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Post by dave on Mar 30, 2015 13:51:56 GMT -6
QC I agree that your statue will be lost in transit. The UDC and the VMI Corps of Cadets are not going to sound your praises. Jackson was the best option Lee had and he used him where needed. I do believe that Lee had concerns about Jackson after his "case of the slows" at Mechanicsville. Longstreet seemed to have a longer leash than Jackson though Lee like having Longstreet near by. As you said the ANV and the Confederacy died at Guinea Station. Regards Dave
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Post by welshofficer on Mar 30, 2015 13:52:31 GMT -6
QC,
I think you are at cross purposes with TJJ's admirers (which includes me). He was a genius, but as Lee's offensive "hammer".
Kernstown was acting on poor intelligence, the Seven Days battles a reminder of how fatigue can degrade the performance of even the best.
Even GAC's tactical shortcomings were mitigated when he was implementing tactics, not simply cut loose with tactical freedom.
WO
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Post by jodak on Mar 30, 2015 14:29:22 GMT -6
I think that the reputation of Jackson as the "offensive", fast moving corps commander and Longstreet as the defensive, slower corps commander is largely undeserved in both instances. As an example, some point to the relative progress of the two corps preliminary to 2nd Manassas as an indication that Jackson moved more rapidly. They say that the fact that Jackson arrived at the future battlefield earlier in the day than Longstreet did when following the same route two days later is proof that Jackson's "foot cavalry" moved faster. However, this fails to take into account two significant factors - 1) Jackson initiated his march early in the morning, while Longstreet did not start until early afternoon. Therefore, all things being equal, it was only natural that Jackson would arrive earlier. 2) However, all things were not equal. Jackson purposely traveled light, with minimal baggage and limited artillery, while Longstreet had to drag all of the army's accoutrements along with him, which naturally served to slow him down. Even so, he made just about as good time as did Jackson.
In another example, just previous to that during The Seven Days, Longstreet was about the only Confederate commander who consistently had his forces at the right place at the right time and launched his attacks when expected, while Jackson was lethargic and went so far as to take naps, on two occasions, when his rigor was most needed and could have possibly ended the war then and there. In Jackson's defense, he was just returned from his valley campaign and was physically and mentally exhausted, as were most of the other commanders, including Lee. The exception was Longstreet, who had experienced recent hard service himself but was able to continue to perform at a high level. He was about 6 feet tall and stoutly built, which made him quite big by the standards of the day, so here was this veritable giant of a man who was seemingly as fresh as if he had just retuned from furlough appearing everywhere and doing everything, while his contemporaries had difficulty functioning properly. While not as well known to us today as Jackson's valley exploits, that is where Longstreet first made his reputation and suitably impressed Lee. When both men were subsequently promoted to Lt. General, it was no accident that Longstreet carried a date of rank one day earlier than Jackson, so there would be no doubt as to who was the senior subordinate and 2nd in command of the army.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 30, 2015 15:31:26 GMT -6
If Jackson had not moved fast at Second Manassas, he could have never enveloped Pope and destroyed the depot at Manassas Junction. He fought no one until he got to Manassas Junction then had two minor engagements, one south of him, another north, then disappeared again. Magnificent maneuvering.
I never will fully understand why he initiated action of the 28th at Brawner's when he did not have to. I have never read of any preplanning as to date - time - place.
Longstreet took the same route as Jackson, to a point, and had to fight his way through Thoroughfare Gap.
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Post by welshofficer on Mar 30, 2015 15:31:31 GMT -6
Jodak,
Lee also preferred to keep Longstreet closer, if he could. No doubt for many of the reasons you hint at.
WO
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Post by quincannon on Mar 30, 2015 15:35:18 GMT -6
How much of your admiration of Jackson stems from a reading of Henderson Justin?
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shaw
Full Member
Posts: 187
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Post by shaw on Mar 30, 2015 15:40:20 GMT -6
To me blaming Reno and Benteen for the LBH disaster is like blaming the officer of the watch and the two sailors in the crows nest for the sinking of the Titanic. If the Titanic had struck the iceberg head on it would have stayed afloat. If the officer hadn't put the wheel hard over and the engines in reverse the ship more than likely would have had enough speed to get around the berg, but the officer followed standard procedure. The sailors in the crows nest had a moonless night and no binoculars ( that's a whole other story ). The ship met specifications including lifeboats.
When no one can imagine the disaster ahead of time, then when the mistake is made, it's a big surprise. Deconstruction of events is how we learn from black swan events. That's why we're still deconstructing the LBH a century and a half later.
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Post by welshofficer on Mar 30, 2015 15:53:34 GMT -6
To me blaming Reno and Benteen for the LBH disaster is like blaming the officer of the watch and the two sailors in the crows nest for the sinking of the Titanic. If the Titanic had struck the iceberg head on it would have stayed afloat. If the officer hadn't put the wheel hard over and the engines in reverse the ship more than likely would have had enough speed to get around the berg, but the officer followed standard procedure. The sailors in the crows nest had a moonless night and no binoculars ( that's a whole other story ). The ship met specifications including lifeboats. When no one can imagine the disaster ahead of time, then when the mistake is made, it's a big surprise. Deconstruction of events is how we learn from black swan events. That's why we're still deconstructing the LBH a century and a half later. Shaw,
Precisely. Look at the design, especially the height of the bulkheads. Look at the speed through an ice field. Look at the provision of lifeboat space and the loading density. To obsess upon and blame the OOW and lookouts would be crazy. And yet that is EXACTLY the equivalent of what many do in relation to the LBH.
