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Post by quincannon on Mar 30, 2015 18:48:40 GMT -6
When you come right down to it, the Gettysburg Campaign was ill advised and premature.
I can appreciate wanting to get conflict out of Northern Virginia. On the other hand when Tom buys a new riding mower, I would suspect he mows the grass closest to his shed, to test that mowers operational capacity and to see if the blades are sharp before he ventures too far down range only to find out that the mower does not live up to its advertised reputation. Cross over and move eastward toward Frederick and bring the AoP to battle there to test the sharpness of the blade may have been a better option. If you lose you slip back across the Potomac. If you win, you just might destroy them before they can get past Rockville and Gaithersburg and into the Washington defenses.
My father used to say that the Gettysburg thing was just a large raid. As I grew more mature in my military studies, a day or so before retirement I think, I used words of rebuttal along the order of ---- My dear father, one does not conduct a raid with three army corps.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 30, 2015 20:44:02 GMT -6
Regarding the LBH, as has been said many times before: it didn't matter if Indians won or lost battles with the Army because they lost the 'wars' and their land just by fighting them. Aside from Custer and others being alive, what big difference to the Sioux and Cheyenne would a Custer victory have meant to them after a year? Either way, they had to split up and keep on the run. And, it didn't matter overall to the Army, either. Beyond embarrassment, they weren't going to cower in St. Louis, win or lose. The campaign was a success despite itself.
Regarding the Titanic, the blame is entirely on Captain Smith, who could legally have shot, hung, married anybody aboard. He ignored warnings and hummed into an ice field accurately stated to be before him. He was olde school and may have resented being channeled by people far away just as so many in the RN resented it. It was a big cultural change to take orders from someone not present in the world's navies, and it took a long time to pat things into shape. Many seem to think it hasn't happened yet.
Lee said Gettysburg was all his fault, by some accounts, and hard to argue. His artillery was not very good, his cavalry divided and partially exhausted, he put Longstreet in charge of an attack Longstreet thought stupid (it was), and so over an open field into the center of the AOP exhausted rebels ran uphill and got smashed. Well, except for those cowering in the road who never charged whatever. The Union had reserves out the ying yang and they all fought well. Possibly because they had food, supplies, plenty of horses and medical people that didn't kill too many Union soldiers and allowed the women volunteers to save lives and comfort the dying.
Jackson could get his guys to move, but 'genius' seems wrong. He did, after all, waste money assembling Richmond warehouses of pikes for his men to use and carry about. Spears. And somewhat like the later issue, so long as the Feds fought and didn't collapse if a battle was lost, they'd win the war. Sorta/kinda like Hannibal in Italy or Napoleon in Russia, Lee had to take DC or they'd lose. You can wander up and down Italy winning odd battles till you lost just one, and then it was over. The Union got stronger and richer every day and were far better organized. The guy Grant covered in praise was their quartermaster who had everything color coded and was so organized the AOP had too much artillery for Grant to use, and it was put in storage. The Southern States did not get along and would not share and they all fell victim to a religious revival fully as idiotic as the later Ghost Dance, complete with clothing that was bullet proof if blessed, etc.
It's why I admire England. For - what? - 1500 years it has been the repository of western civilization just by existing and not surrendering. Even when it was in the hands of reactionary drunks and incompetent inbreds, the shared sense of 'England' and what it was and had endured and accomplished was something no continental power could look to. Shakespeare and all helped in the presentation and the ability Tuchman remarked upon to gloss idiocy and disaster with nobility and beauty. It's amusing, annoying, and impressive as hell. It's a tiny nation and it ruled the world's economy till the US elbowed them aside, but much what we are, they are. Same books.
