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Post by mikegriffith1 on Jul 21, 2024 9:19:16 GMT -6
How about listing the biggest mistakes or errors in judgement that resulted in the debacle at the LBH? Here are my two top ones: Custer sends Benteen off to his "scout" with no guides or medical personal. What was his intent? To keep Benteen out of any credit for Custer's victory or SOP to gather info? My top mistake is not notifying Benteen when there is an attack order given. Custer sends two messengers to Benteen telling him if he finds nothing to keep going. Yet at the most critical and crucial time of the operation he doesn't send any message to Benteen telling him Indians are on the run and a attack order has been issued. He had several options in notifying Benteen: The Indians are on the run, stay alert. Indians are on the run and we need your support ASAP. Don't worry I have everything in hand and all you need to do is mop up any fleeing Indians. Yet he does nothing to let Benteen know that a battle is about to began! What are you opinions on Custer's mistakes at the LBH? Virtually every statement in this post is wrong. These two alleged "mistakes" are based largely on Benteen's lies and have been addressed in dozens of books. Are you aware of Custer's written order, penned by his adjutant W. W. Cooke, that ordered Benteen to "come on" and to "be quick" about it? Are you aware that Martin, sent by Custer, told Benteen that Custer wanted him to come to his position as quickly as possible and that Custer was taking fire? Are you aware that Sgt. Daniel Kanipe, sent by Captain Boston Custer (Custer's brother), told Benteen the same thing--that he needed to get to Gen. Custer as quickly as possible? I suggest you read at least two of the better books on the battle written by professional historians in the last 20 years, such as Stiles' Custer's Trials and Donovan's A Terrible Glory. Gordon Harper, among many other scholars, demolished Benteen's lies about his scout. The scout was not a waste of time but a tactically sound movement, and Custer did not order Benteen to pitch into any Indians he saw during the scout, contrary to what Benteen later falsely claimed (Harper, The Fights on the Little Horn: Unveiling the Mysteries of Custer's Last Stand, pp. 20-24).
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Post by mikegriffith1 on Jul 22, 2024 7:27:27 GMT -6
Here are few facts that scholars have discussed and that we need to keep in mind about the battle:
-- Reno, Benteen, and a few other officers later gave a markedly distorted timeline of events in an effort to conceal their cowardice, incompetence, and refusal to follow orders. They falsely portrayed the pack train as arriving some 90 minutes after Benteen arrived at Reno Hill, when in fact it arrived 10-15 minutes after Benteen reached the hill. They falsely portrayed Weir's stay on Weir Point as being very short in duration, when it was actually around 2 hours, and they falsely indicated that the Custer fight was over when Weir reached Weir Point (the enlisted men's testimony flatly contradicts this picture). In conjunction with these lies, they falsely portrayed Custer's fight as having lasted no more than an hour.
-- Custer did not order Benteen to bring the pack train with him. Benteen and Reno both used this phony assumption to justify Benteen's failure to markedly quicken his pace after being ordered to "be quick," and to justify Reno's delay in moving toward Custer. The focus of Custer's order was that Benteen needed to come quickly to Custer ("come on . . . be quick"). "Bring packs" does not mean "bring the pack train" or even "bring all the packs." Custer understood that Benteen could not "be quick" if he tried to bring the pack train with him. Custer correctly assumed that Benteen was with or near the pack train and could grab some ammo. Custer's intent was that Benteen bring as much ammo as feasible for Benteen to get to him as quickly as possible. Custer's verbal order to Benteen, delivered through Custer's orderly John Martin, was that Benteen was to get to Custer as soon as he could, and Martin advised Benteen that Custer was under fire.
Benteen later lied and claimed that Martin told him the Indians were fleeing, a claim that Martin adamantly rejected.
Furthermore, before Custer sent Martin, his brother, Captain Boston Custer, sent Sgt. Daniel Kanipe to the pack train with orders that if he saw Benteen on the way, he was to stop and tell Benteen to get to Custer as quickly as possible. Kanipe later confirmed that he did see Benteen and did relay this order. Furthermore, Godfrey and Edgerly also later confirmed that Kanipe came to Benteen, and Godfrey noted that Kanipe did so before Martin arrived.
So Benteen knew full well that his most urgent task was to get to Custer as quickly as possible, and he refused to obey that order.
-- Perhaps Benteen's most egregious, astonishing lie was that he believed Custer had already been destroyed when Martin arrived with his message. Benteen made this preposterous claim in his second appearance on the witness stand at Reno's court of inquiry (RCOI).
