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Post by quincannon on Mar 31, 2015 10:41:59 GMT -6
Jodak: Another great example.
Dave: Ignore him. He is as usual blowing smoke out his ass.
Catholics bless a lot of things, but bullet proof clothing is NOT in their bag of tricks, I assure you as a member of that church for a goodly number of years. He alternates Tuchman with Daffy Duck comics.
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Post by dave on Mar 31, 2015 11:53:44 GMT -6
There was no better example of this ascendance of leadership and management in the Union Army than Joshua Chamberlain. My personal favorite in this regard is Francis Barlow.
I would like to recommend John "Black Jack Logan to this Pantheon of Heroes. He had a pretty good career after the War as well. Fortunately our country has had men like them since 1776 to this day. Regards Dave
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Post by dave on Mar 31, 2015 13:26:38 GMT -6
Regarding Gettysburg, someone I don't remember (Shelby Foote?) said Gettysburg was the cost of having R E Lee. Some problems were Lee's supply lines were stretched, defective artillery shells, lack of Jeb Stuart, poor staff work and poor execution of orders by subordinates. He did not have the high ground and was forced to attack or retreat. Confederate units were miss handled and poorly used. An example would be the 26th North Carolina. They fought on July 1 against the Iron Brigade, primarily the 24th Michigan, and suffered 588 casualties out of 800 present for duty. A casualty rate of almost 75 percent. Yet 2 days later they took part in Pickett's charge with 212 present for duty and lost 120 men in the charge. This is just one example of the poor work by Lee's staff. AP Hill had other units that had been in action and yet they were ignored. Lee's hubris got the best of him in Pennsylvania that summer of 1863. Regards Dave
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Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 31, 2015 13:35:28 GMT -6
As Lee said at war's end, God had decided. Ladies auxiliaries were knitting away and getting garments blessed for the wearer's protection. The North and South revivals were not the same, primarily because after Vicksburg and Gettysburg the South was losing big time and they had the desperation the North lacked. www.acton.org/pub/religion-liberty/volume-21-number-3/great-harvest-revival-confederate-army-during-civi The big feast Stuart and Pickett were at near the end featured the blessed garments, I've read, and also elsewhere. It's the "magic shirt" in butternut or grey or whatever. Of course, it did not work, but only because the wearer did not truly believe, or some such ethical scam. It's perfectly fine to make fun of religion, and I have, do, and will. I also credit it when it's due. During the Winter War with Finland, the Soviet soldiers walked forward hand in hand to be shot, to the Fin's amazement, as communism was a religion as much as the Orthodox Church had been to them. Scientology just took it in the gut by HBO last Sunday, and the Catholic Church, as evidenced by the billions it's shelled out in recent years, has to be considered an international criminal organization then and perhaps now. Not a few Catholics, and big name Catholics, have so said. The squalid Protestant scandals of money and sex are as frequent as ever, and even the Orthodox Jews and Muslims are under the gun for misogyny, rape, slavery, and disgusting habits producing fatal disease involving foreskin removal. All this is in the civilized west, and no need to underline the horrors in Africa and elsewhere. Just like with their racism and polygamy issues, the Mormons recently have been sent word from on high regarding equality for gays and conveniently and rewriting their beliefs. Who knows? Maybe God's Law really is based on economic impact. If there is any evidence that believers are better people than those who do not believe, it's not clear to me. Conversely, not believing doesn't make someone better, either.
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Post by welshofficer on Mar 31, 2015 13:40:50 GMT -6
Dave,
There are criticisms of Lee over the Pennsylvania campaign, but that is too harsh.
(1) You could see his logic in getting the fighting off Virginian soil, and additionally sending supplies southwards.
(2) He had to spread his army, if he was to bait Hooker into Pennsylvania.
(3) The delay with the Stuart raid left Lee without warning of the Northern approach, and no other ANV cavalry took up the reconnaissance slack. So the ANV did not close up in time, and only then due to a Longstreet spy.
(4) In particular Robertson and Jones did not fulfil that task, because they were guarding the mountain gaps for the military supply trains heading north and (just as importantly) the non-military supply trains heading south.
(5) Despite the above, cemetery ridge should have been seized on 1 July. Few doubt that Jackson would have attended to that, if he remained alive and in command of his corp.
The key issue is that the North's senior officers got better, whilst the South was struggling for senior officers from 1863 (too many casualties from their earlier lead from the front attitude, and some misused by Davis/state governors). Also don't forget the damage the ANV could still do to the AoP, even in 1864.