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shaw
Full Member
Posts: 187
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Post by shaw on Mar 30, 2015 22:39:45 GMT -6
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Post by Beth on Mar 31, 2015 0:21:24 GMT -6
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Post by welshofficer on Mar 31, 2015 1:19:15 GMT -6
Regarding the LBH, as has been said many times before: it didn't matter if Indians won or lost battles with the Army because they lost the 'wars' and their land just by fighting them. Aside from Custer and others being alive, what big difference to the Sioux and Cheyenne would a Custer victory have meant to them after a year? Either way, they had to split up and keep on the run. And, it didn't matter overall to the Army, either. Beyond embarrassment, they weren't going to cower in St. Louis, win or lose. The campaign was a success despite itself. Regarding the Titanic, the blame is entirely on Captain Smith, who could legally have shot, hung, married anybody aboard. He ignored warnings and hummed into an ice field accurately stated to be before him. He was olde school and may have resented being channeled by people far away just as so many in the RN resented it. It was a big cultural change to take orders from someone not present in the world's navies, and it took a long time to pat things into shape. Many seem to think it hasn't happened yet. Lee said Gettysburg was all his fault, by some accounts, and hard to argue. His artillery was not very good, his cavalry divided and partially exhausted, he put Longstreet in charge of an attack Longstreet thought stupid (it was), and so over an open field into the center of the AOP exhausted rebels ran uphill and got smashed. Well, except for those cowering in the road who never charged whatever. The Union had reserves out the ying yang and they all fought well. Possibly because they had food, supplies, plenty of horses and medical people that didn't kill too many Union soldiers and allowed the women volunteers to save lives and comfort the dying. Jackson could get his guys to move, but 'genius' seems wrong. He did, after all, waste money assembling Richmond warehouses of pikes for his men to use and carry about. Spears. And somewhat like the later issue, so long as the Feds fought and didn't collapse if a battle was lost, they'd win the war. Sorta/kinda like Hannibal in Italy or Napoleon in Russia, Lee had to take DC or they'd lose. You can wander up and down Italy winning odd battles till you lost just one, and then it was over. The Union got stronger and richer every day and were far better organized. The guy Grant covered in praise was their quartermaster who had everything color coded and was so organized the AOP had too much artillery for Grant to use, and it was put in storage. The Southern States did not get along and would not share and they all fell victim to a religious revival fully as idiotic as the later Ghost Dance, complete with clothing that was bullet proof if blessed, etc. It's why I admire England. For - what? - 1500 years it has been the repository of western civilization just by existing and not surrendering. Even when it was in the hands of reactionary drunks and incompetent inbreds, the shared sense of 'England' and what it was and had endured and accomplished was something no continental power could look to. Shakespeare and all helped in the presentation and the ability Tuchman remarked upon to gloss idiocy and disaster with nobility and beauty. It's amusing, annoying, and impressive as hell. It's a tiny nation and it ruled the world's economy till the US elbowed them aside, but much what we are, they are. Same books. DC,
(1) Yes, but it did matter to several hundred men and their families. Big time. Needless slaughter.
(2) I am not having a go at you for blaming Custer (Smith), and it is far better than to blame Reno/Benteen (Murdoch/the other Crow's Nest lookouts), but step back and see the wood for the trees. What about the height of the bulkheads? The quality of the rivets? How many ice warnings actually made it from Marconi to the bridge? How far away was Smith's boss (Bruce Ismay) and who was the one in a hurry to get to New York? I would say he was present. Still doesn't excuse that speed through an ice field, even if it was standard practice on some of the ocean liners. But yes, ultimately Smith was responsible for the Titanic just as Custer was responsible for the 7th.
(3) Yes, Lee and the North Carolina pickets that shot Jackson at Chancellorsville.
(4) You try commanding some of Jackson's manoeuvres. That takes genius, perhaps even mad genius. Not sure Lee had to take Washington. There were several instances where the ANV/AOP could have exchanged capitals. The South had to rout the AoP and, as you say, quickly. The logistics/manpower clock was ticking against them and the Pennsylvania campaign was their last chance. Take your pick whether the Confederacy died at the Guinea Station or on Cemetery Ridge. Grant was coming at Lee in 1864, and he was coming without respite no matter the number of tactical bloody noses.
WO
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Post by Yan Taylor on Mar 31, 2015 4:36:40 GMT -6
At the start of the ACW, were the tactics used based along European lines? Europe’s main nations in Britain, France, Prussia, Austria and Russia had commanders who had fought many battles and campaigns not only on the European mainland but all over the world.
I would have thought that much of thought process in training any officers in the military academies in the USA would be primary based on French tactics, with a few British ones too. But since the whole sorry affair from the 1770s and the minor skirmish in 1814 (sorry about that) the USA Army only clashed with the Mexicans (who were probably based on French military doctrine too) and Indians, so when both forces first met on a field of battle in say Williamsburg, would both sets of commanders have been trained along similar lines at similar academies by the similar tutors?
Some things could be said about national characteristics and each of the big European nations did have different styles of fighting. So in reality both armies were still finding their feet on how to fight such a large scale battle and probably the same could be said of McClellan and Longstreet.
