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Post by Yan Taylor on Mar 29, 2015 5:30:11 GMT -6
How many officers or scouts and guides for that matter, actually warned Custer about splitting his regiment, Benteen may have said something but that may be it. They travelled along Reno creek in two columns with the pack train miles behind and Benteen over to the left, now at this point they had roughly 350 men, 350 to capture, destroy or kill everyone in this village, Custer knew this and what did he do “he split again” so now he expected Reno with a mere 140 or so to cause hell in that valley, now I find that preposterous (now that’s a big word for a Sunday morning) that he allowed this to happen, just what was he thinking and it should have been now that the officers left under his command should have made their objections, some may have but I wouldn’t bet any money on it because it looks like Keogh, Yates and Brother Tom went along with what George thought was a good idea, after this point the only person that Custer may have asked advice off was Bouyer, on how to find the top end of this village.
The difference between USA and the UK, we commend heroic defeats you don’t, as a failure is just that “you lost” but there must be something about men selling their lives dearly and fighting the good fight in the face of adversity, it certainly sells a lot of books and films.
Ian.
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Post by montrose on Mar 29, 2015 5:46:13 GMT -6
1. Strategy. Drive the Plains Indians on to reservations. Deny them the ability to survive in the Plains.
a. Destroy the buffalo. This project had been going on for years. GACs greatest contribution to the Indians Wars was his proficiency at hunting.
b. Extend the railroads to allow US penetration of Indian territory.
c. Military action as required.
2. Operations. The 1876 campaign is the operation to support the USA strategy. Two departments will launch converging attacks into enemy territory. They will engage any enemy they find. Logistics drives the selection of routes used.
3. Tactics. The battle of LBH is the tactical fight between the 7th and the Indians.
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Post by montrose on Mar 29, 2015 5:56:00 GMT -6
Ian,
GAC launched Reno to attack a tiny Indian force, with the assumption that the village was close to Ford A. He then turned away from Reno, again not knowing where the village was, or what the enemy was doing.
By the time he got to 3411, he had 2 messages from Reno and the reports of Cooke and Keough. So he knew Reno was in trouble and needed support. From 3411 he had better information of the village and enemy actions than Reno did.
Why did He not respond?
Hope is not a method. GAC was headstrong. Did he ignore all the intelligence he had because he put hope against reality? He needed the Indians to fight a certain way, and got petulant and ignorant when they did not cooperate.
Tactical incompetence. GAC's career is that of a charismatic leader. His tactical performance throughout his life was bottom 10% of his peers. He had been convicted by court martial of tactical incompetence in 1867.
I have no way of knowing why. But I am very comfortable with the what. The 7th was beaten in detail by scattering itself into 8 elements, none within supporting range of any other. Reno and Benteen played no part in this decision.
All information necessary to fight this battle was known from 3411. The decisions made after this point guaranteed defeat.
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Post by mac on Mar 29, 2015 7:15:48 GMT -6
Why is Custer not blamed? Because he is not real, he is a super hero before there were super heroes. He is the genius who was not acknowledged by West Point but then triumphed in "real life". Who doesn't like that story? The legend can't fail, only others, mere mortals, can fail him. Not just a US phenemenon I think. Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Mar 29, 2015 7:56:35 GMT -6
I am going to extend my remarks on operational and strategic failure. All I listed were contributory, but that should not be construed as meaning that any of those mentioned that any of them was the proximate cause, the but for of tactical defeat. That was Custer's alone.
All of the others, right up the chain of command could have done better jobs than they did, but none of them told Custer to do what he did, or would have condoned his actions in some instances, and lack of action in others.
Despite all of the operational and strategic shortcomings of the campaign, this battle should have had at least a moderately successful outcome, but for only one man.
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Post by welshofficer on Mar 29, 2015 8:04:39 GMT -6
QC,
Agreed - whatever was not ideal in relation to strategic or operational matters, the situation was sound on the morning of the 24th.
Crook had been knocked out, but GAC was hot on the heels of the village and Terry was ready to defend the Yellowstone to the north.
There was no inevitable tactical defeat on the 25th. That was down to a series of subsequent tactical errors by GAC.
WO
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Post by Yan Taylor on Mar 29, 2015 9:46:59 GMT -6
Thanks Wil, and great posts everyone, looking at the bigger picture makes me think that Custer didn’t even consider the option of Terry’s support, in a way he was acting independently as was Crook from Terry, both of these columns had no plan to act in tandem with each other, but Custer was not an independent unit, his regiment was under the command of Terry.
Ian.
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Post by fred on Mar 29, 2015 9:50:31 GMT -6
I think the blame of battle's failure belongs solely to Custer but the failure of the Campaign belongs to Sheridan, Sherman and Grant. I'm not sure where to put Terry. Terry was the rubber-man: everything bounced off him. He had the perfect dupe in Custer. Terry's decisions were problematic and reeked with inexperience, but again, he had buffers between himself and a failure of responsibility... and that included Gibbon and the latter's incapacitation. Terry could justify every action he took or didn't take and any failures could always be blamed on someone else or explained by someone else's failure. In other words, Terry blew the perfect storm. And... and get this... if need be, Terry could always play his ace: he was the one who chased off the Indians and saved the 7th. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Beth on Mar 29, 2015 13:06:51 GMT -6
Was the choice of Terry intentional or was it dictated by seniority system?