-- Dr. Charles Kuhlman, one of the greatest Custer scholars of all time, wrote an entire book to refute the claim that Custer disobeyed General Terry's orders: Did Custer Disobey Orders at the Battle of the Little Big Horn? Custer did not disobey Terry's orders. In fact, when Custer's enemies first made this claim, they used an altered version of Terry's orders because the original orders made it clear that Custer had wide discretion.
-- Dr. Kuhlman also made the point that Custer attacked when he did in order to take pressure off Reno, i.e., in order to support Reno, just as he said he would. Keep in mind that Reno and many of his soldiers saw Custer on the bluffs to Reno's right front, and Custer waved at them--and this was before Reno began his charge into the valley. Yet, Reno later lied and claimed that he thought Custer would support him from the rear and that he had no idea where Custer was. However, in his battle report, Reno admitted he knew Custer was going to attack from the flank.
-- Dr. Robert Utley, one of the giants of Custer scholarship, found considerable evidence from Indian sources (1) that the Indians were preparing to flee while Reno was in the timber but that they changed their minds when Reno fled from the timber, and (2) that if Reno had held the timber, the Indians would have been compelled to keep a large force near the timber even if they had decided not to flee (Custer and the Great Controversy, Bison Books, 1998, pp. 90-103).
-- One of the best responses, if not the best response, that I have seen to Reno and Benteen's professed ignorance of heavy firing to the north was written by Richard G. Hardoff, another giant in Custer scholarship and probably the most knowledgeable scholar on the Indian sources. Hardoff wrote the response in a long footnote that commented on interpreter Nicholas Ruleau’s statement that Custer’s soldiers fired many volleys (“volley after volley”):
These volleys were heard by many of Reno’s command then idling on the bluffs some three miles to the south. Initially, some of these volleys were fired from the Nye-Cartwright Ridge, where many years later little piles of casings were discovered lying in groups of three. Cheyenne statements reveal that volleys were also fired from Calhoun Ridge, and a survey of this area immediately after the battle disclosed that the soldiers deployed here had offered determined resistance. Officers attested later to having seen piles of casings in the intervals between the slain bodies, some piles containing as many as 30 shells. . . .
Lt. Charles A. Varnum heard heavy firing, a sort of crash-crash, and he exclaimed, “J---- C----, Wallace, hear that—and that”; yet, Lt. George Wallace testified he heard no volleys, but only a few scattering shots from the west side of the river, while at the same time Lt. Winfield S. Edgerly remembered hearing very heavy volley firing coming from downstream [i.e., from the north, where Custer was]; but Captain Frederick W. Benteen heard only 15 or 20 shots, while Major Marcus A. Reno did not hear any firing and therefore assumed Custer was not engaged at all, Reno blaming his misjudgment on the other officers for failing to inform him of the true situation.
Yet, the veracity of this self-serving statement is in serious doubt, because Captain Thomas M. McDougall heard two dull-sounding volleys and distinctly recalled reporting this to Reno, who became agitated and totally ignored it. However, McDougall’s concern was not ignored by Captain Myles Moylan who had heard faint volley firing and who checked with McDougall to confirm it; moreover, Lt. Edward S. Godfrey heard two distinct volleys in spite of his natural hearing impairment, and he turned to Lt. Luther R. Hare who affirmed it.
Of the two non-commissioned officers who testified, Sgt. Edward Davern stated he heard indistinctive volley firing in the presence of Major Reno as his orderly, while Sgt. Ferdinand A. Culbertson recalled a couple of very heavy volleys at a time when Reno was near him.
Of the individuals left behind in the valley upon Reno’s retreat, Interpreter Frederick F. Gerard vividly recalled hearing three or four volleys, as if 50 to 100 guns were discharged at a volley, while Scout George Herendeen testified he heard a great many volleys and scattering shots, the whole lasting about a hour; and lastly, Lt. Charles A. DeRudio positively remembered an immense volley firing, which volleys were steady for a long time, and that the whole lasted about an hour and a half before it died out in scattering shots.