So I will throw out a question to you more accomplished AWC chaps, did the standard of leadership improve as the war progressed?
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 31, 2015 6:18:03 GMT -6
Leadership Ian is doing the right thing. Management is doing things right.
Generally speaking the caliber of leadership and management was higher in the military of the Southern Confederacy at the outset of the war and declined. That is very generally speaking. The ANV for instance reached its high water mark at Fredericksburg, or better still from August 62 to May 63. The leadership/management loss during that period though was astounding.
Lee made a huge mistake reorganizing from a two to a three corps structure after Chancellorsville, and then blundered again by first not trying it out close to home rather than a hundred miles inside hostile territory, as I attempted to point out with the Tom's riding mower vignette. He promoted two excellent division commanders to corps commanders. One, Hill, held his own but did not have the qualities of Jackson. The other, Ewell, was a spent and broken man. Moreover the ANV was always an army whose staff work, essential to any organization was sub par, and the reorganization made it worse by spreading the butter all too thin.
After Chancellorsville, you see a marked decline in leadership and management and it just got worse.
The Union Army started off pretty bad, but they just kept getting better and better. All the real losers were gone by the spring of 63, and after that they were on a rapid ascendancy.
Even some of those Union officers who were generally thought of as early day losers had value. McClellan for instance was a first class leader and manager. Her organized the Army of the Potomac, just don't let him take it anywhere near a battlefield. Contrary to popular opinion you do need people like that. Burnside was a steady reliable man at lower levels, just don't give him an army to command. Same with Hooker, He was good a brigade and division, OK at corps, but got too big a case of "I'm the Man" chest thumping when you gave him an Army.
There were several Union guys killed during 62 that may have made a mark in 63 and thereafter had they lived, Kearney, Stevens and Reno were three that come to mind, and tens of several at regiment and brigade, Daniel Webster's son for instance.
There was no better example of this ascendance of leadership and management in the Union Army than Joshua Chamberlain.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Mar 31, 2015 6:51:14 GMT -6
Hi Chuck, after reading your post I see Divisional commanders, Corps commander and Army commanders, but before the start of the ACW, just how many had led anything larger than a Division on a battlefield, so for Lee to change from binary to Triangular must have placed his commanders in a role which would be unfamiliar with, so I suppose the simplest way to broach this would be to train a man on the job so to speak, and that’s why Lee had to promote Divisional commanders and hope they could fill their boots, the problem with this is that we are dealing with men’s lives here, so get it wrong and you have to live with the consequences.
I just checked up on Joshua Chamberlain and he seemed like a man of honour, which is fine by me.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 31, 2015 7:10:19 GMT -6
They to a man knew diddly squat about commanding anything above a company in most cases, and that is on both sides.
Lee reorganized because he realized the limitation of Hill and Ewell. In the two corps system one corps had five divisions, the other four. Under the new system each had three. Longstreet was the only man he had that had proven his ability to command the larger corps organization. The problem was that Lee did not have another man who was the equal of Longstreet or the lost Jackson. The only guy I think who could have come close was Stuart who handled Jackson's corps quite well at Chancellorsville, but he was much too junior.
I think the best course, given the junior status of Stuart was to give Jackson's Corps to Hill, keep a close eye on him, and retain status quo.
As a sidebar. Jackson and Hill were like oil and water. It was sort of a multi-stared version of Custer and Benteen. Upon Jackson's wounding though some of Jackson's first words were "Tell General Hill". Not liking a man, and not respecting him professionally are two different things.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Mar 31, 2015 7:24:37 GMT -6
Chuck you have hit the nail on the head, commanding company or even battalion would be the limit of most of these officers as the US Army had no real purpose to field anything as large as a regiment since 1848 or even 1776, so it is incredible for such large units such as corps or armies to be fielded by these men as experience like in any job comes with getting your hands dirty.
But war calls for extremities and you use what you have got, the Russians had the same problem after Stalin knocked off all of his most experienced officers during the purges.
Ian.