A classic example on this board is one notorious poster talking about "effort". Weir charged off and nearly fed another company to the hostiles, and which would have seriously weakened what remained and was on its own until the 27th. Benteen assessed the situation. He very much "assisted" Reno. He secured the pack train and wounded. Correctly identified the best defendable location, with defilade to park the wounded, horses and mules. Led the defence, in reality. And the majority of the regiment survived to meet Terry. But apparently Weir showed "effort".
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Mar 30, 2015 15:57:41 GMT -6
How much of your admiration of Jackson stems from a reading of Henderson Justin? QC,
Not much. More discussions about Chancellorsville etc at Sandhurst and Camberley. Lee needed Jackson, when Lee was anywhere near his best.
Jackson would have secured that ridge beyond Gettysburg on 1 July. The Pennsylvania campaign would have been decided in a large battle, but the battle wouldn't have been at Gettysburg.
WO
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Post by quincannon on Mar 30, 2015 15:59:18 GMT -6
There is no "half way" like button, but if there were to be one, that would be the one I would push Shaw.
I agree with your analysis, particularly in that the Officer did the standard procedure. I am not sure though that he completely gets off my particular hook, for not accessing the situation and applying the solution that would have worked. He fell back on procedure, when he should have applied best judgment. That is an academic argument that will go nowhere with Titanic. It goes a very long distance at LBH though in that the standard was rejected vice judgment.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 30, 2015 16:12:21 GMT -6
While I never ignore Chancellorsville Justin, I think the best campaign that showed how well the ANV functioned together, together was Second Manassas post Cedar Mountain to Chantilly. I don't think any of the three were at their best, without the presence of the other two.
I agree with Jackson present the decisive engagement of the Pennsylvania Campaign would be fought elsewhere, probably between Emmitsburg and Westminster.
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Post by welshofficer on Mar 30, 2015 16:22:14 GMT -6
QC,
You have to factor in the sheer absence of time in assessing First Officer Murdoch's action. There is no certainty that the engine room even reacted to the bridge orders before the Titanic struck. With hindsight:
(1) We know that if he had just reversed and hit head on, the likelihood is that the collision bulkhead would have absorbed the impact without the keel unzipping. Titanic would have limped into North America with a crushed bow, and several hundred dead steerage passengers and crew in the accommodation near the bow. And F/O Murdoch would be looking for a new employer...
(2) Tiller hard to starboard and all engines astern was not the best collision avoidance action. The central propeller would go dead in the water and work against the rudder turn to port, because the central propeller was not connected to a reversible engine, and the wing reciprocating engines would be working against each other by both being full ahead. The quickest turn to port would have been to leave the central and starboard propellers as they were, with the rudder moved full to port (hard a starboard on the tiller), but to have simply reversed full astern the port reciprocating engine and propeller to expedite the turn to the left.
GAC had far more time on 24/25 June 1876 to make decisions than F/O Murdoch at 11.40pm on 14 April 1912 and it is better to compare GAC with Capt Smith - the hostiles always run and we always safely navigate an ice field at high speed....
WO
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Post by quincannon on Mar 30, 2015 17:12:57 GMT -6
I am soothing my soul with the Skye Boat Song at present. I shall ponder the matter in the by and by. I suppose it is a good thing I confine my naval activities to the table top.
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shaw
Full Member
Posts: 187
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Post by shaw on Mar 30, 2015 18:06:32 GMT -6
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Post by Beth on Mar 30, 2015 18:41:14 GMT -6
QC, You have to factor in the sheer absence of time in assessing First Officer Murdoch's action. There is no certainty that the engine room even reacted to the bridge orders before the Titanic struck. With hindsight: (1) We know that if he had just reversed and hit head on, the likelihood is that the collision bulkhead would have absorbed the impact without the keel unzipping. Titanic would have limped into North America with a crushed bow, and several hundred dead steerage passengers and crew in the accommodation near the bow. And F/O Murdoch would be looking for a new employer... (2) Tiller hard to starboard and all engines astern was not the best collision avoidance action. The central propeller would go dead in the water and work against the rudder turn to port, because the central propeller was not connected to a reversible engine, and the wing reciprocating engines would be working against each other by both being full ahead. The quickest turn to port would have been to leave the central and starboard propellers as they were, with the rudder moved full to port (hard a starboard on the tiller), but to have simply reversed full astern the port reciprocating engine and propeller to expedite the turn to the left. GAC had far more time on 24/25 June 1876 to make decisions than F/O Murdoch at 11.40pm on 14 April 1912 and it is better to compare GAC with Capt Smith - the hostiles always run and we always safely navigate an ice field at high speed.... WO And somewhat ironically both Smith and Custer were assigned their tasks because they were considered the most experienced available. Beth
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