This, then, is the intelligent testimony of mostly trained military observers, of which the two highest ranking officers conveniently disclaimed hearing any of Custer’s volleys at all, while the commanding officer, Major Reno, had the impudence to complain he was not being posted on the matter which progress was being monitored in his presence. (Lakota Recollections of the Custer Fight, University of Nebraska Press, 1997 edition, pp. 43-44)
Reno and Benteen (and their good friend Wallace) lied about hearing heavy gunfire to the north to support their lie that they had no idea Custer was in a serious fight and did not even know where he was. These lies were also employed to support the bogus claim that Weir did not leave to go help Custer but just to do a recon. To buttress these lies, Reno and Benteen, and their allies, denied that Reno and Weir had a heated argument over Reno's refusal to move toward Custer. Yet, Benteen slipped up in a letter and tacitly admitted that the Reno-Weir argument occurred; Benteen also said that Weir left in violation of Reno's orders, and that he himself (Benteen) followed Weir against Reno's orders.
-- When Captain McDougall arrived at Reno Hill, "right away" he "heard firing" to the north and heard men talking about "trying to join Custer." McDougall noted that when he reached the hill, "all was quiet with Reno and Benteen's men and one would not have imagined that a battle had been fought." Yeah, because the Indians had all rushed north to take on Custer--but of course we're supposed to believe that this obvious conclusion never dawned on Reno and Benteen.
Anyway, when McDougall heard the gunfire to the north and the talk of going to support Custer, he walked over to Reno and Benteen and told them he thought they should go help Custer. He added that even though "it appeared to everyone that all should go to support Custer," Reno decided they should remain on the hill. McDougall's full account can be found in Ken Hammer's book Custer in '76: Walter Camp's Notes on the Custer Fight, pp. 70-71.
Reno and Benteen only changed their minds when Captain Weir shamed them into action when Weir took off with his company toward Custer against Reno's orders. Benteen waited a while but then decided to follow Weir. When he did so, Reno ordered him to halt, but Benteen ignored him. Only after all this did Reno finally decide to move his companies toward Custer.
-- The prosecutor (aka the "recorder") at the RCOI, Lt. Jesse Lee, did not buy Reno's story that he was running low on ammo when he left the timber. He noted that when the pack train arrived at Reno Hill, very little ammo was distributed. Noted Lee,
So it appears that Maj. Reno's command was not so badly in need of ammunition after all. (RCOI transcript, vol. 2, p. 239, p. 635 in 1951 compilation)
-- There is ample credible evidence, some of it from Reno's own friends, that Reno was already under the influence of alcohol when he charged up the valley.
-- At the RCOI, Reno feigned concern for the wounded as part of his excuse for not immediately moving toward Custer after he reached Reno Hill. Yet, Reno showed no concern whatsoever for the wounded when he retreated from the timber. As the RCOI prosecutor noted, Reno made no effort to help the wounded during the retreat and even refused to set up covering fire on the other side of the river to protect the men who were still in and approaching the river, even when a sergeant suggested he do so.
As many scholars have noted, Reno only had a relative handful of seriously wounded men when he reached Reno Hill, and these wounded began to be treated before Benteen arrived. Reno could have packed them up and moved toward Custer in short order after Benteen arrived, but instead he dawdled for a good hour before he was finally shamed into moving by Captain Weir. Custer's critics ignore the fact that when Reno finally did move toward Custer, he packed up the wounded and moved out. He could and should have done this much sooner. No military officer with any sense of honor and duty stalls for a good hour to "help the wounded" when he knows that over 200 men are fighting for their lives just 20 minutes away.
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Post by johnson1941 on Jul 23, 2024 12:08:08 GMT -6
?? Saw this at a paper link from your website too...might need re-thinking
You should read Graham, 1923: Martin I handed message to Col. Benteen, and then told him what the General said - that it was a big village and to hurry. He said "where is the General now?' and I answered that the indians we saw were running and I supposed that by this time he had charged through the village.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 23, 2024 12:47:35 GMT -6
Custer had the chance to send either McLlhargey of Mitchell back to Reno, instead they died on LSH, this kept Reno out of any plan he was hatching.
