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Post by lakotadan on Aug 5, 2024 10:43:18 GMT -6
Well, I know why they made false statements at the RCOI. They were trying to cover their ass!
Why, because no one wanted to say what probably really happened.
Custer went ahead into a battle situation without listening to his scouts or doing proper reconnaissance beforehand.
It is also my understanding that he arrived at the Little Bighorn with exausted men and horses.
So, at the start of the battle he thought the village was much smaller than it actually was.
He didn’t support Reno as he stated he would.
He just went ahead on his merry way trying to find that elusive river crossing to find the North-West end of the village.
Custer never made it across the river. Either at Ford B or Ford D.
You mean to tell me that when Custer heard all the firing going on behind him as he was approaching Ford B (or before that time) that he couldn’t tell the difference between a Springfield (Army weapon) being fired and a Winchester (NA weapon) being fired!
He may have been an egomaniac, but he was not stupid!
He must have known (or had a clue) that things with Reno didn’t go as he had planned.
Did he ever send someone to Reno to find out what was happening and then report back to him?
Did he turn back to help support Reno and Benteen , when he must have had a clue that things weren’t going as planned, and then possibly try to find the North-West end of the village on another day?
No! He just continued on his merry way, dividing his command in his quest for glory!
He obviously did not care about his men or officers.
I can see now why some of his officers did not like him!
I wonder what the scholars have to say about that (mg?)!
Just my opinion.
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Post by Bruce Robert on Aug 5, 2024 11:25:23 GMT -6
HR, my request to take the bickering off the boards wasn't aimed at you, but I'm glad you acknowledged Gordon Richard's contributions to Gordon Harper's book. For those who don't know these characters, the much-quoted Gordon Harper died before the completion of his book, and Gordon Richard graciously edited it and provided the conclusion. It was a tremendous task, and Richard did it all without credit; he received no compensation or thanks for his work. To the minutiae-men who have hijacked these boards: move on.Diane Hear, Hear!!! One who attempts to find absolutes via minutiae is doomed to walk the Earth searching for that which never existed. Though the walk may be invigorating. What I am hearing are the same "Libby Lies" dressed in yet another outfit.
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Post by Bruce Robert on Aug 5, 2024 11:29:13 GMT -6
As I read more of these "modern" posts on a topic well beaten, I see the one truth to come out of the "Libby Lies": They will never die.
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Post by noggy on Aug 5, 2024 12:17:06 GMT -6
As I read more of these "modern" posts on a topic well beaten, I see the one truth to come out of the "Libby Lies": They will never die. Still surprised by Custer "fans". Oh well. Noggy
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Post by lakotadan on Aug 5, 2024 13:33:06 GMT -6
Oh well,
It is my understanding that Custer had 35 NA (Native American) scouts with him at the Little Bighorn.
He could have done a more thorough reconnaissance using his scouts (to determine the exact size of the village and the best avenues of approach) before attacking the village.
Evidently, he didn’t listen to what his scouts had to say on the immense size of the village that he was going to attack (he seems to have totally ingored their expertise!).
My opinion, the man was an egomaniac (as I have stated several times before, in this thread and other threads on this forum!).
Oh well, it is what it is and was what it was!
I, again, wonder what the scholars will say about this (in reference to mg).
Onward!
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Post by johnson1941 on Aug 5, 2024 15:20:30 GMT -6
Hairy Moccasin, the Teepee Book, June 1916.
AT THAT TIME I was twenty-four years old, and was an enlisted scout under Gen. Custer's command. Mitch Boyer was our interpreter. I was sent ahead. Custer said, "You go and find that village." I went to a butte at the head of Reno Creek, from where I could see the village. I reported the camp to Custer. He asked if any were running about away from the camp. I said "No." We then came on down to the forks of Reno Creek. When we stopped there to divide up I could hear the Indians in camp shouting and whooping. ... Custer was ahead of his command a short distance behind us. Custer yelled to us to stop, then told us to go to the high hill ahead (the high point just north of where Reno later entrenched). From here we could see the village and could see Reno fighting. He had crossed the creek. Everything was a scramble with lots of Sioux. The battle was over in a few minutes. We thought they were all killed.
Of course when discussing places with different names, or different areas with similiar names, its important to know which one is being talked about and weir it is. LOTS of confusion exists because of that.
You can make up your own mind about... White Man Runs Him "{Custer} said he would finish the Sioux trouble. We scouts thought there were too many Indians for Custer to fight. There were camps and camps and camps."
