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Post by fred on May 2, 2015 16:02:31 GMT -6
I am of the opinion that one of the most important "weapons" that the allies had was the American trucks, particularly the 2.5 ton Studebaker. I totally agree with you. In fact, Hitler was so convinced of victory he diverted German industry from emphasis on military production back to civilian production some time in 1942 or 1943, I forget which. In case you are interested, here is a short, unfinished bio I have put together on Halder: Halder, Franz, Generaloberst (b. 1884 – d. April 2, 1972) Artillery officer. Seriously opposed to the Nazi régime, but could never bring himself to the final act. Leach calls him “the most controversial, even paradoxical, of the generals in Hitler’s service.” Seaton wrote, Halder was, “an indefatigable, competent, and cautious Bavarian,” whose relationship with v. Brauchitsch was “cool.” Quite friendly with v. Fritsch. Chief of the German General Staff, 1938 – September 24, 1942. Replaced Beck. Prior to assuming the role as Chief of the General Staff, Halder was the Quartermaster-General I, Director of Military Operations (Qu I) while Beck was Chief. AG Center— “The German General Staff realized that the Russian enemy was being underestimated and would only be defeated by a quick conquest of the Soviet capital. Hitler and OKW, however, believed more in the economic-political sphere. On [July 28, 1941]… Halder wrote in his diary: ‘… the splitting up of the panzer groups… leads to a dispersal of the forces and their bogging down in the decisive direction of Moscow.’” [Haupt] By August 1941, even though OKH and v. Bock and his generals disagreed on how AG Center was achieving its objectives, they did agree on the danger in the strengthening Soviet resistance and the importance of moving as quickly as possible on Moscow. Halder’s main problem, apparently, was the lack of a main effort—the army group was too dispersed. After WWII, he served fourteen years with the U. S. Army Historical Division and in 1961 was awarded the Meritorious Civilian Service Award, the highest American civilian award for services to the country. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Beth on May 2, 2015 18:09:45 GMT -6
My first observation is that animal management is a huge factor in this era. It is amusing that Rinni and Conzelman are completely blind to this. The 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry has a report that illustrates this. Started with 919 horses, and captured 43. 230 died or were abandoned as they fell out 171 were killed or captured, but really this is a lame excuse. All were abandoned. So 961 animals at the start became 560 at the end, with start being 30 Apr 64, end being 13 Sep 64. Animals need management and leadership. You can run vehicles until they run out of gas. You can run men to extreme conditions through leadership. You abuse animals, and they die. The reports I am reviewing show animal losses exceed human losses on average by 10 to 1. But ratios of 100 to one are frequent. People who do not understand cavalry operations, meaning Conzelman, Rinni and that crowd, deride and make fun of units that manage their animal assets. Crook was a master at this. Look at his leadership, and how he manned, trained and equipped his units to optimize animal assets. I know that the 7th traveled with farriers but what about vets? Was there a formula on how many vets and/or farriers per horse or unit? Also I believe there was a pattern they had to move to prevent the horses from being overworked right?
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Post by montrose on May 2, 2015 21:12:54 GMT -6
Beth,
This is not an issue for vets.
Horses require a variety of forage, varying by breed. If they do not get the food they require, they die. In the ACW animal losses were in the hundred of thousands.
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Post by Beth on May 2, 2015 23:11:18 GMT -6
It wasn't exactly just a fodder problem though the lack of food was a huge factor and probably the could have been the easiest problem to solve. Poor diet was huge but those animals were over ridden and over used. Do you want to bet some of those horses and mules had saddle sores down to the bone? Also just like it was with soldiers, disease was also a huge factor. Link
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Post by mac on May 3, 2015 3:42:13 GMT -6
Economics of WW2 fascinating stuff! The notion of the German army as technologically superior is, as Ian has shown, false. At the top end great...the rest.. ordinary and horse drawn. Not much blitzkreig in a horse! Animal welfare is never divorced from human welfare! Cheers
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Post by fred on May 3, 2015 6:16:24 GMT -6
The notion of the German army as technologically superior is, as Ian has shown, false. At the top end great...the rest.. ordinary and horse drawn. Not much blitzkreig in a horse! Don't be fooled, however. Their equipment was far better. Much of it, however, was rushed into battle too late, i. e., Mark V Panthers at Kursk... which a little later became the world's finest battle tank. The T-34 shocked them and that's when they began upgrading the main gun on their Mark IV's and when suddenly they realized the importance of their 88mm gun. Part of Halder's issue with outstripping the main advance was precisely that: how do you supply units that have been too successful? Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on May 3, 2015 6:18:52 GMT -6
I know that the 7th traveled with farriers but what about vets? VET SURG Carl A. Stein—b. Germany. Left at Powder River camp. Joined regiment in March 1876, resigned September 1, 1876. Studied vet medicine at Military Vet. School, Berlin. Served in 1st Prussian Dragoons Regiment. Appointed to 7th Cavalry on July 7, 1875. As noted, Stein was the regimental vet and he was left behind at the Powder River Depot. Any horses beyond that were deemed expendable I guess. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 3, 2015 6:44:40 GMT -6
The Germans had to rush in an interim weapon to deal with the T-34, their 37mm PAK 36 anti-tank guns were useless against the T-34 and the powerful 75mm PAK 40 was not yet ready, so they merged the barrel of the French mle 1897 75mm field gun with the carriage of the PAK 38. Apparently they had hundreds of French mle 1897 75mm field guns which they captured from both France and Poland. The gun was known as the 75mm PAK 97/38 and was not that good due to violet recoil of the 75. When the 75mm PAK 40 was in full production, they quickly sold these PAK 97/38s to their allies.
Ian.