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Post by jodak on Mar 31, 2015 7:34:47 GMT -6
Except for Winfield Scott, none had commanded anything larger than a regiment and few anything larger than a company. As Richard Ewell was to later say, "I knew everything about commanding a company but nothing about commanding a division". There were a few exceptions in those who had held pre-war assignments of significant responsibility, such as Joe Johnston and Albert Sydney Johnston in the south and Phil Kearney in the north, but, for the most it was on the job training. That encompassed much more than the common perception of how to command a unit of whatever size in battle, and included all of the administrative minutia of caring for the well being of the troops and such things as how and when to fill out the proper requisitions, reports, etc. All of that necessitated a good deal of learning and adaptation, and some naturally learned and adapted more readily than others, making them better initially but with the others maybe catching up later. Others were simply too junior to have much impact early on, but, as time went on and attrition occurred above them, they moved into positions of increasing responsibility and played roles of increasing importance. One person that readily comes to mind in this regard is Winfield Hancock, who began the war in relative obscurity, but, by the end, had justifiably earned his nickname of Hancock the Superb. On the flip side, much of the attrition and replacement by juniors resulted in definite deterioration in quality, and, as was alluded to above, that was particularly pronounced in the south.
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Post by jodak on Mar 31, 2015 7:58:30 GMT -6
They to a man knew diddly squat about commanding anything above a company in most cases, and that is on both sides. Lee reorganized because he realized the limitation of Hill and Ewell. In the two corps system one corps had five divisions, the other four. Under the new system each had three. Longstreet was the only man he had that had proven his ability to command the larger corps organization. The problem was that Lee did not have another man who was the equal of Longstreet or the lost Jackson. The only guy I think who could have come close was Stuart who handled Jackson's corps quite well at Chancellorsville, but he was much too junior. I think the best course, given the junior status of Stuart was to give Jackson's Corps to Hill, keep a close eye on him, and retain status quo. As a sidebar. Jackson and Hill were like oil and water. It was sort of a multi-stared version of Custer and Benteen. Upon Jackson's wounding though some of Jackson's first words were "Tell General Hill". Not liking a man, and not respecting him professionally are two different things. I once read a paper (wish I could find it now) entitled simply "The Wrong Hill", that argued that D.H. Hill would have been a better candidate than A.P. for command of 3rd Corps, However, by that time, Lee and D.H. had had a falling out and D.H. was no longer with the ANV. Both A.P. and Ewell may have made fine corps commanders under other circumstances, but both had been largely used up by the time of their appointments. Hill was sickly and Ewell had been seriously wounded, loosing a leg. There was some discussion yesterday about Jackson's notoriety stemming from the Valley Campaign, but much of that was actually Hill's doing. Jackson was more properly the commander of the Valley "Department", rather than the army there in, and much of the actually military operations were under Hill's direction. Also, as a bit of trivia, most people probably assume that Lee was the one that placed Stuart in command of Jackson's corps subsequent to Jackson's wounding, but it was actually Hill. Upon Jackson being wounded, Hill succeeded to command but was shortly thereafter wounded himself. Knowing that Stuart was nearby, he sent for him and instructed him to take command of the corps. This despite the fact the Stuart was a cavalry officer not within the corps command hierarchy and would have had no claim to command it in the absence of Hill's action. For this Hill probably deserves a good deal of credit for "thinking outside the box" and making a significant (and likely unpopular) command decision.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 31, 2015 7:59:56 GMT -6
Very important points Jodak.
At higher levels administration, or lack of good thereof, can get you into a lot more trouble than being somewhat deficient tactically. Little things like poor supply discipline, bad field sanitation, diet, maintenance, and poor staff work, all add up and loses more battles than a poor tactical array.
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Post by jodak on Mar 31, 2015 8:54:11 GMT -6
There was no better example of this ascendance of leadership and management in the Union Army than Joshua Chamberlain. My personal favorite in this regard is Francis Barlow.
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Post by dave on Mar 31, 2015 10:14:41 GMT -6
As I under go this rite of passage, disagreeing with DC, I will keep my head up and accept my lumps.
DC said
The Southern States did not get along and would not share and they all fell victim to a religious revival fully as idiotic as the later Ghost Dance, complete with clothing that was bullet proof if blessed, etc.
The Great Revival took place from the Fall of 1863 to the Spring of 1864 and was experienced by both Union and Confederate troops in the West and the East. It is estimated that over 100,000 Confederates and between 100,00 to 200,00 Federals were baptized and accepted Christ.
I have not heard of clothing being blessed but I am protestant and that might be a practice of the Catholic Church. However, the Great Revival or the Great Harvest as is was also called can not be compared to the Ghost Dance of the indians.
Belief in God is an indivdual decision and should not be open to ridicule by a non believer.
Regards
Dave
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