Ian
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Post by mikegriffith1 on Jul 23, 2024 16:26:21 GMT -6
?? Saw this at a paper link from your website too...might need re-thinking I think you are more concerned about caring for the wounded (maybe other than 'water'), than they were about actually moving them. Moylan turned to McDougall for help. I'm guessing you've never served in the military. No competent, honorable officer pauses for over an hour to treat a handful of wounded when he knows that his commander has issued a peremptory order to come to his aid quickly and when he knows that his commander and over 200 other men are fighting for their lives just 20 minutes away. I notice you snipped the point that when Reno finally did get shamed into moving toward Custer, he did what he could and should have done an hour earlier: he packed up the wounded and took them with him. You keep avoiding this point. Why do you want to believe something that is obviously not true? This is another old nonsensical chestnut that was debunked long ago. It is wrong for numerous reasons. Reno admitted in his battle report that he knew that Custer would attack from the flank, and that he heard firing to the north and knew it had to be Custer. Even if we make the unlikely assumption that Reno had "no idea" what Custer was doing, as Reno falsely claimed, this does not excuse Reno's failure to follow the time-honored dictum that "if in doubt, go to the sounds of the guns." I've already presented much of the considerable evidence that Custer's fight could be clearly heard on Reno Hill and that several people brought this to Reno's attention and urged him to move toward Custer. So even if Reno truly had no idea what Custer wanted to do, he knew that Custer was in a serious fight and that Custer had ordered Benteen to come to him quickly. In an effort to hide or obscure his cowardly, dishonorable failure to go to the sounds of the guns, Reno lied about the movement toward Custer, lied about when the pack train arrived, lied about his supply of ammo, lied about being unable to hear heavy firing to the north, and lied about knowing what happened to Custer. And in an effort to obscure his poor conduct before Reno Hill, Reno lied about how many Indians were in front of him when he charged up the valley, lied about being drunk, lied about how he thought Custer was going to support him, lied about not seeing Custer to his right front, lied about the timber as a defensive position, and lied about his frantic retreat from the timber.
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Post by lakotadan on Jul 23, 2024 16:32:32 GMT -6
So,
Reading this thread through from the beginning (it was started in 2015).
I agree that Custer could have, and should have, waited till the 26th before attacking the village.
I also agree with some posts here that state Custer’s mistakes were made force marching his men (and thusly the horses) on the 21st through the 24th, and not listening to his scouts or doing enough reconnaissance.
As far as I am concerned, this whole debacle was Custer’s fault.
Anyway, as I stated in a previous thread, Custer was an egomaniac and only concerned with his own glory (my opinion). Unfortunately, he took about 250 good men with him to their deaths in trying to seek his glory.
Like I stated in another thread-
“What kind of egomaniac takes 4 relatives of his into a possible battle situation?
Yes, 2 of his relatives were officers. I can see his brother Thomas wanting to be with the 7th and his brother GAC. Maybe James Calhoun (the brother-in-law) wanted to be with the 7th to be in on any glory that GAC could provide.
But how about the younger brother Boston Custer? Didn’t GAC give him some sort of fictitious title so that he could tag along with the 7th? The same goes for the nephew, Harry Reed.
Why didn’t Custer at least split up his relatives and leave some with Reno or Benteen? At least they might not have all gone into battle, or if they did (as actually happened) maybe some would have survived.
But no! Custer wanted all of his relatives with him to see his great victory over the Native Americans!
Well, that never happened!”
Also, as stated on the markers of the fallen Native Americans (NAs) at the Little Bighorn the NAs "were defending their way of life". Actually, I believe it was much simpler than that. The NAs were protecting their loved ones, protecting their families, and protecting the village.
In this battle the NAs did not attack first. Custer sent Reno and some scouts to attack the NAs first. As I recall the scouts killed a couple of NA kids swimming in the river. Also, didn’t Custer or some of his troop’s rope and tried to drag off a NA woman?
Well, that type of thing would certainly make the NAs warriors fight much harder!
Just my opinion (again).
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Post by johnson1941 on Jul 23, 2024 17:07:39 GMT -6
I guessed you knew the difference between Thomas and Boston. Now I am not so sure. Most of us know all about Reno and the time it took him to do something. What Weir did, and Edgerly, etc. And eventually Benteen did. And what Reno didn't. McDougall How lond did he remain on Reno Hill till whole command of Reno started to find Custer? 1.5 hoursjohnson1941 “WM Camp took issue with Benteen & Reno lingering so long ("2.5 hours") near where Reno retreated before "sending" out an advance. Actually we know Weir eventually went out on his own hook, and Edgerly followed, due to firing heard.” Not even a scout sent to the high ground just 1/2 mile away. I started a thread about it months ago. I will also again simply point out that your timing is off, as ignore off about 9 witnesses (and numerous "historians/scholars") who all agree (+/-45mins-1hr);...for a mistake and a couple "short time later" references mentioned to back yourself up.
