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Post by wild on Jan 2, 2014 19:42:44 GMT -6
At the Rosebud it was the Crookes Indians who saved the command from a worse mauling. I don't think regimental tactics are suitable for a brawl.You take a mob to fight a mob.
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Post by benteen on Jan 2, 2014 20:13:13 GMT -6
OK Dan: You made your statement. Now you tell us all just how that attack was to be conducted. Fine detail will do just fine. Then you back it up with evidence, and what Don Horn and DC says is not evidence. It is nothing more than what you just expressed - opinion. You just hung your ass out, now convince me that Custer would attack with two companies and not his whole available force when he had never before in his life had done so. You are trying once again to have it both ways. You have stated many, many times before why would anyone take only two companies to attack Ford D. Well why would anyone take two companies to attack Ford B. You asked it about one but state it happened at the other. A little bit inconsistent don't you think, seeing that Keogh was a mile or so away when Custer was a B? This may sound brutal. I suppose it is. Brutal but not personal. For once in your life on this board, examine the facts on your own. Do not accept the opinion du jour. Think for yourself. If you run across something that seems to stink it probable does. One of those things you are likely to come upon that stinks is when military units do something outside the norm. The norm is normal, because they are a doctrinally based organization. Wearing pink pants with a dress blue jacket is beyond the norm of a Marine, so your next question is why the Marine was wearing pink pants. You inquire of all available sources, to find out why the Marine was wearing pink pants, and the only thing you come up with is Don Horn and Dark Cloud said he was wearing pink pants so it must be so . RUBBISH. DC is one of the smartest men I will ever know. He trumps me in nearly every field of endeavor and he can play the guitar, which really pisses me off because I can't. Don Horn I do not know, but I have heard of him and all has been good. But for the love of the Good Lord above neither of them were there, so are you going to believe what they say, when it may be contrary to what your lying eyes are seeing? If that is how you move from one posters opinion to that of another, how do you ever keep track of what you thought yesterday? Why are you trying to portray that I am saying or intimating in any way that what Don Horn or any one else says is fact or evidence. I said They Believe this is what happened. That means it is their opinion. Do you honestly believe that I am that stupid. There is no one on earth after June 25th 1876 that knows what Custer said or did any one that did is dead. As far as changing my opinion about attacking with 2 companies I have not changed my mind in the least, if Custer was going to attack at Ford D he would do it with his whole battalion. You say Keogh was a mile away when Custer was at Ford B. How do you know Custer was even at Ford B or Keogh was a mile away. Look what I presented was a thought, the thought was that all these theories about Custer doing this and that was against what the man did his whole career, and I think it is a opinion that deserves credit. I didn't say I put all my chips in on it. I have my own theory which I have posted a few times Be Well Dan PS... I am going to watch Alabama vs Oklahoma. See you at half time
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Post by Gatewood on Jan 2, 2014 20:31:15 GMT -6
At the Rosebud it was the Crookes Indians who saved the command from a worse mauling. I don't think regimental tactics are suitable for a brawl.You take a mob to fight a mob. Wild, I'm going to have to disagree with you here, beginning with the premise that Crook was "mauled". He lost the battle 'tactically' in the sense that the Indians caused him to delay and regroup, but they far from mauled him, and he won the battle in all other respects. You are correct that the actions of his Indian scouts had an important hand in that, in that they precluded him from being surprised in march order, but, once engaged, I think that he did a very good job of conducting the battle - changing focus, redeploying troops, etc. It seems that he doesn't normally get credit for that and most, like you, seem to portray the battle as a devastating defeat for the army, but I just don't see it that way.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 2, 2014 20:32:37 GMT -6
What makes me think this? THIS
"When Reno's attack gave him a window I believe he went to Ford B to do just that, Attack, which he had done his entire career"
You said that an hour ago and I take you at your word - You think he was going to attack. As for two companies it is well established by both testimony and evidence that two companies approached Ford B, one Company E nearer than the other one. The identity of the other one has not been firmly established I think, most believe it to be F and I agree, but E Company was by the color of their horses. Meanwhile there is ample evidence and testimony to support Keogh with at least two companies and most likely three a mile away and to the rear at that very time on the N-C-L Ridge complex dukeing it out with Wolf Tooth at range, and possibly taking a few very long range shots at hostiles on the Bluff south of Weir Point. There is no direct evidence that Custer was at Ford B, but in your, and Horn's scenario how was he shot if he was not there. All this is based upon the tale that a leader was shot at B. Gatewood had been quite correct in his statement, and I paraphrase = The Indians would not know Custer from a bulls ass. Nor would care. He was just another soldier on a horse. I would love to know how many Indians claimed they personally shot Custer? It is all after battle bullshit and chest puffing, and we take it as absolute truth? Do we?