Goes Ahead "Custer rode to the edge of the high bank and looked over to the place where Reno’s men were, as though planning the next move. When they had arrived at about the point where Lieutenant Hodgson’s headstone was placed later, the three Crow scouts saw the soldiers dismounting in front of the Dakota camp and thought the enemy were “too many...."
and Curley: Curley, re: a letter from Russell White Bear, to Fred Dustin, 1938... "When we reached the ridge the soldiers kept marching on the east side of Reno Hill and going down on the west side of the ridge -- down a ravine, running northward. At this point Custer and two other soldiers besides Bouyer and I rode over to a high point that overlooks the Little Big Horn valley to see what was going on -- we could see dust rising everywhere down the valley. Reno's men were riding toward the Indians -- Custer nor any of us dismounted. Custer made a brief survey of the situation and turned and rode to his command. He did not ask Bouyer or me about the country we rode following the creek as you know -- we were all the time going away from the valley. We finally came out at the Creek --Medicine Tail Creek -- and seeing we were a long ways away from the valley -- Custer -- turning left, rode down Medicine Tail.
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Post by lakotadan on Aug 5, 2024 16:50:09 GMT -6
Thank you J41!
You mention about 3 to 7 NA scouts.
What happened to the other 28 scouts (Custer had 35 NA scouts with him)? Were they utilized in reconning the village or terrain?
Why didn't Custer utilize his NA scout resources to his full advantage? How come he did not ask his scouts about the terrain they would encounter?
Just another interseting question!
Maybe the scholars will answer it (again referring to mg!).
I know, I know. I just can't seem to get away from that scholars thing (all the books written by scholars over the past 20 years, scholars, scholars, scholars, etc!).
Maybe time to for me to take a break from this forum!
Onward!
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Post by Colt45 on Aug 5, 2024 19:36:32 GMT -6
I stated this many moons ago way back in the other threads, but the lack of proper recon of the battle space was the first, and most significant mistake made at LBH. Custer rushed to battle because he believed he had been discovered. That amplified the first mistake.
Had Custer delayed and sent out the scouts to locate the village, its size, and approach points, he would have learned that trying to use the envelopment tactic from the east side of the river was not a good idea due to the NOGO terrain on the east side of the river. Sending Reno across the river to attack and develop the situation was ok, and if he had followed across the river at ford A and attacked up the valley through the pony herd area, he would have had good terrain for mobility (the major weapon of cavalry), the ability to use speed in the assault, and his entire regiment would have been utilized at the point of attack. You always hit the enemy with as much force as possible.
Had he done this, and had he been repulsed, the west side of the river had benchland that was defensible, which would have allowed him to prevent the NA's from fleeing south to the Wolf mountains. Terry was coming from the north so the hostiles would have less options for escaping. He would not have been wiped out, and with Terry's arrival might have been able to salvage the situation and gained a victory by forcing them back to the reservations. No, he would not have been the sole hero in this scenario. It would have been a combined force victory.
I have been to the battlefied, and as a former armor officer I would not have used the eastern bluffs, but rather the valley floor for the attack, given that another friendly force was approaching the battle space from the north. Just my 2 cents worth.