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Post by mikegriffith1 on Jul 24, 2024 3:47:12 GMT -6
Below is part of what Dr. Phillip Thomas Tucker says about Reno and Benteen's false denials of hearing heavy firing from Custer's location in his 2017 book Death at the Little Bighorn. Dr. Tucker points out that the clearly audible volleys were obviously distress volleys intended to alert Reno and Benteen, again, that Custer urgently needed assistance. Dr. Tucker:
In order to justify their lack of action and failure to come to the aid of Custer’s five hard-pressed companies, Reno and Benteen later falsely denied (which was part of the process of blaming Custer—the perfect scapegoat—for the disaster and to make themselves look blameless and still responsible officers) that they had heard the distinct succession of volleys during the 1879 Reno Court of Inquiry.
In fact, Lieutenant Edgerly, a blue-eyed West Pointer, was incorrect about the number of distress volleys that had been evidently ordered by second-in-command Captain Keogh to communicate . . . to Benteen’s and Reno’s men in order to hasten assistance before it was too late. Scout George B. Herendeen, born in Ohio and a Civil War veteran, wrote how he knew exactly what Custer’s five companies had delivered because this was a crisis situation: “There were about nine volleys at intervals” in Custer’s sector. The fact that these volleys were so mechanical, successive, and regularly spaced indicated that they were fired to send an urgent and desperate message to Benteen and Reno and not part of a typical combat situation.
Tall Bull also heard these regular volleys, after Custer’s troopers had been repulsed at the ford and then “fell back from [the] river” and in poor “order.” He emphasized how he “[h]eard the volleys” that were distress signals.
Commanding Company K, 7th Cavalry, Lieutenant Edward S. Godfrey correctly concluded as to the true source of these regular volleys before Custer’s men ever faced large numbers of warriors. Only a belated and gradual buildup of massive Indian strength developing would warrant the firing of so many massed volleys that were reminiscent of conventional combat, rather than those of facing an opponent who fought guerrilla-style in moving stealthy up the slope, covered in high, luxurious grass: “I have but little doubt now that these volleys were fired by Custer’s orders as signals of distress and to indicate where he was.”
Indeed, these volleys unleashed by the 7th Cavalry troopers were fired at a time when “there was no mass of Indians at this point opposite any part of the command.” Clearly, this series of rolling volleys that echoed down the Little Bighorn Valley were “distress signals” as Lieutenant Godfrey correctly deduced with the insight of a Civil War and Indian War veteran. As mentioned, this systemic firing of volleys came at a time when the immediate threat before Custer’s men was still not of a magnitude (which only came later) that warranted the unleashing of such a large number of closely spaced successive volleys, because this was before the gradual buildup of warriors: the actual case even if the number total of Herendeen’s nine volleys was mistaken and fewer. Indeed, at this time, the great number of Sioux and Cheyenne who rode north from the Reno fight had still not poured across the ford at this time. (pp. 318-320)
So, again, even if we make the unlikely assumption that Reno knew nothing about Custer's intentions before entering the timber (even though Reno admitted in his battle report that he knew Custer would attack from the flank, and even though he had seen Custer to his right front), Reno certainly knew enough to take action after Benteen arrived on Reno Hill, at the very latest. He could hear heavy firing/distress volleys. He knew Custer had issued a clear, peremptory order to Benteen to come to him quickly. He knew the Indians had suddenly left Reno Hill and gone northward. Surely Reno wasn't so brain dead that he couldn't figure out that they had gone to concentrate on Custer. At least two officers called Reno's attention to the heavy firing and urged that they move toward Custer, toward "the sound of the guns."
But Reno just sat on his hill and dawdled for at least a precious hour while over 200 men were fighting for their lives just 20 minutes away.
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Post by mikegriffith1 on Jul 28, 2024 9:10:17 GMT -6
Gordon Richard wrote one of the best refutations of the claim that Custer had no plan or that Reno didn't know the plan. Here is part of his response to the claim:
It is unlikely then that Custer would have dispersed his forces other than with what he thought were sound military reasons at the time.
Yet at the Reno Court of Inquiry, both Major Reno and Captain Benteen denied that any strategy at all existed. Captain Benteen testified: a) “There was no plan at all” and b) “If there had been any plan of battle, enough of that plan would have been communicated to me so that I would have known what to do under certain circumstances. Not having done that I do not believe there was any plan.”3 While Major Reno said: a) “There was no plan communicated to us if one existed. The subordinate commanders did not know of it” and b) “I might say there that I do not think there was any plan.”41 believe Custer’s subordinates were self-serving, as the suggested lack of a plan deflected attention away from their own shortcomings on June 25, 1876.
