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Post by Beth on Mar 31, 2015 18:35:07 GMT -6
Let's take a look at the "chain of command", with Sturgis, Tilford and Merrill absent/detached:
Grant (Strategy) Sherman (implementing Strategy) Sheridan (Operations) Terry (localised Operations and overall Tactics) GAC (localised Tactics, 22-25 June, as CO 7th Cav) Reno (2IC to GAC, battalion commander) Benteen (3IC, battalion commander) Keogh (4IC, battalion commander) Yates (5IC, battalion commander) TWC - where did he de facto rank in practice as GAC's ADC...?
It is difficult for anybody to exonerate GAC completely, although a few try, given the tactical developments from crossing the divide to LSH.
But it is fascinating, especially from east of the pond, observing where a sizeable minority of Americans try and pin much of the blame. And especially upon Reno and Benteen.
The British mind set would inevitably focus upon how GAC got himself in a position whereby he needed "rescuing" in the first place, or how a regimental commander died as a de facto company commander on LSH. Just as the British Inquiry on the Titanic disaster focussed on the design flaws and navigational errors that triggered the sinking of the "unsinkable" (absurd, anything that floats can sink) ship.
There seem to be many in America that focus on why GAC wasn't "rescued". Just as the US Inquiry on the Titanic focussed on the absence of sufficient lifeboat capacity. So far, so good. That's just a different emphasis between different cultures.
But beyond that, there is an irrational minority west of the pond obsessed with the notion that Benteen should have taken his 3 companies (and a pack train!) and rescued the 5 companies that were butchered pretty quickly without any such rescue. It's not as if there was a hard fought battle on the eastern bluffs, with the outcome in doubt until the end. The GAC wing was overwhelmed, and pretty quickly so. There is no logical explanation for this behaviour.
What is it in the American psyche that causes such irrational behaviour from a minority about GAC, seeking to find subordinates to blame for basically a military fiasco that can only be brought about by the tactical commander on the day...?
WO Is it just the American psyche? I've read somewhere that the French are insisting that they should win at least one battle during the reenactments that will be happening at Waterloo in June. Back to Little Bighorn and people fly against all logic to place the blame. The world will always be filled with tin foil hatted conspiracy theorists who always know better over anyone else and feel that you are just 'drinking the kool aid' when you disagree with them. If Custer himself appeared as a ghostly specter with Tom on his right and Cooke on his left singing Benteen and Reno's praises, there would still be people who wouldn’t believe it. They would probably claim that Reno was too drunk and Benteen dawdled in order to miss the spectral event. Beth
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Post by welshofficer on Mar 31, 2015 20:45:40 GMT -6
Beth,
It's just so bizarre. Responsibility for a tactical defeat, a thrashing, rests with the tactical commander. One GAC....
WO
P.s. some French have never got over the 7 years war!
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Post by quincannon on Mar 31, 2015 21:34:35 GMT -6
I was once told by someone familiar to all here, that he spent years constructing his model of what happened , which itself is completely dysfunctional, trying to fit in all the pieces I suppose, regardless of whether they fit or not, for the only other alternative (to this persons model) was Custer was deaf, dumb, and blind.
The simple answer is that Custer was deaf, dumb, and blind.
You cannot make rational arguments with irrational people.
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Post by Beth on Apr 1, 2015 2:18:27 GMT -6
I was once told by someone familiar to all here, that he spent years constructing his model of what happened , which itself is completely dysfunctional, trying to fit in all the pieces I suppose, regardless of whether they fit or not, for the only other alternative (to this persons model) was Custer was deaf, dumb, and blind. The simple answer is that Custer was deaf, dumb, and blind. You cannot make rational arguments with irrational people. I have to agree, Custer was deaf, dumb, and blind that day. Beth
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 1, 2015 4:33:57 GMT -6
You must admit that when he saw what he was up against on 3411 (I know he could not see the whole of the village but he could see that it was big), then he must have placed a lot of faith in the notion that the Indians would run, again any thoughts that Reno was only facing a small blocking must have also crossed his mind, so his next move would be made with those thoughts in situ and the message to Benteen was to make sure he had enough men to capture and kill everyone in the valley, similar to fox in a hen house, he can see that there is too many chickens for him to kill and some may escape but hey I am going to give it my best shot.