No I don't think you are stupid. I think that you don't think for yourself and accept as gospel the opinions of others because somehow you don't feel yourself qualified to apply analytical methodology to this battle. You are just as qualified as anyone else. More qualified by experience than most here USE IT.
When you tell me you can play the guitar then I will be pissed at you. Not before.
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Post by wild on Jan 2, 2014 21:22:54 GMT -6
Hi Gatewood Perhaps" mauled" was a too strong.Thinking more of his pride than anything else. I would describe the result of the battle as a check for Crook.Significant enough in that he did nor pursue the Indians with the knockon effect of the defeat at the LBH. I think anything other than a full regimental charge into the village is useless.And I.m beginning to think Custer positioned himself so as to rout fugitives crossing the river running from Reno's attack. Cheers
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Post by benteen on Jan 2, 2014 21:26:37 GMT -6
What makes me think this? THIS "When Reno's attack gave him a window I believe he went to Ford B to do just that, Attack, which he had done his entire career" You said that an hour ago and I take you at your word - You think he was going to attack. As for two companies it is well established by both testimony and evidence that two companies approached Ford B, one Company E nearer than the other one. The identity of the other one has not been firmly established I think, most believe it to be F and I agree, but E Company was by the color of their horses. Meanwhile there is ample evidence and testimony to support Keogh with at least two companies and most likely three a mile away and to the rear at that very time on the N-C-L Ridge complex dukeing it out with Wolf Tooth at range, and possibly taking a few very long range shots at hostiles on the Bluff south of Weir Point. There is no direct evidence that Custer was at Ford B, but in your, and Horn's scenario how was he shot if he was not there. All this is based upon the tale that a leader was shot at B. Gatewood had been quite correct in his statement, and I paraphrase = The Indians would not know Custer from a bulls ass. Nor would care. He was just another soldier on a horse. I would love to know how many Indians claimed they personally shot Custer? It is all after battle bullshit and chest puffing, and we take it as absolute truth? Do we? No I don't think you are stupid. I think that you don't think for yourself and accept as gospel the opinions of others because somehow you don't feel yourself qualified to apply analytical methodology to this battle. You are just as qualified as anyone else. More qualified by experience than most here USE IT. When you tell me you can play the guitar then I will be pissed at you. Not before. Chuck, With due respect, I am watching a football game, a darn good one in that Oklahoma was a huge underdog and is actually winning at half time by two touchdowns. Unfortunatly I have been watching the game with MR Rossi and Mr Daniels and I don't want to respond at this this time, as my response may look foolish. But I will give you the courtesy of a response tomorrow at some time. Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on Jan 3, 2014 0:36:22 GMT -6
OK Dan, that is fair enough. Before you answer though I want you to do me a favor. I want you to lay Fred's scenario out on paper. Then I want you to lay DC's scenario out. If you have Horn's or that of anyone else, do the same.