When Custer looked out for a second time from either the Crow’s Nest or Varnum’s Lookout that morning, those with him included Mitch Boyer and some Crow scouts, who were not only looking into a valley that was part of their homeland, but who had also camped in the area where the great Indian village was sited. Being made aware of that, Custer would not have spurned the chance to obtain all the information he could from them about the terrain from there to the Indian camps in preparation for his initial plan to approach the village at dawn the next morning.
Returning to the command however, he was informed that Indians, rifling a lost hard-tack box, had seen the command. Believing that the village would scatter once warned, he decided on an immediate offensive. Lieutenant Godfrey confirms this, reporting Custer as saying, “At all events our presence has been discovered . . . that we would march at once to attack the village . . . “5 Also, Lieutenant Edgerly recounted: “ . . . as our presence had been discovered it would be necessary to attack at once.”6 George Herendeen recalled that Custer told him: “ . . . besides they have discovered us The only thing to do is to push ahead and attack the camp as soon as possible.”7 And finally Reno said, “ . . . .we could not surprise them and it was determined to move at once to the attack.”8
Custer was therefore primed to move aggressively against the camps, and his subordinates were fully aware of that, so what tactics did he have in mind? The possibilities open to him would be dictated by what the Indians did. While they were expected to flee and scatter, their sheer numbers could well mean that much of the village would be intact when he reached it and the warriors would then be forced to put up some resistance to enable their families to escape. The comments of Crow scout Hairy Moccasin suggest that the latter scenario was the most likely. In a June 1916 interview he said:
I was sent ahead [from the Crow’s Nest]. Custer said, “You go and find that village.” I went to a butte at the head of Reno Creek, from where I could see the village. I reported the camp to Custer. He asked if any were running about away from the camp. I said “No.” We then came on down to the forks of Reno Creek. When we stopped there to divide up I could hear the Indians in camp shouting and whooping.9
The usual tactic against a standing village was envelopment, whereby a holding force would engage the enemy while other parts of the command swung to the left and/or right to hit him in the rear or on the flank. The late Jay Smith described such tactics in two articles he authored. In one, citing Von Clausewitz as his basis, he says, “Custer used an envelopment while employing the principles of offense, maneuver, and surprise,”10 and in the other, “These were some of the best professional soldiers in the world. A few words or gestures were all that were needed to provide all the information required for a complete battle. Objectives and unit tactics were understood by all. Often a complete battle plan consisted only of stating which units would go where.”11
Viewed in this light, the deployment of the battalions commanded by Reno and Benteen can be seen to fit the requirements of an envelopment plan, which had of course, been used at the Washita and the Powder River fights, so it was widely known. There are corroborations that it was also to be used at the Little Big Horn from testimony and elsewhere. (Gordon Richard, “Death of the Valiant: Another Look at Custer’s Fight,” in Gordon Harper, The Fights on the Little Horn: 50 Years of Research into Custer's Last Stand, Casemate Publishers, 2014, pp. 257-259)
Richard's refutation continues for several more pages.
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Post by johnson1941 on Jul 28, 2024 10:55:25 GMT -6
Lots of speculation from people who weren't there.
But this does sound eerily familiar...
I take it Reno was the holding force?
Too bad the attack from the flank had failed. Why?
Tall Bull also heard these regular volleys, after Custer’s troopers had been repulsed at the ford and then “fell back from [the] river” and in poor “order.”
Hairy Moccasin "...Then Custer and command turned down south coulee into Medicine Tail Coulee and went down toward river and out onto flat. Two men were killed here and the Sioux told me 5 years afterwards that a single soldier rode his horse across the river and into the camp and been killed in the camp”
Martin "I did not follow Dry Creek all way back to coulee running north and south but cut across the high ground. When I got up on the elevation I looked behind and saw Custer's command over on the flat and Indians over in the village riding toward the river and waving buffalo hides. The battalion appeared at this time to be falling back from the river
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Post by mikegriffith1 on Jul 29, 2024 6:29:18 GMT -6
I don't know how anyone can rely on Reno's word and expect to have their arguments taken seriously. Reno made the ludicrous and shameful claim to the RCOI that Custer's force was already destroyed by the time Reno left the timber. Indian accounts alone prove that Custer's fight did not even become severe until after Reno left the timber. And why was that? Because, as the Indian accounts document, a large number of warriors left Reno Hill and joined the fight against Custer. Only then did Custer's fight start to become desperate. Michno and Hardoff cover this point in their books on the Indian accounts of the battle.