WO
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Post by dave on Mar 31, 2015 14:36:46 GMT -6
DC
Thank you for the web site. I am not attempting to defend any religion or the grievous actions taken in God's name by man. Neither did I contend that people who believe are better than others. God is a big Boy and can handle all arguments and questions. I simply do not believe those who participated in the Great Revival were idiotic fools. They were content in their decisions to believe or not and that is a gift. Regards Dave
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Post by montrose on Mar 31, 2015 14:55:12 GMT -6
This thread is starting to wander. Recommend we move ACW discussions to the ACW section of the boards. And religious discussions to the Around the Campfire area.
I see feelings are going to be hurt soon.
For religion, many true believers give their own, even in causes we may regard as bad. The fanaticism of Islam fighters has to be seen to be believed. There are serious discussions about redesigning our small arms for faster kills. Too many times enemies with 5-6 M4 rounds in them keep on fighting.
Remember the development of the .45 cal pistol? It was to address muslim fanatics in the Philippines 100 years ago. Kinda crazy that my grandfather fought there and a hundred years later I am fighting the same people.
But I am not fighting to expand Catholicism. I am fighting for a system of right or wrong, a rule of law that encompasses all religions. (Maybe not Scientology, a fake religion of criminals).
I just foresee a moment when we may want to draw a collective breath, and relax a little.
Fred, What is the status of your book sales?
W
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Post by dave on Mar 31, 2015 14:56:59 GMT -6
Dave, There are criticisms of Lee over the Pennsylvania campaign, but that is too harsh. (1) You could see his logic in getting the fighting off Virginian soil, and additionally sending supplies southwards. (2) He had to spread his army, if he was to bait Hooker into Pennsylvania. (3) The delay with the Stuart raid left Lee without warning of the Northern approach, and no other ANV cavalry took up the reconnaissance slack. So the ANV did not close up in time, and only then due to a Longstreet spy. (4) In particular Robertson and Jones did not fulfil that task, because they were guarding the mountain gaps for the military supply trains heading north and (just as importantly) the non-military supply trains heading south. (5) Despite the above, cemetery ridge should have been seized on 1 July. Few doubt that Jackson would have attended to that, if he remained alive and in command of his corp. The key issue is that the North's senior officers got better, whilst the South was struggling for senior officers from 1863 (too many casualties from their earlier lead from the front attitude, and some misused by Davis/state governors). Also don't forget the damage the ANV could still do to the AoP, even in 1864. WO WO (1) I am not being harsh on Lee nor trying to question his reasons for the invasion. Northern Virginia was devoid of sufficient materials to supply the ANV and Lee had to go north. (2) I know that Lincoln would require Hooker to shadow Lee and remain between him and DC and Baltimore. Lincoln was one of the few who realized Lee's army was the goal and not Richmond. (3) Stuart got carried away and attempted to do too much and circle the AOP and failed Lee in providing intelligence on the Union forces locations. (4) Lee missed Stuart the man. He had cavalry but did not have his trusted lieutenant Stuart who he trusted and admired. Robertson and Jones were unknowns and not trusted. (5) Cemetery ridge was the key to the town and the 5 crossroads. Hooker/Meade would have had no choice but to fall back into Maryland to the Pipe Creek Line. Lee attempted the impossible with Pickett's charge and that was the price the South paid for having Lee. I agree that the ANV was a dangerous adversary well into 1864. The simply bleed out while Grant had untapped resources available. Regards Dave
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Post by welshofficer on Mar 31, 2015 16:51:18 GMT -6
Dave,
Hooker did not have to chase Lee to protect Washington. Lee allowed Stuart on a 3 day raid, not an 8 day raid. The only real cavalry left were Robertson and Jones (forget Jenkins and Imboden), and they weren't watching the river for Hooker's crossing. The ANV did not have time to properly close up, when Longstreet's spy finally sounded the alert.
Now let's get this thread back on track! No more ACW!
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Mar 31, 2015 16:51:46 GMT -6
1. Strategy. Drive the Plains Indians on to reservations. Deny them the ability to survive in the Plains. a. Destroy the buffalo. This project had been going on for years. GACs greatest contribution to the Indians Wars was his proficiency at hunting. b. Extend the railroads to allow US penetration of Indian territory. c. Military action as required. 2. Operations. The 1876 campaign is the operation to support the USA strategy. Two departments will launch converging attacks into enemy territory. They will engage any enemy they find. Logistics drives the selection of routes used. 3. Tactics. The battle of LBH is the tactical fight between the 7th and the Indians.