Now I want you to remove from them any mention of motivation, of command breakdown, in fact any other factor other than maneuver. Then draw it out on a map. You will see that Fred's and DC's differ only in two areas. One of lesser importance to the story Ford B vs. DC"s first contact further up Medicine Tail Coulee. The remarkable difference between the two, the significant one, the only one that really matters as to outcome is a difference of about five hundred yards from where each say the battle turned and movement turned to hasty defense. A difference in opinion of five hundred yards separates these two men. Other than that they agree completely on outcomes and the quick disintegration of Custer's command. Those are undisputed facts. They differ in only 500 yards difference in the point where disintegration commenced. Everything else the Custer wounding or non wounding, official vs. non official chains of command, cross dressers, Ford B, Ford D, who struck John and how hard, becomes totally immaterial. These two men have applied their intellect to fathom the why, and the important is the where.
Now I am going to go you one better and say this which will probably bring fire and brimstone around my ears. I can give you four scenarios for what played out based only upon approximate body location finds and nothing else.
The first is Fred's scenario and it needs no further explanation here as it is so well known. It contains proper tactical reasoning. It accounts for most if not all of the known evidence. It fits with Custer's personality, and his known past battlefield performance. Plausible - Yes. Possible - Yes. Probable on a scale of 1 to 10 an 8
The second is the Harper (I think that is the name) theory, which if I am correct because he was before my time, suggests that the Custer portion of the battle started in the north and proceeded south, and that the "last stand" was in reality Keogh's Last Stand occurring in the environs of the swale. To be plausible there would also have to be simultaneous pressure coming from Ford B to vicinity of Calhoun Hill. I find this to be the second most plausible scenario based upon approximate body placement alone. Plausible -Yes. Possible - Yes. Probable on a scale of 1 to 10 a 7 1/2
The third, a close third is DC's complete scenario minus a Custer wounded which I think of as being completely immaterial. Custer is divided into two parallel columns one slightly to the rear of the other. He makes sudden contact in, say the middle of MTC between Cedar and the ford with two of his companies. Those two companies break to the right front and move onto battle ridge. Another company moves down off of L-N-C to occupy F-F Ridge to cover the first two so that those two companies probably E and F can get their sheets together. Keogh is blindsided by events, he tries to react but in the absence of further intent and orders comes up onto southern battle ridge deploys L, moves further with I to counter another threat. Meanwhile E and F keep going and are stopped cold somewhere in the Cemetery Ridge-Battle Ridge Area. The rest you know. Plausible - Yes Possible - Yes Probable on a scale of 1 to 10 a 7
The final one is what I call the Bell theory based upon an after battle report of Captain Bell. Contact is first made much closer to Ford B than DC has it, but not as close to the ford as Fred puts them. The five companies are under positive control and form a line on a axis F-F Ridge (refusing what becomes the right flank of the force to address those coming across the river) to Calhoun Hill. As pressure builds tactical disintegration starts to take hold and at least two companies of the force are overwhelmed, a third soon follows suit, and two companies manage to extract themselves only to find themselves confronted by another very powerful band of hostiles, the late arrivals, who show in sufficient time to run these two companies to ground in the LSH-Cemetery Ridge environs Finis. Plausible - Yes. Possible - Yes. Probable on a scale of 1 to 10 a solid 7
In doing this over the course of the last year I did exactly what I suggested Dan do. I ignored testimony. I ignored artifact finds. I concentrated only on known, undisputed movement and the approximate body locations as expressed by marker locations, knowing full well they are approximations and not in any way totally accurate. So what you see is a differential in probability on my personal scale of probabilities (again keep in mind the data used) ONE POINT probability differential between all four scenarios
I think you now see why the various narratives , the locked in concrete positioning , the posturing, the my way or the highways, all have little meaning to ne. Do I have my favorite? You bet I do, and it is well known that it is Fred's and for reasons that are so similar that a very thin piece of tissue paper would have a hard time being wedged between us. Plus I know what is in his frigging book, and that revelation will shed such new light that these discussions will not be necessary to those that read what he said and the documentation behind it. Then maybe it will be so boring around here that I would welcome the Moltke vs. Sheridan, but hopefully not purple backsides and arrows in places arrows should never be.