Ian.
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Post by mac on Apr 1, 2015 5:28:33 GMT -6
I was once told by someone familiar to all here, that he spent years constructing his model of what happened , which itself is completely dysfunctional, trying to fit in all the pieces I suppose, regardless of whether they fit or not, for the only other alternative (to this persons model) was Custer was deaf, dumb, and blind. The simple answer is that Custer was deaf, dumb, and blind. You cannot make rational arguments with irrational people.[/font] Very true! We are all more irrational than we like to admit. What people always need is what is often called "take up time", a period to reflect and a space to retreat from argument and find the rational truth. We may begin with an irrational "opinion" based point of view but I believe given time and education many can eventually begin to think logically. Both these things are necessary, education but also time. Cheers
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Post by mac on Apr 1, 2015 5:38:02 GMT -6
he must have placed a lot of faith in the notion that the Indians would run, again any thoughts that Reno was only facing a small blocking must have also crossed his mind, so his next move would be made with those thoughts in mind and the message to Benteen was to make sure he had enough men to capture and kill everyone in the valley, similar to fox in a hen house, he can see that there is too many chickens for him to kill and some may escape but hey I going to give it best shot. Ian. I agree he must believe they will run and perhaps the Ford B excursion is to see how many are running and where. To go there without Benteen suggests to me he thought he could do it with what he had and Benteen was just an extra who would be useful. Seeing the size of the village and believing any of that is amazingly dismissive of the capabilities of that many warriors. Seeing that village also begs the question "how could he expect Reno to cope?" The only answer must be Indians always run I guess. Cheers
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 1, 2015 5:55:43 GMT -6
Hi Mac, again the terrain would play a big feature, Custer was fairly well isolated from any support from Benteen and as the note said bring packs, which should rule him out of any trek over the bluffs, so the only other option for support would be through the valley, so if Custer did expect a major thrust with a combined attack by both Benteen and Reno then his thoughts may have been to get behind them as he expected the whole village to run north straight into his hands.
Ian.
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Post by tubman13 on Apr 1, 2015 6:40:04 GMT -6
You must admit that when he saw what he was up against on 3411 (I know he could not see the whole of the village but he could see that it was big), then he must have placed a lot of faith in the notion that the Indians would run, again any thoughts that Reno was only facing a small blocking must have also crossed his mind, so his next move would be made with those thoughts in situ and the message to Benteen was to make sure he had enough men to capture and kill everyone in the valley, similar to fox in a hen house, he can see that there is too many chickens for him to kill and some may escape but hey I am going to give it my best shot. Ian. Ian, with all due respect to you and the assorted officers here, all of which who would have been my superior in any military situation. There is only one conclusion this E-7 would have drawn from what he saw at 3411. Reno is going to need support, sooner rather than later, I am not going to extend my distance from support. In fact I am going to return and get into the fight while demanding Benteen and MacDougall, join me post haste. I order them to leave minimal, guard with the train, having that train lay up in the safest location available. They are also to bring forward additional ammunition. I am not sending a gofer to convey my message, I am sending either a junior officer or senior E-M, along with at least two more enlisted. I want to be sure this message gets through and conveyed correctly.
If there is going to be scattering of the NA's it will be north or some variation of north. I have a good number of scouts and we will follow up harass. If not I am going to get more than one pound of flesh, right here right now. I now know for sure I did not scout/plan this right, I am going to correct that right now. I am going to return to that valley in the fastest, most direct way I can. My trumpets will sound, the NA's will know I am coming. They may second guess their plans for Reno. Benteen and MacDougal will bring additional weight. I will block the south to the best of my ability.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 1, 2015 7:01:15 GMT -6
Hi Tom, but from 3411 would his most fastest and direct way be down MTC?