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 3, 2015 6:56:01 GMT -6
Each cavalry company was supposed to include a farrier, blacksmith and saddler, some sources say a wagoner too, now would these specialists simply act as cavalry men and be included in a set of four when the company went into battle?
They would I expect have the rank of private but when the company was stationed in barracks they would be independent of the rank and file and fulfil their duties as there trade allows.
Usually the army likes to keep things in order and I thought that these men would be placed outside the sets of fours, similar to a standard bearer and trumpeter.
Ian.
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Post by jodak on May 3, 2015 7:19:02 GMT -6
My first observation is that animal management is a huge factor in this era. It is amusing that Rinni and Conzelman are completely blind to this. The 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry has a report that illustrates this. Started with 919 horses, and captured 43. 230 died or were abandoned as they fell out 171 were killed or captured, but really this is a lame excuse. All were abandoned. So 961 animals at the start became 560 at the end, with start being 30 Apr 64, end being 13 Sep 64. Animals need management and leadership. You can run vehicles until they run out of gas. You can run men to extreme conditions through leadership. You abuse animals, and they die. The reports I am reviewing show animal losses exceed human losses on average by 10 to 1. But ratios of 100 to one are frequent. People who do not understand cavalry operations, meaning Conzelman, Rinni and that crowd, deride and make fun of units that manage their animal assets. Crook was a master at this. Look at his leadership, and how he manned, trained and equipped his units to optimize animal assets. I know that the 7th traveled with farriers but what about vets? Was there a formula on how many vets and/or farriers per horse or unit? Also I believe there was a pattern they had to move to prevent the horses from being overworked right? The standard organization called for two farriers per company. However, since the 7th's companies were half strength, it is possible that they were also short of farriers. Even so, I would think that they would always have at least one farrier per company, so, for a company at half strength, that would still maintain a ratio of about 1 farrier per every 50 or so horses. A pretty high ratio when you think about it, especially since, in addition to true farrier duties, their responsibilities generally extended to overall horse care. As such, they were sometimes referred to as farrier/vet. Of course they didn't have the training or knowledge of a true vet, but still, they were something, and they generally had a better knowledge of horses in general than did the typical trooper or officer.
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Post by AZ Ranger on May 3, 2015 7:57:49 GMT -6
I look at the farrier as one who had a good back. I use to be able to take care of my own but prefer to spend the money rather than the time. In general the cavalry trooper depended upon his horse for transportation and taking care of your own horse seems important to me. I can imagine soring among the new pack mules but the horses had walked a long was from FAL and must have been taken care of to a reasonable degree.
When we trapped black bears in the Grahams we would occasionally sore up a horse due to the up and downs of the mountain. That horse would be taken out of service. If that was your only horse than you should do everything possible to keep from being on foot.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by fred on May 3, 2015 10:46:17 GMT -6
The standard organization called for two farriers per company. Actually, the organization called for two "farriers/blacksmiths" per company. I suppose there is a significant difference between the two. A Company— Bringes, John B Company— Moore, James F. C Company— Fitzgerald, John D Company— Charley, Vincent E Company— Spencer, Abel B. (Ken Hammer claimed he was with the packs, but Greg Michno says he was at PRD. I believe Hammer.) F Copmpany— Brandon, Benjamin (aka, Robert Nelson) G Company— Wells, Benjamin J. H Company— Marshall, John M. – At Fort Rice, sick. Presence there confirmed by June Returns. I Company— Rivers, John—Remained at PRD. Presence confirmed by June Returns. K Company— Steinker, John R. L Company— Heath, William H. M Company— Wood, William M. – At Fort Rice, D. T., on detached service. Presence confirmed by June Returns. Authorized strength, TO&E, 1876 cavalry regiment: 1 COL 1 LTC 3 MAJ 12 CPT 1 ADJ (LT) 1 QM (LT) 12 1LT 12 2LT 1 SGM 1 QMS 1 SAD SGT 1 CTMP 1 CMUS 12 1SG 60 SGT 48 CPL 24 TMP 24 FAR/BSM 12 SAD 12 WAG 648 PVT Total officers and enlisted personnel: 888 Each post—or place of “subsistence supplies” [Hammer]—was authorized 1 Commissary Sergeant. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on May 3, 2015 11:21:28 GMT -6
Fred: From that you can calculate the delta between required (full wartime) strength and authorized strength of 73% of fill. Today that would rate you a C-4 not combat capable by readiness standards. Pitiful.
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Post by fred on May 3, 2015 11:46:58 GMT -6
Fred: From that you can calculate the delta between required (full wartime) strength and authorized strength of 73% of fill. Today that would rate you a C-4 not combat capable by readiness standards. Well, here's the killer, Chuck. At one point in May 1876, the regiment was assigned 48 officers and 793 enlisted personnel. Of those numbers 15 officers and 79 EM were on some sort of TDY, some for years!!! In addition, 1 officer and 8 EM were on detached or department duty. A total of 32 officers and 706 EM departed FAL for the campaign. Then, they dropped off 1 officer (the assigned vet surgeon, so he really doesn't count... except in a siege!!!) and 124 EM at PRD, and lost an additional 6 to sickness or desertions. That means Custer started up the Rosebud with 31 officers and 576 enlisted men. You have to wonder if the expression, "ho-hum" resonated with these guys. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 3, 2015 13:06:19 GMT -6
The 7th dropped off men as they traveled, similar to a pub crawl when guys drop out as they go from pub to pub.
All this was known to Custer, it must have, each company way below average strength, then deduct men as they go, finally detaching a half a dozen or even a dozen to serve in the pack train, I don't know what the military protocol was for this type of campaign but he made dam sure they fought not only with under strength units but scattered them too, my god I don't know what was worse the reduction or the scattering, but to do them both together was nailing these men to the fence.
Ian.
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