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Post by welshofficer on Mar 30, 2015 2:13:16 GMT -6
LBH was a tactical failure. But both the operational campaign and overall strategy was a success. The Indians were not able to gather meat in the summer to survive the coming winter. By the following summer, they were utterly routed from the Plains, except for those starving in Canada. GAC and Terry were the junior varsity of the Army. After LBH they sent in Mackenzie and Miles, and sent Crook to operate in Terry's Department. Follow on operations chased the Indians all over the area of opeartions. Hunting was disrupted, villages destroyed, supplies abandoned. The following year posts were established along the Yellowstone. This effort permanently denied this area to the Indians. The relentless US pressure caused many of the Indians who fought at LBH to change sides and hunt down and kill their own people. The aftermath of the campaign is often overlooked. Will,
You're on fire on this thread! A series of succinct yet comprehensive posts.
I agree with all of that, just adding that the operational campaign would have been quicker/cheaper without the LBH tactical failure. Albeit maybe not as thorough with the personnel in place until the LBH. I am a huge fan of MacKenzie, and what he accomplished down in the Texas panhandle.
WO
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Post by tubman13 on Mar 30, 2015 4:49:25 GMT -6
WO,
Montrose, has been on his game, not only on this thread, on the "What if" thread as well. He has been hitting dinger after dinger(what we called homeruns, back in the day), not bad for a guy under the weather.
This thread has been good, flow wise, as well. Sorry not adding substance, just listening.
Regards, Tom
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Post by welshofficer on Mar 30, 2015 5:07:33 GMT -6
Maybe Terry should have sent out Maj. Brisbin and his four Companies (F, G, H & L 2nd Cavalry ) out to do Custer’s job and locate the village, this force of about 170 all ranks could conduct a reconnaissance while keeping the 7th as the main strike fore along with Capt. Freemans Infantry Battalion. Ian. Ian,
The split between the 12 companies of the 7th Cavalry and the 9/10 companies of the 2nd Cavalry/7th Infantry was logical.
Maj Brisbin would have had neither the strength to drive the hostiles north or to prevent them moving south. In fact, his battalion would have been extremely vulnerable to being wiped out in isolation whilst unsupported.
As there was no co-operation between Platte and Dakota Depts of the Missouri Div, it was logical to try and put a stronger fast moving mobile strike force to the south of the hostiles and then that column drive the hostiles northwards towards the Yellowstone and a slower moving blocking force. What we had on the 25th was the mobile strike force trying to do both jobs alone, but also only committing 8 companies to attacking and 3 companies to assaulting.
WO
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Post by Yan Taylor on Mar 30, 2015 5:31:48 GMT -6
Thanks Justin,
The column commanded by Gibbon was by far the weakest out of the three, it left Fort Ellis with; Four companies 2nd cavalry (F, G, H & L) Six companies 7th Infantry Three Gatling Guns
In all around 377 including gun detachment, this was the closest column to Terry, did these two ever communicate with each other once the descended towards the Big Horn River?
As you know the 2nd cavalry were split into two with nine companies in total taking the field, the same thing happened to the 3rd cavalry with ten in the field, so in reality this campaign was not only mounted with understrength companies of cavalry but also another five companies were missing from the formations and were probably in service elsewhere which is really a mean way of mounting a campaign.
Ian.
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Post by welshofficer on Mar 30, 2015 6:01:28 GMT -6
Thanks Justin, The column commanded by Gibbon was by far the weakest out of the three, it left Fort Ellis with; Four companies 2nd cavalry (F, G, H & L) Six companies 7th Infantry Three Gatling Guns In all around 377 including gun detachment, this was the closest column to Terry, did these two ever communicate with each other once the descended towards the Big Horn River? As you know the 2nd cavalry were split into two with nine companies in total taking the field, the same thing happened to the 3rd cavalry with ten in the field, so in reality this campaign was not only mounted with understrength companies of cavalry but also another five companies were missing from the formations and were probably in service elsewhere which is really a mean way of mounting a campaign. Ian. Ian,
The downside to Terry accompanying Gibbon's 9 companies (I recollect one of the infantry companies was left behind to guard the forward supply depot on the Yellowstone - Fred will no doubt correct me if I am wrong!) instead of the 7th Cavalry was that GAC was "cut loose". I have often wondered whether GAC declined those 4 companies of 2nd cavalry for fear that Terry would ride with and command such 16 companies of cavalry.
WO
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Post by jodak on Mar 30, 2015 8:33:57 GMT -6
GAC and Terry were the junior varsity of the Army. After LBH they sent in Mackenzie and Miles ... Just as an interesting bit of trivia - Custer and MacKenzie were actually sequential graduates of the USMA. Custer was graduate #1966, ranking last in the class of 1861(2), while MacKenzie was #1967, ranking 1st in the class of 1862.
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Post by fred on Mar 30, 2015 8:53:28 GMT -6
Was the choice of Terry intentional or was it dictated by seniority system? What could Terry have done different? Terry was the department commander and when they axed Custer as the column commander, Terry was instructed to lead the Dakota column. Custer pleaded to be allowed to command the regiment-- otherwise, Reno would have been the choice. Terry should have made Custer's orders more definitive and in my opinion, by wording the orders as he did, Terry cut Custer just enough rope to hang himself with. If things worked out, fine; if not, Custer was there to hang. Apparently-- and according to Darling's research-- Terry liked and admired GAC, though he often grew weary of the antics. (And there were a lot along the way.) This was the lawyer in Terry and because of it, he fended off any criticism coming his way. I always blame Custer for not paying attention to his scouts; Terry was worse. By relying on guys like Taylor, Prevo, and Bostwick, rather than his Crow scouts, Terry's hubris cost him an entire day... and quite possibly, a piece of the action. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by dave on Mar 30, 2015 9:04:56 GMT -6
WO
I did not mean to compare Lee and Custer as to abilities but rather point out that they had both became larger than life because myth replaced fact. Mac had questioned why Custer was not held responsible ? Lee's apologists blamed everyone and everything under the sun and moon to account for the loss of Gettysburg. Was it not the same after LBH for Custer? Perhaps it was a poorly written post but I did have a thought amongst it some where. Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Mar 30, 2015 9:17:51 GMT -6
Dave: I understood your point and you are correct. Comparing Lee and Custer, by performance was not the issue.