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Post by welshofficer on Mar 31, 2015 16:52:19 GMT -6
LBH was a tactical failure. But both the operational campaign and overall strategy were a success. The Indians were not able to gather meat in the summer to survive the coming winter. By the following summer, they were utterly routed from the Plains, except for those starving in Canada. GAC and Terry were the junior varsity of the Army. After LBH they sent in Mackenzie and Miles, and sent Crook to operate in Terry's Department. Follow on operations chased the Indians all over the area of operations. Hunting was disrupted, villages destroyed, supplies abandoned. The following year posts were established along the Yellowstone. This effort permanently denied this area to the Indians. The relentless US pressure caused many of the Indians who fought at LBH to change sides and hunt down and kill their own people. The aftermath of the campaign is often overlooked.
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Post by welshofficer on Mar 31, 2015 16:54:35 GMT -6
Ian, GAC launched Reno to attack a tiny Indian force, with the assumption that the village was close to Ford A. He then turned away from Reno, again not knowing where the village was, or what the enemy was doing. By the time he got to 3411, he had 2 messages from Reno and the reports of Cooke and Keough. So he knew Reno was in trouble and needed support. From 3411 he had better information of the village and enemy actions than Reno did. Why did He not respond? Hope is not a method. GAC was headstrong. Did he ignore all the intelligence he had because he put hope against reality? He needed the Indians to fight a certain way, and got petulant and ignorant when they did not cooperate. Tactical incompetence. GAC's career is that of a charismatic leader. His tactical performance throughout his life was bottom 10% of his peers. He had been convicted by court martial of tactical incompetence in 1867. I have no way of knowing why. But I am very comfortable with the what. The 7th was beaten in detail by scattering itself into 8 elements, none within supporting range of any other. Reno and Benteen played no part in this decision. All information necessary to fight this battle was known from 3411. The decisions made after this point guaranteed defeat.
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Post by welshofficer on Mar 31, 2015 16:55:58 GMT -6
Okay maybe it's because it's the wee hours of a Saturday night but I am drawing a blank but what you mean between strategic, operations and tactical. Who does what? Beth,
Strategy, Operations, Tactical
Broadly think of the strategy as "manifest destiny", the operation as the Centennial Campaign, and the tactics as what happened in the LBH valley.
WO
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Post by tubman13 on Mar 31, 2015 16:59:22 GMT -6
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Post by welshofficer on Mar 31, 2015 17:39:11 GMT -6
Let's take a look at the "chain of command", with Sturgis, Tilford and Merrill absent/detached:
Grant (Strategy) Sherman (implementing Strategy) Sheridan (Operations) Terry (localised Operations and overall Tactics) GAC (localised Tactics, 22-25 June, as CO 7th Cav) Reno (2IC to GAC, battalion commander) Benteen (3IC, battalion commander) Keogh (4IC, battalion commander) Yates (5IC, battalion commander) TWC - where did he de facto rank in practice as GAC's ADC...?
It is difficult for anybody to exonerate GAC completely, although a few try, given the tactical developments from crossing the divide to LSH.
But it is fascinating, especially from east of the pond, observing where a sizeable minority of Americans try and pin much of the blame. And especially upon Reno and Benteen.
The British mind set would inevitably focus upon how GAC got himself in a position whereby he needed "rescuing" in the first place, or how a regimental commander died as a de facto company commander on LSH. Just as the British Inquiry on the Titanic disaster focussed on the design flaws and navigational errors that triggered the sinking of the "unsinkable" (absurd, anything that floats can sink) ship.
There seem to be many in America that focus on why GAC wasn't "rescued". Just as the US Inquiry on the Titanic focussed on the absence of sufficient lifeboat capacity. So far, so good. That's just a different emphasis between different cultures.
But beyond that, there is an irrational minority west of the pond obsessed with the notion that Benteen should have taken his 3 companies (and a pack train!) and rescued the 5 companies that were butchered pretty quickly without any such rescue. It's not as if there was a hard fought battle on the eastern bluffs, with the outcome in doubt until the end. The GAC wing was overwhelmed, and pretty quickly so. There is no logical explanation for this behaviour.
What is it in the American psyche that causes such irrational behaviour from a minority about GAC, seeking to find subordinates to blame for basically a military fiasco that can only be brought about by the tactical commander on the day...?
WO
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