He could have thought the same as you just did, and expecting everyone else to come charging up that valley, so hitting from another direction would sound inviting, which brings me to the point of his arrival on the ridges over looking ford B, did the size of the village plus no sign of any break though up the valley cause him to pause?
Ian.
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Post by Colt45 on Apr 1, 2015 7:12:20 GMT -6
You must admit that when he saw what he was up against on 3411 (I know he could not see the whole of the village but he could see that it was big), then he must have placed a lot of faith in the notion that the Indians would run, again any thoughts that Reno was only facing a small blocking must have also crossed his mind, so his next move would be made with those thoughts in situ and the message to Benteen was to make sure he had enough men to capture and kill everyone in the valley, similar to fox in a hen house, he can see that there is too many chickens for him to kill and some may escape but hey I am going to give it my best shot. Ian. Ian, with all due respect to you and the assorted officers here, all of which who would have been my superior in any military situation. There is only one conclusion this E-7 would have drawn from what he saw at 3411. Reno is going to need support, sooner rather than later, I am not going to extend my distance from support. In fact I am going to return and get into the fight while demanding Benteen and MacDougall, join me post haste. I order them to leave minimal, guard with the train, having that train lay up in the safest location available. They are also to bring forward additional ammunition. I am not sending a gofer to convey my message, I am sending either a junior officer or senior E-M, along with at least two more enlisted. I want to be sure this message gets through and conveyed correctly.
If there is going to be scattering of the NA's it will be north or some variation of north. I have a good number of scouts and we will follow up harass. If not I am going to get more than one pound of flesh, right here right now. I now know for sure I did not scout/plan this right, I am going to correct that right now. I am going to return to that valley in the fastest, most direct way I can. My trumpets will sound, the NA's will know I am coming. They may second guess their plans for Reno. Benteen and MacDougal will bring additional weight. I will block the south to the best of my ability.
Regards, Tom
You are right on the money, Tom. If I saw from 3411 what Custer saw, I would make the same decisions you laid out above. No way would I proceed north, exaggerating an already-bad decision. Best to correct the mistake before it gets any larger. Don't think Custer's ego would allow that, though.
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Post by tubman13 on Apr 1, 2015 7:26:02 GMT -6
Hi Tom, but from 3411 would his most fastest and direct way be down MTC? He could have thought the same as you just did, and expecting everyone else to come charging up that valley, so hitting from another direction would sound inviting, which brings me to the point of his arrival on the ridges over looking ford B, did the size of the village plus no sign of any break though up the valley cause him to pause? Ian. Ian, You have as good a grasp of maps as I do, heck HR showed what he says was a ford nearer to Reno Hill just last week. I don't know that it even exists. What I do know is I am a lot closer to Reno and action here than at MTC. I don't know the terrain ahead, I do know what I have already traversed. If they want to fight rather than run it will be as close to now as I can make it. Reno is already in the fray and I am late. Colt's follow up post is truly to my point.
Regards, Tom
R
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 1, 2015 8:09:48 GMT -6
I agree with both of you lads, but he did continue north, we know that the best thing from a military point of view is to join up with Reno in the valley, but he didn't so rather than ponder over what he should have done, I asked why he did what he did and go even further away from support, Fred reckons that he saw Reno in no real trouble from 3411 and I suppose seeing this and sending for the rest of the regiment would give him no reason not to move on, but for the life of me I cant get why he would think that he had enough men and then get caught piecemeal.
Ian.
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Post by tubman13 on Apr 1, 2015 8:25:43 GMT -6
Agreed Ian, no accounting for his moves away from support. Continually distancing and dividing. Why did he do what he did? Not sure, been to battlefield and never saw the yellow brick road or the wizard.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Colt45 on Apr 1, 2015 9:02:06 GMT -6
Ian, that is the 64,000 dollar question. Why did he do what he did? We will never know why. We can guess, surmise, deduce, but only GAC knew why he did what he did, given the facts before him and what he could see at the time. Fred's analysis of what he probably saw from 3411 is most likely the best answer for what led him to the northward decision, but we still will never really know.
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