Lee was surrounded by post war myth, and primarily by Jubal Early. He was the Mrs. Custer of the Lee adoration society.
I don't believe anyone can deny that Lee was a superb general officer, but I also don't believe anyone would expect him to have not made operational and tactical mistakes as well. He did. He made several, but so did everyone else. The myth builders though elevated him to the point of a perfect operational and tactical god, and that god like status remained until well into the last century when some very bright people started say - wait a minute
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Post by jodak on Mar 30, 2015 10:48:49 GMT -6
There is also the element of Custer, Lee, etc. serving as surrogates for the larger organizations as a whole. For example, take Custer out of it for a moment and think only in terms of a component of the U.S. Army being defeated and embarrassed by a bunch of mere savages (as the reasoning went). Obviously (again as the reasoning went), that wasn't possible in the absence of someone seriously dropping the ball, thus the search for scapegoats begins. Similarly, the Army of Northern Virginia, representing the flower of southern manhood, could not be defeated by degenerate Yankees unless someone there also dropped the ball; a bunch of raggedy ass Japs could not have inflicted the damage that they did at Pearl Harbor in the absence of some sort of conspiracy to let it happen; and on and on.
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Post by welshofficer on Mar 30, 2015 11:40:58 GMT -6
You just have to recognise the limitations of Lee; not so effective on enemy soil, failure to grasp the growth of defence against frontal assault sine the 1840s, and over reliance on corps commanders (particularly TJJ). Otherwise, a superb commander. Unlike GAC.
WO
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Post by Yan Taylor on Mar 30, 2015 11:54:01 GMT -6
Would you say that Lee’s direct style was similar to Haig in the way that he drove his troops forward in those frontal assaults, I know that he was a better general then that as he showed at Chancellorsville but was he aided by better corps commanders, his two main officers at that level was Jackson and Longstreet, but were they better than the Union commanders in McClellan, Burnside and Hooker?
Ian.
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Post by welshofficer on Mar 30, 2015 12:01:17 GMT -6
Ian,
I think Lee simply failed at times to grasp the increase in defensive firepower. For example, Pickett's charge may have been doable in 1847. It was a tall order by 1863. Lee was certainly at his best when TJJ was his offensive corps commander, and the Confederates clearly had for the most part superior military leaders in the opening 2 years of the ACW.
Jodak,
I would say that West point pretty accurately assessed Custer and MacKenzie....
WO
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Post by dave on Mar 30, 2015 12:52:37 GMT -6
Would you say that Lee’s direct style was similar to Haig in the way that he drove his troops forward in those frontal assaults, I know that he was a better general then that as he showed at Chancellorsville but was he aided by better corps commanders, his two main officers at that level was Jackson and Longstreet, but were they better than the Union commanders in McClellan, Burnside and Hooker? Ian. Ian McClellan was an excellent leader of men as long as it did not include battle. He was able to reorganize, reequip, train and establish good order but he lacked to the ability to act or react quickly he could not make a decision. He would have been a very good war gamer. Burnside was a decent honorable man who was in over his head and he knew it. He was told to attack and he did regardless of the situation or position of the army. Hooker was a pretender and prima donna who did well when taking orders from McClellan. His braggadocio behavior got his army badly beaten at Chancellorsville and in poor ship when Meade took over. The Union had a remarkable line up of younger and extremely capable and competent leaders ready to emerge at Gettysburg and to the end of the War. The South do to their instance that general officers be seen leading into combat was hemorrhaging its best and finest leaders and soon depleted the supply. The promotion of AP Hill and Ewell demonstrated how costly was the loss of Jackson to Lee. Ian I hope I answered your question but if not please let me know. Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Mar 30, 2015 13:17:50 GMT -6
He also placed an over-reliance on artillery preparation, on those occasions where fall of shot could not be observed.
I do not share the popular opinion of the genius of Jackson. The only real measure of his ability to operate was in the Valley of Virginia, and there he was opposed by scrubs and bench warmers, yet still he stumbled at least once at Kernstown. He really screwed up at Mechanicsville, his last opportunity, before being completely under the control of Lee. He pulled one out of his butt at Cedar Mountain, coming very close to having the snot beaten out of him by another bench warmer.
I think Longstreet may have done just as well in the opening phases of Second Manassas. I just don't think Longstreet would have moved quite as fast. He suffered from extremely poor situational awareness at Chantilly/Ox Hill. He was nearly broken, by another scrub at Hamilton's Crossing. Chancellorsville, was Lee's master stroke, not Jackson's, Jackson only the screwdriver in Lee's tool box.
The lesson to be drawn I believe, is that the ANV was the ANV of history because of the teamwork, and close association of the three, Lee, Longstreet, and Jackson, where one was not a standout, without the other two. That Army died at Guinea Station.
I probably just blew my chances of having my monument erected on Confederate Avenue in Richmond. Oh well.
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