Benteen told the RCOI the even-more absurd tale that Custer's force was already destroyed by the time John Martin arrived with Custer's written order, which would mean that Custer's force was destroyed even earlier than Reno claimed. Yet, in his previous RCOI testimony, Benteen said that Custer was still fighting when he arrived on Weir Point and that he planted a guideon there in the hope that some of Custer's men would see it. Moreover, Reno stated in his battle report that he and others ("we") on Reno Hill heard firing to the north and knew it had to be Custer.
Obviously, Reno and Benteen were lying through their teeth at the RCOI. However, we have a few people in this forum who routinely base their arguments on Reno and Benteen's RCOI claims.
The entire "there was no plan" and/or "Reno didn't know the plan" myth rests solely on Reno and Benteen's RCOI claims. Reno admitted in his battle report that he was ordered to charge toward the village and that he knew Custer would attack from the flank. Benteen's battle report and letters written soon after the battle contradict his later claims to the RCOI about his scout to the left and about his knowledge of Custer's intentions.
So Reno knew Custer's basic plan, and Benteen knew the purpose of his leftward scout and how it fit into the plan. Benteen soon also knew that he was supposed to get to Custer quickly and that Custer was under fire. And once on Reno Hill, both Reno and Benteen knew that Custer was in a serious fight and needed their aid as soon as possible.
I'll post the remainder of Gordon Richard's response to the "no plan/didn't know the plan" myth today or tomorrow.
But, again, how can anyone take Reno and Benteen's word on this issue given their bald-faced lies to the RCOI about when Custer was destroyed? Unless one dismisses all the soldier accounts of hearing heavy firing to the north, and unless one dismisses all the Indian accounts that indicate Custer's fight became severe after Reno left the timber, no one can believe Reno and Benteen's fantasy that Custer was destroyed when Reno left the timber or when Martin arrived to Benteen with Custer's order.
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Post by johnson1941 on Jul 29, 2024 7:19:38 GMT -6
"I planted a guidon at the highest point that looked over that country. Some of the officers say that the battlefield was in sight, but I know positively that it was not"
Q. State whether at that highest point you saw any evidence of fighting or hear the sounds of any firing. A. I saw no such evidence nor heard any firing.
Q. What was the purpose of placing the guidon, on that high point? A. To present an object to attract the attention of General Custer’s command, if it was in sight. Q. Then in your opinion his command was then alive? A. I thought so.
Herendeen I claim that what is called Weir’s Hill is the highest point on the ridge in that vicinity. Martin 'Yes sir, the highest hill the very highest point around there. [pt 7, Weir's Hill] DeRudio It was on the highest point on the right bank of the creek [pt 7] Edgerly We went to that highest point point 7; Indians whom we had already seen from the highest point [7] Benteen after we had reached that highest point at the figure “7".
Point is - Weir Peaks was not the highest point referred to and is NOT where Benteen planted a guidon. Weir’s HILL aka pt 7 is.
Whatever - moving on to other stuff... Agreed - (so you now believe him?). The whole Gordan Richard thing:
So ONCE AGAIN - what happened to Custer's attack from the flank?!? Quite apparently Custer's initial attack failed and he was repulsed...why?? Instead of pressing at the flank he moved to points North & East...why?
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Post by herosrest on Jul 29, 2024 13:07:55 GMT -6
The Indian assault into Reno's retreat faltered and ceased but for a portion of the numbers available to combat the cavalry. They fell back from pursuing Reno's charge to the rear, and we know then from DeRudio in the timbber that a half the Indians in the valley (8-900 according to Benteen) split, with a half going downriver to the camp and the rest going up the bluffs across the river and moving to attack across Medicine Tail Coulee. That's what happened. That movement by the Indian forces forced the cavalry to fall back rather than be separated but of course, once they began that retreat they were swarmed by Indians who crossed the river opposite into Deep Coulee. The retreat got as far as Finley Hill before it had to dismount and fight on foot.
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Post by herosrest on Jul 29, 2024 13:28:10 GMT -6
Two Bulls, one of ‘Sitting Bull’s People,’ Little Big Horn account, 1930
TWO BULL’S ACCOUNT OF THE FIGHT
Told to A.B. Welch, Mandan, N.D., November 19th, 1930:
This old Indian was in this fight and tells the following story of what he saw. He is Hunkpapa and married to the sister of Crow Ghost. Later on he was a policeman and a member of an Indian detachment, now draws a pension from the Government for those services.
