbers. The citizen sildier,reservist,conscript, 7th cavalry trooper, knowing his number is up will not hold,be it the LBH or the Yalu . Cheers
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 3, 2015 6:16:35 GMT -6
Your comment about Benteen's passiveness is about as accurate as your comment on the accuracy of the Springfield .45-70 Trapdoor Springfield Carbine. (201 Yards) I own two of them and can assure anyone that they are accurate beyond 201 yards if you know how to shoot it to begin with. You post as if Custer had 5 companies in a defensive position and Benteen could just move to that location at will with pack animals in tow. What was more likely to happen is that Benteen would have been in the same situation with 3 (really 1 1/2 by strength) companies stopped short of making it across MTC and forced to defend the pack animals.
Passiveness is not the same as making the best available decision. Benteen demonstrated he was not passive on Reno Hill.
What weapons systems do you think Miles was using in his success?
I think I understand your model although it is not timed out so I can read it. You believe that Custer was driven by the Indians from Ford B till his death. So explain ,in terms of your model, where Custer was located when Martin was sent and the anticipated route the packs would take to get there. Then share with me how long it takes from where you think Custer was starting to be driven back until the place where the current markers are located. I am well aware of marker issues. At what speed would they be moving as they are driven.
So if you wild were with the packs and in Benteen's position but have moved forward as you decide it should have occurred with the packs what route would you take?
In your model Custer is constantly moving so his location under fire is constantly moving and you want the packs to go to a moving target that is surrounded by Indians?
If your ever get to ride there with the Real Birds you will find yourself riding up Luce Ridge because it is a natural selection while on horseback.
If you could have ridden with Chip Watts , I think he no longer does the riding tour, he would have maps and locations of the Indian positions which should convince most that it was not a reenactment since the Indians were firing live rounds in any reenactment that I know of.
So if your model is correct than Custer is retreating and strung out by the Indians yet you think Benteen could observe this action and know where to take the packs to?
Why do think Benteen would be able to keep his troops together when General Custer in your model can't?
Do you think the Indians would have no idea what was in the ammunition pack?
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by wild on Sept 3, 2015 7:42:06 GMT -6
You miss the point AZ . Benteen had no idea as to Custer's situation but he could have reached Weir point . You are trying to justify Benteen's actions in hindsight. As to the packs Benteen was totally indifferent to them and he would have been to Weir point and back by the time they arrived. Cheers
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