What could Terry have done different? Did he let Custer loose too soon? Should he have brought along Sturgis?
Should he have taken Custer out of further out of the picture by sending Custer and a small group of Indians on a scout on the other side of the river starting Northeast and then looping around to the Big Horn with plans to reunite at Big Horn while sending Reno and the rest under his orders of the 22nd?
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Post by Yan Taylor on Mar 29, 2015 13:23:41 GMT -6
Maybe Terry should have sent out Maj. Brisbin and his four Companies (F, G, H & L 2nd Cavalry ) out to do Custer’s job and locate the village, this force of about 170 all ranks could conduct a reconnaissance while keeping the 7th as the main strike fore along with Capt. Freemans Infantry Battalion.
Ian.
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Post by montrose on Mar 29, 2015 17:24:25 GMT -6
LBH was a tactical failure.
But both the operational campaign and overall strategy were a success.
The Indians were not able to gather meat in the summer to survive the coming winter. By the following summer, they were utterly routed from the Plains, except for those starving in Canada.
GAC and Terry were the junior varsity of the Army. After LBH they sent in Mackenzie and Miles, and sent Crook to operate in Terry's Department. Follow on operations chased the Indians all over the area of operations. Hunting was disrupted, villages destroyed, supplies abandoned.
The following year posts were established along the Yellowstone. This effort permanently denied this area to the Indians.
The relentless US pressure caused many of the Indians who fought at LBH to change sides and hunt down and kill their own people.
The aftermath of the campaign is often overlooked.
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Post by Beth on Mar 29, 2015 19:25:17 GMT -6
Did you realize one of the unintended aftermath is the damage done to the plains ecology by the lack of buffalo. Its seems that they were more than lumbering lap robe but instead a keystone species. The wallops were important for wetlands and the buffalo's way of grazing is totally different from cattle and their waste was essential for healthy plant growth. We try to make up for the lack of buffalo in the praire ecosystem by burning but it doesn't do the same.
Beth
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Post by dave on Mar 29, 2015 19:50:48 GMT -6
Why is Custer not blamed? Because he is not real, he is a super hero before there were super heroes. He is the genius who was not acknowledged by West Point but then triumphed in "real life". Who doesn't like that story? The legend can't fail, only others, mere mortals, can fail him. Not just a US phenemenon I think. Cheers Mac After 4 years of war Americans paid little attention to the Army and its members rather focusing on the reconstruction of the South. Custer was elevated to the status of demi-god by the army and American public during the War, then forgotten for a decade. How could GAC lose against the unorganized aborigional forces with the greatest calvary force on the earth at his command? It had to be the treachery, ineptitude of his subordinates, lack of support from politicians and the paucity of numbers. It could not be Custer's fault, the flawed American Hero. As R E Lee was made into a marble man, so was Custer of the truth. Lee had the Southern Historical Society and Custer had Libbie. Just like Lee, no one questioned the Custer legend until well into the 20th century and by then the myth was set in concrete. Just one man's thoughts. Regards Dave
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Post by Beth on Mar 29, 2015 20:48:43 GMT -6
One of the things I wonder is did the Custer myth make its way through all aspects of society or was the military rather vague about what they thought. I was just looking at the West Point Cemetery online and was struck by the modesty of Custer's marker (relative to the time)/ Also it seems that the one statue of him that was installed disappeared and was never seen again. I suspect perhaps it made its way across the river to the foundry. Evidently Libbie didn't like it because the artist wasn't important enough. She must have been waiting for Daanile Chester French to do it. Statue
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Post by welshofficer on Mar 30, 2015 2:09:49 GMT -6
Why is Custer not blamed? Because he is not real, he is a super hero before there were super heroes. He is the genius who was not acknowledged by West Point but then triumphed in "real life". Who doesn't like that story? The legend can't fail, only others, mere mortals, can fail him. Not just a US phenemenon I think. Cheers Mac After 4 years of war Americans paid little attention to the Army and its members rather focusing on the reconstruction of the South. Custer was elevated to the status of demi-god by the army and American public during the War, then forgotten for a decade. How could GAC lose against the unorganized aborigional forces with the greatest calvary force on the earth at his command? It had to be the treachery, ineptitude of his subordinates, lack of support from politicians and the paucity of numbers. It could not be Custer's fault, the flawed American Hero. As R E Lee was made into a marble man, so was Custer of the truth. Lee had the Southern Historical Society and Custer had Libbie. Just like Lee, no one questioned the Custer legend until well into the 20th century and by then the myth was set in concrete. Just one man's thoughts. Regards Dave Dave,
A bit harsh comparing Lee and Custer?!
Who tactically bettered Lee on Virginian soil? Nobody. Grant operationally ground him down, at considerable blood cost to the Army of the Potomac.
WO
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