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Post by wild on Jan 3, 2014 3:56:44 GMT -6
The first is Fred's scenario and it needs no further explanation here as it is so well known. It contains proper tactical reasoning. It accounts for most if not all of the known evidence. It fits with Custer's personality, and his known past battlefield performance. Plausible - Yes. Possible - Yes. Probable on a scale of 1 to 10 an 8 But you have posted that it was a stupid undertaking.One can only wonder how you reconcile proper tactical reasoning with stupidity? In advocating the ford D scenario the absence of the scenario's overriding factor [the reason it failed] in your description calls into doubt your probability rating for the scenario.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 3, 2014 4:28:48 GMT -6
Chuck, may I add my own scenario, I know that this is rich coming from a guy who has never visited the battle site and has never served but here goes;
Now I reckon that the command separated when they entered MTC, this could have happened at the point where Cedar meets MTC or midway down, the reason for the separation could be down to the fact that Custer didn’t want to take a long strung out command down one avenue of attack, plus this was also a dangerous place and it makes sense not wanting to leave his whole force ripe for ambush. Now I recall asking AZ for info on whether or not you could get to Luce Ridge from MTC, and I am sure he said that you could so I will take a punt and say that this is what they did, because I don’t think that the whole command simply rode down to the very end of MTC and then divided with one element riding nearly a mile up to the high ground to the east and another moving a couple of hundred yards to the ford.
And going back to the Officer shot near the ford, we don’t know why Lt. Smith was not with his Company, if E Company was given the role of lead element on any advance to the river then Smith would have been out in front, and given that nearly 28 or so of his men were found near Deep Ravine and he was found on LSH could also mean that he was hit.
So we now have three Companies stationed on Nye-Cartwright ridge and another two by the ford, so any attack now seems pointless to me because there is no way that Keogh could support any attack, the only thing he could do was to cover its backside and maybe help it extract its self if it got into real difficulty, which going by the amount of markers found around the ford seems unlikely.
DC is a Banjo Frailer (or maybe clawhammer), I am a Guitar player.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 3, 2014 8:59:59 GMT -6
I am pissed at you both then for if it is not the guitar in my music dreams it is the banjo, followed closely by the fiddle so I am pissed at Anna Sophie Mutter as well.
Regardless of which scenario is chosen the obvious formation to me as you are coming closer to possible enemy locations is to split after leaving Cedar into two battalion columns, both for ease of control and mutually assured flank protection. That would place one column following the axis L-N-C Ridge and the second west of it probably hugging the foot of those ridges in the MTC itself. Custer was a chancy guy. People get all upset about Ford D, but when you look at what he did at Ford B it was the same thing. Keogh was in contact with Wolf Tooth, and when George went to B, he had no idea that some of Wolf Tooth friends, lots of them were not going to show up on Keogh's doorstep while he was gone. Wolf Tooth had shown up out of nowhere why not several hundred or a thousand more. In those terms B was every bit as risky as D.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jan 3, 2014 9:27:51 GMT -6
Just want to be clear. While appreciative of 'my' theory ranking at all and the kind way it is elevated to consideration, it has to be said it isn't really my theory at all, but rather the near initial impression of the battle by Benteen and others. I have some opinions not widely popular that may be mine, but they're not that exciting.
What bothers me, though, is I get nervous when it's said I've applied a shred of specificity. I think I find comfort with such terms as "somewhere in there" this or that likely happened. The reason is specificity is something recalled, assailed, and has to be defended, and rather pointlessly to my mind. We cannot obtain specificity at this point, we CAN construct a likely scenario within parameters. What I FEEL is momentum and a Custer on the move trying to sustain his orders to Reno and to apply cavalry to the situation. "Waiting", further dividing not only in the face of but under fire of the enemy I cannot ascribe to him. Imagine Custer - or most officers - hearing the fire of his men in the valley and deciding to wait or dawdle till Benteen arrived - with the packs!? - and then proceed.