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Post by mikegriffith1 on Aug 9, 2024 11:40:37 GMT -6
I stated this many moons ago way back in the other threads, but the lack of proper recon of the battle space was the first, and most significant mistake made at LBH. Custer rushed to battle because he believed he had been discovered. That amplified the first mistake. Had Custer delayed and sent out the scouts to locate the village, its size, and approach points, he would have learned that trying to use the envelopment tactic from the east side of the river was not a good idea due to the NOGO terrain on the east side of the river. Sending Reno across the river to attack and develop the situation was ok, and if he had followed across the river at ford A and attacked up the valley through the pony herd area, he would have had good terrain for mobility (the major weapon of cavalry), the ability to use speed in the assault, and his entire regiment would have been utilized at the point of attack. You always hit the enemy with as much force as possible. Had he done this, and had he been repulsed, the west side of the river had benchland that was defensible, which would have allowed him to prevent the NA's from fleeing south to the Wolf mountains. Terry was coming from the north so the hostiles would have less options for escaping. He would not have been wiped out, and with Terry's arrival might have been able to salvage the situation and gained a victory by forcing them back to the reservations. No, he would not have been the sole hero in this scenario. It would have been a combined force victory. I have been to the battlefied, and as a former armor officer I would not have used the eastern bluffs, but rather the valley floor for the attack, given that another friendly force was approaching the battle space from the north. Just my 2 cents worth. These arguments have been answered many times over in the scholarly literature on the battle, as well as in several replies in this thread. Custer did two recons of the village, one from a distance with field glasses on the Crow's Nest and one on horseback with his command after he separated from Reno and moved to the right front. As soon as Custer realized how large the village was, he ordered Benteen three times, once in writing, to hurry to his position. Obviously, Custer did not know that Benteen would disobey his order. Custer was not about to delay and send his scouts to recon the village because he believed his column had been discovered, and his belief was logical and reasonable based on what he saw. Plus, Custer's scouts told him that the regiment had been detected. Terry was two days away, so it was not feasible for Custer to base any plans on Terry's arrival. In other encounters with villages, the Indians broke camp and fled as soon as they saw a military column headed their way. They would send some warriors to fight a holding action to give the village time to get away and then the holding force would disengage and act as a rear guard for the fleeing village. They were not in the habit of waiting around several hours after detecting soldiers, much less two days. Custer used the bluffs to stay hidden from the village until he was ready to attack. He had Reno attack in the valley floor, but of course Custer had no idea that Reno would prematurely halt his charge, then abandon his skirmish line, and then flee from the timber and get 1/3 of his command killed in the process. Custer could have saved his command by simply moving east and then heading south to rejoin Reno and Benteen. However, Custer logically assumed that Benteen was heading toward him, and he deployed part of his force to facilitate Benteen's expected arrival. Also, after Custer saw Reno form a skirmish line, he made an aggressive move toward Medicine Tail Coulee (MTC) to support Reno's effort in the valley--again, not realizing that Reno would lose his nerve and would soon carry out a disastrous retreat across the river. When Custer carried out his probe/feint toward MTC, he revealed his presence to the Indians. Thus alerted, thanks to Reno's blundering retreat from the timber, the Indians were able to mass their force against Custer. We have considerable Indian testimony that if Reno had just stayed put in the valley, the chiefs had already ordered the village to move, and that, if nothing else, if Reno had not left the valley, the Indians would have been compelled to keep a large force on Reno and never would have been able to mass against Custer.
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Post by lakotadan on Sept 2, 2024 10:38:25 GMT -6
So, checking out the internet I found the below quote as part of a wikipedia thing- en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Armstrong_Custer"President Grant, a highly successful general but recent antagonist, criticized Custer's actions in the battle of the Little Bighorn. Quoted in the New York Herald on September 2, 1876, Grant said, "I regard Custer's Massacre as a sacrifice of troops, brought on by Custer himself, that was wholly unnecessary – wholly unnecessary."[141] General Phillip Sheridan took a more moderately critical view of Custer's final military actions." Interesting stuff, and this by the top commanding general of the Union Army during the Civil War! So, to find out what General Sheriden stated about Custer I went to the below website- www.astonisher.com/archives/museum/phil_sheridan_little_big_horn.html"I do not attribute Col. Custer's action to either recklessness or want of judgment, but to a misapprehension of the situation and to a superabundance of courage."' Sheriden's comments were nicer than Grant's. But notice the words "misapprehension of the situation" in his statement. Those words kind of negates all his other more positive comments about Custer! So, whose fault was it for a "misapprehension of the situation"?
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Post by Nape Sintekiya Mani on Sept 12, 2024 12:18:16 GMT -6
Custer could have saved his command by simply moving east and then heading south to rejoin Reno and Benteen. However, Custer logically assumed that Benteen was heading toward him, and he deployed part of his force to facilitate Benteen's expected arrival. Also, after Custer saw Reno form a skirmish line, he made an aggressive move toward Medicine Tail Coulee (MTC) to support Reno's effort in the valley--again, not realizing that Reno would lose his nerve and would soon carry out a disastrous retreat across the river. I´m convinced that Custer tried that or something very similar. He wanted to retreat. He was in much the same situation as Reno. Reno realized that he could not get through and retreated in time. Custer did not realize that he was defeated until very late. When he tried to retreat, the warriors who had come up Deep Coulee cut the battlefield into two parts. Neither Custer could retreat, nor Reno get beyond Weir Peaks.
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Post by johnson1941 on Sept 12, 2024 13:56:57 GMT -6
When did Custer see Reno form a skirmish line?
Nothing like "an aggresive move" on the wrong side of the river to "provide support".
Had the indians shaking, I am sure. Buffalo hides - at least.
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