“I was in that fight with the soldiers of Long Hair. It was a big camp on river there. The south end of it was where my people were. There was a little draw running along there. Sometimes it had water in it. Our lodges were lined up along it and they were about the last in the village. When we saw the soldiers cross the creek, we went back into the village a ways. Then we began to shoot from there. Then we charged out with the horses. Some went around the end of the soldier’s line. I was in the trees and saw some things. These soldiers run back to the creek. They tried to get across. Several white soldiers were killed there. The banks were high. I had two revolvers. That’s all I had. We killed some there at the water crossing.
Then some Indians told me, they said “Here is something different.” I went into the trees. There was a dead man there. He was stripped. They said “This is a black man. It is Ishea.” (Welch note – this was probably Isiaah, Custer’s black servant). This black man had an elk tooth. It was tied on his wrist. I knew that tooth. I had seen it before. Because this black man was dead at the south end of the village, we thought we were fighting Long Hair. Then a white man came out of the trees. He was an officer. He had stripes on his sleeves. We ran at him. We clubbed him then. He died there. If he had stayed in the trees he would have been safe.
Then two Indians came riding hard. They shouted that Long Hair was up there. They said “Ride down close along the line of timber.” So we rode down the river along the trees. There was shooting pretty soon ahead of us. We came then to where there was much noise. There was much smoke. We rode into that. I could not see much. I saw a soldier or two in the smoke. I saw some dead horses too. Some other horses were plunging and trying to get away. I rode fast. My horse fell down. I had a rope tied to my waist to hold him. But he was dead. I cut the rope. I had a costly bridle on him. It was a Mexican bridle. It was silver on it. I pulled it off and carried it with me. I saw some Indians running back. I went too. I jumped about and dodged all the time.
Then I saw a man. He had both hands on the ground and he was bloody. He had long hair. He was a Gros Ventre. (Custer’s Scout) I asked him if he was shot. He said “Yes. Through the hips.” He was scalped. The blood was running over his face. I said “I’ll help you Brother.” I held one of my revolvers to his head. I killed him then. That is all I know about that fight. I struck three enemies. One was the officer who came out of the trees. One was the black man. One was the Toka Indian. We went away
Sand Hill Crane talks to Welch, November 6th, 1924, Mandan, N.D.:
“…Yes. I was at the Little Big Horn Fight. I was on a hill. I was not with the coward, Reno. He ought to put on a woman’s dress. I was with Captain Tom Custer in the morning. Then I went after the Sioux horses. I caught several that day. My uncle, Bloody Knife got killed there.”
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Post by herosrest on Jul 29, 2024 13:56:05 GMT -6
Red Star’s account of the Fight, as told by his Nephew, Miles Horn, 1938
Script from April 13, 1938 Broadcast over Radio Station in Sheridan, Wyoming.
– – – – – As the trumpets sounded for mounts and then the march as as we were given orders that we as scouts would take the lead down the creek at almost a mile ahead, we did so, and as we rode along and to our surprise we saw one teepe some where’s near the forks of Reno. And with a few war cries or whoops we were soon on our way charging on the teepe. As we rode up swiftly and striking the teepe with our quirts or either the butt end of the carbine which represents a cue to strike the enemy on his teepe, that’s for only the first strikes, second and third Young Hawk one of our scouts, ripped the teepe with his big knife. In which we discovered that the teepe was only a burieal teepe as there was a dead body all wrapped up.
As we proceeded our route and as we look back we could now see Reno and his outfit moving rapidly but Custer or Long Hair had already gone out of sight over on the north side of Reno Creek and from there to so west straight for the river.
As Reno approached the river, at this time at about where I stood, we could now see a little cloud of dust rolling up from the north end of the camp just across the river. “Long Hair has charged on the camp already.” one scout yelled. And in the meantime Reno had made an attempt to charge on this end but by force retreated back before he got out to far from the river. The sight of the whole camp seem’d to me the biggest camp of Indians that I ever saw. Long Hair had retreated also and we could see that he was over taken on the north ridge and there the smoke and dust rolled up for about an hour and half and then quieten down.
Reno has been criticized in a way, but we as Scouts believe earnestly that Reno was a better judgement of caracter for a soldier leader. (end)
This account, handed across a generation, is useful for comparison purposes since Red Star left his own record as first hand, with Bede and under oath (afadavit..... don't say that word) printed in State History editions and by O.G. Libby.
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