Soldiers do not like to admit/imagine that things like an ACTUAL chain of command, as opposed to the official, would exist in any manner. I think the nepotism speaks for itself: it was to assist Custer at need. Further, TWC was a good officer and soldier and DID know bro's mind and correctly anticipated as events that day showed. It's not so much he had nudged Cooke aside, though he did, as Reno, the assumed second in command and shouldabeen consultee on these matters. Reno was treated like another Captain, Cooke as a scribe and runner.
This stuff was not unheard of and nobody balked, not even Benteen. It worked, this was a regiment so greatly reduced in size and in such environment that what worked, worked, and good. The hysteria to provide a solid military and specifically cavalry explanation for what happened after they left MTC makes small sense ("When in the face of a superior enemy erroneously attacked by an amusingly small portion of your own forces, further divide your remaining men, assign the largest group to move furthest away out of contact, and pointless taunt and direct the enemy to an undefendable position unlikely to be accessible by supporting units which are important to keep uninformed, clueless as to your intent, yet be encouraged to proceed vaguely in your direction in column on high ground surrounded by enemy in cover....") and is so easily explained by a wounded Custer, not ceding command, and the command trying at first just to get some calm to figure out his condition and not be allowed to do so, and Keogh probably never clear on what's happening but covering the move north till all five groups faced the end, which was quick and brutal.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 3, 2014 9:48:08 GMT -6
Everyone bases "their" theory on the impressions of others. That would have to be for none of us were there. The Bell theory is based upon the impression, actually the words of a private, for Bell was not there either. I don't have the exact words at hand but the private who was in the south with Reno/Benteen, reported that his friend's (a member of Bell's company), body was discovered a mile away from the "main battle", and the description mirrored the LSH area. That leaves us with where this private thought the main battle to have been fought and the inescapable conclusion is the Calhoun - FF Ridge area.
I don't get particularly upset with an unofficial chain of command. It's unusual, but Custer being Custer I suspect there is a very high probability that it did exist and I would give it at least a 9 on a scale of 10. The reason I dismiss Custer being wounded is that it is irrelevant to the narrative. These same things could have well taken place without it. It has nothing to do with my opinion of the wounded officer stories.
DC: What I tried to do was use a methodology that is directly opposed to Fred's to see if the same results were valid in his scenario. He took every bit of information available and pieced it together like a jigsaw puzzle. I took only two things, Known (not conjectural) movement plus the assumption that the markers were in the general area of battle incidents. I did his first, then when it worked I decided to test the other three known to me using the same methods. No one was more shocked at the outcomes than I. All four are very close on the probability scale. In addition each one of them answers at least one question to my satisfaction that the others gloss over.
As to your specificity. I remember questioning you once as to where first contact was made (Custer wounded) and you stated further back from the ford in the coulee. I said OK lets make it halfway back, All that was is splitting the difference. The other was you on a similar occasion mentioning the grouping of officers on LSH and mentioning that it looked to you as this is where they were stopped. Custer always in the front and all that jazz. Fred shifts from movement to defense 500 yards away on the far slope of Cemetery Ridge. He says they were driven back to LSH. You say there was no driving to be done, they were already pinned.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 3, 2014 10:23:40 GMT -6
If the whole Battalion was driven up over Battle Ridge and hitting a hail of lead on the crest of LSH, then that would mean that E Company was deflected to the left and ended up down near Deep Ravine, because that’s where most of them were found.
And if three Companies were dropped off at different intervals in an attempt to slow down this surge of warriors then these men would be virtually sacrificing themselves to allow Custer, the HQ and Yates Troops to escape.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 3, 2014 10:29:00 GMT -6
That is exactly what it means Ian, and I assume you are referring here to the DC/Benteen and Others Theory. I think it is consistent. The head of the column is hit. Yates and F probably leading, the trailing company deploys to what is then the left. That is just how I gamed it out
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 3, 2014 10:33:30 GMT -6
Yes Chuck I am referring to that theory, if this was the case then that could mean that E Company was the last of the five to go down and die as a unit.
Ian.
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